Security Threats to Simplified Multicast Forwarding (SMF)
RFC 7985
| Document | Type |
RFC - Informational
(November 2016; No errata)
Updates RFC 7186
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jiazi Yi , Thomas Clausen , Ulrich Herberg | ||
| Last updated | 2018-12-20 | ||
| Replaces | draft-yi-manet-smf-sec-threats | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Christopher Dearlove | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2016-04-14) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 7985 (Informational) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Alvaro Retana | ||
| Send notices to | "Justin Dean" <bebemaster@gmail.com>, aretana@cisco.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA action state | No IANA Actions | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Yi
Request for Comments: 7985 T. Clausen
Updates: 7186 Ecole Polytechnique
Category: Informational U. Herberg
ISSN: 2070-1721 November 2016
Security Threats to Simplified Multicast Forwarding (SMF)
Abstract
This document analyzes security threats to Simplified Multicast
Forwarding (SMF), including vulnerabilities of duplicate packet
detection and relay set selection mechanisms. This document is not
intended to propose solutions to the threats described.
In addition, this document updates RFC 7186 regarding threats to the
relay set selection mechanisms using the Mobile Ad Hoc Network
(MANET) Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) (RFC 6130).
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It has been approved for publication by the Internet
Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the
IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see
Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7985.
Yi, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 7985 Security Threats for SMF November 2016
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. SMF Threat Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Threats to Duplicate Packet Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Attack on the Hop Limit Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Threats to Identification-Based Duplicate Packet
Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Pre-Activation Attacks (Pre-Play) . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. De-activation Attacks (Sequence Number Wrangling) . . 8
4.3. Threats to Hash-Based Duplicate Packet Detection . . . . 9
4.3.1. Attack on the Hash-Assistant Value . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Threats to Relay Set Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Common Threats to Relay Set Selection . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Threats to the E-CDS Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.1. Link Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.2. Identity Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Threats to S-MPR Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. Threats to the MPR-CDS Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Yi, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 7985 Security Threats for SMF November 2016
1. Introduction
This document analyzes security threats to Simplified Multicast
Forwarding (SMF) [RFC6621]. SMF aims at providing basic Internet
Protocol (IP) multicast forwarding in a way that is suitable for
wireless mesh and Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET). SMF consists of
two major functional components: duplicate packet detection (DPD) and
relay set selection (RSS).
SMF is typically used in decentralized wireless environments and is
potentially exposed to various attacks and misconfigurations. In a
wireless environment, some of these attacks and misconfigurations
represent threats of particular significance as compared to what they
would do in wired networks. [RFC6621] briefly discusses several of
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