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Versions: 00                                                            
Smart Object Security Workshop                             M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                                       SSW
Intended status: Informational                          February 7, 2012
Expires: August 10, 2012


  Challenges in Smart Object Security: too many layers, not enough ram
                draft-richardson-smartobject-security-00

Abstract

   This is a position paper for the pre-IETF83 Workshop on Smart Object
   Security.  The author contends that layer-2 security solutions are
   not only in-adequate, but may in fact be harmful when deployed into
   smart object systems.  While layer-2 security services may be
   valuable, they must be channel bound up to the layer-7 application
   layer.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 10, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as



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   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  What we need  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   4.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     4.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     4.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   Appendix A.  Additional Stuff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6






































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1.  Introduction

   The ROLL RPL specification provides an optional layer-3 security
   mechanism.  The WG did not focus very much on making this security
   system useable, as most WG participants assumed that layer-2 would
   provide all the security that most deployments would want.

   While the ZigBee 2007 is provides a stack up to the application, and
   clearly articulates the role of the application in the security
   system, if ROLL RPL applicability statements specify Zigbee at all
   (XXX), from Zigbee's point of view the "application" is IPv6.  The
   security provided by Zigbee 2007 does not get translated up to the
   IPv6 application, and certainly is not leveraged for end-to-end
   security.

   Other specifications, including 6LowPAN (mesh-over) and ISA100 use a
   network key essentially identical to the 802.11 WEP.  While many of
   these specifications propose to upgrade their mechanisms to include
   WPA-like usage of EAP, this does not solve the fundamental security
   problem of *authorization*.  Except for auditing purposes, the
   network does not care who the nodes are, but rather, are they
   authorized to perform a particular function.  In the context of RPL,
   one of these key functions is routing of packets.

   A good example of the lack of security feature is that it is
   impossible in RPL to create a network where some nodes are authorized
   to route packets, while other nodes are not.  While the specification
   supports this when doing layer-3 security, it only supports it for
   asymmetric security methods, widely regarded as too expensive for
   small devices.  If the security is provided by a layer-2, then even
   if asymmetric methods are used in that layer, they are not available
   to the RPL (or higher) layers.


2.  What we need

   What we need is a security service implemented in layer-2 or layer-3,
   which not only provides for the privacy and integrity that is
   typically sought, but also can be leveraged by upper layers
   (including the layer-3 routing layer), to make authorization
   decisions.

   Layer 2 alliances have created detailed and complex security
   specifications for wireless connectivity of smart objects.  The
   requirements seems to have driven by existing early adopters of
   building and industrial automation.  For many of the participants,
   security has become magic pixie dust provided by the vendor of the
   layer 2 MAC/radio.



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   I had believed that layer 3 security was more appropriate and easier
   to deploy/update.  While requiring possibly more software code space,
   it might have a lower transitor count as flash is sometimes cheaper
   than complex logic in a MAC.  But, I wondered who would need such
   flexibility among current industrial and smartgrid users of ROLL?
   Maybe it just my desire to do ubiquitous l3 networking with strangers
   on the bus, and I should shut up and believe that l2 security is
   enough.

   Then the ROLL WG came to applicability statements, and it has obvious
   to me that people installing industrial equipement have much more
   complex requirements than I could even imagine on the bus.  On the
   bus, I most trust everyone exactly the same: if they get my
   cryptographically signed packets to my intended destination, then I'm
   happy.  I have really only one level of authorization: I either let
   you route my packets, or I do not.  If I do not trust you to route, I
   might still trust you to have a cached copy of some data I want, and
   I have a way to authenticate the data itself.

   The home automation users of ROLL was where I figured the most
   complexity would occur, and this relates mostly to how guests and
   children in the home will interact with the home system(s).  While
   the lighting and appliance control network in the home looks very
   much like an commercial building system, how the occupants of the
   home interact with this system is not well defined as yet.  It is
   likely that initially all interaction will be via hard controls
   ("light switches"), or via a gateway system that not only connected
   the 802.11 and 802.15.4 networks, but also provided an authentication
   and authorization system between the two networks.  The ROLL provided
   security need concern itself only with whether or not a device was
   part of the home network or not, something that layer-2 security can
   do.

   However, smart phones and personal area networks will begin to get
   802.15.4 interfaces, and in some cases home automation is escrewing
   802.15.4, claiming that 802.11 is now so cheap (power and bill-of-
   material) that it makes no sense to assume/require a gateway device.
   This is where, I thought, the multi-level authorization security
   would be required, and this would be subject to much innovation, with
   a number of home automation systems proving inadequate and being
   upgraded or replaced over time.

   I thought that only when we have house guests (consider a teenage
   child to be an extended stay house guest) that we would run into
   troubles: we definitely want to authorize our guests to do many
   things in our homes, but there are many things we do not want them to
   do.




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   What I did I not expect was that industrial users would in fact
   require a multi-level authorization system, and have rekeying and
   trust issues more complex than that of the home.  It was once
   explained that the militaries aren't into authorization: they care
   about authentication and auditing.  A soldier must always have the
   ability to exceed their authority, because sometimes it's the right
   thing to do, and if they did the wrong thing, they have the court
   martial to solve this problem.

   The court martial is not a solution for the industrial ROLL user.
   The various modes of operation described in
   [I-D.phinney-roll-rpl-industrial-applicability] require several
   levels of trust.  While layer-2 security has a place, it seems that
   the installers of the devices (who would have to configure the
   layer-2 security) are not to be trusted in the long term, and
   therefore some way to change layer-2 keying material needs to be
   standardized.

   If during any unplanned (i.e. emergency) situation new equipment will
   be brought into the plant to aid in recovery, that this equipment
   either will need to be configured (by regular plant personal) with
   the right security, or it will be necessary to either turn off or
   revert security to some other more minimal configuration, such that
   the equipment can be used.

   It appears that not only is LAYER 2 security is not only inadequate,
   but may be actually too difficult to configure, simply because
   devices can not configure once installed.  I am concerned that
   without a better answer, every building and plant will -- like most
   BlueTooth heads -- have PIN 0000!

   We need something more sophisticated: sophisticated enough to be
   simple.


3.  Security Considerations

   This document does not propose any changes to existing or new
   systems, but rather details limitations of a current security model


4.  References

4.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.phinney-roll-rpl-industrial-applicability]
              Phinney, T., Thubert, P., and R. Assimiti, "RPL
              applicability in industrial networks",



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              draft-phinney-roll-rpl-industrial-applicability-00 (work
              in progress), October 2011.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

4.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2629]  Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
              June 1999.


Appendix A.  Additional Stuff

   This becomes an Appendix.


Author's Address

   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z 5V7
   CA

   Email: mcr@sandelman.ca
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ca/mcr/
























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