Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) J. Yi
Internet-Draft T. Clausen
Intended status: Informational LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
Expires: September 24, 2015 U. Herberg
Fujitsu Laboratories of America
March 23, 2015
Security Threats for Simplified Multicast Forwarding (SMF)
draft-ietf-manet-smf-sec-threats-02
Abstract
This document analyzes security threats of the Simplified Multicast
Forwarding (SMF), including the vulnerabilities of duplicate packet
detection and relay set selection mechanisms. This document is not
intended to propose solutions to the threats described.
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. SMF Threats Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Threats to Duplicate Packet Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Common Threats to Duplicate Packet Detection Mechanisms . 5
4.1.1. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Threats to Identification-based Duplicate Packet
Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Pre-activation Attacks (Pre-Play) . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. De-activation Attacks (Sequence Number wrangling) . . 8
4.3. Threats to Hash-based Duplicate Packet Detection . . . . . 8
4.3.1. Attack on Hash-Assistant Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Threats to Relay Set Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Relay Set Selection Common Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Threats to E-CDS Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.1. Link Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.2. Identity Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Threats to S-MPR Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. Threats to MPR-CDS Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction
This document analyzes security threats to the Simplified Multicast
Forwarding (SMF) mechanism [RFC6621]. SMF aims at providing basic
Internet Protocol (IP) multicast forwarding, in a way that is
suitable for limited wireless mesh and Mobile Ad hoc NETworks
(MANET). SMF is constituted of two major functional components:
Duplicate Packet Detection and Relay Set Selection.
SMF is typically used in decentralized wireless environments, and is
potentially exposed to different kinds of attacks and
misconfigurations. Some of the threats are of particular
significance as compared to wired networks. In [RFC6621], SMF does
not define any explicit security measures for protecting the
integrity of the protocol.
This document is based on the assumption that no additional security
mechanism such as IPsec is used in the IP layer, as not all MANET
deployments may be suitable to deploy common IP protection mechanisms
(e.g., because of limited resources of MANET routers to support the
IPsec stack). The document analyzes possible attacks on and mis-
configurations of SMF and outlines the consequences of such attacks/
mis-configurations to the state maintained by SMF in each router.
This document aims at analyzing and describing the potential
vulnerabilities of and attack vectors for SMF. While completeness in
such an analysis always is a goal, no claims of being complete are
made. The goal of this document is to be helpful for when deploying
SMF in a network and needing to understand the risks thereby incurred
- as wll as for providing a reference and documented experience with
SMF as input for possibly future developments of SMF.
This document is not intended to propose solutions to the threats
described. [RFC7182] provides a framework, which can be used with
SMF, and which - depending on how it is used - may offer some degree
of protection against the threats described in this document related
to identity spoofing.
2. Terminology
This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444],
[RFC6130] [RFC6621] and [RFC4949].
Additionally, this document introduces the following terminology:
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SMF router: A MANET router, running SMF as specified in [RFC6621].
Attacker: A device that is present in the network and intentionally
seeks to compromise the information bases in SMF routers.
Compromised SMF router: An attacker, which generates syntactically
correct SMF control messages. Control messages emitted by a
compromised SMF router may contain additional information, or omit
information, as compared to a control message generated by a non-
compromised SMF router located in the same topological position in
the network.
Legitimate SMF router: An SMF router, which is not a compromised SMF
Router.
3. SMF Threats Overview
SMF requires an external dynamic neighborhood discovery mechanism in
order to maintain suitable topological information describing its
immediate neighborhood, and thereby allowing it to select reduced
relay sets for forwarding multicast data traffic. Such an external
dynamic neighborhood discovery mechanism may be provided by lower-
layer interface information, by a concurrently operating MANET
routing protocol that already maintains such information such as
[RFC7181], or by explicitly using MANET Neighborhood Discovery
Protocol (NHDP) [RFC6130]. If NHDP is used for neighborhood
discovery by SMF, SMF implicitly inherits the vulnerabilities of
NHDP, as discussed in [RFC7186]. As SMF relies on NHDP to assist in
network layer 2-hop neighborhood discovery (not matter if other
lower-layer mechanisms are used for 1-hop neighborhood discovery),
this document assumes that NHDP is used in SMF. The threats that are
NHDP-specific are indicated explicitly.
Based on neighborhood discovery mechanisms, SMF specified two major
functional components: Duplicate Packet Detection (DPD) and Relay Set
Selection (RSS).
DPD is required by SMF in order to be able to detect duplicate
packets and eliminate their redundant forwarding. An Attacker has
several ways in which to harm the DPD mechanisms:
o It can "deactivate" DPD, so as to make it such that duplicate
packets are not correctly detected, and that as a consequence they
are (redundantly) transmitted, increasing the load on the network,
draining the batteries of the routers involved, etc.
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o It can "pre-activate" DPD, so as to make DPD detect a later
arriving (valid) packet as being a duplicate, which therefore
won't be forwarded"
The attacks on DPD are detailed in Section 4.
RSS produces a reduced relay set for forwarding multicast data
packets across the MANET. SMF supports the use of several relay set
algorithms, including E-CDS (Essential Connected Dominating Set)
[RFC5614], S-MPR (Source-based Multi-point Relay, as known from
[RFC3626] and [RFC7181]), or MPR-CDS [MPR-CDS]. An Attacker can
disrupt the RSS algorithm, by degrading it to classical flooding, or
by "masking" certain parts of the routers from the multicasting
domain. The attacks to RSS algorithms are illustrated in Section 5.
4. Threats to Duplicate Packet Detection
Duplicate Packet Detection (DPD) is required for packet dissemination
in MANET because the packets may be transmitted via the same physical
interface as the one over which they were received. A router may
also receive multiple copies of the same packets from different
neighbors. DPD is thus used to check if an incoming packet has been
received or not.
DPD is achieved by a router maintaining a record of recently
processed multicast packets, and comparing later received multicast
herewith. A duplicate packet detected is silently dropped, and is
not inserted into the forwarding path of that router, nor is it
delivered to an application. DPD, as proposed by SMF, supports both
IPv4 and IPv6 and for each suggests two duplicate packet detection
mechanisms: 1) header content identification-based DPD (I-DPD), using
packet headers, in combination with flow state, to estimate temporal
uniqueness of a packet, and 2) hash-based DPD (H-DPD), employing
hashing of selected header fields and payload for the same effect.
In the following of this section, common threats to packet detection
mechanisms are first discussed. Then the threats to I-DPD and H-DPD
are introduced separately. The threats described in this section are
applicable to general SMF implementations, no matter if NHDP is used
or not.
4.1. Common Threats to Duplicate Packet Detection Mechanisms
4.1.1. Replay Attack
A replay attack implies that control traffic from one region of the
network is recorded and replayed in a different region at (almost)
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the same time, or in the same region at a different time.
One possible replay attack is based on the Time-to-Live (TTL, for
IPv4) or hop limit (for IPv6) field. As routers only forward packets
with TTL > 1, a compromised SMF router can forward an otherwise valid
packet, while drastically reducing the TTL hereof. This will inhibit
recipient routers from later forwarding the same multicast packet,
even if received with a different TTL - essentially a compromised SMF
router thus can instruct its neighbors to block forwarding of valid
multicast packets.
For example, in Figure 1, router A forwards a multicast packet with a
TTL of 64 to the network. A, B, and C are legitimate SMF routers,
and X is the compromised SMF router. In a wireless environment,
jitter is commonly used to avoid systematic collisions in MAC
protocols [RFC5148]. An attacker can thus increase the probability
that its invalid packets arrive first by retransmitting them without
jittering. In this example, router X forwards the packet without
jittering, and reduces the TTL to 1. Router C thus records the
duplicate detection value (hash value for H-DPD, or the header
content of the packets for I-DPD) but stops forwarding it to the next
hops because of the TTL value. When the same packet with normal TTL
value (63 in this case) arrives from router B, it will be discarded
as duplicate packet.
.---.
| X |
--'---' __
packet with TTL=64 / \ packet with TTL=1
/ \
.---. .---.
| A | | C |
'---' '---'
packet with TTL=64 \ .---. /
\-- | B |__/ packet with TTL=63
'---'
Figure 1
As the TTL of a packet is intended to be manipulated by
intermediaries forwarding it, classic methods such as integrity check
values (e.g., digital signatures) are typically calculated with
setting TTL fields to some pre-determined value (e.g., 0) - such is
for example the case for IPsec Authentication Headers - rendering
such an attack more difficult to both detect and counter.
If the compromised SMF router has access to a "wormhole" through the
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network (a directional antenna, a tunnel to a collaborator or a wired
connection, allowing it to bridge parts of a network otherwise
distant), it can make sure that the packets with such an artificially
reduced TTL arrive before their unmodified counterparts.
4.2. Threats to Identification-based Duplicate Packet Detection
I-DPD uses a specific DPD identifier in the packet header to identify
a packet. By default, such packet identification is not provided by
the IP packet header (for both IPv4 and IPv6). Therefore, additional
identification header, such as the fragment header, a hop-by-hop
header option, or IPSec sequencing, must be employed in order to
support I-DPD. The uniqueness of a packet can then be identified by
the [source IP address] of the packet originator, and the [sequence
number] (from the fragment header, hop-by-hop header option, or
IPsec). By doing so, each intermediate router can keep a record of
recently received packets, and determine whether the incoming packet
has been received or not.
4.2.1. Pre-activation Attacks (Pre-Play)
In a wireless environment, or across any other shared channel, a
compromised SMF router can perceive the identification tuple [source
IP address, sequence number] of a packet. It is possible to generate
packet with the same [source IP address, sequence number] pair with
invalid content. If sequence number progression is predictable, then
it is trivial to generate and inject invalid packets with "future"
identification information into the network. If these invalid
packets arrive before the legitimate packets that they're spoofing,
the latter will be treated as a duplicates and discarded. This can
prevent multicast packets from reaching parts of the network.
Figure 2 gives an example of pre-activation attack. A, B, and C are
legitimate SMF routers, and X is the compromised SMF router. The
line between the routers presents the packet forwarding. Router A is
the source and originates a multicast packet with sequence number n.
When router X receives the packet, it generates an invalid packet
with the the source address of A, and sequence number n. If the
invalid packet arrives at router C before the forwarding of router B,
the valid packet will be dropped by C as duplicate packet. An
attacker can manipulate jitter to make sure that the invalid packets
arrive first. Router X can even generate packet with future sequence
numbers (if they are predictable), so that the future legitimate
packets with the same sequence numbers will be dropped as duplicate
ones.
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.---.
| X |
--'---' __
packet with seq=n / \ invalid packet with seq=n
/ \
.---. .---.
| A | | C |
'---' '---'
packet with seq=n \ .---. /
\-- | B |__/ valid packet with seq=n
'---'
Figure 2
As SMF currently does not have any timestamp mechanisms to protect
data packets, there is no viable way to detect such pre-play attacks
by timestamp. Especially, if the attack is based on manipulation of
jitter, the timestamp would not be effective because the timing is
still valid (but with much less value).
4.2.2. De-activation Attacks (Sequence Number wrangling)
A compromised SMF router can also seek to de-activate DPD, by
modifying the sequence number in packets that it forwards. Thus,
routers will not be able to detect an actual duplicate packet as a
duplicate - rather, they will treat them as new packets, i.e.,
process and forward them. This is similar to DoS attack. The
consequence of this attack is an increased channel load, the origin
of which appears to be a router other than the compromised SMF
router.
Given the topology shown in Figure 2, on receiving packet with seq=n,
the attacker X can forward the packet with modified sequence number
n+i. This has two consequences: firstly, router C will not be able
to detect the packet forwarded by X is a duplicate packet; secondly,
the consequent packet with seq=n+i generated by router A probably
will be treated as duplicate packet, and dropped by router C.
4.3. Threats to Hash-based Duplicate Packet Detection
When it is not feasible to have explicit sequence numbers in packet
headers, hash-based DPD can be used. A hash of the non-mutable
fields in the header of and the data payload can be generated, and
recorded at the intermediate routers. A packet can thus be uniquely
identified by the source IP address of the packet, and its hash-
value.
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The hash algorithm used by SMF is being applied only to provide a
reduced probability of collision and is not being used for
cryptographic or authentication purposes. Consequently, a digest
collision is still possible. In case the source router or gateway
identifies that it recently has generated or injected a packet with
the same hash-value, it inserts a "Hash-Assist Value (HAV)" IPv6
header option into the packet, such that calculating the hash also
over this HAV will render the resulting value unique.
4.3.1. Attack on Hash-Assistant Value
The HAV header is helpful when a digest collision happens. However,
it also introduces a potential vulnerability. As the HAV option is
only added when the source or the ingressing SMF router detects that
the coming packet has digest collision with previously generated
packets, it actually can be regarded as a "flag" of potential digest
collision. A compromised SMF router can discover the HAV header, and
be able to conclude a hash collision is possible if the HAV header is
removed. By doing so, other SMF routers receiving the modified
packet will be treated as duplicate packet, and be dropped because it
has the same hash value with precedent packet.
In the example of Figure Figure 3, Router A and B are legitimate SMF
routers, X is a compromised SMF router. A generate two packets P1
and P2, with the same hash value h(P1)=h(P2)=x. Based on SMF
specification, a hash-assistant value (HAV) is added to the latter
packet P2, so that h(P2+HAV)=x', to avoid digest collision. When the
attacker X detects the HAV of P2, it is able to conclude that a
collision is possible by removing the HAV header. By doing so,
packet P2 will be treated as duplicate packet by router B, and be
dropped.
P2 P1 P2 P1
.---. h(P2+HAV)=x' h(P1)=x .---. h(P2)=x h(P1)=x .---.
| A |---------------------------> | X | ----------------------> | B |
`---' `---' `---'
Figure 3
5. Threats to Relay Set Selection
A framework for RSS mechanism, rather than a specific RSS algorithm
is provided by SMF. It is normally achieved by distributed
algorithms that can dynamically generate a topological Connected
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Dominating Set based on 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood information. In
this section, the common threats to the RSS framework are first
discussed. Then the three commonly used algorithms: Essential
Connection Dominating Set (E-CDS) algorithm, Source-based Multipoint
Relay (S-MPR) and Multipoint Relay Connected Dominating Set (MPR-CDS)
are analyzed. As the relay set selection is based on 1-hop and 2-hop
neighborhood information, which rely on NHDP, the threats described
in this section are NHDP-specific.
5.1. Relay Set Selection Common Threats
The common threats to RSS algorithms, including Denial of Service
attack, eavesdropping, message timing attack and broadcast storm have
been discussed in [RFC7186].
5.2. Threats to E-CDS Algorithm
The "Essential Connected Dominating Set" (E-CDS) algorithm [RFC5614]
forms a single CDS mesh for the SMF operating region. It requires
2-hop neighborhood information (the identify of the neighbors, the
link to the neighbors and neighbors' priority information) collected
through NHDP or another process.
An SMF Router select itself as a relay, if:
o The SMF Router has a higher priority than all of its symmetric
neighbors, or
o There does not exist a path from the neighbor with largest
priority to any other neighbor, via neighbors with greater
priority.
A Compromised SMF Router can disrupt the E-CDS algorithm by link
spoofing or identity spoofing.
5.2.1. Link Spoofing
Link spoofing implies that a Compromised SMF Router advertises non-
existing links to another router (present in the network or not).
A Compromised SMF Router can declare itself with high route priority,
and spoofs the links to as many Legitimate SMF Routers as possible to
declare high connectivity. By doing so, it can prevent Legitimate
SMF Routers from self-selecting as relays. As the "super" relay in
the network, the Compromised SMF Router can manipulate the traffic
relayed by it.
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5.2.2. Identity Spoofing
Identity spoofing implies that a compromised SMF router determines
and makes use of the identity of other legitimate routers, without
being authorised to do so. The identity of other routers can be
obtained by overhearing the control messages or source/destination
address from datagram. The compromised SMF router can then generate
control or datagram traffic, pretending to be a legitimate router.
Because E-CDS self-selection is based on the router priority value, a
compromised SMF router can spoof the identity of other legitimate
routers, and declares a different router priority value. If it
declares a higher priority of a spoofed router, it can prevent other
routers from selecting themselves as relays. On the other hand, if
the compromised router declares lower priority of a spoofed router,
it can enforces other routers to selecting themselves as relays, to
degrade the multicast forwarding to classical flooding.
5.3. Threats to S-MPR Algorithm
The source-based multipoint relay (S-MPR) set selection algorithm
enables individual routers, using 2-hop topology information, to
select relays from their set of neighboring routers. MPRs are
selected so that forwarding to the router's complete 2-hop neighbor
set is covered.
An SMF router forwards a multicast packet if and only if:
o the packet is not received before, and
o the neighbor from which the packet was received has selected the
router as MPR.
Because MPR calculation is based on the willingness declared by the
SMF routers, and the connectivity of the routers, it can be disrupted
by both link spoofing and identity spoofing. The threats and its
impacts have been illustrated in section 5.1 of [RFC7186].
5.4. Threats to MPR-CDS Algorithm
MPR-CDS is a derivative from S-MPR. The main difference between
S-MPR and MPR-CDS is that while S-MPR forms a different broadcast
tree for each source in the network, MPR-CDS forms a unique broadcast
tree for all sources in the network.
As MPR-CDS combines E-CDS and S-MPR and the simple combination of the
two algorithms does not address the weakness, the vulnerabilities of
E-CDS and S-MPR that discussed in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 apply
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to MPR-CDS also.
6. Future Work
Neither [RFC6621] nor this document propose mechanisms to secure the
SMF protocol. However, this section aims at discussing possibilities
to secure the protocol in the future and driving new work by
suggesting which threats discussed in the previous sections could be
addressed.
For I-PDP mechanism, employing randomized packet sequence number can
avoid some pre-activation attacks based on sequence number
prediction. If predicable sequence number has to be used, applying
timestamps can mitigate pre-activation attacks.
If NHDP is used as the neighborhood discovery protocol, [RFC7183] is
recommended to be implemented to enable integrity protection to NHDP,
which can help mitigating the threats related to identity spoofing
through the exchange of HELLO messages.
[RFC7183] provides certain protection against identity spoofing by
admitting only trusted routers to the network using Integrity Check
Values (ICVs) in HELLO messages. However, using ICVs does not
address the problem of compromised routers that can generate valid
ICVs. Detecting such compromised routers could be studied in new
work. [RFC7183] mandates implementation of a security mechanism that
is based on shared keys and makes excluding single compromised
routers difficult. Work could be done to facilitate revocation
mechanisms in certain MANET use cases where routers have sufficient
capabilities to support asymmetric keys (such as
[I-D.ietf-manet-ibs]) .
As [RFC7183] does not protect the integrity of the multicast
datagram, and no mechanism is specified to do that for SMF yet, the
duplicate packet detection is still vulnerable to the threats
introduced in Section 4.
If pre-activation/de-activation attacks and attack on hash-assistant
value of the multicast datagrams are to be mitigated, a datagram-
level integrity protection mechanism is desired, by taking
consideration of the identity field or hash-assistant value.
However, this would not be helpful for the attacks on the TTL (or hop
limit for IPv6) field, because the mutable fields are generally not
considered when ICV is calculated.
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7. Security Considerations
This document does not specify a protocol or a procedure. The whole
document, however, reflects on security considerations for SMF for
packet dissemination in MANETs.
8. IANA Considerations
This document contains no actions for IANA.
[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publication.]
9. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Christopher Dearlove (BAE Systems
ATC) who provided detailed review and valuable comments.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "Mobile Ad Hoc
Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)",
RFC 6130, April 2011.
[RFC6621] Macker, J., "Simplified Multicast Forwarding", RFC 6621,
May 2012.
[RFC7186] Yi, J., Herberg, U., and T. Clausen, "Security Threats for
the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 7186,
April 2014.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-manet-ibs]
Dearlove, C., "Identity-Based Signatures for MANET Routing
Protocols", draft-ietf-manet-ibs-03 (work in progress),
September 2014.
[MPR-CDS] Adjih, C., Jacquet, P., and L. Viennot, "Computing
Connected Dominating Sets with Multipoint Relays", Journal
of Ad Hoc and Sensor Wireless Networks 2002, January 2002.
[RFC3626] Clausen, T. and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized Link State
Routing Protocol", RFC 3626, October 2003.
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[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
RFC 4949, August 2007.
[RFC5148] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and B. Adamson, "Jitter
Considerations in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)",
RFC 5148, February 2008.
[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
"Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444,
February 2009.
[RFC5614] Ogier, R. and P. Spagnolo, "Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)
Extension of OSPF Using Connected Dominating Set (CDS)
Flooding", RFC 5614, August 2009.
[RFC7181] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P., and U. Herberg,
"The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2",
RFC 7181, April 2014.
[RFC7182] Herberg, U., Clausen, T., and C. Dearlove, "Integrity
Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks (MANETs)", RFC 7182, April 2014.
[RFC7183] Herberg, U., Dearlove, C., and T. Clausen, "Integrity
Protection for the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)
and Optimized Link State Routing Protocol Version 2
(OLSRv2)", RFC 7183, April 2014.
Authors' Addresses
Jiazi Yi
LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
91128 Palaiseau Cedex,
France
Phone: +33 1 77 57 80 85
Email: jiazi@jiaziyi.com
URI: http://www.jiaziyi.com/
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Internet-Draft Security Threats for SMF March 2015
Thomas Heide Clausen
LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
91128 Palaiseau Cedex,
France
Phone: +33 6 6058 9349
Email: T.Clausen@computer.org
URI: http://www.thomasclausen.org/
Ulrich Herberg
Fujitsu Laboratories of America
1240 E Arques Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94085
USA
Email: ulrich@herberg.name
URI: http://www.herberg.name/
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