Network Working Group L. Dunbar
Internet Draft Futurewei
Intended status: Informational A. Malis
Expires: September 8, 2020 Independent
C. Jacquenet
Orange
March 8, 2020
Gap Analysis of Dynamic Networks to Hybrid Cloud DCs
draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-gap-analysis-04
Abstract
This document analyzes the technological gaps, especially IETF
protocols gaps, to achieve dynamically interconnecting workloads and
applications hosted in Hybrid Cloud Data Centers.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2020.
xxx, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3
2. Conventions used in this document..............................3
3. Gap Analysis for Accessing Cloud Resources.....................4
4. Gap Analysis of Overlay Edge Node's WAN Ports Management.......4
5. Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths.......................6
5.1. Control Plane for Overlay over Heterogeneous Networks.....7
5.2. Using BGP UPDATE Messages.................................8
5.3. SECURE-L3VPN/EVPN.........................................9
5.4. Preventing attacks from Internet-facing ports............10
6. C-PEs not directly connected to VPN PEs.......................10
6.1. Floating PEs to connect to Remote CPEs...................13
6.2. NAT Traversal............................................13
6.3. Complexity of using BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via
Internet......................................................13
6.4. Designated Forwarder to the remote edges.................14
6.5. Traffic Path Management..................................15
7. Manageability Considerations..................................15
8. Security Considerations.......................................15
9. IANA Considerations...........................................16
10. References...................................................16
10.1. Normative References....................................16
10.2. Informative References..................................16
11. Acknowledgments..............................................17
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
1. Introduction
[Net2Cloud-Problem] describes the problems enterprises face today
when interconnecting their branch offices with dynamic workloads in
third party data centers (a.k.a. Cloud DCs). This document analyzes
the IETF routing protocols to identify if there are gaps or if
protocol extension might be needed.
For the sake of readability, an edge, an endpoint, C-PE, or CPE are
used interchangeably throughout this document. However, each term
has some minor emphasis, especially when used in other related
documents:
. Edge: could include multiple devices (virtual or physical);
. endpoint: to refer to a WAN port of an Edge device;
. C-PE: more for provider owned edge, e.g. for SECURE-EVPN's PE
based VPN, where PE is the edge node;
. CPE: more for enterprise owned edge.
2. Conventions used in this document
Cloud DC: Third party Data Centers that usually host applications
and workload owned by different organizations or
tenants.
Controller: Used interchangeably with Overlay controller to manage
overlay path creation/deletion and monitor the path
conditions between sites.
CPE-Based VPN: Virtual Private Network designed and deployed from
CPEs. This is to differentiate from most commonly used
PE-based VPNs a la RFC 4364.
OnPrem: On Premises data centers and branch offices
SDWAN: Software Defined Wide Area Network, "SDWAN" refers to
the solutions of pooling WAN bandwidth from multiple
underlay networks to get better WAN bandwidth
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
management, visibility & control. When the underlay is a
private network, traffic may be forwarded without any
additional encryption; when the underlay networks are
public, such as the Internet, some traffic needs to be
encrypted when passing through (depending on user-
provided policies).
3. Gap Analysis for Accessing Cloud Resources
Many problems described in the [Net2Cloud-Problem] are not in the
scope of IETF, let alone IETF Routing area. Therefore, this document
will not cover the detailed protocol gaps analysis for security,
identity management or DNS for Cloud Resources.
4. Gap Analysis of Overlay Edge Node's WAN Ports Management
Very often the Hybrid Cloud DCs are interconnected by overlay
networks that arch over many different types of networks, such as
VPN, public internet, wireless, etc. Sometimes the enterprises' VPN
providers do not have direct access to the Cloud DCs that are
optimal for some specific applications or workloads.
Under those circumstances, the overlay network' edges can have WAN
ports facing networks provided by different ISPs, some can be
untrusted public internet, some can be trusted provider VPN, some
can be Cloud internal networks, and some can be others.
If all WAN ports of an edge node are facing untrusted network, then
all sensitive data to/from this edge have to be encrypted, usually
by IPsec tunnels which can be terminated at the WAN port address, at
the edge node's loopback address if the loopback address is routable
in the wide area network, or even at the ingress ports of the edge
node.
If an edge node has some WAN ports facing trusted VPN and some
facing untrusted networks, sensitive data can be forwarded through
ports facing VPN natively without encryption and forwarded through
ports facing public network with encryption. To achieve this
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
flexibility, it is necessary to have the IPsec tunnels terminated at
the WAN ports facing the untrusted networks.
In order to establish pair-wise secure encrypted connection among
those WAN ports, it is necessary for peers to be informed of the WAN
port properties.
Some of those overlay networks (such as some deployed SDWAN
networks) use the modified NHRP protocol [RFC2332] to register WAN
ports of the edges with their "Controller" (or NHRP server), which
then map a private VPN address to a public IP address of the
destination node/port. DSVPN [DSVPN] or DMVPN [DMVPN] are used to
establish tunnels between WAN ports of SDWAN edge nodes.
NHRP was originally intended for ATM address resolution, and as a
result, it misses many attributes that are necessary for dynamic
endpoint C-PE registration to the controller, such as:
- Interworking with the MPLS VPN control plane. An overlay edge can
have some ports facing the MPLS VPN network over which packets can
be forwarded without any encryption and some ports facing the
public Internet over which sensitive traffic needs to be
encrypted.
- Scalability: NHRP/DSVPN/DMVPN works fine with small numbers of
edge nodes. When a network has more than 100 nodes, these
protocols do not scale well.
- NHRP does not have the IPsec attributes, which are needed for
peers to build Security Associations over the public internet.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to encode the C-PE supported
encapsulation types, such as IPsec-GRE or IPsec-VxLAN.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to encode C-PE Location
identifiers, such as Site Identifier, System ID, and/or Port ID.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to describe the gateway(s) to
which the C-PE is attached. When a C-PE is instantiated in a Cloud
DC, it is desirable for C-PE's owner to be informed of how/where
the C-PE is attached.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to describe C-PE's NAT
properties if the C-PE is using private addresses, such as the NAT
type, Private address, Public address, Private port, Public port,
etc.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
[BGP-SDWAN-PORT] describes how to use BGP to distribute SDWAN edge
properties to peers. There is need to extend the protocol to
register WAN ports properties to the overlay controller, which then
propagates the information to other overlay edge nodes that are
authenticated and authorized to communicate with them.
5. Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths
Most likely, enterprises (especially the largest ones) already have
their C-PEs interconnected by providers VPNs, such as EVPN, L2VPN,
or L3VPN, which can be PE-based or CPE-based. The commonly used PE-
based VPNs have C-PE directly attached to PEs, therefore the
communication between C-PEs and PEs is considered as secure. MP-BGP
is used to learn & distribute routes among C-PEs, even though
sometimes routes among C-PEs are statically configured on the C-PEs.
For enterprises already interconnected by VPNs, it is desirable to
aggregate the bandwidth among VPN paths and Internet paths by C-PEs
adding additional ports facing public internet. Under this scenario,
which is referred to as Overlay throughout this document, it is
necessary for the C-PEs to manage and communicate with controller on
how traffic are distributed among multiple heterogenous WAN underlay
networks, and manage secure tunnels over untrusted networks
independently from the attached clients routes.
When using NHRP for WAN ports registration purposes, C-PEs need to
run two separate control planes: EVPN&BGP for CPE-based VPNs, and
NHRP & DSVPN/DMVPN for ports connected to the Internet. Two separate
control planes not only add complexity to C-PEs, but also increase
operational cost.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
+---+
+--------------|RR |----------+
/ Untrusted +-+-+ \
/ \
/ \
+----+ +---------+ packets encrypted over +------+ +----+
| TN3|--| A1-----+ Untrusted +------ B1 |--| TN1|
+----+ | C-PE A2-\ | C-PE | +----+
+----+ | A A3--+--+ +---+---B2 B | +----+
| TN2|--| | |PE+--------------+PE |---B3 |--| TN3|
+----+ +---------+ +--+ trusted +---+ +------+ +----+
| WAN |
+----+ +---------+ +--+ packets +---+ +------+ +----+
| TN1|--| C1--|PE| go natively |PE |-- D1 |--| TN1|
+----+ | C-PE C2--+--+ without encry+---+ | C-PE | +----+
| C | +--------------+ | D |
| | | |
+----+ | C3--| without encrypt over | | +----+
| TN2|--| C4--+---- Untrusted --+------D2 |--| TN2|
+----+ +---------+ +------+ +----+
Figure 1: CPEs interconnected by VPN paths and Internet Paths
5.1. Control Plane for Overlay over Heterogeneous Networks
As described in [BGP-SDWAN-Usage], the Control Plane for Overlay
network over heterogenous networks has three distinct properties:
- WAN Port Property registration to the Overlay Controller.
o To inform the Overlay controller and authorized peers of
the WAN port properties of the Edge nodes. When the WAN
ports are assigned private addresses, this step can
register the type of NAT that translates private addresses
into public ones.
- Controller facilitated IPsec SA management and NAT information
distribution
o It is for Overlay controller to facilitate or manage the
IPsec configuration and peer authentication for all IPsec
tunnels terminated at the edge nodes.
- Establishing and Managing the topology and reachability for
services attached to the client ports of overlay edge nodes.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
o This is for the overlay layer's route distribution, so
that a C-PE can populate its overlay routing table with
entries that identify the next hop for reaching a specific
route/service attached to remote nodes. [SECURE-EVPN]
describes EVPN and other options.
5.2. Using BGP UPDATE Messages
[Tunnel-Encap] describe the BGP UPDATE Tunnel Path Attribute that
advertise endpoints' tunnel encapsulation capability for the
respective attached client routes encoded in the MP-NLRI Path
Attribute. The receivers of the BGP UPDATE can use any of the
supported encapsulations encoded in the Tunnel Path Attribute for
the routes encoded in the MP-NLRI Path Attribute.
Here are some of the gaps using [Tunnel-Encap] to distribute Edge
WAN port properties:
- [Tunnel-Encap] doesn't yet have the encoding to describe the NAT
information for WAN ports that have private addresses. The NAT
information needs to be propagated to the trusted peers via
Controllers, such as the virtual C-PEs instantiated in public
Cloud DCs.
- It is not easy using the current mechanism in [Tunnel-Encap] to
exchange IPsec SA specific parameters independently from
advertising the attached clients' routes, even after adding a new
IPsec tunnel type.
[Tunnel-Encap] requires all tunnels updates are associated with
routes. There can be many client routes associated with the IPsec
tunnel between two C-PEs' WAN ports; the corresponding destination
prefixes (as announced by the aforementioned routes) may also be
reached through the VPN underlay without any encryption.
The establishment of an IPsec tunnel can fail, such as due to the
two endpoints supporting different encryption algorithms or other
reasons. There can be multiple negotiations messages for the IPsec
SA parameters between two end points. That is why IPsec SA
association establishment between end points is independent from
the policies on mapping routes to specific IPSec SA.
If C-PEs need to establish WAN Port based IPsec SA, the
information encoded in Tunnel Path Attribute should only apply to
the WAN ports and should be independent of the clients' routes.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
In addition, the Overlay IPsec SA Tunnel may need to be
established before clients' routes are attached.
- C-PEs tend to communicate with a subset of the other C-PEs, not
all the C-PEs need to be connected through a mesh topology.
Therefore, the distribution of the Overlay Edge WAN ports
information need be be scoped to the authorized peers.
5.3. SECURE-L3VPN/EVPN
[SECURE-L3VPN] describes how to extend the BGP/MPLS VPN [RFC4364]
capabilities to allow some PEs to connect to other PEs via public
networks. [SECURE-L3VPN] introduces the concept of Red Interface &
Black Interface used by PEs, where the RED interfaces are used to
forward traffic into the VPN, and the Black Interfaces are used
between WAN ports through which only IPsec-protected packets are
forwarded to the Internet or to other backbone network thereby
eliminating the need for MPLS transport in the backbone.
[SECURE-L3VPN] assumes PEs using MPLS over IPsec when sending
traffic through the Black Interfaces.
[SECURE-EVPN] describes a solution where point-to-multipoint BGP
signaling is used in the control plane for the Scenario #1 described
in [BGP-SDWAN-Usage]. It relies upon a BGP cluster design to
facilitate the key and policy exchange among PE devices to create
private pair-wise IPsec Security Associations without IKEv2 point-
to-point signaling or any other direct peer-to-peer session
establishment messages.
Both [SECURE-L3VPN] and [SECURE-EVPN] are useful, however, they both
miss the aspects of aggregating VPN and Internet underlays. In
summary:
- Both documents assume a client traffic is either forwarded all
encrypted through an IPsec tunnel, or not encrypted at all through
a different tunnel regardless which WAN ports the traffic egress
the PEs towards WAN. For Overlay arch over trusted VPN and
untrusted Internet, one client traffic can be forwarded encrypted
at one time through a WAN port towards untrusted network and be
forwarded unencrypted at different time through a WAN port to MPLS
VPN.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
- The [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes that a CPE "registers" with the RR.
However, it does not say how. It assumes that the remote CPEs are
pre-configured with the IPsec SA manually. In Overlay network to
connect Hybrid Cloud DCs, Zero Touch Provisioning is expected.
Manual configuration is not an option, especially for the edge
devices that are deployed in faraway places.
- The [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes that C-PEs and RR are connected via an
IPsec tunnel. Missing TLS/DTLS. The following assumption by
[SECURE-L3VPN] becomes invalid for the Overlay network to connect
Hybrid Cloud DCs where automatic synchronization of IPsec SA
between C-PEs and RR is needed:
A CPE must also be provisioned with whatever additional
information is needed in order to set up an IPsec SA with
each of the red RRs
- IPsec requires periodic refreshment of the keys. The draft does
not provide any information about how to synchronize the
refreshment among multiple nodes.
- IPsec usually sends configuration parameters to two endpoints only
and lets these endpoints negotiate the key. The [SECURE-L3VPN]
assumes that the RR is responsible for creating/managing the key
for all endpoints. When one endpoint is compromised, all other
connections will be impacted.
5.4. Preventing attacks from Internet-facing ports
When C-PEs have Internet-facing ports, additional security risks are
raised.
To mitigate security risks, in addition to requiring Anti-DDoS
features on C-PEs, it is necessary for C-PEs to support means to
determine whether traffic sent by remote peers is legitimate to
prevent spoofing attacks.
6. C-PEs not directly connected to VPN PEs
Because of the ephemeral property of the selected Cloud DCs for
specific workloads/Apps, an enterprise or its network service
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
provider may not have direct physical connections to the Cloud DCs
that are optimal for hosting the enterprise's specific
workloads/Apps. Under those circumstances, Overlay is a very
flexible choice to interconnect the enterprise on-premises data
centers & branch offices to its desired Cloud DCs.
However, Overlay paths established over the public Internet can have
unpredictable performance, especially over long distances and across
operators' domains. Therefore, it is highly desirable to steer as
much as possible the portion of Overlay paths over the enterprise's
existing VPN that has guaranteed SLA to minimize the distance or the
number of segments over the public Internet.
MEF Cloud Service Architecture [MEF-Cloud] also describes a use case
of network operators using Overlay path over LTE or the public
Internet for last mile access where the VPN service providers cannot
necessarily provide the required physical infrastructure.
Under those scenarios, one or two of the Overlay endpoints may not
be directly attached to the PEs of a VPN Domain.
When using Overlay to connect the enterprise's existing sites to the
workloads hosted in Cloud DCs, the corresponding C-PEs have to be
upgraded to support the desired Overlay. If the workloads hosted in
Cloud DCs need to be connected to many sites, the upgrade process
can be very expensive.
[Net2Cloud-Problem] describes a hybrid network approach that extend
the existing MPLS-based VPNs to the Cloud DC Workloads over the
access paths that are not under the VPN provider's control. To make
it work properly, a small number of the PEs of the MPLS VPN can be
designated to connect to the remote workloads via secure IPsec
tunnels. Those designated PEs are shown as fPE (floating PE or
smart PE) in Figure 3. Once the secure IPsec tunnels are
established, the workloads hosted in Cloud DCs can be reached by the
enterprise's VPN without upgrading all of the enterprise's existing
CPEs. The only CPE that needs to support the Overlay would be a
virtualized CPE instantiated within the cloud DC.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
+--------+ +--------+
| Host-a +--+ +----| Host-b |
| | | (') | |
+--------+ | +-----------+ ( ) +--------+
| +-+--+ ++-+ ++-+ +--+-+ (_)
| | CPE|--|PE| |PE+--+ CPE| |
+--| | | | | | | |---+
+-+--+ ++-+ ++-+ +----+
/ | |
/ | MPLS +-+---+ +--+-++--------+
+------+-+ | Network |fPE-1| |CPE || Host |
| Host | | | |- --| || d |
| c | +-----+ +-+---+ +--+-++--------+
+--------+ |fPE-2|-----+
+---+-+ (|)
(|) (|) Overlay
(|) (|) over any access
+=\======+=========+
// \ | Cloud DC \\
// \ ++-----+ \\
+Remote|
| CPE |
+-+----+
----+-------+-------+-----
| |
+---+----+ +---+----+
| Remote | | Remote |
| App-1 | | App-2 |
+--------+ +--------+
Figure 3: VPN Extension to Cloud DC
In Figure 3, the optimal Cloud DC to host the workloads (as a
function of the proximity, capacity, pricing, or other criteria
chosen by the enterprises) does not have a direct connection to the
PEs of the MPLS VPN that interconnects the enterprise's existing
sites.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
6.1. Floating PEs to connect to Remote CPEs
To extend MPLS VPNs to remote CPEs, it is necessary to establish
secure tunnels (such as IPsec tunnels) between the Floating PEs and
the remote CPEs.
Even though a set of PEs can be manually selected to act as the
floating PEs for a specific cloud data center, there are no standard
protocols for those PEs to interact with the remote CPEs (most
likely virtualized) instantiated in the third party cloud data
centers (such as exchanging performance or route information).
When there is more than one fPE available for use (as there should
be for resiliency purposes or the ability to support multiple cloud
DCs geographically scattered), it is not straightforward to
designate an egress fPE to remote CPEs based on applications. There
is too much applications' traffic traversing PEs, and it is not
feasible for PEs to recognize applications from the payload of
packets.
6.2. NAT Traversal
Cloud DCs that only assign private IPv4 addresses to the
instantiated workloads assume that traffic to/from the workload
usually needs to traverse NATs.
An overlay edge node can solicit a STUN (Session Traversal of UDP
Through Network Address Translation RFC 3489) Server to get the NAT
property, the public IP address and the Public Port number so that
such information can be communicated to the relevant peers.
6.3. Complexity of using BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via Internet
Even though an EBGP (external BGP) Multi-hop design can be used to
connect peers that are not directly connected to each other, there
are still some complications in extending BGP from MPLS VPN PEs to
remote CPEs via any access path (e.g., Internet).
The path between the remote CPEs and VPN PEs that maintain VPN
routes may very well traverse untrusted nodes.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
EBGP Multi-hop design requires static configuration on both peers.
To use EBGP between a PE and remote CPEs, the PE has to be manually
configured with the "next-hop" set to the IP address of the CPEs.
When remote CPEs, especially remote virtualized CPEs are dynamically
instantiated or removed, the configuration of Multi-Hop EBGP on the
PE has to be changed accordingly.
Egress peering engineering (EPE) is not sufficient. Running BGP on
virtualized CPEs in Cloud DCs requires GRE tunnels to be
established first, which requires the remote CPEs to support
address and key management capabilities. RFC 7024 (Virtual Hub &
Spoke) and Hierarchical VPN do not support the required
properties.
Also, there is a need for a mechanism to automatically trigger
configuration changes on PEs when remote CPEs' are instantiated or
moved (leading to an IP address change) or deleted.
EBGP Multi-hop design does not include a security mechanism by
default. The PE and remote CPEs need secure communication channels
when connecting via the public Internet.
Remote CPEs, if instantiated in Cloud DCs, might have to traverse
NATs to reach PEs. It is not clear how BGP can be used between
devices located beyond the NAT and the devices located behind the
NAT. It is not clear how to configure the Next Hop on the PEs to
reach private IPv4 addresses.
6.4. Designated Forwarder to the remote edges
Among the multiple floating PEs that are reachable from a remote
CPE, multicast traffic sent by the remote CPE towards the MPLS VPN
can be forwarded back to the remote CPE due to the PE receiving the
multicast packets forwarding the multicast/broadcast frame to other
PEs that in turn send to all attached CPEs. This process may cause
traffic loops.
Therefore, it is necessary to designate one floating PE as the CPE's
Designated Forwarder, similar to TRILL's Appointed Forwarders
[RFC6325].
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
MPLS VPNs do not have features like TRILL's Appointed Forwarders.
6.5. Traffic Path Management
When there are multiple floating PEs that have established IPsec
tunnels with the remote CPE, the remote CPE can forward outbound
traffic to the Designated Forwarder PE, which in turn forwards
traffic to egress PEs and then to the final destinations. However,
it is not straightforward for the egress PE to send back the return
traffic to the Designated Forwarder PE.
Example of Return Path management using Figure 3 above.
- fPE-1 is DF for communication between App-1 <-> Host-a due to
latency, pricing or other criteria.
- fPE-2 is DF for communication between App-1 <-> Host-b.
7. Manageability Considerations
Zero touch provisioning of Overlay networks to interconnect Hybrid
Clouds is highly desired. It is necessary for a newly powered up
edge node to establish a secure connection (by means of TLS, DTLS,
etc.) with its controller.
8. Security Considerations
Cloud Services is built upon shared infrastructure, therefore not
secure by nature.
Secure user identity management, authentication, and access
control mechanisms are important. Developing appropriate security
measurements can enhance the confidence needed by enterprises to
fully take advantage of Cloud Services.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
9. IANA Considerations
This document requires no IANA actions. RFC Editor: Please remove
this section before publication.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC8192] S. Hares, et al, "Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF) Problem Statement and Use Cases", July 2017
[RFC5521] P. Mohapatra, E. Rosen, "The BGP Encapsulation Subsequent
Address Family Identifier (SAFI) and the BGP Tunnel
Encapsulation Attribute", April 2009.
[BGP-SDWAN-PORT]L. Dunbar, et al, "Subsequent Address Family
Indicator for SDWAN Ports", draft-dunbar-idr-sdwan-port-
safi-00, Work-in-progress, March 2019.
[BGP-SDWAN-Usage] L. Dunbar, et al, "Framework of Using BGP for
SDWAN Overlay Networks", draft-dunbar-idr-sdwan-framework-
00, work-in-progress, Feb 2019.
[Tunnel-Encap]E. Rosen, et al, "The BGP Tunnel Encapsulation
Attribute", draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-10, July 2018.
[SECURE-EVPN A. Sajassi, et al, draft-sajassi-bess-secure-evpn-01,
work in progress, March 2019.
[SECURE-L3VPN] E. Rosen, "Provide Secure Layer L3VPNs over Public
Infrastructure", draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00, work-
in-progress, July 2018
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
[DMVPN] Dynamic Multi-point VPN:
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/dynamic-
multipoint-vpn-dmvpn/index.html
[DSVPN] Dynamic Smart VPN:
http://forum.huawei.com/enterprise/en/thread-390771-1-
1.html
[ITU-T-X1036] ITU-T Recommendation X.1036, "Framework for creation,
storage, distribution and enforcement of policies for
network security", Nov 2007.
[Net2Cloud-Problem] L. Dunbar and A. Malis, "Seamless Interconnect
Underlay to Cloud Overlay Problem Statement", draft-dm-
net2cloud-problem-statement-02, June 2018
11. Acknowledgments
Acknowledgements to John Drake for his review and contributions.
Many thanks to John Scudder for stimulating the clarification
discussion on the Tunnel-Encap draft so that our gap analysis can be
more accurate.
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Net2Cloud Gap Analysis March 2020
Authors' Addresses
Linda Dunbar
Futurewei
Email: ldunbar@futurewei.com
Andrew G. Malis
Independent
Email: agmalis@gmail.com
Christian Jacquenet
Orange
Rennes, 35000
France
Email: Christian.jacquenet@orange.com
Dunbar, et al. Expires September 8, 2020 [Page 18]