Network Working Group Eric C. Rosen
Internet Draft Peter Psenak
Expiration Date: September 2004 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Padma Pillay-Esnault
Juniper Networks, Inc.
March 2004
Using an LSA Options Bit to Prevent Looping in BGP/MPLS IP VPNs
draft-ietf-ospf-2547-dnbit-04.txt
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
This document specifies a procedure that deals with a particular
issue that may arise when a Service Provider (SP) provides "BGP/MPLS
IP VPN" service to a customer, and the customer uses OSPFv2 to
advertise its routes to the SP. In this situation, a Customer Edge
(CE) Router and a Provider Edge (PE) Router are OSPF peers, and
customer routes are sent via OSPFv2 from the CE to the PE. The
customer routes are converted into BGP routes, and BGP carries them
across the backbone to other PE routers. The routes are then
converted back to OSPF routes sent via OSPF to other CE routers. As
a result of converting the routes from OSPF to BGP and back to OSPF,
some of the information needed to prevent loops may be lost. A
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procedure is needed to ensure that once a route is sent from a PE to
a CE, the route will be ignored by any PE which receives it back from
a CE. This document specifies the necessary procedure, using one of
the options bits in the LSA (Link State Advertisements) to indicate
that an LSA has already been forwarded by a PE, and should be ignored
by any other PEs that see it.
Table of Contents
1 Specification of Requirements ........................ 2
2 Introduction ......................................... 2
3 Information Loss and Loops ........................... 4
4 Using the LSA Options to Prevent Loops ............... 5
5 Security Considerations .............................. 5
6 Acknowledgments ...................................... 6
7 Authors' Addresses ................................... 6
8 Normative References ................................. 7
9 Intellectual Property Statement ...................... 7
10 Full Copyright Statement ............................. 7
1. Specification of Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. Introduction
[VPN] describes a method by which a Service Provider (SP) can use its
IP backbone to provide an "IP VPN" service to customers. In that
sort of service, a customer's edge devices (CE devices) are connected
to the provider's edge routers (PE routers). Each CE device is in a
single VPN. Each PE device may attach to multiple CEs, of the same
or of different VPNs. A VPN thus consists of a set of "network
segments" connected by the SP's backbone.
A CE exchanges routes with a PE, using a routing protocol that is
jointly agreed to by the customer and the SP. The PE runs that
routing protocol's decision process (i.e., performs the routing
computation) to determine the set of IP address prefixes for which
the following two conditions hold:
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- each address prefix in the set can be reached via that CE
- the path from that CE to each such address prefix does NOT
include the SP backbone (i.e., does not include any PE routers).
The PE routers which attach to a particular VPN redistribute routes
to these address prefixes into BGP, so that they can use BGP to
distribute the VPN's routes to each other. BGP carries these routes
in the "VPN-IPv4 address family", so that they are distinct from
ordinary Internet routes. The VPN-IPv4 address family also extends
the IP addresses on the left so that address prefixes from two
different VPNs are always distinct to BGP, even if both VPNs use the
same piece of the private RFC1918 address space. Thus routes from
different VPNs can be carried by a single BGP instance, and can be
stored in a common BGP table, without fear of conflict.
If a PE router receives a particular VPN-IPv4 route via BGP, and if
that PE is attached to a CE in the VPN to which the route belongs,
then BGP's decision process may install that route in the BGP route
table. If so, the PE translates the route back into an IP route, and
redistributes it to the routing protocol which is running on the link
to that CE.
This methodology provides a "peer model"; CE routers peer with PE
routers, but CE routers at different sites do not peer with each
other.
If a VPN uses OSPFv2 as its internal routing protocol, it is not
necessarily the case that the CE routers of that VPN use OSPFv2 to
peer with the PE routers. Each site in a VPN can use OSPFv2 as its
intra-site routing protocol, while using, e.g., BGP or RIP to
distribute routes to a PE router. However, it is certainly
convenient, when OSPFv2 is being used intra-site, to use it on the
PE-CE link as well, and [VPN] explicitly allows this. In this case,
a PE will run a separate instance of OSPFv2 for each VPN which is
attached to the PE; the PE will in general have multiple VPN-specific
OSPFv2 routing tables.
When OSPFv2 is used on a PE-CE link which belongs to a particular
VPN, the PE router must redistribute to that VPN's OSPFv2 instance
certain routes which have been installed in the BGP routing table.
Similarly, a PE router must redistribute to BGP routes which have
been installed in the VPN-specific OSPF routing tables. Procedures
for this are specified in [VPN-OSPF].
The routes which are redistributed from BGP to OSPFv2 are advertised
in LSAs that are originated by the PE. The PE acts as an OSPF border
router, advertising some of these routes in AS-external LSAs, and
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some in summary LSAs, as specified in [VPN-OSPF].
Similarly, when a PE router receives an LSA from a CE router, it runs
the OSPF routing computation. Any route that gets installed in the
OSPF routing table must be translated into a VPN-IPv4 route and then
redistributed into BGP. BGP will then distribute these routes to the
other PE routers.
3. Information Loss and Loops
A PE, say PE1, may learn a route to a particular VPN-IPv4 address
prefix via BGP. This may cause it to generate a summary LSA or an
AS-external LSA in which it reports that address prefix. This LSA
may then be distributed to a particular CE, say CE1. The LSA may
then be distributed throughout a particular OSPF area, reaching
another CE, say CE2. CE2 may then distribute the LSA to another PE,
say PE2.
As stated in the previous section, PE2 must run the OSPF routing
computation to determine whether a particular address prefix,
reported in an LSA from CE2, is reachable from CE2 via a path which
does not include any PE router. Unfortunately, there is no standard
way to do this. The OSPFv2 LSAs do not necessarily carry the
information needed to enables PE2 to determine that the path to
address prefix X in a particular LSA from CE2 is actually a path that
includes, say, PE1. If PE2 then leaks X into BGP as a VPN-IPv4
route, then PE2 is violating one of the constraints for loop-freedom
in BGP, viz., that routes learned from a particular BGP domain not be
redistributed back into that BGP domain. This could cause a routing
loop to be created.
It is therefore necessary to have a means by which an LSA may carry
the information that a particular address prefix has been learned
from a PE router. Any PE router which receives an LSA with this
information would omit the information in this LSA from its OSPF
routing computation, and thus would not leak the information back
into BGP.
When a PE generates an AS-external LSA, it could use a distinct tag
value to indicate that the LSA is carrying information about an
address prefix for whom the path includes a PE router. However, this
method is not available in the case where the PE generates a Summary
LSA. Per [VPN-OSPF], each PE router must function as an OSPF area 0
router. If the PE-CE link is an area 0 link, then it is possible for
the PE to receive, over that link, a summary LSA which originated at
another PE router. Thus we need some way of marking a summary LSA to
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indicate that it is carrying information about a path via a PE
router.
4. Using the LSA Options to Prevent Loops
The high-order bit of the LSA Options field (a previously unused bit)
is used to solve the problem described in the previous section. We
refer to this bit as the DN bit. When a type 3, 5, or 7 LSA is sent
from a PE to a CE, the DN bit MUST be set. The DN bit MUST be clear
in all other LSA types.
+-------------------------------------+
| DN | * | DC | EA | N/P | MC | E | * |
+-------------------------------------+
Options Field with DN Bit
(RFC 2328, Section A.2)
When the PE receives, from a CE router, a type 3, 5, or 7 LSA with
the DN bit set, the information from that LSA MUST NOT be used during
the OSPF route calculation. As a result, the LSA is not translated
into a BGP route. The DN bit MUST be ignored in all other LSA types.
This prevents routes learned via BGP from being redistributed to BGP.
(This restriction is analogous to the usual OSPF restriction that
inter-area routes which are learned from area 0 are not passed back
to area 0.)
Note that the DN bit has no other effect on LSA handling. In
particular, an LSA with the DN bit set will be put in the topological
database, aged, flooded, etc., just as if DN were not set.
5. Security Considerations
An attacker may cause the DN bit to be set, in an LSA traveling from
CE to PE, when the DN bit should really be clear. This may cause the
address prefixes mentioned in that LSA to be unreachable from other
sites of the VPN. Similarly, an attacker may cause the DN bit to be
clear, in an LSA traveling in either direction, when the DN bit
should really be set. This may cause routing loops for traffic which
is destined to the address prefixes mentioned in that LSA.
These possibilities may be eliminated by using cryptographic
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authentication as specified in section D of [OSPFv2].
6. Acknowledgments
The idea of using the high-order options bit for this purpose is due
to Derek Yeung. Thanks to Yakov Rekhter for his contribution to this
work. We also wish to thank Acee Lindem for his helpful comments.
7. Authors' Addresses
Eric C. Rosen
Cisco Systems, Inc.
1414 Massachusetts Avenue
Boxborough, MA 01719
E-mail: erosen@cisco.com
Peter Psenak
Parc Pegasus,
De Kleetlaan 6A
1831 Diegem
Belgium
E-mail: ppsenak@cisco.com
Padma Pillay-Esnault
Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
E-mail: padma@juniper.net
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8. Normative References
[OSPFv2] "OSPF Version 2", RFC 2328, Moy, J., April 1998
[VPN] "BGP/MPLS IP VPNs", draft-ietf-l3vpn-rfc2547bis-01.txt, Rosen,
Rekhter, et. al., September 2003
[VPN-OSPF] "OSPF as the PE/CE Protocol in BGP/MPLS VPNs", draft-
ietf-l3vpn-ospf-2547-01.txt, Rosen, Psenak, Pillay-Esnault, February
2004
9. Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
ipr@ietf.org.
10. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
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INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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