Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D.
Internet Draft Seo, K.
Expires: May 2009 Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational BBN Technologies
November 2008
Template for an
Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 31, 2009.
Abstract
This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
(e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI).
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 9 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
Table of Contents
Preface...........................................................8
1. Introduction...................................................9
1.1. Overview.................................................10
1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11
1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
1.3.5. Other participants..................................12
1.4. Certificate usage........................................12
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13
1.5. Policy administration....................................13
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13
1.5.2. Contact person......................................13
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15
2.1. Repositories.............................................15
2.2. Publication of certification information.................15
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15
3. Identification And Authentication.............................16
3.1. Naming...................................................16
3.1.1. Types of names......................................16
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation.................................................18
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
...........................................................19
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate................................................20
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................22
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
certificate................................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................22
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................23
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate................................................23
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................24
4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................25
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
...........................................................25
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................25
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
request....................................................26
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
[OMITTED]..................................................27
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
[OMITTED]..................................................27
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27
4.10. Certificate status services.............................27
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
...........................................................27
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
practices [OMITTED]........................................27
5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28
5.1. Physical controls........................................28
5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28
5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28
5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28
5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28
5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28
5.2. Procedural controls......................................28
5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
...........................................................29
5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29
5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
[OMITTED]..................................................30
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
[OMITTED]..................................................30
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
[OMITTED]..................................................30
5.6. Key changeover...........................................30
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
[OMITTED]..................................................31
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31
6. Technical Security Controls...................................32
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32
6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls......................................................33
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................33
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34
6.2.5. Private key archival................................34
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
module.....................................................34
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34
6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................34
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods....................................................35
6.4. Activation data..........................................35
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35
6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35
6.5. Computer security controls...............................35
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36
6.6.1. System development controls.........................36
6.6.2. Security management controls........................36
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36
6.7. Network security controls................................36
6.8. Time-stamping............................................36
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-
res-certs-01].................................................37
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................38
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................38
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................38
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............38
8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................38
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................38
8.6. Communication of results.................................38
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39
9.1. Fees.....................................................39
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39
9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39
9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39
9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39
9.2.2. Other assets........................................39
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....39
9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information................................................39
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39
9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39
9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39
9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39
9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................39
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......39
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......39
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
process....................................................40
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40
9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........40
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
[OMITTED]..................................................40
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40
9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
9.9. Indemnities..............................................40
9.10. Term and termination....................................40
9.10.1. Term...............................................40
9.10.2. Termination........................................40
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40
9.12. Amendments..............................................40
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
[OMITTED]..................................................40
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40
9.14. Governing law...........................................40
9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................40
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................40
9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41
9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41
9.16.3. Severability.......................................41
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41
9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41
10. Security Considerations......................................42
11. IANA Considerations..........................................42
12. Acknowledgments..............................................42
13. References...................................................42
13.1. Normative References....................................42
13.2. Informative References..................................43
Author's Addresses...............................................43
Intellectual Property Statement..................................44
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45
Copyright Statement..............................................45
Preface
This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
(e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI). The user of this document should
1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of
Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.
2. delete this Preface
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
brackets>
4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
reference section with just the references in 13.2
5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
additions above.
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect
in the Introduction below. This information should be left in the
CPS as an explanation to the user.
1. Introduction
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
of Registry>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address
and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. These practices are defined
in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP,
[RFCxxxx]) of this PKI.
The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations
about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The
goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers
to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this
allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the
holder of the associated private key has been allocated the
resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique
holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, in conjunction
with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide
critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of
route filters by ISPs.
The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
to digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable
using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
sections are also marked [OMITTED].
1.1. Overview
This CPS describes:
. Participants
. Distribution of the certificates and CRLs
. How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked
. Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
. Key management
. Audit procedures
. Business and legal issues
The PKI encompasses several types of certificates:
. CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder
. End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other
(non-certificate/CRL) signed objects
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
. In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system
1.2. Document name and identification
The name of this document is "<Name of Registry>'s Certification
Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)".
1.3. PKI participants
Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an LIR/ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber"
can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs,
and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but
which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term.
Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to
subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are
individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used
to refer to an organization that receives network services from an
LIR/ISP.
1.3.1. Certification authorities
<Name of Registry> will operate two CAs for the RPKI: one is
designated "offline" and the other is designated "production." The
offline CA is the top level CA for the <Name of Registry> portion of
the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in
case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus
this CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA
and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only a certificate issued
to that CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to
<Name of Registry> members, to which address space or AS numbers
have been allocated.
1.3.2. Registration authorities
There is no registration authority (RA) for either the offline or
the production CA operating under this CPS. The former needs no RA
capability because it issues certificates only to the production CA.
The production CA relies upon certificates issued by the <Name of
Registry> Business PKI (BPKI) (see Section 3.2.6) to identify
individuals authorized to requests certificates under the RPKI.
<Name of Registry> already establishes a business relationship with
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
each subscriber (<Name of Registry> member) and assumes
responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of
address space and AS numbers. Since <Name of Registry> operates the
BPKI CA, there is no distinct RA for the RPKI.
1.3.3. Subscribers
Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and
AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense:
network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
<Additionally, this CA issues certificates to <Local/National>
Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies)
who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or
LIRs/ISPs.>
1.3.4. Relying parties
Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
number current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example,
entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer
resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers. This
includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but
want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to
this space.
To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties.
1.3.5. Other participants
<Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects, e.g., ROAs.
1.4. Certificate usage
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
permitted under this policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
1.5. Policy administration
1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry>
1.5.2. Contact person
<Insert Registry contact info here>
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
1.6. Definitions and acronyms
BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is used by an RIR to identify members to
whom RPKI certificates can be issued.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
CP - Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community and/or class of applications with common security
requirements.
CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates.
ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
and selling Internet services to other organizations.
LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional
(or National) Registry.
NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional
Registry. These form an optional second tier in the tree
scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation.
RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
specified geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs:
ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -
Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC
(Africa).
ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This is a digitally signed
object that identifies a network operator, identified by an
AS, that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set
of address blocks.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories
As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for
downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate
this data for use in support of routing security.
The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and
other signed objects accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of
Registry>.net.
2.2. Publication of certification information
<Name of Registry> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to
a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide
distributed system of repositories.
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication
<Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If you choose to
outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this
information for relying parties.>
As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times
and frequency:
A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.
The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish its CRL prior to the
nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.
2.4. Access controls on repositories
Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must
be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
(certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
3. Identification And Authentication
3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of names
The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). For certificates
issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject will consist of a
single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. For
certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will be the name of the
NIR.
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> RPKI CA.
However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be
globally unique in this PKI.
Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need
not to be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense,
since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization
in support of routing security, not for identification
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a
function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
<Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
enforced through technical means.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc.
3.2. Initial identity validation
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
<Name of Registry> accepts certificate requests via the protocol
described in [up/down]. This protocol makes use of the PKCS #10
format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format requires that
the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This
mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of
registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in
a fashion that preserves the accuracy of allocations as represented
in <Name of Registry> records. Specifically, a BPKI certificate used
to authenticate a certificate request serves as a link to the <Name
of Registry> member database that maintains the resource allocation
records. The certificate request is matched against the database
record for the member in question, and an RPKI certificate is issued
only if the resources requested are a subset of those held by the
member.
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
identity of a resource holder. However, <Name of Registry> maintains
contact information for each resource holder in support of
certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation, via the BPKI.
The <Name of Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates
that are used to identify individuals who represent <Name of
Registry> members that are address space (or AS number) holders.
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
3.2.5. Validation of authority
Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6)
has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each
certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI. However, <Name of Registry> operates a BPKI [cps-
business-pki] that is used to authenticate members and to enable
them to manage their resource allocations. The Resource PKI relies
on this BPKI to authenticate Subscribers who make certificate
requests, revocation requests, etc.
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
Routine re-key is effected via a Certificate Issuance Request
message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS message
is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with the
requester.
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
Re-key after revocation is effected via a Certificate Issuance
Request message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS
message is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with
the requester.
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
An RPKI Subscriber makes an explicit revocation request using the
protocol defined in [up/down]. Revocation requests in this protocol
are digitally signed CMS messages, and are verified using a public
key bound to an authorized representative via the <Name of Registry>
BPKI.
When a Subscriber requests an new resource allocation, an existing
resource certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so
long as the set of resources allocated to the Subscriber did not
"shrink," i.e., the new resources are a superset of the old resource
set. However, if a new resource allocation results in "shrinkage" of
the set of resources allocated to a Subscriber, this triggers an
implicit revocation of the old resource certificate(s) associated
with that Subscriber.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
CA:
o <Insert if appropriate: "Any NIR or LIR/ISP operating in the
geopolitical region served by this registry">
o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by
this registry
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
<Name of Registry> members who are resource holders are enrolled in
the <Name of Registry> BPKI via the process described in
[operations-business-pki]. Only a member who holds a certificate
issued under the BPKI is eligible to make an RPKI certificate
request.
4.2. Certificate application processing
<A/An Name of Registry> resource holder requests a certificate via a
Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down], which is
authenticated via the digital signature on the CMS envelope. The
certificate used to authenticate the message is issued under the
<Name of Registry> BPKI. <Name of Registry> processes the resource
request as described in [up/down]. The Certificate Issuance Response
message [up/down] either provides the certificate to the Subscriber,
or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
The <Name of Registry> BPKI is used to identify <A/An Name of
Registry> member representative applying for a certificate via a
certificate issuance request in the up/down protocol. See the <Name
of Registry> BPKI CPS for additional details [cp-business-pki].
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides
the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating
why the request was not fulfilled. <Describe your practices for
approval or rejection of applications and refer to documentation of
existing business practices relevant to this process. Note that
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
according to the CP, certificate applications will be approved based
on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA,
based on the CA's records of address space and AS number holders.
Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the corresponding
private key for the public key that will be bound to the certificate
the CA issues to the requester.>
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
<You may declare here your expected time frame for processing
certificate applications.>
4.3. Certificate issuance
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
A Subscriber generates a draft certificate using the PKCS #10
format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This draft certificate is
encapsulated in a CMS message, signed by the requester, and
submitted as a Certificate Issuance Request as described in
[up/down]. The CA verifies the request message as described in
[up/down] and generates a Certificate Issuance Response message.
That message either contains the requested certificate, or provides
a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate by the
Certificate Issuance Response message.
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
4.4. Certificate acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
When a certificate is issued, the RPKI CA will place it in the
repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
Certificates will be published in the Repository system within 1
business day of being issued by this CA.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA
certificates. The private key associated with each of these
certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
CRLs. A subscriber will issue certificates to any organizations to
which it allocates resources and one or more EE certificates for use
in verifying signatures on ROAs signed by the subscriber. <If
appropriate, add "Subscribers that are NIRs issue certificates to
organizations to which they have allocated address space or AS
numbers. Subscribers that are LIRs issue certificates to
organizations to which they have allocated address space.">
Subscribers also will issue certificates to operators in support of
repository access control.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
RPKI EE certificates to verify ROAs and other signed objects, e.g.,
in support of generating route filters.
4.6. Certificate renewal
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource
holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in
advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in
conjunction with notification of service expiration".> The validity
interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.
Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 will apply.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
4.6.2. Who may request renewal
The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
renewal process. For the case of the certificate holder, only an
individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been
issued may request renewal of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate
issuance request is verified using the BPKI.
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
A Subscriber requests certificate renewal by sending a Certificate
Issuance Request message [up/down].
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate via
the Certificate Issuance Response message, if the Subscriber
initiated the renewal. If <Name of Registry> initiated the renewal
process, the Subscriber is notified by the posting of the renewed
certificate in the <Name of Registry> repository. A Subscriber can
discover a certificate renewed by <Name of Registry> through use of
the List message [up/down].
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
repository. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a certificate
unless the subscriber explicitly requests revocation of the
certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
<Name of Registry> will publish a renewal certificate in the <Name
of Registry> RPKI repository within 1 business day after issuance of
the renewed certificate.
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
4.7. Certificate re-key
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
requested, based on:
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
(1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or
(2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
key pair
If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate will be revoked.
Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places
additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
<Name of Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
compromise report. If the Subscriber (certificate Subject) requests
the rekey, authentication is effected using the <Name of Registry>
BPKI. <Describe how a compromise report received from other than a
subscriber is verified.>
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
A Subscriber requests a re-key of a certificate by issuing a
Certificate Issuance Request message in which the resources are ones
that the Subscriber already holds, but a new public key is provided
in the PKCS #10 portion of the request.
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a re-keyed certificate
via the Certificate Issuance Response message.
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
A re-keyed certificate will be published in the Repository system
within 1 business day of being issued by this CA.
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
4.8. Certificate modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A
subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a
result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The
request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of
additional resources, or may be explicit. A subscriber also may
request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
previous certificates.
If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in
addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not
request that a new certificate be issued containing only these
resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate
modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new
certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same
public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate,
but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address
space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address
space or AS numbers are to be removed from a certificate, then the
old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting
the new allocation) issued.
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
certificate modification process. If a certificate holder requests
the modification, the request is authenticated using the <Name of
Registry> BPKI, as described in [up/down]. <Name of Registry> will
modify a certificate, and revoke the old certificate, if, for
example, a Subscriber fails to renew membership in a timely fashion.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
A certificate can be modified (other than for re-key) only by the
addition or removal or resources. A Subscriber requests certificate
modification by submitting a Certificate Issuance Request. If the
request contains values for AS and/or (IPv4 or IPv6) address
resource sets that the Subscriber already holds, but which are
different from those in the currently issued certificates, the
request is interpreted as a request for certificate modification.
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber
A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a modified certificate
by the publication of the certificate in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system.
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
repository and notify the subscriber. A subject is deemed to have
accepted the modified certificate unless the subject explicitly
requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the
<Name of Registry> RPKI repository system, as described in Section
4.9.3.
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
A modified certificate will be published in the <Name of Registry>
RPKI Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this
CA.
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the
relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the
public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate
also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by
that certificate.
4.9.2. Who can request revocation
The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may request a
revocation. A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the
Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down].
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the Certificate
Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. The Certificate
Revocation Response message confirms receipt of the revocation
request by <Name of Registry>, and indicates that <Name of Registry>
will include the revoked certificate in a CRL.
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
A Subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified.
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
process a revocation request.>
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
The <Name of Registry> RPKI production CA will publish CRLs
approximately every 24 hours. The <Name of Registry> RPKI offline CA
will publish CRLs on a monthly basis. Each CRL will carry a
nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or
before that time. <Name of Registry> will set the
nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
next scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
after generation.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]
4.10. Certificate status services
<Name of Registry> does not support OCSP. <Name of Registry> issues
CRLs.
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls
5.1. Physical controls
<As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
in the management of address space and AS number allocation.>
5.1.1. Site location and construction
5.1.2. Physical access
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
5.1.4. Water exposures
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
5.1.6. Media storage
5.1.7. Waste disposal
5.1.8. Off-site backup
5.2. Procedural controls
<As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to
those used in the management of address space and AS number
allocation.>
5.2.1. Trusted roles
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
5.3. Personnel controls
<As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
space and AS number allocation.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
5.3.2. Background check procedures
5.3.3. Training requirements
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
5.4. Audit logging procedures
5.4.1. Types of events recorded
Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)
Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
Posting of any material to a repository
Any attempts to change or delete audit data
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
<Describe your polices for retention of audit logs.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
5.4.4. Protection of audit log
<Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
<Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
<Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether
such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]
5.6. Key changeover
The <Name of Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period
that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA
certificate. To support this, <Name of Registry> will create a new
signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate
containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum
amount of lead time, e.g., "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of
the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]
5.8. CA or RA termination
<Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address
space and AS number allocations in case of its own termination.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
6. Technical Security Controls
This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
Registry>.
6.1. Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1. Key pair generation
<Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers. In
most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
subscriber, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of
address space or AS numbers. However, your procedures may include
one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they
so request. (This might be done for subscribers who do not have the
ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion or who want a
registry to provide backup for the subscriber private key.) Since
the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes,
generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the
security of the PKI. >
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
is not applicable.>
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
Subscribers deliver public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA by
use of the up/down protocol as described in [up/down].
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in
certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus
certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying
parties will download these certificates from this system. Public
key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be
distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software
that will be made available to the Internet community.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
6.1.5. Key sizes
For the <Name of Registry> offline CA'sand production CA's
certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber
certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
1024 bits. If NIR key size is larger than LIR/ISP/subscriber key
size, describe each independently.>
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
(e) F4 (65,537).
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for
performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
<Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing such checks for
subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280.
For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
marked critical.
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA employs a cryptographic module
evaluated under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
There will be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m>
multi-person control.
6.2.3. Private key escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
6.2.4. Private key backup
<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at
an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
6.2.5. Private key archival
See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s offline CA and production
CA will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.
The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted
form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA will be stored in the
cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in
accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the
module. (See [FIPS])
6.2.8. Method of activating private key
<Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
key.>
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module
will be stored securely when not in use.
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key
<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key,
e.g., when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular
module.>
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
The cryptographic module used by the <Name of Registry> production
CA will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1. Public key archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys.
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
of <insert number of years - Registry key pairs and certificates
should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>
6.4. Activation data
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation
<Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
6.4.2. Activation data protection
Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
<Describe your procedures here>.
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data
<Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None.">
6.5. Computer security controls
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement
<Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with
those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP
addresses and AS numbers.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
6.6. Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1. System development controls
<Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
(TSDM) Level 2.>
6.6.2. Security management controls
<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
software and equipment employed by the CA. These security measures
should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the
CAs for managing and allocating RPKI resources.>
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI
functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.
This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and
AS numbers is handled. >
6.7. Network security controls
<Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
operation. These should be commensurate with the network security
controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of
IP addresses and AS numbers.>
6.8. Time-stamping
The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
<List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers. These
are sufficient for the PKI systems.>
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
8.4. Topics covered by assessment
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
8.6. Communication of results
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
9. Other Business And Legal Matters
<The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your
business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with
the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the
allocation of RPKI resources.>
9.1. Fees
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)
9.1.3. Refund policy
9.2. Financial responsibility
9.2.1. Insurance coverage
9.2.2. Other assets
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
9.3. Confidentiality of business information
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information
9.4. Privacy of personal information
9.4.1. Privacy plan
9.4.2. Information treated as private
9.4.3. Information not deemed private
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)
9.6. Representations and warranties
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties
9.8. Limitations of liability
9.9. Indemnities
9.10. Term and termination
9.10.1. Term
9.10.2. Termination
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions
9.14. Governing law
9.15. Compliance with applicable law
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
9.16.1. Entire agreement
9.16.2. Assignment
9.16.3. Severability
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
9.16.5. Force Majeure
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
10. Security Considerations
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can
include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
done in a secure manner. Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
relying party systems.
11. IANA Considerations
None.
12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress.
[up/down] Houston, G., Loomis, R., Ellacott, B., Austein, R., "A
Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", work in
progress.
13.2. Informative References
[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.
[cps-business-pki] <Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for
this registry's business PKI -- to be filled in>
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
(FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.
[operations-business-pki] <Document or pointer to document
describing the operations of this registry's business PKI --
to be filled in>
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.
Author's Addresses
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
Email: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
Email: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com
Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
in this document or the extent to which any license under such
rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
ipr@ietf.org.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry November 2008
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on
an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE
ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires May 2009 [Page 45]
