Network Working Group P. Koch
Internet-Draft M. Sanz
Intended status: Informational DENIC eG
Expires: September 8, 2011 March 7, 2011
Changing DNS Operators under DNSSEC
draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change-00
Abstract
Changing the DNS delegation for a DNS zone is quite involved if done
by the books, but most often handled pragmatically in today's
operational practice at the top level with registries and registrars.
This document describes a proposal for a delegation change procedure
that will maintain consistency and validation under DNSSEC.
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2011.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Purpose of this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements for Seamless Operator Change . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix A. Document Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A.1. Initial document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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1. Introduction
When the NS RRSet in a DNS delegation is to be changed from one to a
disjoint other, the conservative approach has been to add the new
servers as (stealth) secondary servers, then add them to the NS
RRSet, change the primary master (that is, change the AXFR/IXFR
source for all the secondary servers), remove the old name servers'
names from the NS RRSet and finally cease service on those former
name servers. This would involve two changes to the zone file for
the apex NS RRSet and in turn two interactions with the parent zone
(the registry) for the delegation NS RRSet.
Operational practice deviates from this in many cases, especially
where there is a combined role of the registrar as registrar, DNS
operator and web hoster. Often the new infrastructure is set up
independent of and in parallel to the old one and there is only one
delegation change. Resolvers will access either version of the DNS
zone and the inconsistency in DNS data and even at the application
layer will be tolerated as long as the end user gets to see any
result at all.
DNSSEC is less tolerant to this inconsistency, and the challenge is
that access to and validation of DNS data will involvce multiple
steps. The resolver might access DNS data through one (say, the old)
name server infrastructure and DNS key material (the apex DNSKEY
RRSet) through the other. A hard switch would increase the
likelyhood of a validation failure, should the signature over some
RRSet not match any key in the DNSKEY RRset.
1.1. Purpose of this Document
This document attempts to list requirements for a seamless change of
DNS operators in a registry/registrar environment. It then suggests
a procedure that should work in an automated environment even for
large numbers of DNS operator changes. It is meant as a supplement
or contribution to the updated version of [RFC4641], as currently
expressed in [I-D.ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis], section 4.3.5.
2. Requirements for Seamless Operator Change
Regardless of the the particular registry provisioning protocol
(e.g., EPP, [RFC5930], [RFC5931]) DNS registries usually provide for
a method to transfer a domain name between different registrars.
However, from this angle there is no separate role for the DNS
operator, the entity that is responsible for the DNS infrastructure
and/or the content of the DNS zone. This entity may be identical to
the registrar, the registrant, or neither. From the DNSSEC
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perspective it is important to consider the entity controlling the
ZSK and KSK in any transfer that involves changing the NS RRSet to a
disjoint set (as opposed to simple additions to or removals from the
NS RRSet).
The change of a registrar is of limited effect from the DNSSEC
perspective. The discussion of the ability of the gaining registrar
to accept DNSSEC information within a domain object is beyond the
scope of this document. The focus is kept on the change of the DNS
operator. There are two cases: ideally, the losing operator will be
able to incorporate data generated by the gaining operator into their
version of the DNS zone. However, the proposed solution should also
be able to cover the case where this cooperation cannot be relied
upon.
This is a preliminary list of requirements for the operator change:
no private keys Private cryptographic keys will not be exchanged
between the losing and the gaining operator. Scenarios in which
this would be feasible would not pose the challenges addressed in
this document.
little interaction To ease automation the number of interactions
between registry, registrar or registrars and operators should be
minimized.
no direct channel We do not assume the existence of a direct,
confidential, authenticated communication channel between the
losing and the gaining operator. On an abstract level, the
registrant could be viewed as an indirect channel, but involving
the registrant is not necessarily easily automated.
little overhead for losing operator Whenever interaction or action
cannot be avoided, the losing operator should be involved as
little as possible to avoid overhead for the leaving customer. In
turn, this suggests the gaining operator should be in control of
the process.
3. Security Considerations
This section needs more work
4. IANA Considerations
This document does not request any IANA action.
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5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2606] Eastlake, D. and A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS
Names", BCP 32, RFC 2606, June 1999.
[RFC5735] Cotton, M. and L. Vegoda, "Special Use IPv4 Addresses",
BCP 153, RFC 5735, January 2010.
5.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis]
Kolkman, O., "DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2",
draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc4641bis-05 (work in progress),
October 2010.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC4641] Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices",
RFC 4641, September 2006.
[RFC5930] Shen, S., Mao, Y., and NSS. Murthy, "Using Advanced
Encryption Standard Counter Mode (AES-CTR) with the
Internet Key Exchange version 02 (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 5930, July 2010.
[RFC5931] Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only a Password",
RFC 5931, August 2010.
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Appendix A. Document Revision History
This section is to be removed should the draft be published.
$Id: draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change.xml,v 1.1 2011/03/07 21:52:05 pk Exp $
A.1. Initial document
...
Authors' Addresses
Peter Koch
DENIC eG
Kaiserstrasse 75-77
Frankfurt 60329
DE
Phone: +49 69 27235 0
Email: pk@DENIC.DE
Marcos Sanz
DENIC eG
Kaiserstrasse 75-77
Frankfurt 60329
DE
Phone: +49 69 27235 0
Email: sanz@DENIC.DE
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