Routing Protocol Security B. Christian, Ed.
Requirements KMC Telecom Solutions
Internet-Draft T. Tauber, Ed.
Expires: January 20, 2006 Comcast
July 19, 2005
BGP Security Requirements
draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec-02
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
The security of BGP, the Border Gateway Protocol, is critical to the
proper operation of large-scale internetworks, both public and
private. While securing the information transmitted between two BGP
speakers is a relatively easy technical matter, securing BGP, as a
routing system, is more complex. This document describes a set of
requirements for securing BGP, including securing peering
relationships between BGP speakers, and authenticating the routing
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information carried within BGP.
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1. Introduction
1.1 System Description
BGP is described in RFC1771 [3], and, more recently, in an updated
specification, as a path-vector routing protocol. BGP speakers
typically exchange information about reachable destinations
(expressed as address prefixes) in an internetwork through pairwise
peering sessions. Once this information has been exchanged, each BGP
speaker locally determines a loop free path to each reachable
destination, based on local policy, policy indicators (or policies)
carried in the update, and the AS_PATH data carried in the BGP UPDATE
messages.
Each BGP speaker represents an Autonomous System (AS). All of the
BGP speakers within an AS operate under a common administrative
policy.
1.2 Threats
Violations of security for network and information systems generally
fall under one of the three categories as defined in RFC 2196 [1]:
o Unauthorized access to resources and/or information
o Unintended and/or unauthorized disclosure of information
o Denial of service
A number of attacks can be realized which, if exploited, can lead to
one of the above mentioned security violations. Attacks against
communications are typically classified as passive attacks or active
wiretapping attacks. Passive attacks are ones where an attacker
simply observes information traversing the network, violating
confidentiality or identifying a means of engaging in further
attacks. Active attacks are ones where the attacker modifies data in
transit. Such attacks include replay attacks, message insertion,
message deletion, and message modification attacks. Some attacks may
be effected by sending data from any where in the Internet. Other
active attacks require a "man-in-the-middle" capability, i.e., the
attacker must be in a position where traffic passes through an
attacker-controlled device. Attacks against BGP may be used by an
attacker to facilitate a wide variety of active or passive
wiretapping attacks.
Attacks that do not involve direct manipulation of BGP, and the
information contained within BGP, are outside the scope of this
document.
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Because ASes are autonomous in their operation, it is not possible to
mandate secure operation by all ASes, nor would it be advisable to
assume such operation. Thus the primary goal of BGP security
measures is to provide data to AS operators to enable BGP speakers to
reject advertisements (UPDATE messages) that are not valid. For
example, UPDATE messages that represent erroneous binding of prefixes
to an origin AS, or that advertise invalid paths (as defined later in
this document) should be rejected. Because BGP peering sessions take
place in the context of TCP, the authentication and integrity
guarantees usually association with TCP need to be provided in the
face of possible active wiretapping attacks. Using the terminology
established in RFC 3552 [2], these peering sessions should be
afforded data origin and peer entity authentication and connection-
oriented integrity.
Security for subscriber traffic is outside the scope of this
document, of BGP security in general. IETF standards for subscriber
data security, e.g., IPsec, TLS, and S/MIME should be employed for
such purposes. While adoption of BGP security measures may preclude
certain classes of attacks on subscriber traffic, these measures are
not a substitute for use of subscriber-based security mechanisms of
the sort noted above.
1.3 Areas to secure
There are two primary points where BGP may be secured. If we examine
the system description presented above those points are as follows.
o The session between two BGP speakers can be secured such that the
BGP data received by the BGP speakers can by cryptographically
verified to have been transmitted by the peer BGP speaker. There
are several existing IETF standards to choose from to ensure that
this system functions with greater effectiveness than the current
system. Examples include IPsec and TLS.
o The originator and the propagators of prefix information may have
their routing preference, such as the LOCAL_PREF Attribute,
information verified such that the intent of their preferences
with respect to a specific prefix is preserved.
There are also several questions we can ask about the information
contained within a received update.
o Is the originating Autonomous System authorized to propagate the
prefix we have received?
o Does the AS_PATH, received via an UPDATE, represent a viable path
through the network?
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The verification of AS_PATH validity falls into two distinct
categories. These categories are ordered from least to most
rigorous.
o Does the AS_PATH specified actually exist as a path in the network
topology and, based on the AS_PATH, is it possible to traverse
that path to reach a given prefix? This AS_PATH Feasibility Check
will be referred to later in this document.
o Has the update actually travelled the path?
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2. Underlying Assumptions regarding BGP
In order to properly identify security requirements it is important
to articulate the fundamental aspects of BGP as related to security
requirements. The following list presents the basic parameters and
application concepts of BGP that are assumed by this document.
o Peer Communication: BGP traffic travels over TCP between peers, so
BGP speakers assume the TCP data delivery guarantees of TCP in a
benign environment. This includes ordered, error-free delivery of
application traffic from a peer identified by an IP address, plus
integrity of the control aspects of TCP. From a security
perspective, these guarantees need to be enforced in the context
of possible active wiretapping.
o Routing and Reachability: BGP is a protocol used to convey routing
and reachability information both internal and external to an
Autonomous System. Typically, interior BGP (iBGP) is used to
distribute prefix reachability information in conjunction with an
IGP and is used by a distinct network administrative entity to
convey internal routing policy regarding external and internal
information. Exterior BGP (eBGP) is typically used to distribute
route/prefix reachability information between two distinct routing
entities and is used to signal eBGP preferences and policy
decisions.
o Inter-AS UPDATE Message assumptions: When an AS distributes
reachability information to a peer it is done with the intent of
affecting routing decisions by the peer. For example, an AS-A
sends peer AS-B a less specific advertisement and peer AS-C a
"more" specific advertisement. This prefix distribution decision
may have been made to provide a means for failure resolution
between AS-A and AS-C. However, it should be noted that while
AS-A tries to influence the routing decisions of AS-B and
downstream ASes, AS-A is only providing inputs to a local decision
by AS-B, a decision that is very much influenced by AS-B's local
policy over which AS-A has no control. Update messages are sent
between AS peers with the implicit assumption that those messages
will be forwarded to others. A notable exception to this
assumption is the use of various policy based mechanisms between
peers such as the NO-EXPORT community. In this document an
important aspect of the UPDATE message to note is that the
specific UPDATE message itself is typically not re-transmitted.
Instead, the specific UPDATE message is regenerated continually as
it passes from BGP speaker to BGP speaker. Furthermore, UPDATE
messages have no mechanism for freshness (e.g. timestamps or
sequence numbers). This indicates that messages may appear valid
at any point in the life of a BGP peering session. While the
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AS_PATH information is typically transitive it is, currently, not
clearly mandated and many times is removed for various utilitarian
reasons.
o It is important to note that while preference regarding routing
can be explicity managed with direct peers it is markedly more
difficult to influence routing decisions with ASes not directly
adjacent.
o Inter-AS withdrawal message assumptions: The processing model of
BGP RFC1771 [3] indicates that only the peer advertising NLRI
information may withdraw it. There are several instances where a
withdrawal may occur. Typical reasons for withdrawal include the
determination of a better path, peer session failure, or local
policy change. There is no specified mechanism for indicating, to
an external peer, the reason for a route withdrawal. Each
withdrawal received from a valid peering session must be taken at
face value. There is no existing method to ensure that an AS will
properly propagate withdrawal messages received from its external
peers nor do mechanisms exist to ensure that old UPDATES are not
re-propagated.
o AS_PATH assumptions: Aside from the use of AS_SET, the AS_PATH is
typically considered to be an ordered list of the Autonomous
Systems that an update has traversed. In most cases the rightmost
AS in the list is the origin AS, or at least the AS responsible
for the management of the NLRI information associated with the
first AS. Specifications state that the AS topology MUST be loop
free. This indicates that updates received from an external peer
which contain the local AS will be rejected. The prepending of AS
information for received updates and transmitted updates is
generally permitted and is common practice. Prepended AS
information on inbound advertisements (where the external peers AS
is prepended) and outbound advertisements (where the local AS
number is prepended) is a commonly used method to effect
forwarding changes. Prepending a peer AS on inbound reception is
accomplished for internal routing and forwarding management while
prepending one's own AS on outbound advertisement is typically
accomplished to effect forwarding and routing changes in external
networks. The common practice is to prepend (possibly multiple)
instances of either one's own AS number or that of the neighbor
from which an update was heard. Another practice, according to
some operators, involves inserting a remote AS number, in order to
cause the update to be dropped by that AS so that traffic will not
traverse a given path. Though this practice appears to be
unintended in the design in BGP, anecdotal evidence is that its
use is not totally insignificant. While such a practice can be
beneficial to legitimate operators, it presents a strong potential
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for misuse. A proposed security system SHOULD address how to
either address this concern or give specific information on this
topic for consideration by the Operational community.
o Route Origination: BGP speakers may originate routes based on
various internal and external data. An Autonomous System should
only originate a prefix to its external peers if that prefix has
been somehow allocated to the administrators of that system, or
authorized by the prefix holders.
o Originating a route without the ability to forward the traffic
associated with that route is, in most cases, in conflict with the
intent of the BGP specification, notable exceptions include:
* Deployments that make extensive use of separate route servers
and forwarding devices
* Deployments that use the propagation of prefixes in order to
effectively block high bandwidth attacks against specific IP
addresses (and the associated oversubscription of resources).
o Aggregation and de-aggregation: According to RFC1771 [3], if a BGP
speaker chooses to aggregate a set of more specific prefixes into
a less specific prefix then the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE attribute SHOULD
be set. This creates a significant potential loophole in an
attempt to secure BGP based on the RFC specifications.
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3. Operational Requirements
We have determined, through discussion with several large
internetwork operators and equipment vendors, that the following
attributes are important to the ongoing performance of interdomain
routing systems such as BGP.
3.1 Convergence speed
Convergence speed is a major concern to many operators of large scale
internetworking systems. Networks, and internetworks, are carrying
ever increasing amounts of information that is time and delay
sensitive; increasing convergence times can adversely affect the
usability of the network, and the ability of an internetwork to grow.
BGP's convergence speed, with a security system in operation, SHOULD
be equivalent to BGP running without the security system in
operation. This includes the preservation of optimizations currently
used to produce acceptable convergence speeds on current hardware,
including update packing, peer groups, and others. Two types of
verification MAY be offered for the NLRI and the AS_PATH in order to
allow for a selection of optimizations:
o Contents of the UPDATE message SHOULD be authenticated in real-
time as the UPDATE message is processed.
o The route information base MAY be authenticated periodically or in
an event-driven manner by scanning the data and verifying the
originating AS and the validity of the AS_PATH list.
All BGP implementations that implement security MUST utilize at least
one of the above methods for validating routing information. Real
time verification is preferred in order to prevent transitive
failures based on periodic or event-driven scan intervals.
3.2 Incremental deployment
We will not be able to deploy a newly secured BGP protocol
instantaneously and will be unable to dictate a partitioning of large
ASes by network operators. Because of this, there are several
requirements that any proposed mechanism to secure BGP must consider.
o A BGP security mechanism MUST enable each BGP speaker to configure
use of the security mechanism on a per-peer basis.
o MUST provide backward compatibility in the message formatting,
transmission, and processing of routing information carried
through a mixed security environment. Message formatting in a
fully secured environment MAY be handled in a non-backward
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compatible fashion though care must be taken to ensure when
traversing intermediate routers which don't support the new
format.
o In an environment where both secured and non-secured systems are
interoperating a mechanism MUST exist for secured systems to
identify whether an originator intended the information to be
secured.
3.3 Conditions for initialization
A key factor in the robust nature of the existing internal and
external relationships maintained in todays Internet provider space
is the ability to maintain and return to a significantly converged
state without the need to rely on systems external to the routing
system (the physical equipment that is performing the forwarding).
In order to ensure the rapid initialization and/or return to service
of failed nodes it is important to reduce reliance on external
systems to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, proposed systems
SHOULD NOT require connections to external systems, beyond those
directly involved in peering relationships, in order to return to
full service. Proposed systems MAY require post initialization
synchronization with external systems in order to synchronize
security information.
3.4 Local controls for secure UPDATE acceptance
Each secured environment may have different levels of requirements in
terms of what is acceptable or unacceptable. In environments that
require strict security it may not be acceptable to temporarily route
to a destination while waiting for security verification to be
performed. However, in many commercial environments the rapidity of
route installation may be of paramount importance; in order to
facilitate the more common occurence of route withdrawal due to
network failure. Based on the two divergent requirements, the
following criteria apply.
o The security system MUST support a range of possible outputs for
local determination of the trust level for a specific route so
that routing preference and policy can be applied to its inclusion
in the RIB. Any given route should be trustable to a locally
configured degree, based on the completeness of security
information for the update and other factors.
o The security system SHOULD allow the operator to determine whether
the speed of convergence is more important than security
operations, or security operations are more important than the
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speed of convergence. This facilitates the incremental deployment
of security on systems not designed to support increased
processing requirements imposed by the security system.
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4. Infrastructure Requirements
In the case that proposed BGP security mechanisms make use of a
security infrastructure to distribute authenticated data that is an
input to routing decisions. Such data may be needed to verify
whether a given AS is authorized to originate an advertisement for a
specified prefix, whether an given organization is the recognized
holder of a block of address space or of an AS number, etc. Any
infrastructure used to distribute data in support of BGP security is
subject to the following criteria:
o It MUST be resilient to attacks on the integrity of the data it
contains.
o It MUST enable network operators to verify the origin of the data.
o It MUST be sufficiently available so as to not degrade the
existing pace of network operations.
o It SHOULD not introduce new organizational entities that have to
be trusted in order to establish the authenticity of the data.
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5. The Trust Model
In discussion with the operations community, concerns have emerged
regarding the viability of a security system which requires agreement
on a hierachical trust model dependent on a single root. Current
operational practice has many providers engaging in bilateral
agreements which local policy choices remaining sacrosanct. The
viability of a solution may well rest on the business imperatives of
the provider community which may be unwilling to surrender their
percieved autonomy or unable to come to communal agreement on this
topic.
In other environments, deployments may require an authority which has
been decided by law or other institutional mandate. Moreover, these
two deployment types (single-rooted heirarchy or arbitrary
association) may "touch" (i.e. be part of the same co-extensive BGP
topology).
Solutions MUST account for these differing types of deployments.
If two internetworks using differing trust models are interconnected
they MUST be able to interoperate using locally determined levels of
trust to compensate for differences in their trust models. Some
acknowledgement is made that this requirement might render it
difficult to discern an attack from a difference in trust model or
implementation. Any proposed solution MUST mitigate this risk.
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6. The AS_PATH Attribute and NLRI Authentication
BGP distributes routing information across the Internet (between BGP
speakers) using BGP UPDATE messages. The UPDATE message contains
withdrawn routes, path attributes and one or more NLRIs (Network
Layer Reachability Information is synonymous with advertised prefix).
For the remainder of this section, we will focus on the AS_PATH
Attribute and the NLRI. Attributes such as local pref are locally
specific and, as such, are protected by BGP session security.
The AS_PATH for specific prefixes may be protected in any proposed
security system in four ways:
o Authorization of Originating AS: For the purposes of authorization
of the originating AS, verifiable means that it is possible to
determine the authorization of the originator of a specific prefix
(or block of IP addresses) relative to the organization that holds
the prefix.
o Announcing AS Check: For all BGP peers, a BGP Implementation MUST
ensure that the first element of the AS_PATH list corresponds to
the locally configured AS of the peer from which the UPDATE was
received.
o AS_PATH Feasibility Check: The AS_PATH list MUST correspond to a
valid list of autonomous systems according to the first
verification category listed in the "Areas to Secure" Section
above.
o Update Transit Check: Routing information carried through BGP
SHOULD include information that can be used to verify the
readvertisement or modification by each autonomous system through
which the UPDATE has passed. This check is somewhat more rigorous
than the "verifiable list of autonomous systems" above.
Both checks SHOULD be made available to operators who MAY employ more
rigorous checks according to the needs of the deployment.
There are many ways in which a differential between the speed of
prefix/AS path attribute propagation and the information validating
the the prefix/AS_PATH attribute information can be exploited to
attack the routing system on a temporary basis. These types of
attacks are dominantly exploitative of the time it takes to follow
the withdrawal of a route via an update. As a result of this
potential for temporary disruption, BGP security solutions MUST
propagate security information at the same rate as the BGP
announcements and withdrawals propagate.
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The following items are required to propagate at the same rate:
o the distribution of key information used by individual actors
within the system, including the keys used by individual
autonomous systems to sign certificates and other objects,
o the distribution of information about the AS(es) authorized to
advertise a given block of IP addresses (or an address space),
o the distribution of information about connectivity between
autonomous systems and about autonomous system polcies.
Note that in today's operational Internet, the first two pieces of
information, or their analogues, are not a part of the BGP routing
system per se (e.g. information in Routing or Address regisistries.)
They are consulted by operators on an inconsistent basis and do are
not consulted in real time by the routing system. The third piece of
information is explicitly carried in the routing system and
inconsistently expressed and consulted by operators. However, the
ability to change the connectivity in real time is an important
feature of the current Internet.
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7. Address Allocation and Advertisement
As part of the regular operation of the Internet, addresses that are
allocated to one organization may be, and are quite commonly,
advertised by different organizations. Common reasons for this
practice include multi-homing and route reduction for the purposes of
resource conservation (e.g aggregation). There are two modes of
delegation:
o A BGP speaker and listener have chosen to restrict the amount of
received prefixes for the listener. The listener has chosen to
honor route announcements sent in a summary fashion by the
speaker.
o Address space that is being delegated is part of a larger
allocation that is owned by an autonomous system. The owner then
delegates the smaller block to another AS for purposes of
advertisement. This mode is commonly observed in multi-homing.
These two modes lead to a single common requirement: Any BGP Security
solution MUST support the ability of an address block holder to
declare (in a secure fashion) the AS(es) that the holder authorizes
to originate routes to its address block(s) or any portion thereof
regardless of the relationship of the entities.
An associated delegation criteria is the requirement to allow for
non-BGP IP end user implementations. As a result, all secured BGP
implementations MUST allow for the contemporaneous origination of a
route for a prefix by more than one AS.
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8. Logging
In order to facilitate auditing and troubleshooting, a logging
capability MUST be implemented which will indicate both negative and
positive event behaviors. This data SHALL be for consumption of the
AS operating the device which is producing the logs and MAY be
combined with data from other ASes or devices with different
implmentations within the same AS for purposes of event correlation
and tracking. Here follow some considerations in this regard:
The data generated by logging may be very large depending on the
number of peers, the number of prefixes received, the authentication
model used, and routing policies. As such, efficient data structures
and storage mechanisms MUST be developed to allow for an effective
means of reproducing incidents and outages
Path and NLRI attributes MUST be logged using a standard format. The
format MUST be scalable with the amount of data logged and the
frequency of log generation. The frequency of log generation should
be controllable by the operator. The logging mechanisms for the
tracked information MUST be standardized across all platforms.
Logging ability both on and off line is considered highly desirable.
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9. NLRI and Path Attribute Tracking
The ability for a receiver to know exactly who originated and
forwarded a routing update is a desirable trait. In order to rapidly
identify attack points and parties at fault for route table
disruption, it is important to be able to track and log prefix
origination information along with associated security information.
This capability can be afforded by implementation of the
aforementioned directive that any security system SHOULD provide a
method to allow the receiver of an update to verify that the
originator is actually authorized to originate the update, and that
the AS's listed in the AS_PATH actually forwarded the update.
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10. Transport Layer Protection
Transport protection is an important aspect of BGP routing protocol
security. The potential to create a linked transport/NLRI/AS_PATH
authentication mechanism should not be overlooked and may provide for
the accelerated deployment of a BGP security system. Current
security mechanisms for BGP transport (e.g. TCP-MD5 [4] and GTSM
[6]) are inadequate and require significant operator interaction to
maintain a respectable level of security.
Transport protection systems SHOULD function as a component of the
BGP routing protocol security mechanism. This includes the use of
the same key generation/management systems as the rest of the
security system.
Any proposed security mechanism MUST include provisions for securing
both internal BGP and external BGP peering sessions.
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11. Key Management
Current implementations and deployments of TCP-MD5 [4] exhibit
serious shortcomings with regard of key management as described in
RFC 3562 [5] which involve key generation, handling, and
distribution.
Key maintenance can be especially onerous to the operators. The
number of keys required and the maintenance of keys (update/withdraw/
renew) has had an additive effect as a barrier to deployment. Thus
automated means of managing keys, to reduce operational burdens, MUST
be available throughout BGP security systems. These security systems
MUST be resistant to compromise of session-level or device-level
keys, i.e., the security implications of such compromises MUST be
limited.
12. References
[1] Fraser, "RFC 2196 - Site Security Handbook", September 1997.
[2] Rescorla, Korver, and Internet Architecture Board, "RFC 3552 -
Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations",
July 2003.
[3] Rekhter and Li, "RFC 1771 - A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4)", March 1995.
[4] Heffernan, "RFC 2385 - Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP
MD5 Signature Option", August 1998.
[5] Leech, "RFC 3562 - Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
Signature Option", July 2003.
[6] Gill, Heasley, and Meyer, "RFC 3682 - The Generalized TTL
Security Mechanism (GTSM)", February 2004.
Authors' Addresses
Blaine Christian (editor)
KMC Telecom Solutions
1545 U.S. Highway 206
Bedminster, NJ 07921
US
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Tony Tauber (editor)
Comcast
27 Industrial Avenue
Chelmsford, MA 01824
US
Email: ttauber@1-4-5.net
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The following individuals contributed to the development and review
of this draft. Steve Kent, Russ White, Sandy Murphy, Jeff Haas, Bora
Akyol, Susan Hares, Mike Tibodeau, Thomas Renzy, Kaarthik Sivakumar,
Tao Wan, Radia Perlman, and Merike Kaeo.
This draft was developed based on conversations with various network
operators including Chris Morrow, Jared Mauch, Tim Battles, and Ryan
McDowell.
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