Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft VeriSign, Inc.
June 14, 2001 Expires: December 14, 2001
Extensible Provisioning Protocol Transport Over TCP
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Abstract
This document describes how an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
session is mapped onto a single Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
connection. This mapping requires use of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol to protect information exchanged between an EPP client
and an EPP server.
Conventions Used In This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................. 3
2. Session Management ........................................... 4
3. Message Exchange ............................................. 5
4. Internationalization Considerations .......................... 6
5. IANA Considerations .......................................... 6
6. Security Considerations ...................................... 6
7. References ................................................... 7
8. Author's Address ............................................. 7
A. Revisions From Previous Version .............................. 8
B. Full Copyright Statement ..................................... 9
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1. Introduction
This document describes how the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
is mapped onto a single client-server TCP connection. Security
services beyond those defined in EPP are provided by the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC2246]. EPP is described in [EPP].
TCP is described in [RFC793].
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2. Session Management
Mapping EPP session management facilities onto the TCP service is
straight forward. An EPP session first requires creation of a TCP
connection between two peers, one that initiates the connection
request and one that responds to the connection request. The
initiating peer is called the "client", and the responding peer is
called the "server". An EPP server MUST listen for TCP connection
requests on a standard TCP port. TCP port 65000 should be used for
development and testing purposes in the absence of a port assignment
from IANA.
The client MUST issue an active OPEN call, specifying the TCP port
number on which the server is listening for EPP connection attempts.
The server MUST respond with a passive OPEN call, which the client
MUST acknowledge to establish the connection. The EPP server MUST
return an EPP <greeting> to the client after the TCP session has been
established.
An EPP session is nominally ended by the client issuing an EPP
<logout> command. A server receiving an EPP <logout> command MUST end
the EPP session and close the TCP connection through an active CLOSE
call. The client MUST respond with a passive CLOSE call.
A client MAY end an EPP session by issuing an active CLOSE call. A
server SHOULD respond with a passive CLOSE call.
A server MAY limit the life span of an established TCP connection.
EPP sessions that are inactive for more than a server-defined period
MAY be ended by a server issuing an active CLOSE call. A server MAY
also close TCP connections that have been open and active for more
than a server-defined period.
Peers SHOULD respond to an active CLOSE call with a passive CLOSE
call. The closing peer MAY issue an ABORT call if the responding peer
does not respond to the active CLOSE call.
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3. Message Exchange
With the exception of the EPP server greeting, EPP messages are
initiated by the EPP client in the form of EPP commands. An EPP
server MUST return an EPP response to an EPP command on the same TCP
connection that carried the command. If the TCP connection is closed
after a server receives and successfully processes a command but
before the response can be returned to the client, the server MUST
undo the effects of the command to ensure a consistent state between
the client and the server.
An EPP client streams EPP commands to an EPP server on an established
TCP connection. A client MAY establish multiple TCP connections to
facilitate multiple command exchange channels. A server MAY limit a
client to a maximum number of TCP connections based on server
capabilities and operational load.
An EPP command MUST be a well-formed XML instance. An EPP command
begins with a RECOMMENDED XML declaration, followed by an <epp>
element, EPP child elements, and ending with an </epp> element. A
server MUST receive data from a client until an </epp> element is
received, signaling the end of a potentially well-formed XML instance.
XML parsing and command processing begins after the server has
received a complete XML instance.
A server SHOULD impose a limit on the amount of time required for a
client to issue a well-formed EPP command. A server SHOULD end an EPP
session and close an open TCP connection if a well-formed command is
not received within the time limit.
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4. Internationalization Considerations
This mapping does not introduce or present any internationalization
issues.
5. IANA Considerations
Mapping EPP onto TCP requires a TCP port assignment from IANA for
public operation. TCP port 3121 (a port number in the user port
range) has been assigned by IANA for development and test purposes. A
system port will need to be assigned, and this user port assignment
will need to be reclaimed, if this document advances to RFC status.
System Port number XXX - TBA by IANA.
6. Security Considerations
EPP as-is provides only simple client authentication services using
identifiers and plain text passwords. A passive attack is sufficient
to recover client identifiers and passwords, allowing trivial command
forgery. Protection against most other common attacks must be
provided by other layered protocols.
EPP provides protection against replay attacks through command
idempotency. A replayed or repeated command will not change the state
of any object in any way, though denial of service through consumption
of connection resources is a possibility.
When layered over TCP, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
described in [RFC2246] MUST be used to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, and command forgery attacks. Implementations of TLS often
contain a US-exportable cryptographic mode that SHOULD NOT be used to
protect EPP. Clients and servers desiring high security SHOULD
instead use TLS with cryptographic algorithms that are less
susceptible to compromise.
Mutual client and server authentication using the TLS Handshake
Protocol is REQUIRED. EPP service MUST NOT be granted until
successful completion of a TLS handshake, ensuring that both client
and server have been authenticated and cryptographic protections are
in place.
EPP TCP servers are vulnerable to common TCP denial of service attacks
including TCP SYN flooding. Servers SHOULD take steps to minimize the
impact of a denial of service attack using combinations of easily
implemented solutions, such as deployment of firewall technology and
border router filters to restrict inbound server access to known,
trusted clients.
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7. References
[EPP] S. Hollenbeck: "Extensible Provisioning Protocol", work in
progress.
[RFC793] J. Postel: "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793,
September 1981.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner: "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2246] T. Dierks and C. Allen: "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
2246, January 1999.
8. Author's Address
Scott Hollenbeck
VeriSign Global Registry Services
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
USA
shollenbeck@verisign.com
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A. Revisions From Previous Version
-00 to -01:
Modified the IANA Considerations section to note temporary TCP user
port assignment.
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B. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2001. All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing
Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined
in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to
translate it into languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT
NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN
WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
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