Network Working Group J. Jeong
Internet-Draft H. Kim
Intended status: Standards Track Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: January 6, 2017 J. Park
ETRI
T. Ahn
S. Lee
Korea Telecom
July 5, 2016
Software-Defined Networking Based Security Services using Interface to
Network Security Functions
draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-05
Abstract
This document describes a framework, objectives, requirements, and
use cases for security services based on Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) using a common Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF).
It first proposes the framework of SDN-based security services in the
I2NSF framework. It then explains three use cases, such as a
centralized firewall system, centralized DDoS-attack mitigation
system, and centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System . . . . . . . . 10
7.3. Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Changes from
draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-04 . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a set of techniques that enables
users to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network
resources through software (e.g., SDN applications). It relocates
the control of network resources to a dedicated network element,
namely SDN controller. The SDN controller uses interfaces to
arbitrate the control of network resources in a logically centralized
manner. It also manages and configures the distributed network
resources, and provides the abstracted view of the network resources
to the SDN applications. The SDN applications can customize and
automate the operations (including management) of the abstracted
network resources in a programmable manner via the interfaces
[RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Due to the increase of sophisticated network attacks, the legacy
security services become difficult to cope with such network attacks
in an autonomous manner. SDN has been introduced to make networks
more controllable and manageable, and this SDN technology will be
promising to autonomously deal with such network attacks in a prompt
manner.
This document describes a framework, objectives and requirements to
support the protection of network resources through SDN-based
security services using a common interface to Network Security
Functions (NSF) [i2nsf-framework]. It uses an interface to NSF
(I2NSF) for such SDN-based security services that are performed in
virtual machines through network functions virtualization [ETSI-NFV].
This document addresses the challenges of the exisiting systems for
security services. As feasible solutions to handle these challenges,
this document proposes three use cases of the security services, such
as a centralized firewall system, centralized DDoS-attack mitigation
system, and centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system.
For the centralized firewall system, this document raises limitations
in the legacy firewalls in terms of flexibility and administration
costs. Since in many cases, access control management for firewall
is manually performed, it is difficult to add the access control
policy rules corresponding to new network attacks in a prompt and
autonomous manner. Thus, this situation requires expensive
administration costs. This document introduces a use case of SDN-
based firewall system to overcome these limitations.
For the centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, this document
raises limitations in the legacy DDoS-attack mitigation techniques in
terms of flexibility and administration costs. Since in many cases,
network configuration for the mitigation is manually performed, it is
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difficult to dynamically configure network devices to limit and
control suspicious network traffic for DDoS attacks. This document
introduces a use case of SDN-based DDoS-attack mitigation system to
provide an autonomous and prompt configuration for suspicious network
traffic.
For the centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system, this documents raises
challenges in the legacy VoIP/VoLTE security system in terms of
provisioning time, the granularity of security, cost, and the
establishment of policy. This document shows a use case of SDN-based
VoIP/VoLTE security system to resolve these challenges along in the
I2NSF framework.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149],
[ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-OpenFlow], [ONF-SDN-Architecture],
[ITU-T.X.1252], and [ITU-T.X.800]. In addition, the following terms
are defined below:
o Software-Defined Networking: A set of techniques that enables to
directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage network
resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of
network services in a dynamic and scalable manner [ITU-T.Y.3300].
o Access Control: A procedure used to determine if an entity should
be granted access to resources, facilities, services, or
information based on pre-established rules and specific rights or
authority associated with the requesting party [ITU-T.X.1252].
o Access Control Policy: The set of rules that define the conditions
under which access may take place [ITU-T.X.800].
o Access Control Policy Rules: Security policy rules concerning the
provision of the access control service [ITU-T.X.800].
o Network Resources: Network devices that can perform packet
forwarding in a network system. The network resources include
network switch, router, gateway, WiFi access points, and similar
devices.
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o Firewall: A firewall that is a device or service at the junction
of two network segments that inspects every packet that attempts
to cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not
satisfy certain criteria for disallowed port numbers or IP
addresses.
o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
establish and distribute access control policy rules into network
resources for efficient firewall management. These rules can be
managed dynamically by a centralized server for firewall. SDN can
work as a network-based firewall system through a standard
interface between firewall applications and network resources.
o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation. These
rules can be managed dynamically by a centralized server for DDoS-
attack mitigation. SDN can work as a network-based mitigation
system through a standard interface between DDoS-attack mitigation
applications and network resources.
o Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System: A centralized security
system that handles the security issues related to VoIP and VoLTE
services. SDN can work as a network-based security system through
a standard interface between VoIP/VoLTE security applications and
network resources.
4. Overview
This section describes the referenced architecture to support SDN-
based security services, such as centralized firewall system and
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system. Also, it describes a
framework for SDN-based security services using I2NSF.
As shown in Figure 1, network security functions (NSFs) as security
services (e.g., firewall, DDoS-attack mitigation, VoIP/VoLTE, web
filter, and deep packet inspection) run on the top of SDN controller
[ITU-T.Y.3300] [ONF-SDN-Architecture]. When an administrator
enforces security policies for such security services through an
application interface, SDN controller generates the corresponding
access control policy rules to meet such security policies in an
autonomous and prompt manner. According to the generated access
control policy rules, the network resources such as switches take an
action to mitigate network attacks, for example, dropping packets
with suspicious patterns.
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Network Security Functions |
| (e.g., firewall, DDoS-attack mitigation, | Application
|VoIP/VoLTE, web filter, deep packet inspection)| Layer
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ (Application-
| Application Support | Control Interface)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Orchestration | Switch Controller
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Layer
| Abstraction |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ (Resource-
| Control Support | Control Interface)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data Transport and Processing | Resource Layer
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: High-level Architecture for SDN-based Security Services
Figure 2 shows a framework to support SDN-based security services
using I2NSF [i2nsf-framework]. As shown in Figure 2, I2NSF client
can use security services by delivering their high-level security
policies to security controller via client facing interface.
Security controller asks NSFs to perform function-level security
services via NSF facing interface. The NSFs run on top of virtual
machines through Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV].
NSFs ask switch controller to perform their required security
services on switches under the supervision of switch controller. In
addition, security controller uses registration interface to
communicate with developer's management system for registering (or
deregistering) the developer's NSFs into (or from) the NFV system
using the I2NSF framework.
NSF facing interface between security controller and NSFs can be
implemented by Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241]
with a data modeling language called YANG [RFC6020] that describes
function-level security services. A data model in
[i2nsf-cap-interface-yang] can be used for the I2NSF capability
interface, which is NSF facing interface.
The proposed framework of SDN-based security services can be combined
to a security management architecture in [i2nsf-sec-mgnt-arch] for
handling high-level security policies as well as low-level security
policies.
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Also, the proposed framework can enforce low-level security policies
in NSFs by using a service function chaining (SFC) enabled I2NSF
architecture in [i2nsf-sfc-enabled-arch].
5. Objectives
o Prompt reaction to new network attacks: SDN-based security
services allow private networks to defend themselves against new
sophisticated network attacks.
o Automatic defense from network attacks: SDN-based security
services identify the category of network attack (e.g., malware
and DDoS attacks) and take counteraction for the defense without
the intervention of network administrators.
o Network-load-aware resource allocation: SDN-based security
services measure the overhead of resources for security services
and dynamically select resources considering load balance for the
maximum network performance.
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+------------+
|I2NSF Client|
+------------+
^
| Client Facing Interface
v
+-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgnt System|
+-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
^
| NSF Facing Interface
v
+-------------------+ +-------------------+ +-------------------+
| NSF 1 |-| NSF 2 |....| NSF n |
+-------------------+ +-------------------+ +-------------------+
^
| SDN Northbound Interface
v
+-----------------+
|Switch Controller|
+-----------------+
^
| SDN Southbound Interface
v
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Switch 1|-|Switch 2|......|Switch m|
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+
Figure 2: A Framework for SDN-based Security Services using I2NSF
6. Requirements
SDN-based security services provide dynamic and flexible network
resource management to mitigate network attacks, such as malware and
DDoS attacks. In order to support this capability, the requirements
for SDN-based security services are described as follows:
o SDN-based security services are required to support the
programmability of network resources to mitigate network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to support the
orchestration of network resources and SDN applications to
mitigate network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide an application
interface allowing the management of access control policies in an
autonomous and prompt manner.
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o SDN-based security services are required to provide a resource-
control interface for the control of network resources to mitigate
network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide the logically
centralized control of network resources to mitigate network
attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to support the seamless
services to mitigate network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide the dynamic
control of network resources to mitigate network attacks.
7. Use Cases
This section introduces three use cases for security services based
on SDN: (i) centralized firewall system, (ii) centralized DDoS-attack
mitigation system, and (iii) centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system.
7.1. Centralized Firewall System
For the centralized firewall system, a centralized network firewall
can manage each network resource and firewall rules can be managed
flexibly by a centralized server for firewall (called Firewall). The
centralized network firewall controls each switch for the network
resource management and the firewall rules can be added or deleted
dynamically.
The procedure of firewall operations in the centralized firewall
system is as follows:
1. Switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to Switch Controller.
2. Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet to an
appropriate security service application, such as Firewall.
3. Firewall analyzes the headers and contents of the packet.
4. If Firewall regards the packet as a malware's packet with a
suspicious pattern, it reports the malware's packet to Switch
Controller.
5. Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets with the
suspicious pattern) into switches.
6. The malware's packets are dropped by switches.
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For the above centralized firewall system, the existing SDN protocols
can be used through standard interfaces between the firewall
application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow]
[ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Legacy firewalls have some challenges such as the expensive cost,
performance, management of access control, establishment of policy,
and packet-based access mechanism. The proposed framework can
resolve these challenges through the above centralized firewall
system based on SDN as follows:
o Cost: The cost of adding firewalls to network resources such as
routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
that we need to add firewall on each network resource. To solve
this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single firewall is manipulated by a centralized server.
o Performance: The performance of firewalls is often slower than the
link speed of network interfaces. Every network resource for
firewall needs to check firewall rules according to network
conditions. Firewalls can be adaptively deployed among network
switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.
o The management of access control: Since there may be hundreds of
network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
management of access control for security services like firewall
is a challenge. In the framework, firewall rules can be
dynamically added for new malware.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is
not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access
control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application
level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system
through the centralized server.
7.2. Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
For the centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, a centralized
DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource and
manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for
DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against
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DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network.
Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack
mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by
traffic flow forwarding path management according to the category of
servers [AVANT-GUARD]. Such a managenent should consider the load
balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS attacks.
The procedure of DDoS-attack mitigation operations in the centralized
DDoS-attack mitigation system is as follows:
1. Switch periodically reports an inter-arrival pattern of a flow's
packets to Switch Controller.
2. Switch Controller forwards the flow's inter-arrival pattern to an
appropriate security service application, such as DDoS-attack
Mitigator.
3. DDoS-attack Mitigator analyzes the reported pattern for the flow.
4. If DDoS-attack Mitigator regards the pattern as a DDoS attack, it
computes a packet dropping probability corresponding to
suspiciousness level and reports this DDoS-attack flow to Switch
Controller.
5. Switch Controller installs new rules into switches (e.g., forward
packets with the suspicious inter-arrival pattern with a dropping
probability).
6. The suspicious flow's packets are randomly dropped by switches
with the dropping probability.
For the above centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, the existing
SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
DDoS-attack mitigator application and switches [RFC7149]
[ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
The centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system has challenges similar
to the centralized firewall system. The proposed framework can
resolve these challenges through the above centralized DDoS-attack
mitigation system based on SDN as follows:
o Cost: The cost of adding DDoS-attack mitigators to network
resources such as routers, gateways, and switches is substantial
due to the reason that we need to add DDoS-attack mitigator on
each network resource. To solve this, each network resource can
be managed centrally such that a single DDoS-attack mitigator is
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manipulated by a centralized server.
o Performance: The performance of DDoS-attack mitigators is often
slower than the link speed of network interfaces. The checking of
DDoS attacks may reduce the performance of the network interfaces.
DDoS-attack mitigators can be adaptively deployed among network
switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.
o The management of network resources: Since there may be hundreds
of network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
management of network resources for performance (e.g., load
balancing) is a challenge for DDoS-attack mitigation. In the
framework, as dynamic network resource management, traffic flow
forwarding path management can handle the load balancing of
network switches [AVANT-GUARD]. With this management, the current
and near-future workload can be spread among the network switches
for DDoS-attack mitigation. In addition, DDoS-attack mitigation
rules can be dynamically added for new DDoS attacks.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for new DDoS-attacks (e.g., DNS reflection
attack) within a specific organization network under management.
Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies
for such a network.
7.3. Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System
For the centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system, a centralized VoIP/
VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE flow and manage
VoIP/VoLTE security rules controlled by a centralized server for
VoIP/VoLTE security service (called VoIP IPS). The VoIP/VoLTE
security system controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow
management by manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or
modified dynamically.
The procedure of VoIP/VoLTE security operations in the centralized
VoIP/VoLTE security system is as follows:
1. A switch forwards an unknown call flow's signal packet (e.g., SIP
packet) to Switch Controller. Also, if the packet belongs to a
matched flow's packet related to SIP (called matched SIP packet),
Switch forwards the packet to Switch Controller so that the
packet can be checked by an NSF for VoIP (i.e., VoIP IPS) via
Switch Controller, which monitors the behavior of its SIP call.
2. Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet or the
matched SIP packet to an appropriate security service function,
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such as VoIP IPS.
3. VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal packet,
such as IP address, calling number, and session description
[RFC4566].
4. If VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed packet by hackers or
a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE devices, it requests
the Switch Controller to block that packet and the subsequent
packets that have the same call-id.
5. Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets) into
switches.
6. The illegal packets are dropped by switches.
For the above centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system, the existing
SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
VoIP IPS application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300]
[ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Legacy hardware based VoIP IPSes have some challenges, such as
provisioning time, the granularity of security, expensive cost, and
the establishment of policy. The proposed framework can resolve
these challenges through the above centralized VoIP/VoLTE security
system based on SDN as follows:
o Provisioning: The provisioning time of setting up a legacy VoIP
IPS to network is substantial because it takes from some hours to
some days. By managing the network resources centrally, VoIP IPS
can provide more agility in provisioning both virtual and physical
network resources from a central location.
o The granularity of security: The security rules of a legacy VoIP
IPS are compounded considering the granularity of security. The
proposed framework can provide more granular security by
centralizing security control into a switch controller. The VoIP
IPS can effectively manage security rules throughout the network.
o Cost: The cost of adding VoIP IPS to network resources, such as
routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource. To solve
this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific
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organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
So far this document has described the procedure and impact of the
three use cases for security services. To support these use cases in
the proposed framework, a data model described in
[i2nsf-cap-interface-yang] can be used as NSF facing interface along
with NETCONF [RFC6241].
8. Security Considerations
The proposed SDN-based framework in this document is derived from the
I2NSF framework [i2nsf-framework], so the security considerations of
the I2NSF framework should be included in this document. Therefore,
proper secure communication channels should be used the delivery of
control or management messages among the components in the proposed
framework.
This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
9. Acknowledgements
This document was supported by Institute for Information &
communications Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
government (MSIP) [10041244, Smart TV 2.0 Software Platform] and by
MSIP/IITP [R0166-15-1041, Standard Development of Network Security
based SDN].
This document has greatly benefited from inputs by Jinyong Kim,
Daeyoung Hyun, Mahdi Daghmehchi-Firoozjaei, and Geumhwan Cho.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs
to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, March 1997.
[i2nsf-framework] Lopez, E., Lopez, D., Dunbar, L.,
Strassner, J., Zhuang, X., Parrott, J.,
Krishnan, R., and S. Durbha, "Framework
for Interface to Network Security
Functions",
draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-01,
June 2016.
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[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder,
J., and A. Bierman, "Network
Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",
RFC 6241, June 2011.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling
Language for the Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[i2nsf-cap-interface-yang] Jeong, J., Kim, J., Hyun, D., Park, J.,
and T. Ahn, "YANG Data Model of Interface
to Network Security Functions Capability
Interface", draft-jeong-i2nsf-capability-
interface-yang-00, July 2016.
[i2nsf-sec-mgnt-arch] Kim, H., Ko, H., Oh, S., Jeong, J., and
S. Lee, "An Architecture for Security
Management in I2NSF Framework", draft-
kim-i2nsf-security-management-
architecture-01, July 2016.
[i2nsf-sfc-enabled-arch] Hyun, S., Woo, S., Yeo, Y., Jeong, J.,
and J. Park, "Service Function Chaining-
Enabled I2NSF Architecture",
draft-hyun-i2nsf-sfc-enabled-i2nsf-00,
July 2016.
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet,
"Software-Defined Networking: A
Perspective from within a Service
Provider Environment", RFC 7149,
March 2014.
[ITU-T.Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework
of Software-Defined Networking",
June 2014.
[ONF-OpenFlow] ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification
(Version 1.4.0)", October 2013.
[ONF-SDN-Architecture] ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014.
[ITU-T.X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline
Identity Management Terms and
Definitions", April 2010.
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[ITU-T.X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800, "Security
Architecture for Open Systems
Interconnection for CCITT Applications",
March 1991.
[AVANT-GUARD] Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P.,
and G. Gu, "AVANT-GUARD: Scalable and
Vigilant Switch Flow Management in
Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS,
November 2013.
[ETSI-NFV] ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network
Functions Virtualisation (NFV);
Architectural Framework", October 2013.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C.
Perkins, "SDP: Session Description
Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
Appendix A. Changes from draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-04
The following changes were made from
draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-04:
o According to the change of terminology in the I2NSF framework, the
names of the components and interfaces are updated as follows:
Application Controller -> I2NSF Client, Security Function (SF) ->
Network Security Function (NSF), Vendor System -> Developer's
Management System, Service Layer Interface -> Client Facing
Interface, Capability Layer Interface -> NSF Facing Interface.
o Three use cases described in this document can use a data model
corresponding to the information model for the I2NSF capability
interface.
o The proposed framework of SDN-based security services can be
combined to a security management architecture for handling
security policies.
o The proposed framework can enforce low-level security policies in
NSFs by using a service function chaining (SFC) enabled I2NSF
architecture.
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Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon Paul Jeong
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Hyoungshick Kim
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4324
Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: hyoung@skku.edu
URI: http://seclab.skku.edu/people/hyoungshick-kim/
Jung-Soo Park
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon 305-700
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 860 6514
EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr
Tae-Jin Ahn
Korea Telecom
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon 305-811
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 870 8409
EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com
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Se-Hui Lee
Korea Telecom
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon 305-811
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 870 8162
EMail: sehuilee@kt.com
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