Network Working Group S. Santesson
Internet-Draft 3xA Security
Intended status: Proposed Standard P. Hallam-Baker
Updates: 2560 (once approved) Default Deny Security
Expires: September 9, 2010 March 8, 2010
OCSP Algorithm Agility
draft-ietf-pkix-ocspagility-08
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Abstract
The OSCP specification defined in RFC 2560 [RFC2560] requires server
responses to be signed but does not specify a mechanism for selecting
the signature algorithm to be used. This may lead to avoidable
interoperability failures in contexts where multiple signature
algorithms are in use. This document specifies rules for server
signature algorithm selection and an extension that allows a client
to advise a server that specific signature algorithms are supported.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 OCSP Algorithm Agility Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 Updates to Mandatory and Optional Cryptographic Algorithms . . . 4
4 Client Indication of Preferred Signature Algorithms . . . . . . 5
5 Responder Signature Algorithm Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1 Dynamic Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2 Static Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1 Use of insecure algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2 Man in the Middle Downgrade Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.3. Denial of Service Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A - ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.2 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1 Introduction
1.1 Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2 OCSP Algorithm Agility Requirements
OCSP RFC 2560 [RFC2560] defines a protocol for obtaining certificate
status information from an online service. An OCSP Responder may or
may not be issued an OCSP Responder certificate by the CA that issued
the certificate whose status is being queried. An OCSP Responder may
provide pre-signed OCSP responses or may sign responses when queried.
RFC 2560 [RFC2560] specifies a means for an OCSP responder to
indicate the signature and digest algorithms used in a response but
not how those algorithms are specified. The only algorithm
requirements established by that protocol specification are that the
OCSP client SHALL support the DSA sig-alg-oid specified in section
7.2.2 of [RFC2459] and SHOULD be capable of processing RSA signatures
as specified in section 7.2.1 of [RFC2459]. The only requirement
placed on responders by RFC 2560 is that they SHALL support the SHA1
hashing algorithm.
Since algorithms other than the mandatory to implement algorithms are
Allowed, and since a client currently has no mechanism to indicate
it's algorithm preferences, there is always a risk that a server
choosing a non-mandatory algorithm, will generate a response that the
client may not support.
While an OCSP Responder may apply rules for algorithm selection,
e.g., using the signature algorithm employed by the CA for signing
CRLs and certificates, such rules may fail in common situations:
o The algorithm used to sign the CRLs and certificates may not be
consistent with key pair being used by the OCSP Responder to sign
responses.
o A request for an unknown certificate provides no basis for a
responder to select from among multiple algorithm options.
The last criterion cannot be resolved through the information
available from in-band signaling using the RFC 2560 [RFC2560]
protocol, without modifying the protocol.
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In addition, an OCSP Responder may wish to employ different signature
algorithms than the one used by the CA to sign certificates and CRLs
for several reasons:
o The responder may employ an algorithm for certificate status
response that is less computationally demanding than for signing
the certificate itself.
o An implementation may wish to guard against the possibility of a
compromise resulting from a signature algorithm compromise by
employing two separate signature algorithms.
This document describes:
o A mechanism that allows a client to indicate the set of preferred
signature algorithms.
o Rules for signature algorithm selection that maximizes the
probability of successful operation in the case that no supported
preferred algorithm(s) are specified.
3 Updates to Mandatory and Optional Cryptographic Algorithms
Section 4.3 "Mandatory and Optional Cryptographic Algorithms" of RFC
2560 [RFC2560] is updated as follows:
OLD: Clients that request OCSP services SHALL be capable of
processing responses signed used DSA keys identified by the DSA
sig-alg-oid specified in section 7.2.2 of [RFC2459]. Clients
SHOULD also be capable of processing RSA signatures as specified
in section 7.2.1 of [RFC2459]. OCSP responders SHALL support the
SHA1 hashing algorithm.
NEW: Clients that request OCSP services SHALL be capable of
processing responses signed using RSA with SHA-1 (identified by
sha1WithRSAEncryption OID specified in [RFC3279]) and RSA with
SHA-256 (identified by sha256WithRSAEncryption OID specified in
[RFC4055]). Clients SHOULD also be capable of processing
responses signed using DSA keys (identified by the id-dsa-with-
sha1 OID specified in [RFC3279]). Clients MAY support other
algorithms.
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4 Client Indication of Preferred Signature Algorithms
A client MAY declare a preferred set of algorithms in a request by
including a preferred signature algorithms extension in
requestExtensions of the OCSPRequest [RFC2560].
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL
}
The syntax of AlgorithmIdentifier is defined in section 4.1.1.2 of
RFC 5280 [RFC5280]
sigIdentifier specifies the signature algorithm the client prefers,
e.g. algorithm=ecdsa-with-sha256. Parameters are absent for most
common signature algorithms.
certIdentifier specifies the subject public key algorithm identifier
the client prefers in the server's certificate used to validate the
OCSP response. e.g. algorithm=id-ecPublicKey and parameters=
secp256r1.
certIdentifier is OPTIONAL and provides means to specify parameters
necessary to distinguish among different usages of a particular
algorithm, e.g. it may be used by the client to specify what curve it
supports for a given elliptic curve algorithm.
The client MUST support each of the specified preferred signature
algorithms and the client MUST specify the algorithms in the order of
preference.
The server SHOULD use one of the preferred signature algorithms for
signing OCSP responses to the requesting client.
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5 Responder Signature Algorithm Selection
RFC 2560 [RFC2560] does not specify a mechanism for deciding the
signature algorithm to be used in an OCSP response. As previously
noted this does not provide a sufficient degree of certainty as to
the algorithm selected to facilitate interoperability.
5.1 Dynamic Response
A responder MAY maximize the potential for ensuring interoperability
by selecting a supported signature algorithm using the following
order of precedence, as long as the selected algorithm meets all
security requirements of the OCSP responder, where the first method
has the highest precedence:
1. Select an algorithm specified as a preferred signing algorithm in
the client request
2. Select the signing algorithm used to sign a CRL issued by the
certificate issuer providing status information for the
certificate specified by CertID
3. Select the signing algorithm used to sign the OCSPRequest
4. Select a signature algorithm that has been advertised as being
the default signature algorithm for the signing service using an
out of band mechanism
5. Select a mandatory or recommended signing algorithm specified for
the version of the OCSP protocol in use
A responder SHOULD always apply the lowest numbered selection
mechanism that is known, supported, and that meets the responder's
criteria for cryptographic algorithm strength.
5.2 Static Response
For purposes of efficiency, an OCSP responder is permitted to
generate static responses in advance of a request. The case may not
permit the responder to make use of the client request data during
the response generation, however the responder SHOULD still use the
client request data during the selection of the pre-generated
response to be returned. Responders MAY use the historical client
requests as part of the input to the decisions of what different
algorithms should be used to sign the pre-generated responses.
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6 Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledges Santosh Chokhani for the helpful comments
made on earlier drafts, Sean Turner for proposing the syntax for
algorithm identifiers, Jim Schaad for providing and testing the ASN.1
module in Annex A and Stephen Kent for valuable review and input.
7 IANA Considerations
This document requires no actions by IANA.
8 Security Considerations
The mechanism used to choose the response signing algorithm MUST be
considered to be sufficiently secure against cryptanalytic attack for
the intended application.
In most applications it is sufficient for the signing algorithm to be
at least as secure as the signing algorithm used to sign the original
certificate whose status is being queried. This criteria may not
hold in long term archival applications however in which the status
of a certificate is being queried for a date in the distant past,
long after the signing algorithm has ceased being considered
trustworthy.
8.1 Use of insecure algorithms
It is not always possible for a responder to generate a response that
the client is expected to understand and that meets contemporary
standards for cryptographic security. In such cases an OCSP
responder operator MUST balance the risk of employing a compromised
security solution and the cost of mandating an upgrade, including the
risk that the alternative chosen by end users will offer even less
security or no security.
In archival applications it is quite possible that an OCSP responder
might be asked to report the validity of a certificate on a date in
the distant past. Such a certificate might employ a signing method
that is no longer considered acceptably secure. In such
circumstances the responder MUST NOT generate a signature for a
signing mechanism that is considered unacceptably insecure.
A client MUST accept any signing algorithm in a response that it
specified as a preferred signing algorithm in the request. It
follows therefore that a client MUST NOT specify as a preferred
signing algorithm any algorithm that is either not supported or not
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considered acceptably secure.
8.2 Man in the Middle Downgrade Attack
The mechanism to support client indication of preferred signature
algorithms is not protected against a man in the middle downgrade
attack. This constraint is not considered to be a significant
security concern since the OCSP Responder MUST NOT sign OCSP
Responses using weak algorithms even if requested by the client. In
addition, the client can reject OCSP responses that do not meet its
own criteria for acceptable cryptographic security no matter what
mechanism is used to determine the signing algorithm of the response.
8.3. Denial of Service Attack
Algorithm agility mechanisms defined in this document introduces a
slightly increased attack surface for Denial of Service attacks where
the client request is altered to require algorithms that are not
supported by the server, alternatively does not match pre-generated
responses.
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9 References
9.1 Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
[RFC3279] W. Polk, R. Housley, L. Bassham, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
[RFC4055] J. Schaad, B. Kaliski, R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms
and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, June
2005.
[RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley
and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[NEWASN] P. Hoffman, J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for PKIX",
draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, August 2009.
9.2 Informative References
[RFC2459] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and CRL Profile",
January 1999
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Appendix A - ASN.1 Modules
A.1 ASN.1 Module
OCSP-AGILITY-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-agility-2009-93(66) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL; -- export all items from this module
IMPORTS
id-pkix-ocsp
FROM OCSP-2009 -- From OCSP [RFC2560]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-02(48) }
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [NEWASN]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [NEWASN]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} ;
-- Add re-preferred-signature-algorithms to the set of extensions
-- for TBSRequest.requestExtensions
re-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL }
END
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A.2 1988 ASN.1 Module
OCSP-AGILITY-88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-agility-2009-88(67) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
id-pkix-ocsp
FROM OCSP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp(14)}
AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18) };
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL
}
END
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Author's Address
Phillip Hallam-Baker
Default Deny Security
Email: phill@hallambaker.com
Stefan Santesson
3xA Security AB
Sweden
Email: sts@aaa-sec.com
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