DOTS K. Nishizuka
Internet-Draft NTT Communications
Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair
Expires: August 18, 2019 Orange
T. Reddy
McAfee
T. Nagata
Lepidum
February 14, 2019
Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal Channel
draft-nishizuka-dots-signal-control-filtering-04
Abstract
This document specifies an extension to the DOTS signal channel to
control the filtering rules when an attack mitigation is active.
Particularly, this extension allows a DOTS client to activate or de-
activate filtering rules during a DDoS attack. The characterization
of these filtering rules is supposed to be conveyed by a DOTS client
during peace time by means of DOTS data channel.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
Please update these statements within the document with the RFC
number to be assigned to this document:
o "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"
o "RFC XXXX: Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal Channel";
o reference: RFC XXXX
o [RFCXXXX]
Please update these statements with the RFC number to be assigned to
the following documents:
o "RFC SSSS: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Signal Channel Specification" (used to be
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel])
o "RFC DDDD: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Data Channel Specification" (used to be
[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel])
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Please update the "revision" date of the YANG module.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. The Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Controlling Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Binding of the Data Channel and Signal Channel . . . . . 4
3.2. DOTS Signal Channel Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. Filtering Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. Sample Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.3. DOTS Signal Filtering Control Module . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3.1. Tree Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . 14
4.2. DOTS Signal Control Filtering YANG Module . . . . . . . . 14
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
1.1. The Problem
The DOTS data channel protocol [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] is used
for bulk data exchange between DOTS agents to improve the
coordination of all the parties involved in the response to the DDoS
attack. Filter management is one of its tasks which enables a DOTS
client to retrieve DOTS server filtering capabilities and to manage
filtering rules. Filtering rules are used for dropping or rate-
limiting unwanted traffic, and permitting accept-listed traffic.
Unlike the DOTS signal channel, the DOTS data channel is not expected
to deal with attack conditions. As such, an issue that might be
encountered in some deployments is when filters installed by means of
DOTS data channel protocol may not function as expected during DDoS
attacks or exacerbate an ongoing DDoS attack. The DOTS data channel
cannot be used then to change these filters, which may complicate
DDoS mitigation operations [Interop].
A typical case is a DOTS client which configures during peace time
filtering rules using DOTS data channel to permit traffic from
accept-listed sources, but during a volumetric DDoS attack the DDoS
mitigator identifies the source addresses/prefixes in the accept-
listed filtering rules are attacking the target. For example, an
attacker can spoof the IP addresses of accept-listed sources to
generate attack traffic or the attacker can compromise the accept-
listed sources and program them to launch DDoS attack.
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is designed so that the DDoS server
notifies the conflict to the DOTS client ('conflict-cause' set to 2
(Conflicts with an existing accept list)), but the DOTS client may
not be able to withdraw the accept-list rules during the attack
period due to the high-volume attack traffic saturating the inbound
link. In other words, the DOTS client cannot use the DOTS data
channel to withdraw the accept-list filters when the DDoS attack is
in progress. This assumes that this DOTS client is the owner of the
filtering rule.
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1.2. The Solution
This specification addresses the problems discussed in Section 1.1 by
adding the capability of managing filtering rules using the DOTS
signal channel, which enables a DOTS client to request the activation
or de-activation of filtering rules during a DDoS attack.
The DOTS signal channel protocol [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is
designed to enable a DOTS client to contact a DOTS server for help
even under severe network congestion conditions. Therefore,
extending the DOTS signal channel protocol to manage the filtering
rules during a attack will enhance the protection capability offered
by DOTS protocols. Sample examples are provided in Section 3.2.2.
Note: The experiment at the IETF103 hackathon [Interop] showed
that even when the incoming link is saturated by DDoS attack
traffic, the DOTS client can signal mitigation requests using the
DOTS signal channel over the saturated link.
Conflicts that are induced by filters installed by other DOTS clients
of the same domain are not discussed in this specification.
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].
3. Controlling Filtering Rules
3.1. Binding of the Data Channel and Signal Channel
The filtering rules eventually managed using the DOTS signal channel
must be created a priori by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data
channel. Managing conflicts with filters installed by other DOTS
clients of the same domain is out of scope.
As discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], a
DOTS client must use the same 'cuid' for both the signal and data
channels. This requirement is meant to facilitate binding channels
used by the same DOTS client.
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The DOTS signal and data channels from a DOTS client may or may not
use the same DOTS server. Nevertheless, the scope of the mitigation
request, alias, and filtering rules are not restricted to the DOTS
server but to the DOTS server administrative domain. To that aim,
DOTS servers within a domain are assumed to have a mechanism to
coordinate the mitigation requests, aliases, and filtering rules to
coordinate their decisions for better mitigation operation
efficiency. The exact details about such mechanism is out of scope
of this document.
A filtering rule controlled by the DOTS signal channel is identified
by its Access Control List (ACL) name. Note that an ACL name
unambiguously identifies an ACL bound to a DOTS client, but the same
name may be used by distinct DOTS clients.
The activation or de-activation of an ACL by the signal channel
overrides the 'activation-type' (defined in Section 7.2
[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]) a priori conveyed with the filtering
rules using the DOTS data channel.
3.2. DOTS Signal Channel Extension
3.2.1. Filtering Control
This specification extends the mitigation request defined in
Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] to convey the
intended control of the configured filtering rules. The DOTS client
conveys the following parameters in the CBOR body of the mitigation
request:
acl-name: A name of an access list defined in the data channel.
As a reminder, an ACL is an ordered list of Access Control Entries
(ACE). Each Access Control Entry has a list of match criteria and
a list of actions [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]. The list of
configured ACLs can be retrieved using the DOTS data channel
during peace time.
This is an optional attribute.
activation-type: Indicates the activation type of an ACL overriding
the existing 'activation-type' installed by the DOTS client using
the DOTS data channel.
This attribute can be set to 'deactivate', 'immediate', or
'activate-when-mitigating' defined [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].
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Note that 'immediate' or 'activate-when-mitigating' are equivalent
when a mitigation request is being processed by the DOTS server.
If this attribute is not provided, the DOTS server MUST use
'activate-when-mitigating' as the default value.
This is an optional attribute.
The JSON/YANG mapping to CBOR for 'activation-type' is shown in
Table 1.
+-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
| Parameter Name | YANG | CBOR | CBOR Major | JSON |
| | Type | Key | Type & | Type |
| | | | Information | |
+-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
| activation-type | enumeration| 0x0031 | 0 unsigned | String |
| | | (TBD1) | | |
+-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
Table 1: JSON/YANG mapping to CBOR for 'activation-type'
When acl-* attributes are to be included in a request with an
existing 'mid', the DOTS client MUST repeat all the other parameters
as sent in the original mitigation request (i.e., having that 'mid')
apart from a possible change to the lifetime parameter value.
If the DOTS server does not find the ACL name conveyed in the
mitigation request in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it
MUST respond with a "4.04 (Not Found)" error response code.
It is RECOMMENDED for a DOTS client to subscribe to asynchronous
notifications of the attack mitigation, as detailed in
Section 4.4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. If not, the
polling mechanism in Section 4.4.2.2 of
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] has to be followed by the DOTS client.
A DOTS client MUST NOT use the filtering control over DOTS signal
channel if no attack (mitigation) is active; such requests MUST be
discarded by the DOTS server with 4.00 (Bad Request). By default,
ACL-related operations are achieved using the DOTS data channel
[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] when no attack is ongoing.
A DOTS client relies on the information received from the DOTS server
and/or local information to the DOTS client domain to trigger a
filter control request. Obviously, only filters that are pertinent
for an ongoing mitigation should be controlled by a DOTS client using
the DOTS signal channel.
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This specification does not require any modification to the efficacy
update, the retrieval of mitigation requests, and the withdrawal
procedures defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. In particular,
ACL-related clauses are not included in a PUT request used to send an
efficacy update, GET responses, and DELETE requests.
3.2.2. Sample Examples
This section provides sample examples to illustrate the behavior
specified in Section 3.2.1.
Let's consider a DOTS client which contacts its DOTS server during
peace time to install an accept-list allowing for UDP traffic issued
from 2001:db8:1234::/48 with a destination port number 443 to be
forwarded to 2001:db8:6401::2/127. It does so by sending, for
example, a PUT request shown in Figure 1.
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PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\
/acl=an-accept-list HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
"acl": [
{
"name": "an-accept-list",
"type": "ipv6-acl-type",
"activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "test-ace-ipv6-udp",
"matches": {
"ipv6": {
"destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",
"source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/48"
},
"udp": {
"destination-port": {
"operator": "eq",
"port": 443
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 1: DOTS Data Channel Request to Create a Filtering
Some time later, consider that a DDoS attack is detected by the DOTS
client on 2001:db8:6401::2/127. Consequently, the DOTS client sends
a mitigation request to its DOTS server as shown in Figure 2.
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Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:6401::2/127"
],
"target-protocol": [
17
],
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 2: DOTS Signal Channel Mitigation Request
The DOTS server accepts immediately the request by replying with 2.01
(Created) (Figure 3).
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"mid": 123,
"lifetime": 3600,
}
]
}
}
Figure 3: Conflict Status Response
Assuming the DOTS client subscribed to asynchronous notifications,
when the DOTS server concludes that some of the attack sources belong
to 2001:db8:1234::/48, it sends a notification message with 'status'
code set to '1 (Attack mitigation is in progress)' and 'conflict-
cause' set to '2' (conflict-with-acceptlist) to the DOTS client to
indicate that this mitigation request is in progress, but a conflict
is detected.
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Upon receipt of the notification message from the DOTS server, the
DOTS client sends a PUT request to deactivate the "an-accept-list"
ACL as shown in Figure 4.
The DOTS client can also decide to send a PUT request to deactivate
the "an-accept-list" ACL, if suspect traffic is received from an
accept-listed source (2001:db8:1234::/48). The structure of that PUT
is the same as the one shown in Figure 4.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
"scope": [
{
"target-prefix": [
"2001:db8:6401::2/127"
],
"target-protocol": [
17
],
"acl-list": [
{
"acl-name": "an-accept-list",
"activation-type": "deactivate"
}
]
"lifetime": 3600
}
]
}
}
Figure 4: PUT for Controlling a Filter
Then, the DOTS server deactivates "an-accept-list" ACL and replies
with 2.04 (Changed) response to the DOTS client to confirm the
successful operation.
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3.2.3. DOTS Signal Filtering Control Module
3.2.3.1. Tree Structure
This document augments the "dots-signal-channel" DOTS signal YANG
module defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] for managing the
filtering rules.
This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-control-
filter", which has the following tree structure:
module: ietf-dots-signal-control-filter
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type
/ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope:
+--rw acl-list* [acl-name] {control-filtering}?
+--rw acl-name
| -> /ietf-data:dots-data/dots-client/acls/acl/name
+--rw activation-type? activation-type
3.2.3.2. YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-control-filter@2019-02-15.yang"
module ietf-dots-signal-control-filter {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control-filter";
prefix signal-control-filter;
import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
prefix ietf-signal;
reference
"RFC SSSS: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-dots-data-channel {
prefix ietf-data;
reference
"RFC DDDD: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
}
organization
"IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
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Author: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
<mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
Author: Mohamed Boucadair
<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Author: Kaname Nishizuka
<mailto:kaname@nttv6.jp>
Author: Takahiko Nagata
<mailto:nagata@lepidum.co.jp>";
description
"This module contains YANG definition for the signaling
messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server
for the DOTS signal channel controlling the filtering rules
configured using the DOTS data channel.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2019-02-15 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Controlling Filtering Rules Using DOTS Signal
Channel ";
}
feature control-filtering {
description
"This feature means that DOTS signal channel is able to
manage the filtering rules created by the same DOTS
client using the DOTS data channel.";
}
typedef activation-type {
type enumeration {
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enum "activate-when-mitigating" {
value 1;
description
"The ACL is installed only when a mitigation is active.
The ACL is specific to this DOTS client.";
}
enum "immediate" {
value 2;
description
"The ACL is immediately activated.";
}
enum "deactivate" {
value 3;
description
"The ACL is maintained by the DOTS server, but it is
deactivated.";
}
}
description
"Set the activation type of an ACL.";
}
augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type/" +
"ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope" {
if-feature control-filtering;
description "ACL name and activation type";
list acl-list {
key "acl-name";
description
"List of ACLs as defined in the DOTS data
channel. These ACLs are uniquely defined by
cuid and name.";
leaf acl-name {
type leafref {
path "/ietf-data:dots-data/ietf-data:dots-client/" +
"ietf-data:acls/ietf-data:acl/ietf-data:name";
}
description
"Reference to the ACL name bound to a DOTS client.";
}
leaf activation-type {
type activation-type;
default activate-when-mitigating;
description
"Set the activation type of an ACL.";
}
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}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
4. IANA Considerations
4.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry
This specification registers the 'activation-type' parameter in the
IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values" registry established by
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
The 'activation-type' is a comprehension-required parameter. The
'acl-list' and 'acl-name' parameters are defined as comprehension-
required parameters in Table 6 in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
Following the rules in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], if the DOTS
server does not understand the 'acl-list' or 'acl-name' or
'activation-type' attributes, it responds with a "4.00 (Bad Request)"
error response code.
o Note to the RFC Editor: Please delete (TBD1) once the CBOR key is
assigned from the (0x0001 - 0x3FFF) range.
+--------------------+--------+-------+------------+---------------+
| Parameter Name | CBOR | CBOR | Change | Specification |
| | Key | Major | Controller | Document(s) |
| | Value | Type | | |
+--------------------+--------+-------+------------+---------------+
| activation-type | 0x0031 | 0 | IESG | [RFCXXXX] |
| | (TBD1) | | | |
+--------------------+--------+-------+------------+---------------+
4.2. DOTS Signal Control Filtering YANG Module
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
"IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control-filter
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].
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name: ietf-dots-signal-control-filter
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-control-filter
maintained by IANA: N
prefix: signal-control-filter
reference: RFC XXXX
5. Security Considerations
The security considerations discussed in
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] and [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] need
to be taken into account.
6. Acknowledgements
Thank you to Takahiko Nagata and Wei Pan for the comments.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]
Boucadair, M., K, R., Nishizuka, K., Xia, L., Patil, P.,
Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
Specification", draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-25 (work in
progress), January 2019.
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
K, R., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-
ietf-dots-signal-channel-28 (work in progress), January
2019.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
Mortensen, A., K, R., and R. Moskowitz, "Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-18 (work in
progress), February 2019.
[Interop] Nishizuka, K., Shallow, J., and L. Xia , "DOTS Interop
test report, IETF 103 Hackathon", November 2018,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/
slides-103-dots-interop-report-from-ietf-103-hackathon-
00>.
Authors' Addresses
Kaname Nishizuka
NTT Communications
GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
Tokyo 108-8118
Japan
Email: kaname@nttv6.jp
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Tirumaleswar Reddy
McAfee, Inc.
Embassy Golf Link Business Park
Bangalore, Karnataka 560071
India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Nishizuka, et al. Expires August 18, 2019 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft DOTS Signal Control Filtering February 2019
Takahiko Nagata
Lepidum
Japan
Email: nagata@lepidum.co.jp
Nishizuka, et al. Expires August 18, 2019 [Page 17]