Network Working Group                                       S. Josefsson
Internet-Draft                                            March 24, 2006
Expires: September 25, 2006


                   Channel bindings for SASL over TLS
                     draft-josefsson-sasl-tls-cb-00

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 25, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document define how to compute data that is bound to a specific
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) session, for use by Simple
   Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms.









Josefsson              Expires September 25, 2006               [Page 1]


Internet-Draft     Channel bindings for SASL over TLS         March 2006


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Conventions Used in this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Deriving the Channel Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements  . . . . . . . . . . 6







































Josefsson              Expires September 25, 2006               [Page 2]


Internet-Draft     Channel bindings for SASL over TLS         March 2006


1.  Introduction

   Binding an authentication attempt to a specific encrypted session can
   protect from certain attacks [4].  This document describe how to
   generate data that can be used by SASL [2] mechanisms to bind it to a
   specific TLS [3] session.

   An application that use SASL under TLS is responsible for deriving
   channel binding data for use by SASL.  This document make it possible
   to derive channel bindings that can be used by any SASL mechanism.
   Compared to specifying TLS channel bindings for each and every SASL
   mechanism, the process described below enable an interface between
   applications and SASL implementations that is not mechanism specific.


2.  Conventions Used in this Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [1].


3.  Deriving the Channel Binding

   The TLS Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) generate, using the constant
   string "SASL channel binding", and based on the master secret and the
   random values established during a TLS handshake, a 64 octet string
   that make up the SASL channel binding data.

   Using the terminology of TLS [3], the SASL channel binding data is
   computed as follows:

         SASL_channel_binding =
            PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret,
                "SASL channel binding",
                SecurityParameters.server_random +
                SecurityParameters.client_random) [0..64];

   The derived data MUST NOT be used for any other purpose than in
   combination with an SASL authentication.


4.  IANA Considerations

   None.






Josefsson              Expires September 25, 2006               [Page 3]


Internet-Draft     Channel bindings for SASL over TLS         March 2006


5.  Security Considerations

   It is critical to protect the TLS master secret.

   We claim that by appropriately using the channel binding data derived
   from a TLS session a SASL mechanism can protect itself from the
   attacks in attacks [4].  To guarantee this property, the derived data
   is only to be used for the intended purpose.

   The security considerations in SASL and TLS should also be
   considered.


6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]  Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)",
        RFC 2222, October 1997.

   [3]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
        RFC 2246, January 1999.

6.2.  Informative References

   [4]  Asokan, N., Niemi, V., and K. Nyberg, "Man-in-the-Middle in
        Tunneled Authentication",
        WWW http://www.saunalahti.fi/~asokan/research/mitm.html.




















Josefsson              Expires September 25, 2006               [Page 4]


Internet-Draft     Channel bindings for SASL over TLS         March 2006


Author's Address

   Simon Josefsson

   Email: simon@josefsson.org














































Josefsson              Expires September 25, 2006               [Page 5]


Internet-Draft     Channel bindings for SASL over TLS         March 2006


Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.


Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.


Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.




Josefsson              Expires September 25, 2006               [Page 6]