Network Working Group E. Lear
Internet-Draft R. Droms
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems
Expires: December 9, 2016 June 07, 2016
Manufacturer Usage Description Specification
draft-lear-ietf-netmod-mud-02
Abstract
This memo specifies the necessary components to implement
manufacturer usage descriptions (MUD). This includes a YANG model,
IPv4 and IPv6 DHCP options, a URL suffix specification, an X.509
certificate extension and a means to sign and verify the
descriptions.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 9, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Element Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. last-update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. previous-mud-file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. cache-validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. masa-server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.5. is-supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.6. packet-direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.7. manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.8. same-manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.9. model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.10. local-networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.11. controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.12. direction-initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Processing of the MUD file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. What does a MUD URL look like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. The MUD YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. MUD File Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. The MUD URL DHCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3. Relay Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension 14
9. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Creating a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Verifying a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2. PKIX Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.3. Well Known URI Suffix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.4. MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files . . . . . . . 17
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUDs) provide advice to end networks
on how to treat specific classes of devices. The MUD architecture is
explained in [I-D.lear-mud-framework]. The files that are retrieved
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are intended to be closely aligned to existing network architectures
so that they are easy to deploy. We make use of YANG [RFC6020]
because of the time and effort spent to develop accurate and adequate
models for use by network devices. JSON is used as a serialization
for compactness and readability.
The YANG model specified here is an extension of
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. The extensions in this model allow for
a manufacturer to express classes of systems that a manufacturer
would find necessary for the proper function of the device. These
classes are then instantiated into actual IP addresses through local
processing. This provides manufacturers the opportunity to limit
device exposure to that which a manufacturer would find necessary for
the proper function of the device.
In this memo two means are defined to emit the MUD URL. One is a
DHCP option[RFC2131],[RFC3315] that the DHCP client uses to inform
the DHCP server. The DHCP server may take further actions, such as
retrieve the URL or otherwise pass it along to network management
system or controller.
The other method defined is an X.509 constraint. The IEEE has
developed [IEEE8021AR] that provides a certificate-based approach to
communicate device characteristics, which itself relies on [RFC5280].
The MUD URL extension is non-critical, as required by IEEE 802.1AR.
Because manufacturers do not know who will be using their devices, it
is important for functionality referenced in usage descriptions to be
relatively ubiquitous, and therefore, mature. Therefore, only a
limited subset of NETCONF-like content is permitted.
1.1. Terminology
MUD: manufacturer usage description.
MUD file: a file containing YANG-based JSON that describes a
recommended behavior.
MUD file server: a web server that hosts a MUD file.
MUD controller: the system that requests and receives the MUD file
from the MUD server. After it has processed a MUD file it may
direct changes to relevant network elements.
MUD URL: a URL that can be used by the MUD controller to receive the
MUD file.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning
A MUD file consists of JSON based on a YANG model. For purposes of
MUD, the elements that can be modified are access lists as augmented
by this model. The MUD file is limited to the serialization of a
small number of YANG schema, including the models specified in the
following documents:
o [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
o [I-D.lear-ietf-netmod-acl-dnsname]
o [RFC6991]
Publishers of MUD files MUST NOT include other elements, and MUST
only contain information relevant to the device being described.
Devices parsing MUD files MUST cease processing if they find other
elements.
This module is structured into three parts. The first container
holds information that is relevant to retrieval and validity of the
MUD file itself. The second container augments the access list to
indicate direction the ACL is to be applied. The final container
augments the matching container of the ACL model to add several
elements that are relevant to the MUD URL, or other otherwise
abstracted for use within a local environment.
module: ietf-mud
+--rw support-information
+--rw last-update? yang:date-and-time
+--rw previous-mud-file? yang:uri
+--rw cache-validity? uint32
+--rw masa-server? inet:uri
+--rw is-supported? boolean
augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl:
+--rw packet-direction? direction
augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl
/acl:access-list-entries/acl:ace/acl:matches:
+--rw manufacturer? inet:host
+--rw same-manufacturer? empty
+--rw model? string
+--rw local-networks? empty
+--rw controller? inet:uri
+--rw direction-initiated? direction
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3. Element Definitions
The following elements are defined.
3.1. last-update
This is a date-and-time value of the last time the MUD file was
updated. This is akin to a version number.
3.2. previous-mud-file
This is a URL that should point to the previous MUD URL for auditing
purposes. Because it should not be necessary to resign a MUD file
when a new one is released, the archival location of a current MUD
file should be identified prior to its release. Note the signature
file MUST also be available. For example, if previous-mud-file is
set to "https://example.com/.mud/v1/xxx", the corresponding signature
would be found at "https://example.com/.mud/v1/xxx.p7s".
3.3. cache-validity
This uint32 is the period of time in hours that a network management
station MUST wait since its last retrieval before checking for an
update. It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24 and no
more than 1440 for any device that is supported.
3.4. masa-server
This optional element refers to the URL that should be used to
resolve the location any MASA service, as specified in
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].
3.5. is-supported
This boolean is an indication from the manufacturer to the network
administrator as to whether or not the device is supported. In this
context a device is said to be supported if the manufacturer might
issue an update to the device or if the manufacturer might update the
MUD file.
3.6. packet-direction
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] describes access-lists but does not
attempt to indicate where they are applied as that is handled
elsewhere in a configuration. However, in this case, a MUD file must
be explicit in describing the communcation pattern of a device, and
that includes indicating what is to be permitted or denied in either
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direction of communication. This element takes a single value of
either "to-device" or "from-device", based on a typedef "direction".
3.7. manufacturer
This element consists of a hostname that would be matched against the
authority section of another device's MUD URL.
3.8. same-manufacturer
This is an equivalent for when the manufacturer element is used to
indicate the authority that is found in another device's MUD URL
matches that of the authority found in this device's MUD URL.
3.9. model
This string matches the one and only segment following the authority
section of the MUD URL. It refers to a model that is unique within
the context of the authority. It may also include product version
information. Thus how this field is constructed is entirely a local
matter for the manufacturer.
3.10. local-networks
This null-valued element expands to include local networks. Its
default expansion is that packets must not traverse toward a default
route that is received from the router.
3.11. controller
This URI specifies a value that a controller will register with the
network management station. The element then is expanded to the set
of hosts that are so registered.
In addition, some meta information is defined in order to determine
when a usage description should be refreshed.
3.12. direction-initiated
When applied this matches packets when the flow was initiated in the
corresponding direction. [RFC6092] provides guidance for IPv6
guidance best practices. While that document is scoped specifically
to IPv6, its contents are applicable for IPv4 as well. When this
flag is set, and the system has no reason to believe a flow has been
initiated it MUST drop the packet. This match SHOULD be applied with
specific transport parameters, such as protocol.
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4. Processing of the MUD file
To keep things relatively simple in addition to whatever definitions
exist, we also apply two additional default behaviors:
o Anything not explicitly permitted is denied.
o Local DNS, DHCP, and NTP are, by default, permitted to and from
the device.
5. What does a MUD URL look like?
To begin with, MUD takes full advantage of both the https: scheme and
the use of .well-known. HTTPS is important in this case because men
in the middle could otherwise harm the operation of a class of
devices. .well-known is used because we wish to add additional
structure to the URL. And so the URL appears as follows:
mud-url = "https://" authority "/.well-known/mud/" mud-rev
"/" model ( "?" extras )
; authority is from RFC3986
mud-rev = "v1"
model = segment ; from RFC3986
extras = query ; from RFC3986
mud-rev signifies the version of the manufacturer usage description
file. This memo specifies "v1" of that file. Later versions may
permit additional schemas or modify the format.
"model" represents a device model as the manufacturer wishes to
represent it. It could be a brand name or something more specific.
It also may provide a means to indicate what version the product is.
Specifically if it has been updated in the field, this is the place
where evidence of that update would appear. The field should be
changed when the intended communication patterns of a device change.
While from a controller standpoint, only comparison and matching
operations are safe, it is envisioned that updates will require some
administrative review. Processing of this URL occurs as specified in
[RFC2818] and [RFC3986].
6. The MUD YANG Model
<CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-mud.yang";
module ietf-mud {
yang-version 1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud";
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prefix "ietf-mud";
import ietf-access-control-list {
prefix "acl";
}
import ietf-yang-types
{
prefix "yang";
}
import ietf-inet-types
{
prefix "inet";
}
organization
"Cisco Systems, Inc.";
contact
"Eliot Lear
lear@cisco.com
";
description
"This YANG module defines a component that augments the
IETF description of an access list. This specific module
focuses on additional filters that include local, model,
and same-manufacturer.
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
the document authors. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-05-28" {
description "A policy container for manufacturer-driven policy";
reference "RFC XXXX";
}
typedef direction {
type enumeration {
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enum to-device {
description "packets or flows destined to the target device";
}
enum from-device {
description "packets or flows destined from
the target device";
}
}
description "Which way are we talking about?";
}
container support-information
{
description "Information about when support end(ed), and
when to refresh";
leaf last-update
{
type yang:date-and-time;
description "This is intended to be the time and date that
the MUD file was generated.";
}
leaf previous-mud-file
{
type inet:uri;
description "Use to find the previous MUD file location
for auditing purposes.";
}
leaf cache-validity
{
type uint32;
description "The information retrieved from the MUD server is
valid for these many hours, after which it should
be refreshed.";
}
leaf masa-server {
type inet:uri;
description "The URI of the MASA server that network
elements should forward requests to for this device.";
}
leaf is-supported
{
type boolean;
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description "The element is currently supported
by the manufacturer.";
}
}
augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl" {
description "add inbound or outbound. Normally access lists
are applied in an inbound or outbound direction
separately from their definition. This is not
possible with MUD.";
leaf packet-direction
{
type direction;
description "inbound or outbound ACL.";
}
}
augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl/" +
"acl:access-list-entries/acl:ace/" +
"acl:matches" {
description "adding abstractions to avoid need of IP addresses";
leaf manufacturer
{
type inet:host;
description "authority component of the manufacturer URI";
}
leaf same-manufacturer
{
type empty;
description "expand to ACEs for each device
with the same origin";
}
leaf model
{
type string;
description "specific model (including version) for a
given manufacturer";
}
leaf local-networks {
type empty;
description "this string is used to indicate networks
considered local in a given environment.";
}
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leaf controller {
type inet:uri;
description "expands to one or more controllers for a
given service that is codified by inet:uri.";
}
leaf direction-initiated {
type direction;
description "which direction a flow was initiated";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
6.1. MUD File Example
This example contains two access lists that are intended to provide
outbound access to a cloud service on TCP port 443.
{
"ietf-mud:support-information": {
"last-update": "2016-05-18T20:00:50Z",
"cache-validity": 1440
},
"ietf-access-control-list:access-lists": {
"acl": [ {
"acl-name": "inbound-stuff",
"acl-type" : "ipv4-acl",
"ietf-mud:direction" : "to-device",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "access-cloud",
"matches": {
"ietf-acl-dnsname:source-hostname":
"lighting-system.example.com",
"protocol" : 8,
"source-port-range" : {
"lower-port" : 443,
"upper-port" : 443
}
},
"actions" : {
"permit" : [null]
}
}
]
}
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},
{
"acl-name": "outbound-stuff",
"acl-type" : "ipv4-acl",
"ietf-mud:direction" : "from-device",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "access-cloud",
"matches": {
"ietf-acl-dnsname:destination-hostname":
"lighting-system.example.com",
"protocol" : 8,
"destination-port-range" : {
"lower-port" : 443,
"upper-port" : 443
}
},
"actions" : {
"permit" : [null]
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
7. The MUD URL DHCP Option
The IPv4 MUD URL client option has the following format:
+------+-----+------------------------------
| code | len | MUD URL
+------+-----+------------------------------
Code OPTION_MUD_URL_V4 (TBD) is assigned by IANA. len is a single
octet that indicates the length of the URL in octets. MUD URL is a
URL. The length of a MUD URL does not exceed 255 bytes.
The IPv6 MUD URL client option has the following format:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 | option-length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MUD URL |
| ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 (TBD; assigned by IANA).
option-length contains the length of the URL in octets. The length
MUST NOT exceed 255 octets.
The intent of this option is to provide both a new device classifier
to the network as well as some recommended configuration to the
routers that implement policy. However, it is entirely the purview
of the network system as managed by the network administrator to
decide what to do with this information. The key function of this
option is simply to identify the type of device to the network in a
structured way such that the policy can be easily found with existing
toolsets.
7.1. Client Behavior
A DHCP client MAY emit either a DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 option or both.
These options singletons, as specified in [RFC7227]. Because clients
are intended to have at most one MUD URL associated with them, they
may emit at most one MUD URL option via DHCPv4 and one MUD URL option
via DHCPv6. In the case where both v4 and v6 DHCP options are
emitted, the same URL MUST be used.
Clients SHOULD log or otherwise report improper acknowledgments from
servers, but they MUST NOT modify their MUD URL configuration based
on a server's response. The server's response is only an
acknowledgment that the server has processed the option, and promises
no specific network behavior to the client. In particular, it may
not be possible for the server to retrieve the file associated with
the MUD URL, or the local network administration may not wish to use
the usage description. Neither of these situations should be
considered in any way exceptional.
7.2. Server Behavior
A DHCP server may ignore these options or take action based on
receipt of these options. For purposes of debugging, if a server
successfully parses the option and the URL, it MUST return the option
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with the same URL as an acknowledgment. Even in this circumstance,
no specific network behavior is guaranteed. When a server consumes
this option, it will either forward the URL and relevant client
information to a network management system (such as the giaddr), or
it will retrieve the usage description by resolving the URL.
DHCP servers may implement MUD functionality themselves or they may
pass along appropriate information to a network management system or
controller. A DHCP server that does process the MUD URL MUST adhere
to the process specified in [RFC2818] and [RFC5280] to validate the
TLS certificate of the web server hosting the MUD file. Those
servers will retrieve the file, process it, create and install the
necessary configuration on the relevant network element. Servers
SHOULD monitor the gateway for state changes on a given interface. A
DHCP server that does not provide MUD functionality and has forwarded
a MUD URL to a network management system MUST notify the network
management of any corresponding change to the DHCP state of the
client (such as expiration or explicit release of a network address
lease).
7.3. Relay Requirements
There are no additional requirements for relays.
8. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension
[RFC7299] provides a procedure and means to specify extensions to
X.509 certificates. The MUD URL is a non-critical Certificate
extension that points to an on-line Manufacturer Usage Description
concerning the certificate subject. This extension contains a single
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). Internationalized Resource
Identifiers must be represented as URI's in the way described in RFC
5280, section 7.4.
The choice of id-pe is based on guidance found in Section 4.2.2 of
[RFC5280]:
These extensions may be used to direct applications to on-line
information about the issuer or the subject.
The MUD URL is precisely that: online information about the
particular subject.
The new extension is identified as follows:
- The MUD URI extension id-pe-mud-url OBJECT IDENTIFER ::= { id-pe
TBD }
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The extension returns a single value:
mudURLSyntax ::= IA5String - for use with mud architecture.
The semantics of the URI are defined Section 5.
9. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files
Because MUD files contain information that may be used to configure
network access lists, they are sensitive. To insure that they have
not been tampered with, it is important that they be signed. We make
use of DER-encoded Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for
this purpose.
9.1. Creating a MUD file signature
A MUD file MUST be signed using CMS as an opaque binary object. In
order to make successful verification more likely, intermediate
certificates SHOULD be included. If the device that is being
described supports IEEE 802.1AR, its manufacturer certificate and the
certificate in the MUD file MUST share a common trust anchor in order
to insure that manufacturer of the device is also the provider of the
MUD file. The signature is stored at the same location as the MUD
URL but with the suffix of ".p7s". Signatures are transferred using
content-type "Application/pkcs7-signature".
For example:
% openssl cms -sign -signer mancertfile -inkey mankey \
-in mudfile -binary -outform DER - \
-certfile intermediatecert -out mudfile.p7s
Note: A MUD file may need to be resigned if the signature expires.
9.2. Verifying a MUD file signature
Prior to retrieving a MUD file the MUD controller SHOULD retrieve the
MUD signature file using the MUD URL with a suffix of ".p7s". For
example, if the MUD URL is "https://example.com/.well-known/v1/
modela", the MUD signature URL will be "https://example.com/.well-
known/v1/modela.p7s".
Upon retrieving a MUD file, a MUD controller MUST validate the
signature of the file before continuing with further processing. A
MUD controller SHOULD produce an error and it MUST cease all
processing of that file if the signature cannot be validated. If the
MUD controller has received the MUD URL via IEEE 802.1AR containing
an IDevID (a manufacturer certificate), it MUST further confirm that
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the manufacturer certificate and that of the MUD file share a common
trust anchor.
For Example:
% openssl cms -verify -in mudfile.p7s -inform DER -content mudfile
Note the additional step of verifying the common trust root.
10. Security Considerations
Based on the means a URL is procured, a device may be able to lie
about what it is, thus gaining additional network access. There are
several means to limit risk in this case. The most obvious is to
only believe devices that make use of certificate-based
authentication such as IEEE 802.1AR certificates. When those
certificates are not present, devices claiming to be of a certain
manufacturer SHOULD NOT be included in that manufacturer grouping
without additional validation of some form. This will occur when it
makes use of primitives such as "manufacturer" for the purpose of
accessing devices of a particular type.
Network management systems SHOULD NOT deploy a usage description for
a a device with the same MAC address that has indicated a change of
authority without some additional validation (such as review of the
class). New devices that present some form of unauthenticated MUD
URL SHOULD be validated by some external means when they would be
otherwise be given increased network access.
It may be possible for a rogue manufacturer to inappropriately
exercise the MUD file parser, in order to exploit a vulnerability.
There are three recommended approaches to address this threat. The
first is to validate the signature of the MUD file. The second is to
have a system do a primary scan of the file to ensure that it is both
parseable and believable at some level. MUD files will likely be
relatively small, to start with. The number of ACEs used by any
given device should be relatively small as well. Second, it may be
useful to limit retrieval of MUD URLs to only those sites that are
known to have decent web reputations.
Use of a URL necessitates the use of domain names. If a domain name
changes ownership, the new owner of that domain may be able to
provide MUD files that MUD controllers would consider valid. There
are a few approaches that can mitigate this attack. First, MUD file
servers SHOULD cache certificates used by the MUD file server. When
a new certificate is retrieved for whatever reason, the MUD
controller should check to see if ownership of the domain has
changed. A fair programmatic approximation of this is when the name
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servers for the domain have changed. If the actual MUD file has
changed, the controller MAY check the WHOIS database to see if
registration ownership of a domain has changed. If a change has
occured, or if for some reason it is not possible to determine
whether ownership has changed, further review may be warranted.
Note, this remediation does not take into account the case of a
device that was produced long ago and only recently fielded, or the
case where a new MUD controller has been installed.
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options
IANA is requested to allocated the DHCPv4 and v6 options as specified
in Section 7.
11.2. PKIX Extensions
The IANA is requested to assign a value for id-pe-mud-uri in the "SMI
Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" Registry. Its use is
specified in Section 8.
11.3. Well Known URI Suffix
The IANA is requested to register the URL suffix of "mud" as follows:
o URI Suffix: "mud" o Specification documents: this document o
Related information: n/a
11.4. MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files
The following media-type is defined for transfer of MUD file:
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o Type name: application
o Subtype name: mud+json
o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/mud+json values
are represented as a JSON object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be
employed.
o Security considerations: See {{secon}} of this document.
o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: this document
o Applications that use this media type: MUD controllers as
specified by this document.
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
o Additional information:
Magic number(s): n/a
File extension(s): n/a
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information:
Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
o Change controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No.
12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Einar Nilsen-Nygaard, Bernie Volz,
Tom Gindin, Dan Romascanu, Sandeep Kumar, Thorsten Dahm, John
Bashinski, and Dan Wing for their valuable advice and reviews. The
remaining errors in this work are entirely the responsibility of the
author.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., and S.
Bjarnason, "Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures", draft-
ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-02 (work in progress),
March 2016.
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[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
Bogdanovic, D., Koushik, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-07 (work in progress), March
2016.
[I-D.lear-ietf-netmod-acl-dnsname]
Lear, E., "Using DNS Names in the IETF ACL Model", draft-
lear-ietf-netmod-acl-dnsname-00 (work in progress),
January 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
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[RFC6092] Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7227] Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
13.2. Informative References
[I-D.lear-mud-framework]
Lear, E., "Manufacturer Usage Description Framework",
draft-lear-mud-framework-00 (work in progress), January
2016.
[IEEE8021AR]
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Secure Device Identity", 1998.
Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions
RFC Editor to remove this section prior to publication.
Draft -00 to -01:
o XML->JSON
o Remove device versioning information from URL
o Add PKIX and DHCP options
o Add Content-type information
o Clean up IANA considerations to match registration templates
o Ralph Droms carried over as author from DHCP option.
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o Signing information
o Expanded Security Considerations
o Add directionality for both packets and flows.
o add previous-mud-file
Authors' Addresses
Eliot Lear
Cisco Systems
Richtistrasse 7
Wallisellen CH-8304
Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 878 9200
Email: lear@cisco.com
Ralph Droms
Cisco Systems
55 Cambridge Parkway
Cambridge 1057
United States
Phone: +1 617 621 1904
Email: rdroms@cisco.com
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