[Search] [txt|xml|pdf|bibtex] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05                                             
Network Working Group                                      M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                                       SSW
Intended status: Informational                              July 4, 2014
Expires: January 5, 2015


                     6tisch secure join using 6top
               draft-richardson-6tisch--security-6top-01

Abstract

   This document details a security architecture that permits a new
   6tisch compliant node to join an 802.15.4e network.  The process
   bootstraps the new node authenticating the node to the network, and
   the network to the node, and configuring the new node with the
   required 6tisch schedule.  Any resemblance to WirelessHART/IEC62591
   is entirely intentional.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology and Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Architectural requirements of join protocol . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  prefixes to use for join traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  threat model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.1.  threats to the joining node . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.2.  threats to the resources of the network . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.3.  threats to other joining nodes  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  implementation cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  denial of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  protocol requirements/constraints/assumptions . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  inline/offline  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  time sequence diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  explanation of each step  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       6.1.1.  step (1): enhanced beacon . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.2.  step (1B): send router solicitation . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.3.  step (1C): receive router advertisement . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.4.  step (2): acquire authorizer key  . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.5.  step (3): receive authorizer key  . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.6.  step (4): join request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       6.1.7.  step (5): NS duplicate address request (DAR)  . . . .  13
       6.1.8.  step (7): 6LBR informs JCE of new node  . . . . . . .  13
       6.1.9.  step (8): JCE informs/acks to 6LBR of new node  . . .  13
       6.1.10. step (9): NS duplicate address confirmation (DAC) . .  13
       6.1.11. step (10): JCE initiates connection to joining node .  13
       6.1.12. step (11): Join Assistant forwards packet to joining
               node  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       6.1.13. step (12): Joining node replies . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       6.1.14. step (13): Join Assistant forwards reply to JCE . . .  13
     6.2.  size of each packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  resulting security properties obtained from this process  . .  14
   8.  deployment scenarios underlying protocol requirements . . . .  14
   9.  device identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.1.  PCE/Proxy vs Node identification  . . . . . . . . . . . .  14



Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


     9.2.  Time source authentication / time validation  . . . . . .  14
     9.3.  description of certificate contents . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.4.  privacy aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   10. slotframes to be used during join . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   11. configuration aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   12. authorization aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     12.1.  how to determine a proxy/PCE from a end node . . . . . .  15
     12.2.  security considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   13. security architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   14. Posture Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   16. Other Related Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   17. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   18. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   19. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     19.1.  Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     19.2.  Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   A challenging part with constructing an LLN with nodes from multiple
   vendors is providing enough security context to each node such that
   the network communication can form and remain secure.  Most LLNs are
   small and have no operator interfaces at all, and even if they have
   debug interfaces (such as JTAG) with personnel trained to use that,
   doing any kind of interaction involving electrical connections in a
   dirty environment such as a factory or refinery is hopeless.

   It is necessary to have a way to introduce new nodes into a 6tisch
   network that does not involve any direct manipulation of the nodes
   themselves.  This act has been called "zero-touch" provisioning, and
   it does not occur by chance, but requires coordination between the
   manufacturer of the node, the service operator running the LLN, and
   the installers actually taking the devices out of the shipping boxes.

1.1.  Assumptions

   For the process described in this document to work, some assumptions
   about available infrastructure are made.  These are perhaps more than
   assumptions, but rather architectural requirements; the exact
   operation of said infrastructure to be defined in a subsequent
   document.

   In the diagrams and text that follows entities are named (and defined
   in the terminology section).  Unless otherwise stated these are
   roles, not actual machines/systems.  The roles are seperated by
   network protocols in order that they roles can be performed by



Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


   different systems, not because they have to be.  Different
   deployments will have different scaling requirements for those
   entities.  Smaller deployments might co-located many roles together
   into a single ruggedized platform, while other deployments might
   operate all of the roles on distinct, multiply-redundant server
   classes located in a fully equipped datacentre.

2.  Terminology and Roles

   Most terminology should be taken from [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture]
   and from [I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-interface]  and
   [I-D.wang-6tisch-6top-sublayer].  As well, many terms are taken from
   [RFC6775].

   The following roles/things are defined:

   PCE                 the Path Computation Engine.  This entity reaches
                       out to each of the nodes in the LLN, and
                       configures an appropriate schedule using 6top.

   Authz Server/ACE    the Authorization Server.  This offloads
                       calculation of access control lists and other
                       access control decisions for constrainted nodes.
                       See [I-D.seitz-ace-problem-description]

   JCE                 the Join Coordination Entity.  This acronym is
                       chosen to parallel the PCE.

   802.1AR             a certificate created according the specification
                       in [IEEE.802.1AR]

   joining node        The newly unboxed constrained node that needs to
                       join a network.

   join assistant      A constrained node near the joining node that
                       will act as it's first 6LR, and will relay
                       traffic to/from the joining node.

   join network        A 802.15.4e network whose encryption and
                       authentication key is "JOIN6TISCH".

   production network  A 802.15.4e network whose encryption/
                       authentication keys are determined by some
                       algorithm.  There may have network-wide group
                       keys, or per-link keys.






Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


3.  Architectural requirements of join protocol

   This section works from the ultimate goal, and goes backwards to
   prerequisit actions.  Section 6 presents the protocol from beginning
   to end order.

   The ultimate goal of the join protocol is to provide a new node with
   enough locally significant security credentials that it is able to
   take part in the network directly.  The credentials may vary by
   deployment.  They can be:

   1)  a network-wide shared symmetric key

   2)  a locally significant (one-level only) 802.11AR type DevID
       certificate

   Given one of the the above, there are a number of possible protocols
   that can be used to generate layer-2 sessions keys for the node,
   including:

   1)  Mesh Link Exchange [I-D.kelsey-intarea-mesh-link-establishment]

   2)  work in 802.15.9

   3)  Security Framework and Key Management Protocol Requirements for
       6TiSCH [I-D.ohba-6tisch-security] (this document provides the
       phase 0 required)

   4)  Layer-2 security aspects for the IEEE 802.15.4e MAC
       [I-D.piro-6tisch-security-issues]

   The intermediate goal of the join protocol is to enable a Join
   Coordination Entity (JCE) to reach out to the new node, and install
   the credentials detailed above.  The JCE must authenticate itself to
   the joining node so that the joining node will know that it has
   joined the correct network, and the joining node must authenticate
   itself to the JCE so that the JCE will know that this node belongs in
   the network.  This two way authentication occurs in the 6top/CoAP/
   DTLS session that is established between the JCE and the joining
   node.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-interface] presents a way to interface to a
   6top MIB.  [I-D.ietf-6tisch-coap] explains how to access that MIB
   using CoAP.  That model is to be extended to include security
   attributes for the network.  The JCE would therefore reach out to the
   joining node and simply provision appropriate security properties
   into the joining node, much like the PCE will provision schedules.




Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


   This 6top-based secure join protocol has defined a push model for
   security provisioning by the JCE.  This has been done for three
   reasons:

   1)  6tisch nodes already have to have a 6top CoAP server for schedule
       provising

   2)  this permits the JCE to manage how many nodes are trying to join
       at the same time, and limit how much bandwidth/energy is used for
       the join operation, and also for the JCE to prioritize the join
       order for nodes.

   3)  making the JCE initiate the DTLS connection significantly
       simplies the certificate chains that must be exchanged as the
       most constrained side (the joining node) provides it's
       credentials first, and lets the much richer JCE figure out what
       kind of certificate chain will be required to authenticate the
       JCE.  In EAP-TLS/802.1x situations, the TLS channel is created in
       the opposite direction, and it would have to complete in a
       tentative way, and then further authorization occur in-band.

   In order for a 6top/DTLS/CoAP connection to occur between the JCE and
   the joining node, there needs to be end-to-end IPv6 connectivity
   between those two entities.  The joining node will not participate in
   the route-over RPL mesh, but rather will be seen by the network as
   being a 6lowpan only leaf-node.

   There are some alternatives to having full end to end connectivity
   which are discussed in the security considerations section.

   The specific mechanism to enable end to end connectivity with the JCE
   are still open but will consist of one of:

   (1)  IPIP tunnel between Join Assistant and JCE

   (2)  using straight RPL routing: the Join Assistant sends a DAO

   (3)  using a separate RPL DODAG for join traffic

   (4)  establishing a specific multi-hop 6tisch track for join traffic
        for each Join Assistant

   Of these mechanisms, the only one which does not require additional
   state on the Join Assistant (which is also a constrained device) is
   (1) and (2).  Mechanism (2) additionally requires no specific state
   on the Join Assistant.  Mechanism (2), in a non-storing DODAG
   requires additional state on the DODAG root (6LBR) only; while
   mechanism (1) requires a similar amount of state on the JCE.  For



Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


   deployments where the JCE is part of the 6LBR, the amount of state is
   similar, but in any case, the 6LBR is assumed to be a non-constrained
   node.

   As long as the Join Assistant does not do any kind of stateful
   firewalling, the IPIP tunnel and the DAO (2) method can be done by
   the Join Assistant statelessly.  Upward traffic from the Join Network
   must be restricted to a 6tisch slotframe(s) to which join traffic is
   welcome, no tunnelling is necessary as the upwards routes are all in
   place.  A destination address ACL on traffic from the Join Network
   restricts the Joining Nodes to sending traffic only to the address of
   the JCE.  (If JCE and 6LBR are colocated, then this is the address in
   the ABRO, if they are not colocated, then this address needs to have
   been provisioning in the Join Assistant when it joined, or could be
   carried in a new RA option)

   When using option (2), networks that have storing mode DODAGs will
   consume routing resources on all intermediate nodes between the Join
   Assistant and the DODAG root.  This resource will be depleted without
   any authentication, and this threat is detailed below.

   Continuing to work backwards, in order the JCE reach out to provision
   the Joining Node, it needs to know that the new node is present.
   This is done by taking advantage of the 6lowPAN Address Resolution
   Option (ARO) (section 4.1 [RFC6775]).  The ARO causes the new address
   to also be sent up to the 6LBR for duplicate detection using the DAR/
   DAC mechanism.  The 6LBR simply needs to tell the JCE about this
   using a protocol that needs to be defined, but could be either DAR or
   NS.

   In addition to needing to know the joining devices address from the
   DAR/NS, the JCE also needs to know the joining node' IDevID.  If the
   IDevID is less than 64 bits, then it is possible that it could be
   placed into the EUI-64 option of the ARO, or the OUI of the
   [I-D.thubert-6lowpan-backbone-router] EARO.  The JCE needs to know
   the joining node's IDevID to know if this is device that it should
   even attempt to provision; and if so, it may need to retrieve an
   appropriate certificate chain (see
   [I-D.richardson-6tisch-idevid-cert]) from the Factory in order for
   the JCE to prove it is the legitimate owner of the joining node.

   Prior to being able to announce itself in a NS, the joining node
   needs to find the Join Network.  This is done by listening to an
   extended beacon which are broadcast in designated slotframes by Join
   Assistants.  The Extended Beacon provides a way for the Joining Node
   to synchronize itself to the overall timeslot schedule and provides
   an Aloha period in which the Joining Node can send a Router
   Soliticiation, and receive an appropriate Router Advertisement giving



Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


   the Joining Node a prefix and default route to which to send join
   traffic.

   It may be possible to eliminate a message exchange if space for a
   Router Advertisement can be found as part of the Join Network
   Extended Beacon.  This Enhanced Beacon would be distinct to the Join
   Network, and would be encrypted with the well-known Join Network key.

3.1.  prefixes to use for join traffic

   What prefix would the joining node for communication?  There are
   three options:

   (1)  just use link-local addresses (requires all traffic be tunneled)

   (2)  use a prefix specifically for join traffic (may be easier with a
        join-only DODAG)

   (3)  use the same prefix as the rest of the traffic (may require more
        complex ACLs, and leaks information to attackers)

4.  security requirements

4.1.  threat model

   There are three kinds of threats that a join process must deal with:
   threats to the joining node, threats to the resources of the network,
   and threats to other joining nodes.

4.1.1.  threats to the joining node

   A node may be taken out of it's box by a malicious entity and powered
   on.  This could happen during shipping, while being stored in a
   warehouse.  The device may be subject to physical theft, or the goal
   of the attacker may be to turn the device into a trojan horse of some
   kind.  Physical protection of the device is out of scope for this
   document; this document will henceforth assume that the device is
   sealed in some tamper-evident way and this document deals with
   attacks over the network.

   An attacker may attempt to convince the joining node that it is the
   legitimate Production Network; this is done by putting up a
   legitimate looking Join Network, and following the protocol as
   described in this document.  The Joining Node can not know if it has
   the corrrect Production Network until steps 11-13, when it attempts
   to validate the ClientCertificate provided by the JCE.





Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


   When the joining node determines that this is the incorrect network,
   it must remember the PANID of the network that it has attempted to
   join, and then look for another network to try.  It SHOULD have some
   limit as the number of times it will try before going back to sleep,
   or shutting down, and it SHOULD take care not to consume more than
   some specified percentage of any battery it might have.

   Should a malicious production network be present at the same time/
   place as the legitimate production network, a the malicious agent
   could intercept and replay various packets from the proper join
   network, but ultimately this either results in a jamming-like denial
   of service, and/or the the ClientCertificate will not validate.

   It is a legitimate situation for there to be multiple possible join
   networks, and the joining node may have to try each one before it
   finds the network that it the right one for it.  The incorrect, but
   non-malicious networks will not attempt the 6top provisioning step,
   and SHOULD return a negative result in steps 8/9, refusing the node's
   NS.  Those incorrect networks will be recognize that the node does
   not belong to them, because they will be able to see the Joining
   Node's IDevID in the ARO of step 4.

4.1.2.  threats to the resources of the network

   The production network has two important resources that may be
   attacked by malicious Joining nodes: 1) energy/bandwidth, 2) memory
   for routing entries.

   A malicious joining node could send many NS messages to the Join
   Assistant (from many made up addresses), which would send many NS/DAR
   messages to the 6LBR, and this would consume bandwidth, and therefore
   energy from the members of the mesh along the path to the 6LBR.  This
   can be mitigated by limited the total bandwidth available for
   joining.

   A malicious joining node could send many NS messages, and if the 6LBR
   agreed to accept the new node (by IDevID), then the Join Assistant
   would MAY inject routing information into mesh for the Joining node.
   Non-storing DODAGs store are routing information in the DODAG Root
   (probably the 6LBR), which is generally not a constrained node.
   Storing DODAGs store routing entries at all nodes up to the DODAG,
   and those are constrained nodes.  Using a separate Join DODAG, and
   having that DODAG be non-storing will reduce any impact on
   intermediate nodes, but it does cause resources to be used for the
   second DODAG, and it may have a code impact if the nodes otherwise
   would not implement non-storing RPL.





Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


4.1.3.  threats to other joining nodes

   A joining node (or the nodes of a malicious network, co-located near
   the legitimate production network) may mount attacks on legitimate
   nodes which have not yet joined.

   The malicious nodes may attempt to perform 6top operations against
   the joining node to keep it from being able to respond to the
   legitimate 6top session from the legitimate JCE.  During the Join
   phase, the Joining node MUST have all other resources and protocols
   turned off, even if they would normally be accessible as read-only
   unauthenticated CoAP resources.

   Malicious nodes could use the Join Network to mount various DTLS
   based attacks against the joining node, such as sending very long
   certificate chains to validate.  One might think to limit the length
   of such chains, but as shown in [I-D.richardson-6tisch-idevid-cert]
   the chain may as a long as the supplier chain, plus may include
   additional certificates due to resales of plants/equipment/etc.
   Validating from a trusted certificate down to the specific
   certificate which proves ownership would eliminate random certificate
   chains, but the attacker could just feed the joining node legitimate
   chains that it observed (and replayed) from the legitimate JCE.  This
   does no good; the Joining node finds that the DTLS connection is
   invalid, but it may significantly run batteries down.

4.2.  implementation cost

   (storage of security material, computational cost)

4.3.  denial of service

   other communication impacts of security protocol mechanics

5.  protocol requirements/constraints/assumptions

5.1.  inline/offline

   dependencies on centralized or external functionality, inline and
   offline

6.  time sequence diagram









Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


 +-----+   +------+            +----------+                +-----------+
 |     |   |      |            |  JOIN    |                |  Joining  |
 | JCE |   | 6LBR |            | Assistant|                |   Node    |
 +-----+   +------+            |  (proxy) |                |           |
    |         |                +----------+                +-----------+
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |                     |-------BEACON (1)---------->|
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |                     |<----Router Solicitation----|
    |         |                     |---Router Advertisement---->|
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |                     |<------CERTIFICATE----------|
    |         |                     |         REQUEST (2)        |
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |                     |-------CERTIFICATE--------->|
    |         |                     |        RESPONSE (multiple) |
    |         |                     |                 (packets)  |
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |                     |<-----JOIN REQUEST (4) -----|
    |         |                     |      (NS w/ARO )           |
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |<---NS (DAR) (5)-----|                            |
    |<--??(6)-|                     |                            |
    |         |                     |                            |
    |--??(7)->|                     |                            |
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |----NS (DAC)-(8)---->|                            |
    |         |     +------+        |                            |
    |         |<DAO-| mesh |<--DAO--|                            |
    |         |-DAO-| node |--DACK->|                            |
    |         | ACK +------+        |                            |
    |         |                     |-------JOIN ACK (9)-------->|
    |         |                     |                            |
    |         |                     |                            |
    |================(10)==========>|----------6top----(11)----->|
    |         |                     |          DTLS              |
    |<===============(13)===========|<---------CoAP----(12)------|
    |         |                     |        (many packets)      |


                Figure 1: Message sequence for JOIN message

6.1.  explanation of each step







Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


6.1.1.  step (1): enhanced beacon

   A 6tisch join/synchronization beacon is broadcast periodically, and
   is authenticated with a symmetric "beacon key":

      well known JOIN key, such "JOIN6TISCH"

      another key, provisioned in advance (OOB)

      a shared symmetric key derived from public part of top level
      certificate (a closely held "secret")

   The purpose of this key is not to provide a high level of assurance,
   but rather to filter out 6tisch traffic from another random traffic
   that may be sharing the same radio frequencies.

   These beacons are used for JOIN purpose only, and are not related to
   the Enhanced Beacons used in the rest of 6tisch.

6.1.2.  step (1B): send router solicitation

   The joining node sends a router solicitation during the Aloha period
   of the beacon.

6.1.3.  step (1C): receive router advertisement

   The joining node receives a router advertisement from the Join
   Assistant.  It could include 6CO options to help compress packets,
   and should contain a prefix appropriate for join traffic.

6.1.4.  step (2): acquire authorizer key

   Step (4) will involve doing a public key encryption to node
   performing the authorization management role.  In order to do this,
   the new node needs to know the public key of the manager, and so in
   this step it requests that certificate from the neighbour that that
   it received the beacon from.

   This step is optional, and it's benefit has not been demonstrated by
   a real world use case, but has been retained for now

6.1.5.  step (3): receive authorizer key

   the proxy neighbour sends the key in one or more messages, along with
   the address of the authorizing server.  The address of the
   authorization server could be an attribute of the certificate that is
   received.




Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


6.1.6.  step (4): join request

   A regular Neighbour Solicitation is sent.  This should contain an ARO
   (or EARO) option containing the Joining Nodes' IDevID.  The ARO/EARO
   will be proxied by the Join Assistant as part of normal 6LowPAN
   processing for leaf nodes (non-RPL nodes) upwards to the 6LBR

6.1.7.  step (5): NS duplicate address request (DAR)

6.1.8.  step (7): 6LBR informs JCE of new node

6.1.9.  step (8): JCE informs/acks to 6LBR of new node

   The JCE could reply in the negative, and this would cause a DAC
   failure, TBD

6.1.10.  step (9): NS duplicate address confirmation (DAC)

6.1.11.  step (10): JCE initiates connection to joining node

   The double lines indicate that an IPIP tunnel operation may be
   required.  If a straight DAO or seperate Join DODAG is used, then
   this is just a straight forwarding root to leaf node forwarding
   operation, and involves either using source routes (non-storing), or
   just forwarding for storing DODAGs.

   A specific bandwidth allocation would be used for this join traffic

   The production network encryption keys would be used for the join
   traffic

6.1.12.  step (11): Join Assistant forwards packet to joining node

   The JOIN Assistant would forward traffic to the Joining Node.
   Recognizing that this traffic the JOIN Network, the JOIN Assistant
   would use the JOIN Network key.

6.1.13.  step (12): Joining node replies

   The joining node replies, using JOIN Network key.

6.1.14.  step (13): Join Assistant forwards reply to JCE

   The JOIN Assistant, recognizing that the traffic came from the JOIN
   Network, restricts the destination that can be reached to the the JCE
   only.  It can do this in a stateless way, and it does NOT need to
   track the traffic at (10) to open pinhole, etc.




Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


   Recognizing that the traffic came from the JOIN Network, the traffic
   would be placed into a bandwidth allocation (track?) that allows such
   traffic.

6.2.  size of each packet

   and number of frames needed to contain it.

7.  resulting security properties obtained from this process

   An end to end IPv6 CoAP/DTLS connection is created between the JCE
   and the Joining Node.  This connection carries 6top commands to
   update security parameters.  This results in either deployment of a
   single-level, locally relevant certificate, or deployment of a
   network-wide symmetric "Master Key"

8.  deployment scenarios underlying protocol requirements

9.  device identification

   The JCE authenticates the joining node using a certificate chain
   provided inline during the DTLS negotiation.  The certificate chain
   is rooted in a vendor certificate that the JCE must have preloaded,
   and is a statement as to the node's 802.1AR IDevID.  The joining node
   authenticates the

9.1.  PCE/Proxy vs Node identification

9.2.  Time source authentication / time validation

   Note: RPL Root authentication is a chartered item

9.3.  description of certificate contents

9.4.  privacy aspects

   The EUI-64 of the Joining node is transmitted using a Well Known
   layer-2 encryption key.  Within the ARO/EARO of the Neighbour
   Solicitation is an OUI, which may be identical to the EUI-64 of the
   Joining node, or it might be an unrelated IDevID.

   An eavesdropper can therefore learn something about the manufacturer
   of every device as it joins.








Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


10.  slotframes to be used during join

   how is this communicated in the (extended) beacon.

11.  configuration aspects

   (allocation of slotframes after join, network statistics,
   neighboetc.)

12.  authorization aspects

   lifecycle (key management, trust management)

12.1.  how to determine a proxy/PCE from a end node

12.2.  security considerations

   what prevents a node from transmitting when it is not their turn
   (part one: jamming)

   can a node successfully communicate with a peer at a time when not
   supposed to, may be tied to link layer security, or will it be
   policed by receiver?

13.  security architecture

   security architecture and fit of e.g. join protocol and provisioning
   into this

14.  Posture Maintenance

   (SACM related work)

15.  Security Considerations

16.  Other Related Protocols

17.  IANA Considerations

18.  Acknowledgements

19.  References

19.1.  Normative references

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.




Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 15]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


   [RFC6550]  Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R.,
              Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R.
              Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
              Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012.

   [RFC6775]  Shelby, Z., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C. Bormann,
              "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Low-Power
              Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", RFC 6775,
              November 2012.

   [IEEE.802.1AR]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Secure
              Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR, 2009,
              <http://www.ieee802.org/1/pages/802.1ar.html>.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-coap]
              Sudhaakar, R. and P. Zand, "6TiSCH Resource Management and
              Interaction using CoAP", draft-ietf-6tisch-coap-00 (work
              in progress), May 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-interface]
              Wang, Q., Vilajosana, X., and T. Watteyne, "6TiSCH
              Operation Sublayer (6top) Interface", draft-ietf-6tisch-
              6top-interface-00 (work in progress), March 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture]
              Thubert, P., Watteyne, T., and R. Assimiti, "An
              Architecture for IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE
              802.15.4e", draft-ietf-6tisch-architecture-01 (work in
              progress), February 2014.

   [I-D.seitz-ace-problem-description]
              Seitz, L. and G. Selander, "Problem Description for
              Authorization in Constrained Environments", draft-seitz-
              ace-problem-description-00 (work in progress), May 2014.

   [I-D.richardson-6tisch-idevid-cert]
              Richardson, M., "X509.v3 certificate extension for
              authorization of device ownership", draft-richardson-
              6tisch-idevid-cert-00 (work in progress), May 2014.

   [I-D.wang-6tisch-6top-sublayer]
              Wang, Q., Vilajosana, X., and T. Watteyne, "6TiSCH
              Operation Sublayer (6top)", draft-wang-6tisch-6top-
              sublayer-00 (work in progress), February 2014.






Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 16]


Internet-Draft                 6tisch-6top                     July 2014


19.2.  Informative references

   [I-D.thubert-6lowpan-backbone-router]
              Thubert, P., "LoWPAN Backbone Router", draft-thubert-
              6lowpan-backbone-router-00 (work in progress), March 2008.

   [I-D.kelsey-intarea-mesh-link-establishment]
              Kelsey, R., "Mesh Link Establishment", draft-kelsey-
              intarea-mesh-link-establishment-05 (work in progress),
              February 2013.

   [I-D.ohba-6tisch-security]
              Chasko, S., Das, S., Lopez, R., Ohba, Y., Thubert, P., and
              A. Yegin, "Security Framework and Key Management Protocol
              Requirements for 6TiSCH", draft-ohba-6tisch-security-01
              (work in progress), March 2014.

   [I-D.piro-6tisch-security-issues]
              Piro, G., Boggia, G., and L. Grieco, "Layer-2 security
              aspects for the IEEE 802.15.4e MAC", draft-piro-6tisch-
              security-issues-02 (work in progress), June 2014.

Author's Address

   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z 5V7
   CA

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ca/



















Richardson               Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 17]