LAMPS Working Group                                         H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft                                             D. von Oheimb
Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved)                          Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track                        22 February 2021
Expires: 26 August 2021


             Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
                    draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-08

Abstract

   This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport
   of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2.  This document
   updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712.

   The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
   instead of EncryptedValue, adding new general message types, defining
   extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP endpoints on
   certification and registration authorities, and adding an HTTP URI
   discovery mechanism and extending the URI structure.

   To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
   EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction
   is supposed to use EnvelopedData.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 August 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Convention and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol
           (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header  . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . .   7
     2.5.  Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . .   8
     2.6.  Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . .   9
     2.7.  Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response  . . . . .  10
     2.8.  Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . .  11
     2.9.  Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key
            Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.10. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . .  12
     2.11. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.12. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update  . . .  12
     2.13. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template  . .  13
     2.14. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response  . .  14
     2.15. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation  . . . . . . . . .  15
     2.16. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510
            Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     2.17. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . .  16
     2.18. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase  . .  18
     2.19. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
            Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     2.20. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
            These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     2.21. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile  . . . . . .  19
     2.22. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
            (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   3.  Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
           Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . .  20
     3.2.  Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.3.  Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . .  21
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21



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   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     A.2.  2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   Appendix B.  History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52

1.  Introduction

   [RFC Editor: please delete]: !!! The change history was moved to
   Appendix B !!!

   While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
   developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
   identified in the original CMP specification.  This document updates
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
   limitations.

   Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which
   means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.

   This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
   endpoints on registration and certification authorities.

1.1.  Convention and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
   [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
   here.

   Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
   RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280].  The following key words
   are used:

   CA:   Certification authority, which issues certificates.

   RA:   Registration authority, an optional system component to which a
         CA delegates certificate management functions such as
         authorization checks.

   KGA:  Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf



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         of an EE.  The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.

   EE:   End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
         certificate.  An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
         of the certificate.

2.  Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)

2.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210

   The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210
   [RFC4210].  They are always related to the base specification.  Hence
   references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
   whenever possible.

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:

   1.1.  Changes since RFC 4210

   The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:

   *  Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
      registration authority and certification authority, to express the
      authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
      containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
      the indicated PKI management entity.

   *  Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
      use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.

   *  Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
      EncryptedValue to better support crypto agility in CMP.  Note that
      according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1. point 9 the use of
      the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
      EnvelopedData structure.  RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the
      EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
      EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData.  For reasons of
      completeness and consistency the type EncryptedValue has been
      exchanged in all occurrences in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].  This includes
      the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of
      certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases.  To
      properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
      EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a
      transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData.

   *  Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a
      root CA update, or a certificate request template.




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   *  Extend the usage of polling to p10cr messages.

   *  Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2
      [RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].

2.2.  New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage

   The following subsection describes new extended key usages for
   various CMP server types specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4:

   4.5.  Extended Key Usage

   The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
   which the certified key pair may be used.  It therefore restricts the
   use of a certificate to specific applications.

   A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management
   entities.  The mechanism to prove this delegation explained in this
   section offers automatic way of checking the authorization of such
   delegation.  Such delegation could also be expressed by other means,
   e.g., explicit configuration.

   To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA,
   the certificates used for CMP message protection or signed data for
   central key generation MUST be issued by the delegating CA and MUST
   contain the respective EKUs.  This proves the authorization of this
   entity by the delegating CA to act in the given role as described
   below.

   The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:

      id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 }
      id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 }
      id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 }

   Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and
   a CMC RA.  As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to
   using CMC or CMP as certificate management protocol, these OIDs SHALL
   be re-used also for CMP CAs and for CMP RAs.



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   The description of the PKI management entity for each of the EKUs is
   as follows:

   CMP CA:   CMP Certification Authorities are CMP endpoints on CA
             equipment as described in section 3.1.1.2.  The private key
             used in the context of CMP management operations,
             especially CMP message protection, does not need to be the
             same as for signing certificates.  It is necessary,
             however, to ensure that the entity acting as CMP CA is
             authorized to do so.  Therefore, the CMP CA MUST do one of
             the following,

             *  use the CA private key also for the CMP endpoint, or

             *  explicitly designate this role to another entity.

             For automatic validation of such a delegation this MUST be
             indicated by the id-kp-cmcCA extended key usage.  This
             extended key usage MUST be placed into the certificate used
             on the CA equipment and the CA that delegates this role
             MUST issue the CMP CA certificate.

             Note: Using a separate key pair for protecting CMP
             management operations at the CA decreases the number of
             operations of the private key used to sign certificates.

   CMP RA:   CMP Registration Authorities are CMP endpoints on RA
             equipment as described in Section 3.1.1.3.  A CMP RA is
             identified by the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage.  This
             extended key usage MUST be placed in RA certificates.  The
             CA that delegated this role is identified by the CA that
             issued the CMP RA certificate.

   CMP KGA:  CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-
             cmKGA extended key usage.  The CMP KGA knows the private
             key it generated on behalf of the end entity.  This is a
             very sensitive service and therefore needs specific
             authorization.  This authorization is either with the CA
             certificate itself, or it MUST be indicated by placing the
             id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the certificate used to
             authenticate the origin of the generated private key, and
             to express the authorization to offer this service.

   < TBD: Tomas addressed the quiestion if the CMP CA role and EKU are
   really needed.  The discussion is ongoing. >






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   Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates
   IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018], CA certificates may
   have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value
   99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as
   specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] and
   RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]).  Such validity periods SHOULD
   NOT be used for protection of CMP messages.  Certificates for
   delegated CMP message protection (CMP CA, CMP RA, CMP KGA) MUST NOT
   use indefinite expiration date.

2.3.  Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header

   Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header.
   This document introduces the new version 3 indicating support of
   EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.6.

   Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description
   of pvno with the following text:

      PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
         pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
                                           cmp2021(3) },
         sender              GeneralName,
         recipient           GeneralName,
         messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
         protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
         senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
         recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
         transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
         senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
         recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
         freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
         generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                             InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
      }
      PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String

   The usage of different pvno values is described in Section 7.

2.4.  Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information

   Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based
   protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac.

   Replace the first paragraph with the following text:






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   In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
   sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a
   previous PKI management operation).  PKIProtection will contain a MAC
   value and the protectionAlg will be the following (see also [RFC4211]
   and [I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs]):

2.5.  Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection

   Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
   This document enables using opens the usage of nested messages also
   for batch transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities
   and also with mixed body types.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   5.1.3.4.  Multiple Protection

   When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such
   as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which
   MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and
   certificates shared between the RA and the CA).  Moreover, multiple
   PKI messages MAY be aggregated.  There are several use cases for such
   messages.

   *  The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and
      forwards the original message unchanged.

   *  The RA collects several messages that are to be forwarded in the
      same direction and forwards them in a batch.  In communication to
      the CA request messages and in communication from the CA response
      or announcement messages will be collected.  This can for instance
      be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI
      management entities.

   *  The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., add or modify
      particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding
      them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody.  In case the
      changes made by the RA to PKIMessage breaks the POP of a
      certificate request, the RA MUST set the POP RAVerified.  It MAY
      include the original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo
      field of PKIHeader of the nested message (to accommodate, for
      example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or other
      information on the original EE message).  The infoType to be used
      in this situation is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value
      of id-it) and the infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in
      the same order as the message in PKIBody).





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   These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages sent by the
   PKI entity within a new PKI message.  The structure used is as
   follows:

      NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

2.6.  Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values

   Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of
   EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data.  This document extends
   the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   5.2.2.  Encrypted Values

   Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys,
   certificates, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the
   EncryptedKey data structure is used.

      EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
         encryptedValue        EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
         envelopedData     [0] EnvelopedData }

   See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS
   [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax.  Using the EncryptedKey data
   structure, offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for
   backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData.  The use of the
   EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
   EnvelopedData structure.  Therefore, it is recommended to use
   EnvelopedData.

   Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused
   here, which makes the update is backward compatible.  Using the new
   syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-
   the-wire compatible with the old syntax.

   To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced
   by this document.  Details on the usage of different pvno values is
   described in Section 7.

   The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private
   key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.

   EnvelopedData is used as follows:

   *  It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content
      is encrypted only for one recipient.



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   *  It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure
      as defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure
      as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key
      Generation Authority.

   *  It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in
      the encryptedContent field.

   The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
   section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
   symmetric content-encryption key.  This content-encryption key MUST
   be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
   management techniques.

   The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
   depends on the credential available at the recipient:

   *  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652].  This is the preferred
      technique.

   *  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key transport key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].

   *  A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the password-based key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].

2.7.  Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response

   Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
   Response.  This document updates the syntax by using the parent
   structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
   Section 2.6 above.

   Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with
   the following text:










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      CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
         certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
         privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey        OPTIONAL,
         -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
         publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
      }

      CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
         certificate     [0] Certificate,
         encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
      }

   Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:

   A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
   structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId.
   Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response
   (cp) message MUST be set to 0.

   Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.

   Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is
   introduced by this document.  Details on the usage of different pvno
   values is described in Section 7.

2.8.  Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types

   The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair
   Types PKI general message on referencing EC curves.

   Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2:

   Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
   elements need to be given, one each per named curve.

2.9.  Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types

   The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key
   Agreement Key Pair Types PKI general message on referencing EC
   curves.

   Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3:

   Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
   elements need to be given, one each per named curve.




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2.10.  Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase

   Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
   a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
   request.  This document updates the handling by using the parent
   structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this
   information as described in Section 2.6 above.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   5.3.19.9.  Revocation Passphrase

   This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
   purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
   that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
   authenticate the request).  See Appendix B for further details on the
   use of this mechanism.

      GenMsg:    {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
      GenRep:    {id-it 12}, < absent >

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.

2.11.  New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates

   The following subsection describes the PKI general message using id-
   it-caCerts.  The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-
   D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.

   Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:

   2.3.19.14 CA Certificates

   This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and
   issuing CA certificates.

      GenMsg:    {id-it 17}, < absent >
      GenRep:    {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate | < absent >

2.12.  New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update

   The following subsection describes the PKI general message using id-
   it-rootCaKeyUpdate.  The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.

   Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:

   5.3.19.15.  Root CA Certificate Update



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   This MAY be used by the client to get an update of an existing root
   CA Certificate.  In contrast to the ckuann message it follows the
   request/response model.

      GenMsg:    {id-it 18}, < absent >
      GenRep:    {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >

      RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
         newWithNew       CMPCertificate
         newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
         oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
         }

   < TBD: In case the PKI offers updates of various root CA
   certificates, it needs to be defined how the EE requests an update of
   a specific root CA certificate. >

   Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
   newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
   needs of the EE.

2.13.  New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template

   The following subsection describes the PKI general message using id-
   it-certReqTemplate.  The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.

   Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15:

   5.3.19.16.  Certificate Request Template

   This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
   requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions and
   optionally a specification for the key pair to generate for a future
   certificate request operation.
















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      GenMsg:    {id-it 19}, < absent >
      GenRep:    {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >

      CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        certTemplate           CertTemplate,
        keySpec                Controls OPTIONAL
        }

      Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue

      id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
         identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
         mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) TBD3 }
      AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier

      id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
         identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
         mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) TBD4 }
      RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= Integer

   < TBD: The OIDs TBD3 and TBD4 have to be registered at IANA. >

   < TBD: In case the PKI offers certificate request templates for
   various certificates, it needs to be defined how the EE requests a
   specific certificate request template. >

   CertReqTemplateValue contains a prefilled certTemplate to be used for
   the future certificate request.  The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in
   the certTemplate MUST NOT be used.  In case the PKI management entity
   wishes to specify supported algorithms, the keySpec field MUST be
   used.  One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or RSA key
   length MUST be used.

   Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]

2.14.  Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response

   Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
   messages are used.  This document adds the polling mechanism also for
   outstanding responses to a p10cr.

   Replace in the first paragraph the word 'cr' by 'cr, p10cr' and add
   just before the state machine diagram the following text:

   A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
   structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate
   request identifier.  Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all
   subsequent messages of this transaction.



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2.15.  Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation

   Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of different CMP
   protocol versions.  This document describes the handling of the
   additional CMP version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of
   EnvelopedData.

   Replace the text of the first two paragraphs with the following text:

   This section defines the version negotiation between client and
   servers used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510
   [RFC2510]), of cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021
   (specified in this document).  The only difference between protocol
   versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces
   EncryptedValue.

   If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a
   request as follows:

   *  If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the
      server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-
      of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest
      version supported by both it and the server.

   *  If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports,
      then it MUST send a PKIMessage using the highest version it
      supports.

   If a client supports cmp2021 and encrypted values are supposed to be
   transferred in the PKI management operation the client MUST choose
   the version for a request as follows:

   *  If the client supports EnvelopedData, but not EncryptedValue, then
      it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021.

   *  If the client does not support EnvelopedData, but EncryptedValue,
      then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2000.

   *  If the client supports both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValues:

      -  If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the
         server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some
         out-of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the
         highest version supported the server.

      -  If the client does not know what version(s) the server
         supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021.




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2.16.  Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers

   Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behaviour of a
   client talking to a cmp1999 server.  This document extends the
   section to all clients with a higher version than cmp1999.

   Replace the first sentence of section 7.1.1 with the following text:

   If, after sending a message with a higher protocol version number
   than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
   cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.

2.17.  Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations

   Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
   that document.  As this document defines one new and updates two
   existing Extended Key Usages, the IANA Considerations need to be
   updated accordingly.

   Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the
   section:

   In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
   Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
   numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] three
   changes have been performed.

   Two existing entries have been updated to also point to this
   document:

   +=========+=============+====================+
   | Decimal | Description | References         |
   +=========+=============+====================+
   | 27      | id-kp-cmcCA | [RFC6402][thisRFC] |
   +---------+-------------+--------------------+
   | 28      | id-kp-cmcRA | [RFC6402][thisRFC] |
   +---------+-------------+--------------------+

     Table 1: Changes to the PKIX Extended Key
            Purpose Identifiers registry

   One new entry has been added:

   +=========+=============+============+
   | Decimal | Description | References |
   +=========+=============+============+
   | 32      | id-kp-cmKGA | [thisRFC]  |



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   +---------+-------------+------------+

        Table 2: Adition to the PKIX
      Extended Key Purpose Identifiers
                  registry

   In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information
   Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-
   numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in
   RFC 7299 [RFC7299] three additions have been performed.

   Three new entries have been added:

   +=========+=======================+============+
   | Decimal | Description           | References |
   +=========+=======================+============+
   | 17      | id-it-caCerts         | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+
   | 18      | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+
   | 19      | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+

          Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CMP
              Information Types registry

   In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration
   Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as
   defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.

   Two new entries have been added:

   +=========+======================+============+
   | Decimal | Description          | References |
   +=========+======================+============+
   | TBD3    | id-regCtrl-algId     | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+----------------------+------------+
   | TBD4    | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+----------------------+------------+

          Table 4: Addition to the PKIX CRMF
            Registration Controls registry








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2.18.  Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase

   Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation
   passphrase.  As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize
   the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as
   described in Section 2.6 above, the description is updated
   accordingly.

   Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
   text:

   *  The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
      GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo
      field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time.  (In
      particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section
      5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that
      confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization
      request or certificate request message.)  This conveys a
      revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA.
      For use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of
      encryptedContent field and for use of EncryptedValue this is in
      the decrypted bytes of the encValue field.  Furthermore, the
      transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality
      characteristics.

   Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
   text:

   *  When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in
      RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint
      field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along
      with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the
      correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is
      constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).

2.19.  Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications

   Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
   request message behavior.  As this document updates RFC 4210
   [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
   EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.6 above, the description is
   updated accordingly.

   Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
   definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:






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      -- **********
      -- *  the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
      -- *  [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
      -- *  Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this
      -- *  document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying
      -- *  that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
      -- *  "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
      -- *  compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.  This
      -- *  allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
      -- *  private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
      -- *  with RFC 4211 [RFC4211].
      -- **********

2.20.  Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
       Profiles

   Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for
   interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in
   Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210].  This document
   updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.

   Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
   the following text:

   Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value
   (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).

2.21.  Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile

   Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that
   implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI
   Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2
   [RFC4210].  This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as
   specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   D.2.  Algorithm Use Profile

   For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
   conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP
   Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].








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2.22.  Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
       Authenticated Scheme)

   Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
   certification scheme.  This scheme shall continue using
   EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.

   Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
   crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
   message with the following text:

      -- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
      -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue

3.  Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
    Protocol (CMP)

3.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712

   The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712
   [RFC6712].  They are related to the base specification.  Hence
   references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used
   whenever possible.

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:

   1.1 Changes since RFC 6712

   The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:

   *  Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.

   *  Extend the URI structure.

3.2.  Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI

   Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs.  This
   document introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the
   URIs.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   3.6.  HTTP Request-URI

   Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS
   transport MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as
   defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease
   interworking in a multi-vendor environment.



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   The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to
   form the CMP server URI.  This is at least the authority portion of
   the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path
   segment of the PKI management entity.  Additionally, OPTIONAL path
   segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part
   of the full operation path to provide further distinction.  A path
   segment could for example support the differentiation of specific
   CAs, certificate profiles, or PKI management operations.  A valid
   full operation path segment can look like this:

      http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
      http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel
      http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel
      http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel

3.3.  Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations

   Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of
   that document.  As this document defines a new well-known URI, the
   IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.

   Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the
   section:

   In the well-known URI registry (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   well-known-uris/well-known-uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined
   in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] the following change has been performed.

   One new name entry has been added:

   +============+===================+
   | URI suffix | Change controller |
   +============+===================+
   | cmp        | IETF              |
   +------------+-------------------+

                Table 5

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections
   to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712].

   < TBD: This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F
   [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912].  New OIDs TBD1 and TBD2
   need to be registered to identify the updates ASN.1 modules. >





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   < TBD: New OIDs TBD3 (id-regCtrl-algId) and TBD4 (id-regCtrl-
   rsaKeyLen) need to be registered. >

   < TBD: The existing description and information of id-kp-cmcRA and
   id-kp-cmcCA need to be updated to reflect their extended usage. >

5.  Security Considerations

   No changes are made to the existing security considerations of
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712].

6.  Acknowledgements

   Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
   on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which
   updates CMC.  Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley and Tomas
   Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on
   improving this document.

   We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
   feedback.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]
              Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and S. Mister,
              "CMP Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-02, 20 January 2021,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
              algorithms-02>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs]
              Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
              Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Request Message Format (CRMF)", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-04, 19
              February 2021, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
              lamps-crmf-update-algs-04>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.






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   [RFC2510]  Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
              RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC6402]  Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
              Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.



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   [RFC6712]  Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712>.

   [RFC7299]  Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
              Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8615]  Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
              (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
              Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight
              CMP Profile", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-04, 2 November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
              cmp-profile-04>.

   [IEEE.802.1AR_2018]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
              DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,
              <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules

A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module

   This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210].  This
   module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document.  Although
   a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the
   normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group.

   PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
         dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
         id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(TBD1)}

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=




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   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL --

   IMPORTS

       Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier,
       UTF8String, id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out
              FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}

       GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
              FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}

       CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
       CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl
              FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
       -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
       -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to
       -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.


       -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
       -- Appendix C of this specification
       CertificationRequest
              FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2)
                            us(840) rsadsi(113549)
                            pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)}
       -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
       -- tags).  Alternatively, implementers may directly include
       -- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module

       localKeyId
              FROM PKCS-9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
                           pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
       -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]

       EnvelopedData, SignedData
              FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
              member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
              smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
       -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to



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       -- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

       ;

   -- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and
   -- constructs

   CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
       x509v3PKCert        Certificate
   }
   -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
   -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
   -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
   -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
   -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
   -- should a need ever arise to support such generality.  Those
   -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
   -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
   -- above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to
   -- compiling this ASN.1 module.  (Note that interoperability
   -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
   -- this change.)

   -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate

   PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       header           PKIHeader,
       body             PKIBody,
       protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
       extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                        OPTIONAL
   }

   PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage

   PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
                                         cmp2021(3) },
       sender              GeneralName,
       -- identifies the sender
       recipient           GeneralName,
       -- identifies the intended recipient
       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits



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       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
       -- messages
       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
       -- the intended recipient of this message
       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                              InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
   }

   PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
       -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
       -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
       -- to indicate the language of the contained text
       -- see [RFC2482] for details)

   PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements
       ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
       ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
       cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
       cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
       p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [PKCS10]
       popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
       popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
       kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
       kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
       krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
       krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
       rr       [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
       rp       [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
       ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
       ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
       ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
       cann     [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
       rann     [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
       crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement



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       pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation
       nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
       genm     [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
       genp     [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
       error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,        --Error Message
       certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,     --Certificate confirm
       pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,         --Polling request
       pollRep  [26] PollRepContent          --Polling response
   }

   PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING

   ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
       header    PKIHeader,
       body      PKIBody
   }

   id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
   PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       salt                OCTET STRING,
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       iterationCount      INTEGER,
       -- number of times the OWF is applied
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
   }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

   id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
   DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
   }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])


   NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

   PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
       accepted                (0),
       -- you got exactly what you asked for



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       grantedWithMods        (1),
       -- you got something like what you asked for; the
       -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
       rejection              (2),
       -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
       waiting                (3),
       -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
       -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
       -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
       -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
       -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
       revocationWarning      (4),
       -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
       -- imminent
       revocationNotification (5),
       -- notification that a revocation has occurred
       keyUpdateWarning       (6)
       -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
       -- CertReqMsg
   }

   PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
   -- since we can fail in more than one way!
   -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
       badAlg              (0),
       -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
       badMessageCheck     (1),
       -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
       badRequest          (2),
       -- transaction not permitted or supported
       badTime             (3),
       -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
       -- as defined by local policy
       badCertId           (4),
       -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
       badDataFormat       (5),
       -- the data submitted has the wrong format
       wrongAuthority      (6),
       -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
       -- one creating the response token
       incorrectData       (7),
       -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
       missingTimeStamp    (8),
       -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
       -- (by policy)
       badPOP              (9),
       -- the proof-of-possession failed
       certRevoked         (10),



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          -- the certificate has already been revoked
       certConfirmed       (11),
          -- the certificate has already been confirmed
       wrongIntegrity      (12),
          -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
          -- vice versa
       badRecipientNonce   (13),
          -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
       timeNotAvailable    (14),
          -- the TSA's time source is not available
       unacceptedPolicy    (15),
          -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.
       unacceptedExtension (16),
          -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
       addInfoNotAvailable (17),
          -- the additional information requested could not be
          -- understood or is not available
       badSenderNonce      (18),
          -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
       badCertTemplate     (19),
          -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
       signerNotTrusted    (20),
          -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
       transactionIdInUse  (21),
          -- the transaction identifier is already in use
       unsupportedVersion  (22),
          -- the version of the message is not supported
       notAuthorized       (23),
          -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
          -- request or perform the preceding action
       systemUnavail       (24),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
       systemFailure       (25),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
       duplicateCertReq    (26)
       -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
       -- certificate already exists
   }

   PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       status        PKIStatus,
       statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
       failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate

   OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {



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       hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
       certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
       hashVal         BIT STRING
       -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
       -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
   }

   POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
   -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).

   Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
       -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
       -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
       -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
       -- Challenge is to be used).
       witness             OCTET STRING,
       -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
       -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
       -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
       challenge           OCTET STRING
       -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
       -- request is being made) of Rand.
   }

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
   -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
   -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
      int                  INTEGER,
      -- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
      sender               GeneralName
      -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
   }

   POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
   -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
   -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
   -- corresponding Challenge.

   CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                        OPTIONAL,
       response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
   }



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   CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
       certReqId           INTEGER,
       -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
       -- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
       -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
       status              PKIStatusInfo,
       certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
       rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
       -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
       -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
   }

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey        OPTIONAL,
       -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
   }

   KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status                  PKIStatusInfo,
       newSigCert          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                           CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                           CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
   }

   RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

   RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
       certDetails         CertTemplate,
       -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about



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       -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
       -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
       crlEntryDetails     Extensions       OPTIONAL
       -- requested crlEntryExtensions
   }

   RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
       -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
       revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
                                           OPTIONAL,
       -- IDs for which revocation was requested
       -- (same order as status)
       crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
                                           OPTIONAL
       -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
   }

   CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       oldWithNew   CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
       newWithOld   CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
       newWithNew   CMPCertificate  -- new pub signed with new priv
   }

   CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate

   RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status              PKIStatus,
       certId              CertId,
       willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,
       badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
       crlDetails          Extensions  OPTIONAL
       -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
   }

   CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList

   CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
      certHash    OCTET STRING,
      -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
      -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
      certReqId   INTEGER,
      -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
   }




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   PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      newWithNew       CMPCertificate
      -- new root CA certificate
      newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
      -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
      -- signed with the old private root CA key
      oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
      -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
      -- signed with the new private root CA key
      }

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      certTemplate           CertTemplate,
      -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
      -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
      -- be used.
      keySpec                Controls OPTIONAL
      -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
      -- Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
      -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
      }

      id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD3 }
      AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
      -- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA

      id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD4 }
      RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= Integer
      -- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths

   InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
       infoType               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
       infoValue              ANY DEFINED BY infoType  OPTIONAL
   }
   -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
   -- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
   -- appropriate for a given environment):
   --
   --   id-it-caProtEncCert    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
   --      CAProtEncCertValue      ::= CMPCertificate
   --   id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
   --      SignKeyPairTypesValue   ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier



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   --   id-it-encKeyPairTypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
   --      EncKeyPairTypesValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
   --      PreferredSymmAlgValue   ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
   --      CAKeyUpdateInfoValue    ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
   --   id-it-currentCRL       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
   --      CurrentCRLValue         ::= CertificateList
   --   id-it-unsupportedOIDs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
   --      UnsupportedOIDsValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamReq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
   --      KeyPairParamReqValue    ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamRep  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
   --      KeyPairParamRepValue    ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
   --   id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
   --      RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedKey
   --      -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
   --      -- of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
   --      -- made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --      -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
   --      -- syntax without this change
   --   id-it-implicitConfirm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
   --      ImplicitConfirmValue    ::= NULL
   --   id-it-confirmWaitTime  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
   --      ConfirmWaitTimeValue    ::= GeneralizedTime
   --   id-it-origPKIMessage   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
   --      OrigPKIMessageValue     ::= PKIMessages
   --   id-it-suppLangTags     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
   --      SuppLangTagsValue       ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
   --   id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 17}
   --      CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate
   --      -- id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 18}
   --      RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
   --      -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 19}
   --      CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
   --      -- id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --
   -- where
   --
   --   id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   --      iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   --      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
   -- and
   --   id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
   --
   --



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   -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
   -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
   -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
   -- specific environments.

   GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

   -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
   -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
   -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
   -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it
   -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
   -- indicates that the CA may send
   -- any/all information that it wishes.

   GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
   -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
   -- recognize.

   ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
       errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
       -- implementation-specific error codes
       errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
       -- implementation-specific error details
   }

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER
   }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER,
       checkAfter             INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason                 PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
   }

   --
   -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
   -- operations, added due to the changes made in
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
   -- [RFC6402]
   --

   -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
   -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
   id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }



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   END -- of CMP module

A.2.  2002 ASN.1 Module

   This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
   This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document.  The
   module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from
   RFC4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] that were to update to 2002 ASN.1
   standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document.

   PKIXCMP-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-cmp2021-02(TBD2) }
   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN
   IMPORTS

   AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
   FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

   AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
       DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
   FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

   Certificate, CertificateList, id-kp
   FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}

   GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
   FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

   CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
       CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl
   FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
       -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
       -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]. EncryptedValue does not need to



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       -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.

   -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
   -- Appendix C of this specification

   CertificationRequest
   FROM PKCS-10
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
   -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
   -- tags).  Alternatively, implementers may directly include
   -- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module

   localKeyId
   FROM PKCS-9
       {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
       -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   EnvelopedData, SignedData
   FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
       {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
       -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
       -- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   ;

   -- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
   -- constructs

   CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
   -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
   -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
   -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
   -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
   -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
   -- should a need ever arise to support such generality.  Those
   -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
   -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
   -- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to
   -- compiling this ASN.1 module.  (Note that interoperability
   -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
   -- this change.)

   -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate

   PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {



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       header           PKIHeader,
       body             PKIBody,
       protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
       extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                     OPTIONAL }

   PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage

   PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
                                         cmp2012(3) },
       sender              GeneralName,
       -- identifies the sender
       recipient           GeneralName,
       -- identifies the intended recipient
       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
                               OPTIONAL,
       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
       -- messages
       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
       -- the intended recipient of this message
       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                           InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
   }

   PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
       -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
       -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
       -- to indicate the language of the contained text;



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       -- see [RFC2482] for details)

   PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements
       ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
       ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
       cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
       cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
       p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [PKCS10]
       popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
       popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
       kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
       kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
       krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
       krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
       rr       [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
       rp       [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
       ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
       ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
       ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
       cann     [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
       rann     [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
       crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
       pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation
       nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
       genm     [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
       genp     [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
       error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,        --Error Message
       certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,     --Certificate confirm
       pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,         --Polling request
       pollRep  [26] PollRepContent          --Polling response
   }

   PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING

   ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
       header    PKIHeader,
       body      PKIBody }

   id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
   PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       salt                OCTET STRING,
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       iterationCount      INTEGER,



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       -- number of times the OWF is applied
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
       -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
   }

   id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
   DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
       -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
   }

   PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
       accepted               (0),
       -- you got exactly what you asked for
       grantedWithMods        (1),
       -- you got something like what you asked for; the
       -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
       rejection              (2),
       -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
       waiting                (3),
       -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
       -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
       -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
       -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
       -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
       revocationWarning      (4),
       -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
       -- imminent
       revocationNotification (5),
       -- notification that a revocation has occurred
       keyUpdateWarning       (6)
       -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
       -- CertReqMsg
   }

   PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
   -- since we can fail in more than one way!
   -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
       badAlg              (0),
       -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier



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       badMessageCheck     (1),
       -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
       badRequest          (2),
       -- transaction not permitted or supported
       badTime             (3),
       -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
       -- as defined by local policy
       badCertId           (4),
       -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
       badDataFormat       (5),
       -- the data submitted has the wrong format
       wrongAuthority      (6),
       -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
       -- one creating the response token
       incorrectData       (7),
       -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
       missingTimeStamp    (8),
       -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
       -- (by policy)
       badPOP              (9),
       -- the proof-of-possession failed
       certRevoked         (10),
       -- the certificate has already been revoked
       certConfirmed       (11),
       -- the certificate has already been confirmed
       wrongIntegrity      (12),
       -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
       -- vice versa
       badRecipientNonce   (13),
       -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
       timeNotAvailable    (14),
       -- the TSA's time source is not available
       unacceptedPolicy    (15),
       -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
       unacceptedExtension (16),
       -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
       addInfoNotAvailable (17),
       -- the additional information requested could not be
       -- understood or is not available
       badSenderNonce      (18),
       -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
       badCertTemplate     (19),
       -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
       signerNotTrusted    (20),
       -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
       transactionIdInUse  (21),
       -- the transaction identifier is already in use
       unsupportedVersion  (22),



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       -- the version of the message is not supported
       notAuthorized       (23),
       -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
       -- request or perform the preceding action
       systemUnavail       (24),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
       systemFailure       (25),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
       duplicateCertReq    (26)
       -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
       -- certificate already exists
   }

   PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       status        PKIStatus,
       statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
       failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL }

   OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate

   OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
       hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                           OPTIONAL,
       certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
       hashVal         BIT STRING
       -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
       -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
   }

   POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
   -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).

   Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                               OPTIONAL,
       -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
       -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
       -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
       -- Challenge is to be used).
       witness             OCTET STRING,
       -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
       -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
       -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
       challenge           OCTET STRING
       -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
       -- request is being made) of Rand.
   }



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   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
   -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
   -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
      int                  INTEGER,
      -- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
      sender               GeneralName
      -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
   }

   POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
   -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
   -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
   -- corresponding Challenge.

   CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                     OPTIONAL,
       response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }

   CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
       certReqId           INTEGER,
       -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
       -- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
       -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
       status              PKIStatusInfo,
       certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
       rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
       -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
       -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
   }

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey      OPTIONAL,
       -- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey



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       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
   }

   KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status                  PKIStatusInfo,
       newSigCert          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                        CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                        CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }

   RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

   RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
       certDetails         CertTemplate,
       -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
       -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
       -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
       crlEntryDetails     Extensions{{...}}    OPTIONAL
       -- requested crlEntryExtensions
   }

   RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
       -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
       revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
       -- IDs for which revocation was requested
       -- (same order as status)
       crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
       -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
   }

   CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       oldWithNew   CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
       newWithOld   CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
       newWithNew   CMPCertificate  -- new pub signed with new priv
   }

   CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate

   RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status              PKIStatus,
       certId              CertId,
       willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,



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       badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
       crlDetails          Extensions{{...}}  OPTIONAL
       -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
   }

   CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
   PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL

   NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      newWithNew       CMPCertificate
      -- new root CA certificate
      newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
      -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
      -- signed with the old private root CA key
      oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
      -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
      -- signed with the new private root CA key
      }

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      certTemplate           CertTemplate,
      -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
      -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
      -- be used.
      keySpec                Controls OPTIONAL
      -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
      -- Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
      -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
      }

   id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD3 }
   AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
   -- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA

   id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD4 }
   RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= Integer
   -- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths

   INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

   InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
       infoType    INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.



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                       &id({SupportedInfoSet}),
       infoValue   INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
                       &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }

   SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }

   -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
   -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
   -- appropriate for a given environment):
   --
   --   id-it-caProtEncCert    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
   --      CAProtEncCertValue      ::= CMPCertificate
   --   id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
   --      SignKeyPairTypesValue   ::= SEQUENCE OF
   --                                      AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-encKeyPairTypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
   --      EncKeyPairTypesValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF
   --                                      AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
   --      PreferredSymmAlgValue   ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
   --      CAKeyUpdateInfoValue    ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
   --   id-it-currentCRL       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
   --      CurrentCRLValue         ::= CertificateList
   --   id-it-unsupportedOIDs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
   --      UnsupportedOIDsValue    ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamReq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
   --      KeyPairParamReqValue    ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamRep  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
   --      KeyPairParamRepValue    ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
   --   id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
   --      RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedKey
   --      -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
   --      -- of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
   --      -- made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --      -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
   --      -- the syntax without this change
   --   id-it-implicitConfirm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
   --      ImplicitConfirmValue    ::= NULL
   --   id-it-confirmWaitTime  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
   --      ConfirmWaitTimeValue    ::= GeneralizedTime
   --   id-it-origPKIMessage   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
   --      OrigPKIMessageValue     ::= PKIMessages
   --   id-it-suppLangTags     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
   --      SuppLangTagsValue       ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
   --   id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 17}
   --      CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate
   --      -- id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]



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   --   id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 18}
   --      RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
   --      -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 19}
   --      CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
   --      -- id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --
   -- where
   --
   --   id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   --      iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   --      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
   -- and
   --   id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
   --
   --
   -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
   -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
   -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
   -- specific environments.

   GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

   -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
   -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
   -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
   -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it
   -- does not recognize.  If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
   -- indicates that the CA may send
   -- any/all information that it wishes.

   GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
   -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
   -- recognize.

   ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
       errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
       -- implementation-specific error codes
       errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
       -- implementation-specific error details
   }

   CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
       certHash    OCTET STRING,
       -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm



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       -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
       certReqId   INTEGER,
       -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER,
       checkAfter             INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason                 PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }

   --
   -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
   -- operations, added due to the changes made in
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
   -- [RFC6402]
   --

   -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
   -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
   id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }

   END

Appendix B.  History of changes

   Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
   document.

   From version 07 -> 08:

   *  Added a ToDo to Section 2.2 to reflect a current discussion on the
      need of an additional CMP-CA role and EKU and differentiation from
      CMP-RA
   *  Added ToDos to Section 2.12 and 2.13

   From version 06 -> 07:

   *  Added David von Oheimb as co-author
   *  Changed to XML V3
   *  Added Section 2.3 to enable a CMP protocol version number 3 in the
      PKIHeader for cases where EnvelopedData is to be used (see thread
      "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").





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   *  Added Section 2.4 to refer to [I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs]
      for the update of id-PasswordBasedMac for PKI message protection
      using passwords or shared secrets.
   *  Updated Section 2.6 to introduce the protocol version number 3 to
      properly indicate support of EnvelopedData instead of
      EncryptedValue in case a transaction requires use of EnvelopedData
      (see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").
   *  Update Section 2.14 to make the minimal changes to the respective
      section in CMP more explicit.
   *  Added Sections 2.15 and 2.16 to address the new cmp2021 protocol
      version in Section 7 Version Negotiation.
   *  Updated Section 2.17 to add new OIDs for id-regCtrl-algId and id-
      regCtrl-rsaKeyLen for registration at IANA.
   *  Added Section 2.20 to update the general rules of interpretation
      in Appendix D.1 regarding the new cmp2021 version.
   *  Added Section 2.21 to update the Algorithm Use Profile in
      Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document
      as decided at IETF 108.
   *  Updates Section 3.1 to delete the description of a discovery
      mechanism as decided at IETF 108.
   *  Various changes and corrections in wording.

   From version 05 -> 06:

   *  Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP
      Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108
   *  Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-
      regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.
   *  Minor changes and corrections

   From version 04 -> 05:

   *  Added Section 2.8 and Section 2.9 to clarify the usage of these
      general messages types with EC curves (see thread
      "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue
      in CMP headers")
   *  Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA
      Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three
      separate sections for easier readability
   *  Changed in Section 2.12 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue
      from using reaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF
      Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and
      rsaKeyLen")
   *  Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.17 to introduce new
      OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread
      "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")





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   *  Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce
      new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action:
      draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt")
   *  Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of
      types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread
      "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
   *  Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see
      thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
   *  Minor changes and corrections

   From version 03 -> 04:

   *  Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in
      general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
      updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-
      rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")
   *  Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA
      Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
   *  Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.18
   *  Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from
      Martin Peylo

   From version 02 -> 03:

   *  Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
      be set up as decided in IETF 108
   *  Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.6 to add the
      AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
      private key as decided in IETF 108
   *  Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.18
   *  Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.18 and the ASN.1 module
   *  Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
      regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-
      known/' as discussed in IETF 108
   *  Updated the IANA Considerations section
   *  Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
      Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
      2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
   *  Minor changes in wording

   From version 01 -> 02:

   *  Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
   *  Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
      management technique in Section 2.6 as discussed with Russ and Jim
      on the mailing list
   *  Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
      revocation passphrase in Section 2.18



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Internet-Draft                 CMP Updates                 February 2021


   *  Moved the change history to the Appendix

   From version 00 -> 01:

   *  Minor changes in wording

   From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
   updates-00:

   *  Changes required to reflect WG adoption

   From version 02 -> 03:

   *  Added some clarification in Section 2.1

   From version 01 -> 02:

   *  Added clarification to section on multiple protection
   *  Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas
      Gustavsson
   *  Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at
      IETF 106
   *  Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for
      a revocation passphrase
   *  Minor changes in wording

   From version 00 -> 01:

   *  Added a section describing the new extended key usages
   *  Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted
      values
   *  Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4
   *  Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
      5.3.22
   *  Minor changes in wording

Authors' Addresses

   Hendrik Brockhaus
   Siemens AG

   Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com


   David von Oheimb
   Siemens AG

   Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com



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