PKIX Working Group S. Farrell
INTERNET-DRAFT Baltimore Technologies
Expires in six months R. Housley
SPYRUS
March 2000
An Internet Attribute Certificate
Profile for Authorization
<draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-02.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of [RFC2026].
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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Abstract
This specification defines a profile for the use of X.509 Attribute
Certificates in Internet Protocols. Attribute certificates may be
used in a wide range of applications and environments covering a
broad spectrum of interoperability goals and a broader spectrum of
operational and assurance requirements. The goal of this document is
to establish a common baseline for generic applications requiring
broad interoperability as well as limited special purpose
requirements. The profile places emphasis on attribute certificate
support for Internet electronic mail, IPSec, and WWW security
applications.
Table of Contents
Status of this Memo..............................................1
Abstract.........................................................1
Table of Contents................................................1
1. Introduction.................................................3
1.1 Delegation and AC chains...............................4
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1.2 Attribute Certificate Distribution ("push" vs "pull")..4
1.3 Document Structure.....................................6
2. Terminology..................................................7
3. Requirements.................................................8
4. The AC Profile...............................................9
4.1 X.509 Attribute Certificate Definition.................9
4.2 Profile of Standard Fields............................11
4.2.1 Version.........................................11
4.2.2 Holder..........................................11
4.2.3 Issuer..........................................12
4.2.4 Signature.......................................12
4.2.5 Serial Number...................................13
4.2.6 Validity Period.................................13
4.2.7 Attributes......................................13
4.2.8 Issuer Unique Identifier........................14
4.2.9 Extensions......................................14
4.3 Extensions............................................14
4.3.1 Audit Identity..................................14
4.3.2 AC Targeting....................................15
4.3.3 Authority Key Identifier........................16
4.3.4 Authority Information Access....................17
4.3.5 CRL Distribution Points.........................17
4.3.6 No Revocation Available.........................17
4.4 Attribute Types.......................................18
4.4.1 Service Authentication Information..............18
4.4.2 Access Identity.................................19
4.4.3 Charging Identity...............................19
4.4.4 Group...........................................19
4.4.5 Role............................................19
4.4.6 Clearance.......................................20
4.5 Profile of AC Issuer's PKC............................21
5. Attribute Certificate Validation............................22
6. Revocation..................................................23
7. Optional Features...........................................24
7.1 Attribute Encryption..................................24
7.2 Proxying..............................................25
7.3 Use of ObjectDigestInfo...............................26
7.4 AA Controls...........................................27
8. Security Considerations.....................................29
9. References..................................................30
Author's Addresses..............................................31
Full Copyright Statement........................................31
Appendix B: Object Identifiers..................................32
Appendix B: "Compilable" ASN.1 Module...........................33
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1. Introduction
The key words "MUST", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY"
in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
A server makes an access control decision when a client requests
access to a resource offered by that server. The server must ensure
that the client is authorized to access that resource. The server
decision is based on the access control policy, the context of the
request, and the identity and authorizations of the client. The
access control policy and the context of the request are readily
available to the server. Certificates may be used to provide
identity and authorization information about the client.
Similar access control decisions are made in other network
environments, such as a store-and-forward electronic mail
environment. That is, access control decisions are not limited to
client-server protocol environments.
X.509 public key certificates (PKCs) [X.509-97], [X.509-DAM],
[PKIXPROF] bind an identity and a public key. The identity may be
used to support identity-based access control decisions after the
client proves that it has access to the private key that corresponds
to the public key contained in the PKC. The public key is used to
validate digital signatures or cryptographic key management
operations. However, not all access control decisions are identity-
based. Rule-based, role-based, and rank-based access control
decisions require additional information. For example, information
about a client's ability to pay for a resource access may be more
important than the client's identity. Authorization information to
support such access control decisions may be placed in a PKC
extension or placed in a separate attribute certificate (AC).
The placement of authorization information in PKCs is usually
undesirable for two reasons. First, authorization information does
not have the same lifetime as the binding of the identity and the
public key. When authorization information is placed in a PKC
extension, the general result is the shortening of the PKC useful
lifetime. Second, the PKC issuer is not usually authoritative for
the authorization information. This results in additional steps for
the PKC issuer to obtain authorization information from the
authoritative source.
For these reasons, it is often better to separate this authorization
information from the PKC. Yet, this authorization information also
needs to be protected in a fashion similar to a PKC. An attribute
certificate (AC) provides this protection, and it is simply a
digitally signed (or certified) set of attributes.
An AC is a structure similar to a PKC; the main difference being
that it contains no public key. An AC may contain attributes that
specify group membership, role, security clearance, and other access
control information associated with the AC holder. The syntax for
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the AC is defined in Recommendation X.509 (making the term "X.509
certificate" ambiguous). This document specifies a profile of the
X.509 AC suitable for use with authorization information within
Internet protocols.
When making an access control decision based on an AC, an access
control decision function may need to ensure that the appropriate AC
holder is the entity that has requested access. For example, one way
in which the linkage between the request and the AC can be achieved
is if the AC has a "pointer" to a PKC for the requester and that PKC
has been used to authenticate the access request.
As there is often confusion about the difference between PKCs and
ACs, an analogy may help. A PKC can be considered to be like a
passport: it identifies the holder, tends to last for a long time
and should not be trivial to obtain. An AC is more like an entry
visa: it is typically issued by a different authority and does not
last for as long a time. As acquiring an entry visa typically
requires presenting a passport, getting a visa can be a simpler
process.
1.1 Delegation and AC chains
The X.509 standard defines delegation as "Conveyance of privilege
from one entity that holds such privilege, to another entity". It
further defines a delegation path as "An ordered sequence of
certificates which, together with authentication of a privilege
asserter's identity can be processed to verify the authenticity of a
privilege asserter's privilege". It then goes on to define various
mechanisms for use in delegation cases involving "chains" of ACs.
As the administration and processing associated with such AC chains
is potentially much more complex than use of a single AC, and as the
use of ACs in the Internet is today in its infancy, this
specification does not address such AC chains. Other (future)
specifications may address the use of AC chains.
This means that conformant implementations are only REQUIRED to be
able to "handle" a single AC at a time. Note however, that
validation of that AC MAY require validation of a full PKC chain, as
specified in [PKIXPROF].
1.2 Attribute Certificate Distribution ("push" vs "pull")
As discussed above, ACs provide a mechanism to securely provide
authorization information to access control decision functions.
However, there are a number of possible communication paths that an
AC may take.
In some environments it is suitable for a client to "push" an AC to
a server. This means that no new connections between the client and
server are required. It also means that no search burden is imposed
on servers, which improves performance.
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In other cases, it is more suitable for a client simply to
authenticate to the server and for the server to request ("pull")
the client's AC from an AC issuer or a repository. A major benefit
of the "pull" model is that it can be implemented without changes to
the client or client-server protocol. It is also more suitable for
some inter-domain cases where the client's rights should be assigned
within the server's domain, rather than within the client's "home"
domain.
There are a number of possible exchanges that can occur and three
entities involved (client, server and AC issuer). In addition the
use of a directory service or other repository for AC retrieval MAY
be supported.
Figure 1 shows an abstract view of the exchanges that may involve
ACs. This profile does not specify protocol for these exchanges.
+--------------+
| | Server Acquisition
| AC Issuer +----------------------------+
| | |
+--+-----------+ |
| |
| Client |
| Acquisition |
| |
+--+-----------+ +--+------------+
| | AC "push" | |
| Client +-------------------------+ Server |
| | (part of app. protocol) | |
+--+-----------+ +--+------------+
| |
| Client | Server
| Lookup +--------------+ | Lookup
| | | |
+---------------+ Repository +---------+
| |
+--------------+
Figure 1: AC Exchanges
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1.3 Document Structure
The remainder of the document is structured as follows:-
Section 2 defines some terminology
Section 3 specifies the requirements that this profile is to meet
Section 4 contains the profile of the X.509 AC
Section 5 specifies rules for AC validation
Section 6 specifies rules for AC revocation checks
Section 7 specifies optional features which MAY be supported but for
which support is not required for conformance to this profile
Appendices contain the list of OIDs required to support this
specification and a "compilable" ASN.1 module.
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2. Terminology
For simplicity, we use the terms client and server in this
specification. This is not intended to indicate that ACs are only to
be used in client-server environments, e.g. in the S/MIME v3
context, the mail user agent would, by turns, be both "client" and
"server" in the sense the terms are used here.
Term Meaning
AA Attribute Authority, the entity that issues the
AC, synonymous in this specification with "AC
issuer"
AC Attribute Certificate
AC user any entity that parses or processes an AC
AC verifier any entity that checks the validity of an AC and
then makes use of the result
AC issuer the entity which signs the AC, synonymous in this
specification with "AA"
AC holder the entity indicated (perhaps indirectly) in the
holder field of the AC
Client the entity which is requesting the action for
which authorization checks are to be made
Proxying In this specification, Proxying is used to mean
the situation where an application server acts as
an application client on behalf of a user.
Proxying here does not mean granting of authority.
PKC Public Key Certificate - uses the type ASN.1
Certificate defined in X.509 and profiled in RFC
2459. This (non-standard) acronym is used in order
to avoid confusion about the term "X.509
certificate".
Server the entity which requires that the authorization
checks are made
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3. Requirements
This Attribute Certificate profile meets the following requirements.
Time/Validity requirements:
1. Support for short-lived or long-lived ACs is required. Typical
validity periods might be measured in hours, as opposed to
months for X.509 public key certificates. Short validity
periods mean that ACs can be useful without a revocation
mechanism.
Attribute Types:
2. Issuers of ACs should be able to define their own attribute
types for use within closed domains.
3. Some standard attribute types should be defined which can be
contained within ACs, for example "access identity", "group",
"role", "clearance", "audit identity", "charging id" etc.
4. Standard attribute types should be defined so that it is
possible for an AC verifier to distinguish between e.g. the
"Administrators group" as defined by Baltimore and the
"Administrators group" as defined by SPYRUS.
Targeting of ACs:
5. It should be possible to "target" an AC. This means that a
given AC may be "targeted" at one, or a small number of,
servers in the sense that a trustworthy non- target will reject
the AC for authorization decisions.
Push vs. Pull
6. ACs should be defined so that they can either be "pushed" by
the client to the server, or "pulled" by the server from a
repository or other network service (which may be an online AC
issuer).
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4. The AC Profile
Attribute certificates may be used in a wide range of applications
and environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals
and a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements.
The goal of this document is to establish a common baseline for
generic applications requiring broad interoperability and limited
special purpose requirements. In particular, the emphasis will be
on supporting the use of attribute certificates for informal
Internet electronic mail, IPSec, and WWW applications.
This section presents a profile for attribute certificates that will
foster interoperability. This section also defines some private
extensions for the Internet community.
While the ISO/IEC/ITU documents use the 1993 (or later) version of
ASN.1; as has been done for PKCs [PKIXPROF], this document uses the
1988 ASN.1 syntax, the encoded certificate and standard extensions
are equivalent.
Where maximum lengths for fields are specified, these lengths refer
to the DER encoding and do not include the ASN.1 tag or length
fields.
Conforming implementations MUST support the profile specified in
this section.
4.1 X.509 Attribute Certificate Definition
X.509 contains the definition of an Attribute Certificate given
below. Types that are not defined can be found in [PKIXPROF].
AttributeCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
acinfo AttributeCertificateInfo,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING
}
AttributeCertificateInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version AttCertVersion DEFAULT v1,
holder Holder,
issuer AttCertIssuer,
signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
attrCertValidityPeriod AttCertValidityPeriod,
attributes SEQUENCE OF Attribute,
issuerUniqueID UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
extensions Extensions OPTIONAL
}
AttCertVersion ::= INTEGER {v1(0), v2(1) }
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Holder ::= SEQUENCE {
baseCertificateID [0] IssuerSerial OPTIONAL,
-- the issuer and serial number of
-- the holder's Public Key Certificate
entityName [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
-- the name of the claimant or role
objectDigestInfo [2] ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL
-- if present, version must be v2
}
ObjectDigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
digestedObjectType ENUMERATED {
publicKey (0),
publicKeyCert (1),
otherObjectTypes (2) },
-- otherObjectTypes MUST NOT
-- MUST NOT be used in this profile
otherObjectTypeID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
objectDigest BIT STRING
}
AttCertIssuer ::= CHOICE {
oldForm GeneralNames,
newForm [0] SEQUENCE {
issuerName GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
baseCertificateId [0] IssuerSerial OPTIONAL,
objectDigestInfo [1] ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL
--at least one of issuerName, baseCertificateId or --
-- objectDigestInfo must be present --
-- if newForm is used, version must be v2--
}
IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer GeneralNames,
serial CertificateSerialNumber,
issuerUID UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL
}
AttCertValidityPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
notBeforeTime GeneralizedTime,
notAfterTime GeneralizedTime
}
Although the Attribute syntax is defined in [PKIXPROF], we repeat
the definition here for convenience.
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType,
values SET OF AttributeValue
-- at least one value is required --
}
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AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
AttributeValue ::= ANY
Implementers should note that the DER encoding (DER is defined in
[X.208-88]) of the SET OF values requires ordering of the encodings
of the values. Though this issue arises with respect to
distinguished names, and has to be handled by [PKIXPROF]
implementations, its is much more significant in this context, since
the inclusion of multiple values is much more common in ACs.
4.2 Profile of Standard Fields
For all GeneralName fields in this profile the otherName,
x400Address, ediPartyName and registeredID options MUST NOT be used
unless otherwise specified (e.g. as in the description of targeting
extension).
The use of Kerberos [KRB] format names, encoded into the otherName,
SHOULD however, be supported using the krb5PrincipalName OID and the
KerberosName syntax as defined in [PKINIT].
This means that unless otherwise indicated,(e.g. for the role
attribute), conforming implementations MUST be able to support the
dNSName, directoryName, uniformResourceIdentifier and iPAddress
fields in all cases where GeneralName is used. The MUST support
requirements for each of these fields are as specified in
[PKIXPROF], (mainly in section 4.2.1.7).
4.2.1 Version
This MUST be the default value of v1, i.e. not present in the DER
encoding, except where the holder is identified using the optional
objectDigestInfo field, as specified in section 7.3.
4.2.2 Holder
For any environment where the AC is passed in an authenticated
message or session, and where the authentication is based on the use
of an X.509 public key certificate (PKC), the holder field SHOULD
use the baseCertificateID.
With the baseCertificateID option, the holder's PKC serialNumber and
issuer MUST be identical to the AC holder field. The PKC issuer MUST
have a non empty distinguished name which is to be present as the
single value of the holder.baseCertificateID.issuer construct in the
directoryName field. The holder.baseCertificateID.issuerUID field
MUST only be used if the holder's PKC contains an issuerUniqueID
field (in which case, the same value MUST be present in the
holder.baseCertificateID.issuerUID_field). Thus, the
baseCertificateID is only usable with PKC profiles (like [PKIXPROF])
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which mandate that the PKC issuer field contain a non empty
distinguished name value.
Note: An "empty" distinguished name is a distinguished name where
the SEQUENCE OF relative distinguished names is of zero length. In a
DER encoding this has the value '3000'H.
If the holder field uses the entityName option and the underlying
authentication is based on a PKC, then the entityName MUST be the
same as the PKC subject field, unless the PKC subject field contains
an empty distinguished name. In that case, the entityName field MUST
be identical to one of the values of the PKC subjectAltName field
extension. Note that [PKIXPROF] mandates that the subjectAltNames
extension be present if the PKC subject is a non empty distinguished
name.
In any other case where the holder field uses the entityName option
then only one name SHOULD be present.
Implementations conforming to this profile are not required to
support the use of the objectDigest field. However, section 7.3
specifies how this optional feature MAY be used.
Any protocol conforming to this profile SHOULD specify which AC
holder option is to be used and how this fits with the supported
authentication schemes define in that protocol.
4.2.3 Issuer
ACs conforming to this profile MUST use the newForm.issuerName
choice, which MUST contain one and only one GeneralName, which MUST
contain a non empty distinguished name in the directoryName field.
This means that all AC issuers MUST have non empty distinguished
names.
Part of the reason for the use of the issuerName field is that it
allows the AC verifier to be independent of the AC issuer's public
key infrastructure. Using the baseCertificateId field to reference
the AC issuer would mean that the AC verifier would have such a
dependency.
4.2.4 Signature
Contains the algorithm identifier used to validate the AC signature.
This MUST be one of the following algorithms defined in [PKIXPROF]
section 7.2: md5WithRSAEncryption, id-dsa-with-sha1 or sha-
1WithRSAEncryption, or ecdsa-with-SHA1 defined in [ECDSA] section
3.2.
id-dsa-with-sha1 MUST be supported by all AC users. The other
algorithms SHOULD be supported.
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4.2.5 Serial Number
For any conforming AC, the issuer/serialNumber pair MUST form a
unique combination, even if ACs are very short-lived (one second is
the shortest possible validity due to the use of GeneralizedTime).
AC issuers MUST force the serialNumber to be a positive integer,
that is, the sign bit in the DER encoding of the INTEGER value MUST
be zero - this can be done by adding a leading (leftmost) `00'H
octet if necessary. This removes a potential ambiguity in mapping
between a string of octets and an integer value.
Given the uniqueness and timing requirements above serial numbers
can be expected to contain long integers. AC users MUST be able to
handle serialNumber values longer than 32 bits. Conformant ACs MUST
NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets.
There is no requirement that the serial numbers used by any AC
issuer follow any particular ordering, in particular, they need not
be monotonically increasing with time, but they MUST be unique for a
given AC issuer.
4.2.6 Validity Period
The attrCertValidityPeriod (a.k.a. validity) field specifies the
period for which the AC issuer expects that the binding between the
holder and the attributes fields will be valid.
The generalized time type, GeneralizedTime, is a standard ASN.1 type
for variable precision representation of time. Optionally, the
GeneralizedTime field can include a representation of the time
differential between local and Greenwich Mean Time.
For the purposes of this profile, GeneralizedTime values MUST be
expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e.,
times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is
zero. GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds.
(Note that the above is as specified in [PKIXPROF], section
4.1.2.5.2.)
Note that AC users MUST be able to handle the case where an AC is
issued, which (at the time of parsing), has its entire validity
period in the future (a "post-dated" AC). This is valid for some
applications, e.g. backup.
4.2.7 Attributes
The attributes field gives information about the AC holder. When the
AC is used for authorization this will often contain a set of
privileges.
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The attributes field contains a SEQUENCE OF Attribute. Each
Attribute MAY contain a SET OF values. For a given AC each attribute
type OID in the sequence MUST be unique, that is, only one instance
of each attribute can occur in a single AC. All instances can
however, be multi-valued.
AC users MUST be able to handle multiple values for all attribute
types.
Note that an AC MUST contain at least one attribute, that is, the
SEQUENCE OF Attributes MUST NOT be of zero length.
Some standard attribute types are defined in section 4.5.
4.2.8 Issuer Unique Identifier
This field MUST NOT be used unless it is also used in the AC
issuer's PKC, in which case it MUST be used. Note that [PKIXPROF]
states that this field "SHOULD NOT" be used by conforming CAs, but
that applications SHOULD be able to parse PKCs containing the field.
4.2.9 Extensions
The extensions field generally gives information about the AC as
opposed to information about the AC holder.
Section 4.3 defines the extensions that MAY be used with this
profile. An AC that has no extensions conforms to the profile. If
any other critical extension is used, then the AC does not conform
to this profile. An AC that contains additional non-critical
extensions still conforms.
The extensions defined for ACs provide methods for associating
additional attributes with holders. This profile also allows
communities to define private extensions to carry information unique
to those communities. Each extension in an AC may be designated as
critical or non-critical. An AC using system MUST reject an AC if
it encounters a critical extension it does not recognize; however, a
non-critical extension may be ignored if it is not recognized.
Section 4.3 presents recommended extensions used within Internet
certificates and standard locations for information. Communities
may elect to use additional extensions; however, caution should be
exercised in adopting any critical extensions in ACs, which might
prevent use in a general context.
4.3 Extensions.
4.3.1 Audit Identity
In some circumstances it is required (e.g. by data protection/data
privacy legislation) that audit trails do not contain records which
directly identify individuals. This may make the use of the holder
field of the AC unsuitable for use in audit trails.
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In order to allow for such cases an AC MAY contain an audit identity
extension. Ideally it SHOULD be infeasible to derive the AC holder's
identity from the audit identity value except with the co-operation
of the AC issuer.
The value of the audit identity plus the AC issuer/serial SHOULD
then be used for audit/logging purposes. If the value of the audit
identity is suitably chosen then a server/service administrator can
use audit trails to track the behavior of an AC holder without being
able to identify the AC holder.
The server/service administrator in combination with the AC issuer
MUST be able to identify the AC holder in cases where misbehavior is
detected. This means that the AC issuer MUST be able to map
"backwards" from the audit identity to the actual identity of the AC
holder.
Of course, auditing could be based on the AC issuer/serial pair,
however, this method doesn't allow tracking the same AC holder
across different ACs. This means that an audit identity is only
useful if it lasts for longer than the typical AC lifetime - how
much longer is an issue for the AC issuer implementation. Auditing
could also be based on the AC holder's PKC issuer/serial however,
this will often allow the server/service administrator identify the
AC holder.
As the AC verifier might otherwise use the AC subject or some other
identifying value for audit purposes, this extension MUST be
critical when used.
Protocols that use ACs will often expose the identity of the AC
holder in the bits on-the-wire. In such cases, an "opaque" audit
identity does not make use of the AC anonymous, it simply ensures
that the ensuing audit trails are "semi-anonymous".
The value of an audit identity MUST NOT be longer than 20 octets.
name id-pe-ac-auditIdentity
OID { id-pe 4 }
syntax OCTET STRING
criticality must be TRUE
4.3.2 AC Targeting
In order to allow that an AC is "targeted", the target information
extension MAY be used to specify a number of servers/services. The
intent is that the AC SHOULD only be usable at the specified
servers/services - an (honest) AC verifier who is not amongst the
named servers/services MUST reject the AC.
If this extension is not present then the AC is not targeted and may
be accepted by any server.
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In this profile, the targeting information simply consists of a list
of named targets or groups.
The following syntax is used to represent the targeting information:
Targets ::= SEQUENCE OF Target
Target ::= CHOICE {
targetName [0] GeneralName,
targetGroup [1] GeneralName,
targetCertificate [2] IssuerSerial,
targetDigest [3] ObjectDigestInfo
}
The targetCertificate and targetDigest fields are only present to
allow future compatibility with [X.509-DAM] and MUST NOT be used.
The targets check passes if the current server (recipient) is one of
the targetName fields in the targets part, or, the current server is
a member of one of the targetGroup fields in the targets part. In
this case, the current server is said to "match" the targeting
extension.
How the membership of a target within a targetGroup is determined is
not defined here. It is assumed that any given target "knows" the
names of the targetGroup's to which it belongs or can otherwise
determine its membership. For example, if the targetGroup were to be
a DNS domain and the AC verifier knows the DNS domain to which it
belongs. Another example would be where the targetGroup is
"PRINTERS" and the AC verifier "knows" that it's a printer or print
server.
name id-pe-ac-targeting
<<will change this to id-ce-targetInformation from DAM if ISO can
change its syntax otherwise stick with the PKIX OID and live with
two different targeting extensions>>
OID { id-pe 5 }
syntax Targets
criticality MUST be TRUE
4.3.3 Authority Key Identifier
The authorityKeyIdentifier extension as profiled in [PKIXPROF] MAY
be used to assist the AC verifier in checking the signature of the
AC. The [PKIXPROF] description should be read as if "CA" meant "AC
issuer". As with PKCs this extension SHOULD be included in ACs.
Note: An AC where the issuer field used the baseCertificateID choice
would not need an authorityKeyIdentifier extension as it is
explicitly linked to the key in the referred certificate. However,
as this profile states (in section 4.2.3) that ACs MUST use the
entityName choice, this does not arise here.
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name id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier
OID { id-ce 35 }
syntax AuthorityKeyIdentifier
criticality MUST be FALSE
4.3.4 Authority Information Access
The authorityInformationAccess extension as defined in [PKIXPROF]
MAY be used to assist the AC verifier in checking the revocation
status of the AC. Note that support for the id-ad-caIssuers
accessMethod defined in [PKIXPROF] is NOT REQUIRED as in this
profile, the authorityInformationAccess is only used for revocation
status checking. Conformant ACs containing this extension MUST
contain exactly one AccessDescription.
The following accessMethod is used to indicate that revocation
status checking is provided for this AC, using the OCSP protocol
defined in [OCSP]:
id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 }
The accessLocation must contain a URI, this MUST contain an HTTP
URL, specifying the location of an OCSP responder. The AC issuer
MUST, of course, maintain an OCSP responder at this location.
name id-ce-authorityInfoAccess
OID { id-pe 1 }
syntax AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax
criticality MUST be FALSE
4.3.5 CRL Distribution Points
The crlDistributionPoints extension as profiled in [PKIXPROF] MAY be
used to assist the AC verifier in checking the revocation status of
the AC. See section 6 on revocation below for details.
Exactly one distribution point MUST be present, it MUST use the
DistributionPointName option, which MUST contain a fullName, which
MUST contain a single name form. That name MUST contain either an
HTTP URL or a distinguished name.
name id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints
OID { id-ce 31 }
syntax CRLDistPointsSyntax
criticality MUST be FALSE
4.3.6 No Revocation Available
This extension (imported from [X.509-DAM]) allows an AC issuer to
indicate that no revocation information will be made available for
this AC.
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This extension MUST be non-critical, on the basis that an AC
verifier that does not understand it can still find a revocation
list (for example), but won't ever find an entry for the AC.
name id-ce-noRevAvail
OID { id-ce 56 }
syntax NULL (i.e. '0500'H is the DER encoding)
criticality MUST be FALSE
4.4 Attribute Types
Some of the attribute types defined below make use of the
IetfAttrSyntax type defined below. The reasons for using this type
are:
1. It allows a separation between the AC issuer and the attribute
policy authority. This is useful for situations where a single
policy authority (e.g. an organization) allocates attribute
values, but where multiple AC issuers are deployed for
performance, network or other reasons.
2. The syntaxes allowed for values are restricted to OCTET STRING
OID and UTF8String, which reduces some of the matching
complexities associated with more general syntaxes. All multi-
valued attributes using this syntax are restricted so that each
value MUST use the same choice of value syntax, that is, it is
not allowed that one value use an OID but that a second value
uses a string.
IetfAttrSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
policyAuthority [0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
values SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
octets OCTET STRING,
oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
string UTF8String
}
}
In the descriptions below, each attribute type is tagged as either
"Multiple Allowed" or "One Attribute value only; multiple values
within the IetfAttrSyntax". This refers to the SET OF
AttributeValue, the AttributeType still only occurs once, as
specified in section 4.2.7.
4.4.1 Service Authentication Information
This attribute type identifies the AC holder to the server/service
by a name and MAY include optional service specific authentication
information. Typically this will contain a username/password pair
for a "legacy" application.
This attribute type will typically need to be encrypted if the
authInfo field contains sensitive information (e.g. a password).
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name id-aca-authenticationInfo
OID { id-aca 1 }
Syntax SvceAuthInfo
values: Multiple allowed
SvceAuthInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
service GeneralName,
ident GeneralName,
authInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
4.4.2 Access Identity
An access identity identifies the AC holder to the server/service.
For this attribute the authInfo field MUST NOT be present.
name id-aca-accessIdentity
OID { id-aca 2 }
syntax SvceAuthInfo
values: Multiple allowed
4.4.3 Charging Identity
This attribute type identifies the AC holder for charging purposes.
Note that, in general, the charging identity will be different from
other identities of the holder, for example, when the holderÆs
company is to be charged for service.
name id-aca-chargingIdentity
OID { id-aca 3 }
syntax IetfAttrSyntax
values: One Attribute value only; multiple values within the
IetfAttrSyntax
4.4.4 Group
This attribute carries information about group memberships of the AC
holder.
name id-aca-group
OID { id-aca 4 }
syntax IetfAttrSyntax
values: One Attribute value only; multiple values within the
IetfAttrSyntax
4.4.5 Role
This attribute (imported from [X.509-DAM]) carries information about
role allocations of the AC holder.
The syntax used for this attribute is:
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RoleSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
roleAuthority [0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
roleName [1] GeneralName
}
The roleAuthority field MUST NOT be used. The roleName field MUST be
present and MUST use the uniformResourceIdentifier field of the
GeneralName.
name id-at-role
OID { id-aca 5 }
syntax RoleSyntax
values: Multiple allowed
4.4.6 Clearance
This attribute (imported from [X.501]) carries clearance (security
labeling) information about the AC holder.
Clearance ::= SEQUENCE {
policyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
classList ClassList DEFAULT {unclassified},
securityCategories
SET OF SecurityCategory OPTIONAL
}
ClassList ::= BIT STRING {
unmarked (0),
unclassified (1),
restricted (2)
confidential (3),
secret (4),
topSecret (5)
}
SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
type [0] IMPLICIT OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type
}
-- This is the same as the original syntax which was defined
-- using the MACRO construct, as follows:
-- SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
-- type [0] IMPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY,
-- value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type
-- }
--
-- SECURITY-CATEGORY MACRO ::=
-- BEGIN
-- TYPE NOTATION ::= type | empty
-- VALUE NOTATION ::= value (VALUE OBJECT IDENTIFIER)
-- END
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The security category value above can uses the ASN.1 ANY construct.
Conformant ACs MUST only use UTF8String, OID and OCTET STRING
syntaxes for this value.
name { id-at-clearance }
OID { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) module(1) selected-
attribute-types(5) clearance (55) }
syntax Clearance - imported from [X.501]
values Multiple allowed
4.5 Profile of AC Issuer's PKC
The AC Issuer's PKC MUST conform to [PKIXPROF] and its keyUsage MUST
NOT explicitly indicate that the AC issuer can't sign. In order to
avoid confusion (e.g. over serial numbers or revocations) an AC
issuer MUST NOT also be a PKC Issuer (i.e. it can't be a CA as
well), so the AC Issuer's PKC MUST NOT have a basicConstraints
extension with isACA set to TRUE.
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5. Attribute Certificate Validation
This section describes a basic set of rules that all "valid" ACs
MUST satisfy. Some additional checks are also described which AC
verifiers MAY choose to implement.
To be valid an AC MUST satisfy all of the following:
1. The AC signature must be cryptographically correct and the AC
issuer's entire certification path (including the AC issuer's
PKC) MUST be verified in accordance with [PKIXPROF].
2. The AC issuer's PKC MUST also conform to the profile specified
in section 4.5 above.
3. The AC issuer MUST be directly trusted as an AC issuer (by
configuration or otherwise).
4. The time for which the AC is being evaluated MUST be within the
AC validity (if the evaluation time is equal to either
notBeforeTime or notAfterTime then the AC is timely, i.e. this
check succeeds). Note that in some applications, the evaluation
time MAY not be the same as the current time.
5. The AC targeting check MUST pass (see section 4.3.2 above)
6. If the AC contains any "unsupported" critical extensions then
the AC MUST be rejected.
"Support" for an extension in this context means:
a. the AC verifier MUST be able to parse the extension value, and,
b. where the extension value SHOULD cause the AC to be rejected, the
AC verifier MUST reject the AC.
Additional Checks:
1. The AC MAY be rejected on the basis of further AC verifier
configuration, for example an AC verifier may be configured to
reject ACs which contain or lack certain attribute types.
2. If the AC verifier provides an interface that allows
applications to query the contents of the AC, then the AC
verifier MAY filter the attributes from the AC on the basis of
configured information, e.g. an AC verifier might be configured
not to return certain attributes to certain targets.
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6. Revocation
In many environments, the validity period of an AC is less than the
time required to issue and distribute revocation information.
Therefore, short-lived ACs typically do not require revocation
support. However, long-lived ACs and environments where ACs enable
high value transactions MAY require revocation support.
The basic approach taken is to allow use of the following AC
revocation related schemes.
"Never revoke" scheme: ACs may be marked so that the relying party
understands that no revocation status information will be made
available. A noRevAvail extension as defined in section 4.3.6 above
MUST be present in the AC to indicate this.
Where no noRevAvail is not present, then the AC issuer is implicitly
stating that revocation status checks are supported and some method
MUST be provided to allow AC verifiers to establish the revocation
status of the AC.
"Pointer in AC" scheme: ACs may be marked (like PKCs) to "point" to
sources of revocation status information (using an
authorityInfoAccess or crlDistributionPoints extension in the AC
itself).
For AC users, the "never revoke" scheme MUST be supported, the
"pointer in AC" scheme SHOULD be supported. If only the "never
revoke" scheme is supported, then all ACs that do not contain a
noRevAvail extension, MUST be rejected.
For AC issuers, the "never revoke" scheme MUST be supported. If all
ACs that will ever be issued by that AC issuer, will contain a
noRevAvail extension, then the "pointer in AC" scheme NEED NOT be
supported. If any AC can be issued that does not contain the
noRevAvail extension, then the "pointer in AC" scheme MUST be
supported.
All conformant ACs MUST contain exactly one of the noRevAvail,
authorityInformationAccess or crlDistributionPoints extensions. That
is, the crlDistributionPoints, authorityInformationAccess and
noRevAvail extensions are mutually exclusive for a single AC and an
AC MUST NOT contain more than one of these extensions. This differs
from the case with PKCs. An AC verifier MAY use other (e.g.
configured) sources for AC revocation status information.
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7. Optional Features
This section specifies features that MAY be implemented. Conformance
to this specification does NOT require support for these features.
7.1 Attribute Encryption
Where an AC will be carried in clear within an application protocol
or where an AC contains some sensitive information (e.g. a legacy
application username/password) then encryption of AC attributes MAY
be needed.
When a set of attributes are to be encrypted within an AC, the
cryptographic message syntax, EnvelopedData structure [CMS] is used
to carry the ciphertext(s) and associated per-recipient keying
information.
This type of attribute encryption is targeted, which means that
before the AC is signed the attributes have been encrypted for a set
of predetermined recipients.
The AC then contains the ciphertext(s) inside its signed data. The
"enveloped-data" (id-envelopedData) ContentType is used and the
content field will contain the EnvelopedData type.
The set of ciphertexts is included into the AC as the value of an
encrypted attributes attribute. Only one encrypted attributes
attribute can be present in an AC - however it MAY be multi-valued
and each of its values will contain an EnvelopedData.
Each value can contain a set of attributes (each possibly a multi-
valued attribute) encrypted for a set of recipients.
The cleartext that is encrypted has the type:
ACClearAttrs ::= SEQUENCE {
acIssuer GeneralName,
acSerial INTEGER,
attrs SEQUENCE OF Attribute
}
The DER encoding of the ACClearAttrs structure is used as the
encryptedContent field of the EnvelopedData, i.e. the DER encoding
MUST be embedded in an OCTET STRING.
The acIssuer and acSerial fields are present to prevent ciphertext
stealing - when an AC verifier has successfully decrypted an
encrypted attribute it MUST then check that the AC issuer and
serialNumber fields contain the same values. This prevents a
malicious AC issuer from copying ciphertext from another AC issuer's
AC into an AC issued by the malicious AC issuer.
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The procedure for an AC issuer when encrypting attributes is
illustrated by the following (any other procedure that gives the
same result MAY be used):
1. Identify the sets of attributes that are to be encrypted for
each set of recipients.
2. For each attribute set which is to be encrypted:
2.1. Create an EnvelopedData structure for the data for this
set of recipients.
2.2. Encode the EnvelopedData as a value of the
EncryptedAttributes attribute
2.3. Ensure the cleartext attribute(s) are not present in the
to-be-signed AC
3. Add the EncryptedAttribute (with its multiple values) to the
AC
Note that the rule that each attribute type (the OID) only occurs
once may not hold after decryption. That is, an AC MAY contain the
same attribute type both in clear and in encrypted form (and indeed
more than once if the decryptor is a recipient for more than one
EnvelopedData). One approach implementers may choose, would be to
merge attributes values following decryption in order to re-
establish the "once only" constraint.
name id-aca-encAttrs
OID { id-aca 6}
Syntax ContentInfo
values Multiple Allowed
If an AC contains attributes apparently encrypted for the AC
verifier then the decryption process MUST not fail - if decryption
fails then the AC MUST be rejected.
7.2 Proxying
In some circumstances, a server needs to proxy an AC when it acts as
a client (for another server) on behalf of the AC holder. Such
proxying may have to be under the AC issuer's control, so that not
every AC is proxiable and so that a given proxiable AC can be
proxied in a targeted fashion. Support for chains of proxies (with
more than one intermediate server) is also sometimes required. Note
that this does not involve a chain of ACs.
In order to meet this requirement we define another extension,
ProxyInfo, similar to the targeting extension.
When this extension is present the AC verifier must check that the
entity from which the AC was received was allowed to send it and
that the AC is allowed to be used by this verifier.
The proxying information consists of a set of proxy information,
each of which is a set of targeting information. If the verifier and
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the sender of the AC are both named in the same proxy set then the
AC can be accepted (the exact rule is given below).
The effect is that the AC holder can send the AC to any valid target
which can then only proxy to targets which are in one of the same
"proxy sets" as itself.
The following data structure is used to represent the
targeting/proxying information.
ProxyInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF Targets
As in the case of targeting, the targetCertificate and targetDigest
fields MUST NOT be used.
A proxy check succeeds if either one of the conditions below is met:
1.
The identity of the sender as established by the underlying
authentication service matches the holder field of the AC, and,
the current server "matches" any one of the proxy sets (where
"matches" is as defined for the targeting check in section 4.3.2
above).
2.
The identity of the sender as established by the underlying
authentication service "matches" one of the proxy sets (call it
set "A"), and, the current server is one of the targetName fields
in the set "A", or, the current server is a member of one of the
targetGroup fields in set "A".
Where an AC is proxied more than once a number of targets will be on
the path from the original client, which is normally, but not
always, the AC holder. In such cases prevention of AC "stealing"
requires that the AC verifier MUST check that all targets on the
path are members of the same proxy set. It is the responsibility of
the AC using protocol to ensure that a trustworthy list of targets
on the path is available to the AC verifier.
name id-pe-ac-proxying
OID { id-pe 7 }
syntax ProxyInfo
criticality MUST be TRUE
7.3 Use of ObjectDigestInfo
In some environments it may be required that the AC is not linked
either to an identity (via entityName) or to a PKC (via
baseCertificateID). The objectDigestInfo choice in the holder field
allows support for this requirement.
If the holder is identified via the objectDigestInfo field then the
AC version field MUST contain v2 (i.e. the integer 1).
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The basic idea is to link the AC to an object by placing a hash of
that object into the holder field of the AC. For example, this
allows production of ACs that are linked to public keys rather than
names, or production of ACs which contain privileges associated with
an executable object (e.g. a Java class).
However, this profile only specifies how to use a hash over a public
key or PKC, that is, conformant ACs MUST NOT use the
otherObjectTypes value for the digestedObjectType.
In order to link an AC to a public key the hash must be calculated
over the representation of that public key which would be present in
a PKC, specifically, the input for the hash algorithm MUST be the
DER encoding of a SubjectPublicKeyInfo representation of the key.
Note: This includes the AlgorithmIdentifier as well as the BIT
STRING. The rules given in [PKIXPROF] and [ECDSA] for encoding keys
MUST be followed. In this case the digestedObjectType MUST be
publicKey and the otherObjectTypeID field MUST NOT be present.
Note that if the public key value used as input to the hash function
has been extracted from a PKC, then it is possible that the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo from that PKC is NOT the value which should be
hashed. This can occur if, e.g. DSA Dss-parms are inherited as
described in section 7.3.3 of [PKIXPROF]. The correct input for
hashing in this context will include the value of the parameters
inherited from the CA's PKC, and thus may differ from the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo present in the PKC.
Implementations which support this feature MUST be able to handle
the representations of keys for the algorithms specified in section
7.3 of [PKIXPROF] and those specified in [ECDSA]. In this case the
digestedObjectType MUST be publicKey and the otherObjectTypeID field
MUST NOT be present.
In order to link an AC to a PKC via a digest, the digest MUST be
calculated over the DER encoding of the entire PKC (i.e. including
the signature bits). In this case the digestedObjectType MUST be
publicKeyCert and the otherObjectTypeID field MUST NOT be present.
7.4 AA Controls
During AC validation a relying party has to answer the question: "is
this AC issuer trusted to issue ACs containing this attribute?" The
AAControls PKC extension, intended to be used in CA and AC Issuer
PKCs, MAY be used to help answer the question.
Note that this extension is quite likely to change in future based
on experience with the use of ACs in the Internet.
id-pe-aaControls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 6 }
AAControls ::= SEQUENCE {
pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL,
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permittedAttrs [0] AttrSpec OPTIONAL,
excludedAttrs [1] AttrSpec OPTIONAL,
permitUnSpecified BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE
}
AttrSpec::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
The aaControls extension is used as follows:
The pathLenConstraint, if present, is interpreted as in [PKIXPROF],
but now restricts the allowed "distance" between the AA CA, (a CA
directly trusted to include AAControls in its PKCs), and the AC
issuer.
The permittedAttrs field specifies a set of attribute types that any
AC issuer below this AA CA is allowed to include in ACs. If this
field is not present, it means that no attribute types are
explicitly allowed (though the permitUnSpecified field may open
things up).
The excludedAttrs field specifies a set of attribute types that no
AC issuer is allowed to include in ACs. If this field is not
present, it means that no attribute types are explicitly disallowed
(though the permitUnSpecified field may close things down).
The permitUnSpecified field specifies how to handle attribute types
which are not present in either the permittedAttrs or excludedAttrs
fields. TRUE (the default) means that any unspecified attribute type
is allowed in ACs; FALSE means that no unspecified attribute type is
allowed.
Where aaControls are used then the following additional checks on an
AA's PKC chain MUST all succeed for the AC to be valid:
1. Some CA on the AC's certificate path MUST be directly trusted
to issue PKCs which precede the AC issuer in the certification
path, call this CA the "AA CA".
2. All PKC's on the path from the AA CA down to and including the
AC issuer's PKC MUST contain an aaControls extension as defined
below (the PKC with the AA CA's as subject need not contain
this extension).
3. Only those attributes in the AC which are allowed according to
all of the aaControls extension values in all of the PKCs from
the AA CA to the AC issuer, may be used for authorization
decisions, all other attributes MUST be ignored (note that this
check MUST be applied to the set of attributes following
attribute decryption and that in such cases the id-aca-encAttrs
type MUST also be checked).
name id-pe-aaControls
OID { id-pe 6 }
syntax AAControls
criticality MAY be TRUE
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8. Security Considerations
Implementers MUST ensure that following validation of an AC, only
attributes that the issuer is trusted to issue are used in
authorization decisions. Other attributes, which MAY be present MUST
be ignored. Given that the AA controls PKC extension is optional to
implement, this means that AC verifiers MUST be provided with the
required information by other means - e.g. by configuration. This
becomes very important if an AC verified trusts more than one AC
issuer.
There is often a requirement to map between the authentication
supplied by a particular protocol (e.g. TLS, S/MIME) and the AC
holder's identity. If the authentication uses PKCs then this mapping
is straightforward. However, it is envisaged that ACs will also be
used in environments where the holder may be authenticated using
other means. Implementers SHOULD be very careful in mapping the
authenticated identity to the AC holder.
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9. References
[CMC] Myers, M., et al. "Certificate Management Messages over
CMS", draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-05.txt, July 1999.
[CMP] Adams, C., Farrell, S., "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure - Certificate Management Protocols",
RFC2510.
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630.
[ESS] Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
RFC2634.
[ECDSA] D. Johnson, W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Representation of Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) Keys and Signatures in
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates"
draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-ecdsa-02.txt, October 1999.
[LDAP] Wahl, M., et al., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(v3)", RFC 2251.
[KRB] Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network
Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510.
[PKINIT] Tung, B., et al., "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
Authentication in Kerberos", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-
init-10.txt
[PKIXPROF] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, T, & Solo, D., "Internet
Public Key Infrastructure - X.509 Certificate and CRL
profile",RFC 2459.
[OCSP] Myers, M., et al., " X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure - Online Certificate Status Protocol -
OCSP", RFC 2560.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
3", RFC 2026, BCP 9, October 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119.
[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 : Information Technology -
Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models,
1993.
[X.208-88] CCITT Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988.
[X.209-88] CCITT Recommendation X.209: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1).
1988.
[X.501-88] CCITT Recommendation X.501: The Directory - Models.
1988.
[X.509-88] CCITT Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework. 1988.
[X.509-97] ITU-T Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework. 1997.
[X.509-DAM] ISO 9594-8 Information Technology - Open systems
Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication
Framework - Draft Amendment 1: Certificate Extensions,
October 1999.
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Author's Addresses
Stephen Farrell,
Baltimore Technologies
61/62 Fitzwilliam Lane,
Dublin 2,
IRELAND
tel: +353-1-647-3000
email: stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie
Russell Housley,
SPYRUS,
381 Elden Street,
Suite 1120,
Herndon, VA 20170,
USA
email: housley@spyrus.com
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
are included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition,
the ASN.1 module presented in Appendix B may be used in whole or in
part without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This
document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT
NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN
WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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Appendix B: Object Identifiers
This (normative) appendix lists the new object identifiers which are
defined in this specification. Some of these are required only for
support of optional features and are not required for conformance to
this profile.
This specification mandates support for OIDs which have arc elements
with values that are less than 2^28, i.e. they MUST be between 0 and
268,435,455 inclusive. This allows each arc element to be
represented within a single 32 bit word. Implementations MUST also
support OIDs where the length of the dotted decimal (see [LDAP],
section 4.1.2) string representation can be up to 100 bytes
(inclusive). Implementations MUST be able to handle OIDs with up to
20 elements (inclusive). AA's SHOULD NOT issue ACs which contain
OIDs that breach these requirements.
The following OIDs are imported from [PKIXPROF]:
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
id-mod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 0 }
id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 }
id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
The following new ASN.1 module OID is defined:
id-mod-attribute-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-mod 12 }
The following AC extension OIDs are defined:
id-pe-ac-auditIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 4 }
id-pe-ac-targeting OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 5 }
id-pe-ac-proxying OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 7 }
The following PKC extension OIDs are defined:
id-pe-aaControls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 6 }
The following attribute OIDs are defined:
id-aca OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 10 }
id-aca-authenticationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 1 }
id-aca-accessIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 2 }
id-aca-chargingIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 3 }
id-aca-group OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 4 }
id-aca-encAttrs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 6 }
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Appendix B: "Compilable" ASN.1 Module
PKIXAttributeCertificate {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-attribute-cert(12)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
-- PKIX Certificate Extensions
Attribute, AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateSerialNumber,
Extensions, UniqueIdentifier,
id-pkix, id-pe, id-kp, id-ad
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5)
pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
GeneralName, GeneralNames
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5)
pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)} ;
id-pe-ac-auditIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 4 }
id-pe-ac-targeting OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 5 }
id-pe-aaControls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 6 }
id-pe-ac-proxying OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 7 }
id-aca OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 10 }
id-aca-authenticationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 1 }
id-aca-accessIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 2 }
id-aca-chargingIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 3 }
id-aca-group OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 4 }
-- { id-aca 5 } is reserved
id-aca-encAttrs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 6 }
AttributeCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
acinfo AttributeCertificateInfo,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING
}
AttributeCertificateInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version AttCertVersion DEFAULT v1,
holder Holder,
issuer AttCertIssuer,
signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
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serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
attrCertValidityPeriod AttCertValidityPeriod,
attributes SEQUENCE OF Attribute,
issuerUniqueID UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
extensions Extensions OPTIONAL
}
AttCertVersion ::= INTEGER {v1(0), v2(1) }
Holder ::= SEQUENCE {
baseCertificateID [0] IssuerSerial OPTIONAL,
-- the issuer and serial number of
-- the holder's Public Key Certificate
entityName [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
-- the name of the claimant or role
objectDigestInfo [2] ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL
-- if present, version must be v2
}
ObjectDigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
digestedObjectType ENUMERATED {
publicKey (0),
publicKeyCert (1),
otherObjectTypes (2) },
-- otherObjectTypes MUST NOT
-- MUST NOT be used in this profile
otherObjectTypeID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
objectDigest BIT STRING
}
AttCertIssuer ::= CHOICE {
oldForm GeneralNames,
newForm [0] SEQUENCE {
issuerName GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
baseCertificateId [0] IssuerSerial OPTIONAL,
objectDigestInfo [1] ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL
-- at least one of issuerName, baseCertificateId or --
-- objectDigestInfo must be present --
-- if newForm is used, version must be v2--
}
IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer GeneralNames,
serial CertificateSerialNumber,
issuerUID UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL
}
AttCertValidityPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
notBeforeTime GeneralizedTime,
notAfterTime GeneralizedTime
}
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Targets ::= SEQUENCE OF Target
Target ::= CHOICE {
targetName [0] GeneralName,
targetGroup [1] GeneralName,
targetCertificate [2] IssuerSerial,
targetDigest [3] ObjectDigestInfo
}
IetfAttrSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
policyAuthority[0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
values SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
octets OCTET STRING,
oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
string UTF8String
}
}
SvceAuthInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
service GeneralName,
ident GeneralName,
authInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
Clearance ::= SEQUENCE {
policyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
classList ClassList DEFAULT {unclassified},
securityCategories
SET OF SecurityCategory OPTIONAL
}
ClassList ::= BIT STRING {
unmarked (0),
unclassified (1),
restricted (2),
confidential (3),
secret (4),
topSecret (5)
}
SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
type [0] IMPLICIT OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type
}
AAControls ::= SEQUENCE {
pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL,
permittedAttrs [0] AttrSpec OPTIONAL,
excludedAttrs [1] AttrSpec OPTIONAL,
permitUnSpecified BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE
}
AttrSpec::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
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ACClearAttrs ::= SEQUENCE {
acIssuer GeneralName,
acSerial INTEGER,
attrs SEQUENCE OF Attribute
}
ProxyInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF Targets
END
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Appendix C: Changes History
<<This Appendix to be deleted after last call>>
This appendix lists major changes since the previous revision.
Major changes since last revision:
Changes from -01 to -02
1. Re-Synchronized with X.509 DAM
2. Deleted AC chains concept
3. Moved AAControls to "optional features" section
4. Samples will be a separate draft
5. Revocation: now using X.509 DAM (noRevAvail) and standard 2459
mechanisms only
6. Deleted the special wildcard target "ALL"
Changes from -00 to -01
1. Re-structured conformance to profile + options as per Oslo
consensus
2. Moved acquisition protocol (LAAP)_to separate I-D
3. Removed restrictions entirely
4. Added new AC revocation options
5. Added optional support for use of objectDigestInfo for keys
6. Added optional support for chains of ACs
7. Changed some syntax:
Added UTF8String to IetfAttrSyntax value choice
Split target & proxy extensions, removed owner from proxyInfo
8. Allocated PKIX OIDs (note: check with repository before using
these, the PKIX arc is currently available at
http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/pkix-oid.asn)
9. Added compiled ASN.1 module
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