SPEERMINT Working Group J-F. Mule
Internet-Draft CableLabs
Intended status: Best Current July 9, 2007
Practice
Expires: January 10, 2008
SPEERMINT Requirements for SIP-based VoIP Interconnection
draft-ietf-speermint-requirements-02.txt
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Abstract
This memo defines Best Current Practices for session peering between
SIP Service Providers for voice or other types of multimedia traffic
exchanges. In its current state, this document describes high-level
guidelines and general requirements for session peering for
multimedia interconnect . It also defines a minimum set of
requirements applicable to session peering for voice over IP,
presence and instant messaging interconnects. It is intended to
become best current practices based on the use cases discussed in the
SPEERMINT working group.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Session Peering Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Session Establishment Data (SED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.1. User Identities and SIP URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.2. URI Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Signaling and Media Guidelines for Session Peering . . . . . . 10
4.1. Protocol Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Minimum set of SIP-SDP-related requirements . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Media-related Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Requirements for Presence and Instant Messaging . . . . . 11
4.5. Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5.1. Security in today's VoIP networks . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5.2. Signaling Security and TLS Considerations . . . . . . 13
4.5.3. Media Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Policy Parameters for Session Peering . . . . . . . . 21
A.1. Categories of Parameters and Justifications . . . . . . . 21
A.2. Summary of Parameters for Consideration in Session
Peering Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 26
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1. Introduction
Peering at the session level represents an agreement between parties
to allow the exchange of traffic according to a policy. It is
assumed that these sessions use the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
protocol to enable peering between two or more actors. The actors of
SIP session peering are called SIP Service Providers (SSPs) and they
are typically represented by users, user groups such as enterprises
or real-time collaboration service communities, or other service
providers offering voice or multimedia services.
Common terminology for SIP session peering is defined
([I-D.ietf-speermint-terminology]) and a reference architecture is
described in [I-D.ietf-speermint-architecture]. As the traffic
exchanged using SIP as the session establishment protocol increases
between parties, a number of use cases have been exposed by users of
SIP services and various other actors for how session level peering
has been or could be deployed based on the reference architecture
([I-D.ietf-speermint-voip-consolidated-usecases]) .
Peering at the session layer can be achieved on a bilateral basis
(direct peering with SIP sessions established directly between two
SSPs), or on an indirect basis via an intermediary (indirect peering
via a third-party SSP that has a trust relationship with the SSPs),
or on a multilateral basis (assisted peering using a federation model
between SSPs) - see the terminology document for more details.
This document describes guidelines and requirements that are intended
to become Best Current Practices for session peering (direct,
indirect or assisted). These requirements are also independent of
the type of media exchanged by the parties and should be applicable
to any type of multimedia session peering such as Voice over IP
(VoIP), video telephony, and instant messaging. The document also
defines a minimum set of specific requirements for VoIP, presence and
instant messaging interconnects.
It is not the goal of this document to mandate any particular use of
any IETF protocols to establish session peering. However, when
protocol mechanisms are used, the document aims at providing
guidelines or best current practices on how they should be
implemented, configured or configurable in order to facilitate
session peering.
Finally, a list of parameters for the definition of a session peering
policy is provided in an informative appendix. It should be
considered as an example of the information a SIP Service Provider
may require in order to connect to another using SIP.
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2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119
[RFC2119].
This memo makes use of the following terms and acronyms defined in
[I-D.ietf-speermint-terminology]: SIP Service Provider (SSP),
Signaling Path Border Element (SBE), Data Path Border Element (DBE),
Session Establishment Data (SED), Layer 3 and Layer 5 peering,
session peering, federation, etc. It is assumed that the reader is
familiar with the Session Description Protocol (SDP) [RFC4566] and
the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261].
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3. General Requirements
The following sections define general guidelines and requirements
applicable to session peering for multimedia sessions.
3.1. Scope
SSPs desiring to establish session peering relationships have to
reach an agreement on numerous aspects.
This document only addresses best current practice for certain
aspects of a session peering agreement, including the declaration,
advertisement and management of ingress and egress for session
signaling and media, information and conventions related to the
Session Establishment Data (SED), the security requirements each peer
may enforce on its network to accept and secure session exchanges,
and, the format and necessary details to determine the minimum set of
parameters required to achieve SIP and SDP interoperability.
Several other aspects of session peering are critical to reach a
successful agreement but they are considered out of scope of the
SPEERMINT working group and not addressed in this document. They
include aspects such as media (e.g., type of media traffic to be
exchanged, compatible media codecs and media transport protocols,
mechanisms to ensure differentiated quality of service for media),
layer-3 IP connectivity between the Signaling Path and Data Path
Border Elements, traffic capacity control (e.g. maximum number of SIP
sessions at each ingress point, maximum number of concurrent IM or
VoIP sessions), and accounting. The primary focus of this document
is on the requirements applicable to the boundaries of Layer 5 SIP
networks: SIP UA or end-device requirements are also considered out
of scope.
The informative Appendix A lists parameters that SPPs should consider
when discussing the technical aspects of SIP session peering.
3.2. Session Peering Points
For session peering to be scalable and operationally manageable by
SSPs, maximum flexibility should be given for how signaling path and
media path border elements are declared, dynamically advertised and
updated. Indeed, in any session peering environment, there is a need
for a SIP Service Provider to declare or dynamically advertise the
SIP and media entities that will face the peer's network.
An SSP SHOULD declare the signaling border elements responsible for
egress and ingress points so called Signaling Path Border Elements
(SBEs). If the SSP also provides media streams to its users, an SSP
SHOULD declare the media border elements responsible for egress and
ingress points so called Signaling Path Data Elements (SDEs); if such
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an SSP relies on STUN servers ([RFC3489]) and STUN Relay extensions
to permit the traversal of NAT devices, the SSP SHOULD declare those
STUN servers as part of its SDEs. It is RECOMMENDED that SSPs use
DNS and provide one or more domain names to be used with [RFC3263] to
locate SBEs.
An SPP SHOULD also indicate if some restrictions exist on the type of
media traffic the SIP entities acting as SBEs are capable of
establishing. Ingress and egress SBE points MAY be peer-dependent,
and/or media-dependent. An SSP SHOULD be able to accomodate
multiple, media-dependent ingress points from a peer's network. The
mechanisms recommended for the declaration and advertisement of SBE
and SDE entities MUST allow for peer and media variability.
Motivations:
While there could be one single Signaling Path Border Element (SBE)
in some SSP networks that communicates with all SIP peer networks, an
SSP may choose to have one or more SBEs for receiving incoming SIP
session requests (ingress signaling points), and one or more SBEs for
outgoing SIP session requests (egress signaling points). Ingress and
egress signaling points may be distinct SIP entities and could be
media-dependent. Some providers deploy SIP entities specialized for
voice, real-time collaboration, etc. For example, within an SSP
network, some SBEs may be dedicated for certain types of media
traffic due to specific SIP extensions required for certain media
types (e.g. SIMPLE, the SIP MESSAGE Method for Instant Messaging
[RFC3428] or the Message Sessions Relay Protocol (MSRP)).
An SSP SHOULD communicate how authentication of the peer's SBEs will
occur (see the security requirements for more details). The use of
access control lists based on fixed IP addresses or fixed IP sub-nets
of the SBEs is NOT RECOMMENDED as it does not scale: it not only
involves an error-prone manual process to configure access control
lists but it also prevents peers from dynamically making IP network
addressing changes to their SBE egress points without advertising
those changes "manually".
3.3. Session Establishment Data (SED)
The Session Establishment Data (SED) is defined as the data used to
route a call or SIP session to the called domain's ingress point
([I-D.ietf-speermint-terminology]). Given that SED is the set of
parameters that the outgoing SBEs need to complete the session
establishment, some information must be shared between SSPs on
special requirements or conventions required for a successful session
establishment. The following paragraphs capture the recommended best
practices for the SED data.
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3.3.1. User Identities and SIP URIs
User identities used between peers can be represented in many
different formats. Session Establishment Data SHOULD rely on URIs
(Uniform Resource Identifiers, RFC 3986 [RFC3986]) and SIP URIs
SHOULD be preferred over tel URIs (RFC 3966 [RFC3966]).
The use of DNS domain names and hostnames is RECOMMENDED in SIP URIs
and they MUST be resolvable on the public Internet. It is
RECOMMENDED that the host part of SIP URIs contain a fully-qualified
domain name instead of a numeric IPv4 or IPv6 address. As for the
user part of the SIP URIs, an SSP SHOULD NOT need to be aware of
which individual user identities are valid within a peer's domain.
Although SED data may be based on E.164-based SIP URIs for voice
interconnects, a generic peering methodology should not rely on such
E.164 numbers. As described in
[I-D.draft-elwell-speermint-enterprise-usecases], in some use cases
for enterprise to enterprise peering (even if a transit SSP is
involved), it should be possible to use user identity URIs that do
not map to E.164 numbers, e.g. for presence, instant messaging and
even for voice.
Motivations:
When SSP support voice, telephone numbers commonly appear in the
username portion of a SIP URI. When telephone numbers are in tel
URIs, SIP requests cannot be routed in accordance with the
traditional DNS resolution procedures standardized for SIP as
indicated in RFC 3824 [RFC3824]. The recommendations defined in
[RFC3824] SHOULD be followed by implementers when using E.164 numbers
with SIP. Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that all SIP URIs with
the same domain-part share the same set of peering policies, thus the
domain of the SIP URI may be used as the primary key to any
information regarding the reachability of that SIP URI.
3.3.2. URI Reachability
Based on a well-known URI type (for e.g. sip, pres, or im URIs), it
MUST be possible to determine whether the SSP domain servicing the
URI allows for session peering, and if it does, it SHOULD be possible
to locate and retrieve the domain's policy and SBE entities.
For example, an originating service provider must be able to
determine whether a SIP URI is open for direct interconnection
without requiring an SBE to initiate a SIP request. Furthermore,
since each call setup implies the execution of any proposed
algorithm, the establishment of a SIP session via peering should
incur minimal overhead and delay, and employ caching wherever
possible to avoid extra protocol round trips.
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The use of DNS domain names and hostnames is RECOMMENDED in SIP URIs
and they MUST be resolvable on the public Internet. The DNS
procedures specified in [RFC3263] SHOULD be followed to resolve a SIP
URI into a reachable host (IP address and port), and transport
protocol. Note that RFC 3263 relies on DNS SRV [RFC2782] and NAPTR
Resource Records [RFC2915].
Motivations:
This requirement is important as unsuccessful call attempts are
highly undesirable since they can introduce high delays due to
timeouts and can act as an unintended denial of service attack (e.g.,
by repeated TLS handshakes). There should be a high probability of
successful call completion for policy-conforming peers.
3.4. Other Considerations
The considerations listed below were gathered early on in the
SPEERMINT working group as part of discussions to define the scope of
the working group. They are left here but have been re-written
without requirements verbs for the most part.
o Session peering should be independent of lower layers.
The mechanisms used to establish session peering should
accommodate diverse supporting lower layers. It should not matter
whether lower layers rely on the public Internet or are
implemented by private L3 connectivity, using firewalls or L2/L3
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), IPSec tunnels or Transport Layer
Security (TLS) connections [RFC3546]...
o Session Peering Policies and Extensibility:
Mechanisms developed for session peering should be flexible and
extensible to cover existing and future session peering models.
It is also recommended that SSP policies be published via local
configuration choices in a distributed system like DNS rather than
in a centralized system like a 'peering registry'.
In the context of session peering, a policy is defined as the set
of parameters and other information needed by an SPP to connect to
another. Some of the session policy parameters may be statically
exchanged and set throughout the lifetime of the peering
relationship. Others parameters may be discovered and updated
dynamically using by some explicit protocol mechanisms. These
dynamic parameters may also relate to an SSP's session-dependent
or session independent policies as defined in
[I-D.ietf-sipping-session-policy-framework].
o Administrative and Technical Policies:
Various types of policy information may need to be discovered or
exchanged in order to establish session peering. At a minimum, a
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policy should specify information related to session establishment
data in order to avoid session establishment failures. A policy
may also include information related to QoS, billing and
accounting, layer-3 related interconnect requirements which are
out of the scope of this document, see examples in Section
Appendix A.
Motivations:
The reasons for declining or accepting incoming calls from a
prospective peering partner can be both administrative
(contractual, legal, commercial, or business decisions) and
technical (certain QoS parameters, TLS keys, domain keys, ...).
The objectives are to provide a baseline framework to define,
publish and optionally retrieve policy information so that a
session establishment does not need to be attempted to know that
imcompatible policy parameters will cause the session to fail
(this was originally referred to as "no blocked calls").
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4. Signaling and Media Guidelines for Session Peering
This section provides some guidelines for maximizing SIP-based
interconnections between SSPs. It should be considered as the
minimal set of requirements to be implemented to perform SIP
interconnects for presence, IM, or VoIP.
4.1. Protocol Specifications
A detailed list of SIP and SDP RFCs the session peers' SBEs must
conform to must be provided by SSPs. It is NOT RECOMMENDED to rely
on Internet-Drafts for commercial SIP interconnects, but if
applicable, a list of supported or required IETF Internet-Drafts
SHOULD be provided. Such specifications SHOULD include protocol
implementation compliance statements, indicate the minimal extensions
that MUST be supported, and the full details on what options and
protocol features MUST be supported, MUST NOT be supported or MAY be
supported. This specification SHOULD include a high-level
description of the services that are expected to be supported by the
peering relationship and it MAY include sample message flows.
4.2. Minimum set of SIP-SDP-related requirements
The main objective of SIP interconnects being the establishment of
successful SIP calls between peer SSPs, this section provides some
guidelines for the minimum set of SIP specifications that SHOULD be
supported by SBEs.
The Core SIP Specifications as defined in [RFC3261] and
[I-D.ietf-sip-hitchhikers-guide] MUST be supported by Signaling Path
Border Elements (SBEs) and any other SIP implementations involved in
session peering. The specifications contained in the Core SIP group
provide the fundamental and basic mechanisms required to enable SIP
interconnects. The Hitchkiker's guide include specific sections for
voice, instant message and presence.
Furthermore, SBE implementers MUST follow the recommendations
contained in RFC 3261 regarding the use of the Supported and Require
headers. Signaling Path Border Elements SHOULD include the supported
SIP extensions in the Supported header and the use of the Require
header must be configurable on a per SSP target domain basis in order
to match a network peer's policy and to maximize interoperability.
In the cases of indirect or assisted peering, it is also important
that an adequate level of SIP message transparency is available. In
particular, the intermediary SBE MUST NOT modify or remove
information in the SIP or SDP parameters beyond what is required for
the purpose of call routing. In particular, intermediary SBE SHOULD
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NOT:
o Remove SIP header lines, SIP header fields and SIP message bodies
that are intended for the destination SBE, or the called SIP UA
irrespective of whether or not those header lines or parameters
are understood by the intermediary SBE;
o Modify header fields and bodies in a way that may break any
integrity protection.
4.3. Media-related Requirements
SSPs engaged in session peering SHOULD support of compatible codecs.
An SSP domain policy SHOULD specify media-related parameters that
their user's SIP entities support or that the SSP authorizes in its
domain's policy. Direct media exchange between the SSPs' user
devices is preferred and media transcoding SHOULD be avoided by
proposing commonly agreed codecs. SSPs SHOULD discuss mechanisms
employed for IPv4-IPv6 translation of media, as well as solutions
used for NAT traversal such as ICE [I-D.ietf-ice] and STUN
([RFC3489]).
Motivations: The media capabilities of an SSP's network are either a
property of the SIP end-devices, SIP applications, or, a combination
of the property of end-devices and Data Path Border Elements that may
provide media transcoding.
The choice of one or more common media codecs for SIP sessions
between SSPs is outside the scope of SPEERMINT. A list of media-
related policy parameters are provided in the informative Appendix A.
For media related security guidance, please refer to Section
Section 4.5.
4.4. Requirements for Presence and Instant Messaging
This section lists some presence and Instant Messaging requirements
defined in [I-D.presence-im-requirements] and authored by A. Houri,
E. Aoki and S. Parameswar. Credits must go to A. Houri, E. Aoki and
S. Parameswar.
It was requested to integrate [I-D.presence-im-requirements] into
this draft since some of the requirements are generic and non
specific to any application type. In particular, requirements
numbered PRES-IM-REQ-001, PRES-IM-REQ-002, PRES-IM-REQ-010, PRES-IM-
REQ-011, PRES-IM-REQ-015 and PRES-IM_REQ-017 are covered by
guidelines provided in other parts of this document.
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The numbering of the requirements is as defined in the above
mentioned ID. It is expected that as more discussions occur and
consensus is achieved in the working group, those requirements will
be renumbered or re-written in the mindset of a BCP document. The
following list describes requirements for presence and instant
messaging session peering:
o From (PRES-IM-REQ-003, PRES-IM-REQ-004 and PRES-IM-REQ-005): The
mechanisms recommended for the exchange of presence information
between SSPs MUST allow a user of one SSP's presence community to
subscribe presentities served by another SSP via its local
community, including subscriptions to a single presentity, a
public or private (personal) list of presentities.
o From (PRES-IM-REQ-006, PRES-IM-REQ-007, PRES-IM-REQ-008 and PRES-
IM-REQ-009): The mechanisms recommended for Instant Messaging
message exchanges between SSPs MUST allow a user of SSP's
community to communicate with users of the other SSP community via
their local community using various methods, including sending a
one-time IM message, initiating a SIP session for transporting
sessions of messages, participating in n-way chats using chat
rooms with users from the peer SSPs, or sending a file.
o PRES-IM-REQ-012: Privacy Sharing - In order to enable sending less
notifications between communities, there should be a mechanism
that will enable sharing privacy information of users between the
communities. This will enable sending a single notification per
presentity that will be sent to the appropriate watchers on the
other community according to the presentity's privacy information.
o PRES-IM-REQ-013: Privacy Sharing Security - The privacy sharing
mechanism must be done in a way that will enable getting the
consent of the user whose privacy will be sent to the other
community prior to sending the privacy information. if user
consent is not give, it should not be possible to this
optimization. In addition to getting the consent of users
regarding privacy sharing, the privacy data must be sent only via
secure channels between communities.
o PRES-IM-REQ-014: Multiple Recipients - It should be possible to
send a presence document with a list of watchers on the other
community that should receive the presence document notification.
This will enable sending less presence document notifications
between the communities while avoiding the need to share privacy
information of presentities from one community to the other.
o PRES-IM-REQ-016: Mappings - A lot of the early deployments of SIP
based presence and IM gateways are deployed in front of legacy
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proprietary systems that use different names for different
properties that exist in PIDF. For example "Do Not Disturb" may
be translated to "Busy" in another system. In order to make sure
that the meaning of the status is preserved, there is a need that
either each system will translate its internal statuses to
standard PIDF based statuses of a translation table of proprietary
statuses to standard based PIDF statuses will be provided from one
system to the other.
4.5. Security Requirements
4.5.1. Security in today's VoIP networks
In today's SIP deployments, various approaches exist to secure
exchanges between SIP Service Providers. Signaling and media
security are the two primary topics for consideration in most
deployments. A number of transport-layer and network-layer
mechanisms are widely used for SIP by some categories of SSPs: TLS in
the enterprise networks for applications such as VoIP and secure
Instant Messaging or in service provider networks for Instant
Messaging and presence applications, IPsec and L2/L3 VPNs in some SSP
networks where there is a desire to secure all signaling and media
traffic at or below the IP layer. Media level security is not widely
used today between providers for media transported using the Real-
Time Protocol (RTP) , even though it is in use in few deployments
where the privacy of voice and other RTP media is critical.
A security threat analysis provides guidance for VoIP session peering
([I-D.draft-niccolini-speermint-voipthreats]). More discussions
based on this threat analysis and use cases is required in the
working group to define best current practices that this document, or
a separate memo should recommend for both signaling and media
security.
4.5.2. Signaling Security and TLS Considerations
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a standard way to secure
signaling between SIP entities. TLS can be used in direct peering to
mutually authenticate SSPs and provide message confidentiality and
integrity protection. The remaining paragraphs explore how TLS could
be deployed and used between 2 SSPs to secure SIP exchanges. The
intent is to capture what two SSPs should discuss and agree on in
order to establish TLS connections for SIP session peering.
1. SSPs SHOULD agree on one or more Certificate Authorities (CAs)
to trust for securing session peering exchanges.
Motivations:
An SSP should have control over which root CAs it trusts for SIP
communications. This may imply creating a certificate trust list
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and including the peer's CA for each authorized domain. In the
case of a federation, This requirement allows for the initiating
side to verify that the server certificate chains up to a trusted
root CA. This also means that SIP servers SHOULD allow the
configuration of a certificate trust list in order to allow a VSP/
ASP to control which peer's CAs are trusted for TLS connections.
Note that these considerations seem to be around two themes: one
is trusting a root, the other is trusting intermediate CAs.
2. Peers SHOULD indicate whether their domain policies require
proxy servers to inspect and verify the identity provided in SIP
requests as defined in [RFC4474]. Federations supporting
[RFC4474] MUST specify the CA(s) permitted to issue certificates
of the authentication service.
3. SIP and SBE servers involved in the secure session
establishment over TLS MUST have valid X.509 certificates and MUST
be able to receive a TLS connection on a well-known port.
4. The following TLS/SIP Protocol parameters SHOULD be agreed
upon as part of session peering policies: the version of TLS
supported by Signaling Border Elements (TLSv1, TLSv1.1), the SIP
TLS port (default 5061), the server-side session timeout (default
300 seconds), the list of supported or recommended ciphersuites,
and the list of trusted root CAs.
5. SIP and SBE servers involved in the session establishment over
TLS MUST verify and validate the client certificates: the client
certificate MUST contain a DNS or URI choice type in the
subjectAltName which corresponds to the domain asserted in the
host portion of the URI contained in the From header. It is also
recommended that VSPs/ASPs convey the domain identity in the
certificates using both a canonical name of the SIP server(s) and
the SIP URI for the domain as described in section 4 of
[I-D.gurbani-sip-domain-certs]. On the client side, it is also
critical for the TLS client to authenticate the server as defined
in [RFC3261] and in section 9 of [I-D.ietf-sip-certs].
6. A session peering policy SHOULD include details on SIP session
establishment over TLS if TLS is supported.
4.5.3. Media Security
Media security for session peering is as important as signaling
security, especially for SSPs that want to continue to meet commonly
assumed privacy and confidentiality requirements outside their
networks. Media can be secured using secure media transport
protocols (e.g. secure RTP or sRTP). The issues of key management
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protocols for sRTP are being raised in IETF and this continues to be
an area where requirements definition and protocol work is ongoing.
More consensus is required outside SPEERMINT before best current
practices can emerge. See media security requirements for SIP
sessions ([I-D.ietf-wing-media-security-requirements]) and its
references for more details. Some of these scenarios may be
applicable to interdomain SSP session peering.
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5. Acknowledgments
This document is a work-in-progress and it is based on the input and
contributions made by a large number of people in the SPEERMINT
working group, including: Edwin Aoki, Scott Brim, John Elwell, Mike
Hammer, Avshalom Houri, Richard Shocky, Henry Sinnreich, Richard
Stastny, Patrik Faltstrom, Otmar Lendl, Daryl Malas, Dave Meyer,
Sriram Parameswar, Jason Livingood, Bob Natale, Benny Rodrig, Brian
Rosen, Eric Rosenfeld, Adam Uzelac and Dan Wing. Specials thanks go
to Rohan Mahy, Brian Rosen, John Elwell for their initial drafts
describing guidelines or best current practices in various
environments, and to Avshalom Houri, Edwin Aoki and Sriram Parameswar
for authoring the presence and instant messaging requirements.
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6. Security Considerations
Securing session peering communications involves numerous protocol
exchanges, first and foremost, the securing of SIP signaling and
media sessions. The security considerations contained in [RFC3261],
and [RFC4474] are applicable to the SIP protocol exchanges. A number
of security considerations are also described in Section Section 4.5.
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7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.Malas-sip-performance]
Malas, D., "SIP End-to-End Performance Metrics", May 2007.
[I-D.draft-elwell-speermint-enterprise-usecases]
Elwell, J. and B. Rodrig, "Use cases for Enterprise
Peering using the Session Initiation Protocol",
draft-elwell-speermint-enterprise-usecases-00.txt (work in
progress), February 2007.
[I-D.draft-niccolini-speermint-voipthreats]
Niccolini, S. and E. Chen, "VoIP Security Threats relevant
to SPEERMINT", March 2007.
[I-D.gurbani-sip-domain-certs]
Gurbani, V., Jeffrey, A., and S. Lawrence, "Domain
Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
draft-gurbani-sip-domain-certs-05 (work in progress),
June 2007.
[I-D.ietf-ice]
Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
(ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", June 2007.
[I-D.ietf-sip-certs]
Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and J. Fischl, "Certificate
Management Service for The Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP)", May 2007.
[I-D.ietf-sip-hitchhikers-guide]
Rosenberg, J., "A Hitchhikers Guide to the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", July 2007.
[I-D.ietf-sipping-session-policy-framework]
Hilt, V., "A Framework for Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) Session Policies",
draft-ietf-sipping-session-policy-framework-01 (work in
progress), June 2006.
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[I-D.ietf-speermint-architecture]
Penno et al., R., "SPEERMINT Peering Architecture",
April 2007.
[I-D.ietf-speermint-terminology]
Meyer, R. and D. Malas, "SPEERMINT Terminology",
July 2007.
[I-D.ietf-speermint-voip-consolidated-usecases]
Uzelac et al., A., "VoIP SIP Peering Use Cases",
June 2007.
[I-D.ietf-wing-media-security-requirements]
Wing, D., Fries, S., and H. Tschofenig, "Requirements for
a Media Security Key Management Protocol",
draft-wing-media-security-requirements (work in progress),
June 2007.
[I-D.presence-im-requirements]
Houri, A., Aoki, E., and S. Parameswar, "Presence and IM
Requirements", May 2007.
[RFC2198] Perkins, C., Kouvelas, I., Hodson, O., Hardman, V.,
Handley, M., Bolot, J., Vega-Garcia, A., and S. Fosse-
Parisis, "RTP Payload for Redundant Audio Data", RFC 2198,
September 1997.
[RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
February 2000.
[RFC2915] Mealling, M. and R. Daniel, "The Naming Authority Pointer
(NAPTR) DNS Resource Record", RFC 2915, September 2000.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3263] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263,
June 2002.
[RFC3428] Campbell, B., Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Huitema, C.,
and D. Gurle, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension
for Instant Messaging", RFC 3428, December 2002.
[RFC3455] Garcia-Martin, M., Henrikson, E., and D. Mills, "Private
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Header (P-Header) Extensions to the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) for the 3rd-Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP)", RFC 3455, January 2003.
[RFC3489] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy,
"STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489,
March 2003.
[RFC3546] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RFC3603] Marshall, W. and F. Andreasen, "Private Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) Proxy-to-Proxy Extensions for Supporting
the PacketCable Distributed Call Signaling Architecture",
RFC 3603, October 2003.
[RFC3611] Friedman, T., Caceres, R., and A. Clark, "RTP Control
Protocol Extended Reports (RTCP XR)", RFC 3611,
November 2003.
[RFC3702] Loughney, J. and G. Camarillo, "Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting Requirements for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3702, February 2004.
[RFC3824] Peterson, J., Liu, H., Yu, J., and B. Campbell, "Using
E.164 numbers with the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
RFC 3824, June 2004.
[RFC3966] Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers",
RFC 3966, December 2004.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
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Appendix A. Policy Parameters for Session Peering
This informative section lists various types of parameters that
should be first considered by implementers when deciding what
configuration parameters to expose to system admins or management
stations, and second, by SSPs or federations of SSPs when discussing
the technical aspects of a session peering policy.
Some aspects of session peering policies must be agreed to and
manually implemented; they are static and are typically documented as
part of a business contract, technical document or agreement between
parties. For some parameters linked to protocol support and
capabilities, standard ways of expressing those policy parameters may
be defined among SSP and exchanged dynamically. For e.g., templates
could be created in various document formats so that it could be
possible to dynamically discover some of the domain policy. Such
templates could be initiated by implementers (for each software/
hardware release, a list of supported RFCs, RFC parameters is
provided in a standard format) and then adapted by each SSP based on
its service description, server or device configurations and variable
based on peer relationships.
A.1. Categories of Parameters and Justifications
The following list should be considered as an initial list of
"discussion topics" to be addressed by peers when initiating a VoIP
peering relationship.
o IP Network Connectivity:
Session peers must define how the IP network connectivity between
their respective SBEs and SDEs. While this is out of scope of
session peering, SSPs must agree on a common mechanism for IP
transport of session signaling and media. This may be accomplish
via private (e.g. IPVPN, IPsec, etc.) or public IP networks.
o Media-related Parameters:
* Media Codecs: list of supported media codecs for audio, real-
time fax (version of T.38, if applicable), real-time text (RFC
4103), DTMF transport, voice band data communications (as
applicable) along with the supported or recommended codec
packetization rates, level of RTP paylod redundancy, audio
volume levels, etc.
* Media Transport: level of support for RTP-RTCP [RFC3550], RTP
Redundancy (RTP Payload for Redundant Audio Data - [RFC2198]) ,
T.38 transport over RTP, etc.
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* Other: support of the VoIP metric block as defined in RTP
Control Protocol Extended Reports [RFC3611] , etc.
o SIP:
* A session peering policy SHOULD include the list of supported
and required SIP RFCs, supported and required SIP methods
(including private p headers if applicable), error response
codes, supported or recommended format of some header field
values , etc.
* It should also be possible to describe the list of supported
SIP RFCs by various functional groupings. A group of SIP RFCs
may represent how a call feature is implemented (call hold,
transfer, conferencing, etc.), or it may indicate a functional
grouping as in [I-D.ietf-sip-hitchhikers-guide].
o Presence and Instant Messaging: TBD
o Accounting:
Methods used for call or session accounting SHOULD be specified.
An SSP may require a peer to track session usage. It is critical
for peers to determine whether the support of any SIP extensions
for accounting is a pre-requisite for SIP interoperability. In
some cases, call accounting may feed data for billing purposes but
not always: some operators may decide to use accounting as a 'bill
and keep' model to track session usage and monitor usage against
service level agreements.
[RFC3702] defines the terminology and basic requirements for
accounting of SIP sessions. A few private SIP extensions have
also been defined and used over the years to enable call
accounting between SSP domains such as the P-Charging* headers in
[RFC3455], the P-DCS-Billing-Info header in [RFC3603], etc.
o Performance Metrics:
Layer-5 performance metrics should be defined and shared between
peers. The performance metrics apply directly to signaling or
media; they may be used pro-actively to help avoid congestion,
call quality issues or call signaling failures, and as part of
monitoring techniques, they can be used to evaluate the
performance of peering exchanges.
Examples of SIP performance metrics include the maximum number of
SIP transactions per second on per domain basis, Session
Completion Rate (SCR), Session Establishment Rate (SER), etc.
Some SIP end-to-end performance metrics are defined in
[I-D.Malas-sip-performance]; a subset of these may be applicable
to session peering and interconnects.
Some media-related metrics for monitoring VoIP calls have been
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defined in the VoIP Metrics Report Block, in Section 4.7 of
[RFC3611].
o Security:
A SSP SHOULD describe the security requirements that other peers
must meet in order to terminate calls to its network. While such
a list of security-related policy parameters often depends on the
security models pre-agreed to by peers, it is expected that these
parameters will be discoverable or signaled in the future to allow
session peering outside SSP clubs. The list of security
parameters may be long and composed of high-level requirements
(e.g. authentication, privacy, secure transport) and low level
protocol configuration elements like TLS parameters.
The following list is not intended to be complete, it provides a
preliminary list in the form of examples:
* Call admission requirements: for some providers, sessions can
only be admitted if certain criteria are met. For example, for
some providers' networks, only incoming SIP sessions signaled
over established IPSec tunnels or presented to the well-known
TLS ports are admitted. Other call admission requirements may
be related to some performance metrics as descrived above.
Finally, it is possible that some requiremetns be imposed on
lower layers, but these are considered out of scope of session
peering.
* Call authorization requirements and validation: the presence of
a caller or user identity MAY be required by an SSP. Indeed,
some SSPs may further authorize an incoming session request by
validating the caller's identity against white/black lists
maintained by the service provider or users (traditional caller
ID screening applications or IM white list).
* Privacy requirements: an SSP MAY demand that its SIP messages
be securely transported by its peers for privacy reasons so
that the calling/called party information be protected. Media
sessions may also require privacy and some SSP policies may
include requirements on the use of secure media transport
protocols such as sRTP, along with some contraints on the
minimum authentication/encryption options for use in sRTP.
* Network-layer security parameters: this covers how IPSec
security associated may be established, the IPSec key exchange
mechanisms to be used and any keying materials, the lifetime of
timed Security Associated if applicable, etc.
* Transport-layer security parameters: this covers how TLS
connections should be established as described in Section
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Section 4.5.
A.2. Summary of Parameters for Consideration in Session Peering
Policies
The following is a summary of the parameters mentioned in the
previous section. They may be part of a session peering policy and
appear with a level of requirement (mandatory, recommended,
supported, ...).
o IP Network Connectivity (assumed, requirements out of scope of
this document)
o Media session parameters:
* Codecs for audio, video, real time text, instant messaging
media sessions
* Modes of communications for audio (voice, fax, DTMF), IM (page
mode, MSRP)
* Media transport and means to establish secure media sessions
* List of ingress and egress SDEs where applicable, including
STUN Relay servers if present
o SIP
* SIP RFCs, methods and error responses
* headers and header values
* possibly, list of SIP RFCs supported by groups (e.g. by call
feature)
o Accounting
o Capacity Control and Performance Management: any limits on, or,
means to measure and limit the maximum number of active calls to a
peer or federation, maximum number of sessions and messages per
specified unit time, maximum number of active users or subscribers
per specified unit time, the aggregate media bandwidth per peer or
for the federation, specified SIP signaling performance metrics to
measure and report; media-level VoIP metrics if applicable.
o Security: Call admission control, call authorization, network and
transport layer security parameters, media security parameters
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Author's Address
Jean-Francois Mule
CableLabs
858 Coal Creek Circle
Louisville, CO 80027
USA
Email: jf.mule@cablelabs.com
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