[Search] [txt|pdfized|bibtex] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01                                                         
Service Location Working Group                             Jonathan Wood
INTERNET DRAFT                                               Roberto Tam
                                                  Sun Microsystems, Inc.
                                                        25 June 1999

           The Naming and Directory Service Abstract Type
          draft-ieft-svrloc-naming-directory-scheme-01.txt

Status of This Memo

   This document is a submission by the Service Location Working Group
   of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  Comments should be
   submitted to the srvloc@srvloc.org mailing list.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at
   any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''

   To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check
   the ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts
   Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern
   Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific
   Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.


Abstract

   This document describes the Naming and Directory Service abstract
   type. This abstract type serves as an umbrella type for all
   services which support directory-style operations for obtaining
   system information. This type collects a core set of attributes
   common to all such services.

1. Introduction

   This document defines a template for the naming and directory
   service abstract type. Templates and service types are
   defined in [1]. This type can be used with SLP [2] to
   dynamically discover naming and directory servers. In
   particular, this type applies to name spaces which contain



Wood, Tam                expires December 1999                  [Page 1]


INTERNET DRAFT                                                 June 1999


   information intended primarily for system consumption;
   examples of such information are UNIX-style system information
   (such as passwd, hosts, and service tables), and public-key
   certificates for authenticating principals such as people and
   hosts.

   Currently there is a wide variety of services which are used
   to serve system information (i.e. NIS, NIS+, LDAP, NDS, etc.).
   It is common for two or more of these services to be deployed
   at the same time on the same network. This creates configuration
   complexity for naming and directory clients on the network:
   How does a client choose the right service, and once chosen,
   how does the client find the access handle to that service?

   The type defined by this document manages this complexity by
   collecting attributes common to all naming and directory services,
   allowing clients to select the right service from a
   heterogeneous pool. This type can be used in conjunction with
   SLP to implement a unified discovery solution.

   Note that concrete types include all attributes defined in this
   template; they may also define attributes specific to their
   service. Examples of concrete type templates can be found in
   [3], [4], and [5].

2. Examples

   This section presents two scenarios to illustrate how this type might
   be used. For both scenarios, it is assumed that a number of naming
   and directory services have been deployed in the network, and
   that they are advertising their services via SLP. The following
   list enumerates the registered servers and their attributes. Note
   that in an actual registration, the template attributes would be
   included in the attributes list, and all attributes and URLs would
   be properly escaped. Here, however, these steps have been omitted
   for the sake of brevity and readability:

   URL:
     service:naming-directory:nis://192.168.1.100/eng.wiz.com
   Attributes:
     naming-context=eng.wiz.com
     organization=flat
     dynamic-updates=false
     jndi-sp-available=true
     master=true

   URL:
     service:naming-directory:nis://192.168.1.200/eng.wiz.com



Wood, Tam                expires December 1999                  [Page 2]


INTERNET DRAFT                                                 June 1999


   Attributes:
     naming-context=eng.wiz.com
     organization=flat
     dynamic-updates=false
     jndi-sp-available=true
     master=false

   URL:
     service:naming-directory:nisplus://192.168.2.100/b17.eng.wiz.com
   Attributes:
     naming-context=b17.eng.wiz.com
     organization=hierarchical
     dynamic-updates=true
     jndi-sp-available=false
     master=true
     security-mechanism=dh-ext
     pubkey=(dh-ext)1a22345def3324f3ecbb...

   URL:
     service:naming-directory:ldap://192.168.3.100/dc=eng,dc=wiz,dc=com
   Attributes:
     naming-context=dc=eng,dc=wiz,dc=com
     organization=hierarchical
     dynamic-updates=true
     jndi-sp-available=true
     master=true
     security-mechanism=clear,tls,kerb5
     transport=cots

   Note that some attributes are not defined in the template
   given below; they are defined in the templates for the
   particular services.

2.1. System Configuration

   A number of UNIX platforms currently bundle clients for the
   NIS, NIS+, and LDAP services. When the system initially needs
   to configure its name service, it has no idea with what services
   its new network has been populated. It does, however, know
   that it wants an authenticated connection to its server, and
   that it has been configured with Kerberos and extended DH
   security. Also, it would like to talk to an authoritative server
   to populate its initial configuration.

   So, in order to discover what naming services are available,
   the system issues the following SLP service request:

   <type>=service:naming-directory



Wood, Tam                expires December 1999                  [Page 3]


INTERNET DRAFT                                                 June 1999


   <predicate>=(&(|(security=kerb5)(security=dh-ext))(master=true))

   It receives the following service handles:

   service:naming-directory:ldap://192.168.3.100/dc=eng,dc=wiz,dc=com
   service:naming-directory:nisplus://192.168.2.100/b17.eng.wiz.com

   Each service handle provides enough information to contact and
   query the server.

   The system then decides whether to use NIS+ or LDAP (or both),
   and uses the access handle to contact the server.

2.2. JNDI Configuration

   The Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) [6] provides a
   common interface to naming and directory operations. Using JNDI,
   it is possible to write an application which accesses directories
   without knowing which particular naming or directory service
   it is actually talking to.

   However, JNDI applications require some initial configuration
   in order to find and query a service; this configuration is
   different for each different kind of service.

   This example demonstrates how JNDI applications can use SLP to
   configure themselves in a unified manner. All the application needs
   to know in advance is in what manner it wishes to use a naming or
   directory service.

   In this example, the JNDI application wishes to obtain authentication
   information for a user, and to update preferences for that user in
   the directory. Therefore the required attributes for this directory
   are:
     - dynamic-updates = true
     - jndi-sp-available = true
   The 'jndi-sp-available' attribute is used to find only those services
   for which a JNDI service provider exists, since the application
   needs this driver to communicate with any found services. These
   required attributes are all the application currently "knows"; it
   does not know the address or even the access protocol of a server,
   nor does it have any JNDI service provider available to it. All
   it has are the JNDI framework classes, and a Java environment.

   In order to obtain service handles to suitable service instances,
   the application issues the following SLP service request:

   <type>=service:naming-directory



Wood, Tam                expires December 1999                  [Page 4]


INTERNET DRAFT                                                 June 1999


   <predicate>=(&(dynamic-updates=true)(jndi-sp-available))

   It receives the following service handles:

   service:naming-directory:ldap://192.168.3.100/dc=eng,dc=wiz,dc=com

   At this point, the application now has enought configuration
   information to contact the server. However, it does not have the
   Java class files for the LDAP service provider implementation. It
   can dynamically discover, download, and instantiate the necessary
   classfiles using SLP and the JNDI Drivers service type [7]. See [7]
   for an example of this process.

   The JNDI application is now able to configure itself to talk to a
   directory server, and access the necessary JNDI service provider.

3. The Naming and Directory Service Abstract Type

Names of submitters: Jonathan Wood <jonathan.wood@eng.sun.com>
                     Roberto Tam <roberto.tam@eng.sun.com>
Language of service template: en
Security Considerations:
  If these services are used as authentication repositories, and they
  are compromised, any clients of the service become susceptible to
  forged identities. This could result in compromised systems, forged
  messages, etc. Some security measure, such as SLP security, should
  be used to authenticate service advertisements.

  In particular, it is important to understand what is trusted
  during the process of service discovery. If no security measures
  are used, all service advertisements are implicitly trusted. This
  scenario allows for very trivial attacks: an attacker need only
  insert a malicious advertisement for a bogus directory server into
  the service name space. It should also be noted that this scenario
  is open to inadvertant attacks. For example, someone may be testing
  an LDAP server which advertises itself according to [5]. If the
  test server is configured in manner similar to production servers,
  clients will bind to the test server and find false or missing
  data.

  The triviality of the attacks outlined above should provide a strong
  case for implementing security measures. However, even with security
  measures it is important to understand trust dependencies.
  Discovery frameworks like SLP [2] provide only the mechanism for
  making service advertisements available and authenticated. Thus
  advertisements obtained via the discovery framework are valid only
  if a correct advertisement was originally injected into the
  discovery name space. For example, if an LDAP server was incorrectly



Wood, Tam                expires December 1999                  [Page 5]


INTERNET DRAFT                                                 June 1999


  configured, or became corrupted, the bogus configuration would
  be reflected through the discovery framework to all clients. If the
  configuration error pertained to security, the client and server may
  end up using a weaker security flavor than necessary.

  Public key cryptography is ideal for discovery frameworks, since it
  lends itself to store-and-forward mechanisms which can be very
  efficient (for example, directory agents in SLP), and can be
  scalably deployed (see [8]). However, a PKI introduces another
  complex set of trust considerations. For a PKI to be reasonably
  secure, the public key of the principal to be authenticated must
  have been obtained in a secure manner. Discovery frameworks which
  use a PKI must thus trust that the public key or certificate it
  is using for authentication is valid. For example, if a PKI were
  implemented such that it dynamically retrieves a public key over
  the network in an unsecured transfer, an attacker could substitute
  a false public key and thus trick the discovery client into
  believing a principal was to be trusted. The client could then be
  tricked into using a false advertisement and connect to a bogus
  server. [8] defines mechanisms to handle the attack just described.
  PKI users must also trust that the site administrator has correctly
  configured and populated the PKI. Finally, PKI users must trust the
  method used to discover key servers. DNS is often implicitly
  trusted in this step; insertion of a bogus address for a key server
  into the DNS can prevent clients from accessing their PKI.

  See also the security considerations from [2].

Template text:
-------------------------template begins here-----------------------
template-type=naming-directory

template-version=0.0

template-description=
  This is an abstract service type. This type is intended to
  encompass all services which support directory-style operations
  for looking up and searching system information.

template-url-syntax=
  url-path=  ; Depends on concrete service type.

naming-context= string M
  # A list of the names of organizational units or domains which
  # this server serves.

organization= string
  # Names spaces can be either hierarchical (as in LDAP) or flat



Wood, Tam                expires December 1999                  [Page 6]


INTERNET DRAFT                                                 June 1999


  # (as in NIS).
flat,hierarchical

dynamic-updates= boolean
  # True if the service's namespace can be modified dynamically;
  # false if the namespace is static.

jndi-sp-available= boolean O
  # True if a JNDI service provider is available for this particular
  # service.

master= boolean
  # True if an instance of a service is the master or authoritative
  # server for a namespace. For multi-master services, all masters
  # should set this value to true.

--------------------------template ends here------------------------


References:

  [1] E. Guttman, C. Perkins, J. Kempf, Service Templates and service:
      Schemes. RFC 2609, February 1999

  [2] E. Guttman, C. Perkins, J. Veizades, M. Day.  Service Location
      Protocol. RFC 2608, April 1999

  [3] J. Wood, R. Tam, The NIS Service Type. draft-ieft-svrloc-nis-
      scheme-00.txt, November 1998 (work in progress)

  [4] J. Wood, R. Tam, The NIS+ Service Type. draft-ieft-svrloc-nisplus-
      scheme-00.txt, November 1998 (work in progress)

  [5] J. Wood, R. Tam, The LDAP Service Type. draft-ieft-svrloc-ldap-
      scheme-02.txt, June 1999 (work in progress)

  [6] The Java Naming and Directory Interface (TM) Specification,
      Sun Microsystems, Inc.  Feb 1998.  http://java.sun.com/jndi/.

  [7] J. Kempf, J. Wood, The jndi-drivers Abstract Service Type.
      draft-ietf-svrloc-jndi-drivers-00.txt, June 1998
      (work in progress)









Wood, Tam                expires December 1999                  [Page 7]