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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04                                                
Network Working Group                                         Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft                                               Check Point
Intended status: Experimental                              H. Tschofenig
Expires: September 20, 2008                       Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                              L. Dondeti
                                                            V. Narayanan
                                                          QUALCOMM, Inc.
                                                          March 19, 2008


                    IPsec Gateway Failover Protocol
                  draft-sheffer-ipsec-failover-03.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2008.

Abstract

   The Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol has
   computational and communication overhead with respect to the number
   of round-trips required and cryptographic operations involved.  In
   remote access situations, the Extensible Authentication Protocol is
   used for authentication, which adds several more round trips and
   therefore latency.

   To re-establish security associations (SA) upon a failure recovery



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   condition is time consuming, especially when an IPsec peer, such as a
   VPN gateway, needs to re-establish a large number of SAs with various
   end points.  A high number of concurrent sessions might cause
   additional problems for an IPsec peer during SA re-establishment.

   In many failure cases it would be useful to provide an efficient way
   to resume an interrupted IKE/IPsec session.  This document proposes
   an extension to IKEv2 that allows a client to re-establish an IKE SA
   with a gateway in a highly efficient manner, utilizing a previously
   established IKE SA.

   A client can reconnect to a gateway from which it was disconnected,
   or alternatively migrate to another gateway that is associated with
   the previous one.  The proposed approach conveys IKEv2 state
   information, in the form of an encrypted ticket, to a VPN client that
   is later presented to the VPN gateway for re-authentication.  The
   encrypted ticket can only be decrypted by the VPN gateway in order to
   restore state for faster session setup.

































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Non-Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Usage Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Recovering from a Remote Access Gateway Failover . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Recovering from an Application Server Failover . . . . . .  8
   4.  Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Requesting a Ticket  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Presenting a Ticket  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.1.  Protection of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME Exchange  . . . . 12
       4.2.2.  Presenting a Ticket: The DoS Case  . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.2.3.  Requesting a ticket during resumption  . . . . . . . . 13
     4.3.  IKE Notifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.4.  TICKET_OPAQUE Notify Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.5.  TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST Notify Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.6.  Processing Guidelines for IKE SA Establishment . . . . . . 15
   5.  The IKE Ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.1.  Ticket Contents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.2.  Ticket Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     5.3.  Ticket Identity and Lifecycle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     5.4.  Exchange of Ticket-Protecting Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     7.1.  Stolen Tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     7.2.  Forged Tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     7.3.  Denial of Service Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     7.4.  Ticket Protection Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     7.5.  Ticket Lifetime  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     7.6.  Alternate Ticket Formats and Distribution Schemes  . . . . 20
     7.7.  Identity Privacy, Anonymity, and Unlinkability . . . . . . 20
     7.8.  Replay Protection in the IKE_SESSION_RESUME Exchange . . . 20
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Appendix A.  Related Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   Appendix B.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     B.1.  -03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     B.2.  -02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     B.3.  -01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     B.4.  -00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 25





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1.  Introduction

   The Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol has
   computational and communication overhead with respect to the number
   of round-trips required and cryptographic operations involved.  In
   particular the Extensible Authentication Protocol is used for
   authentication in remote access cases, which increases latency.

   To re-establish security associations (SA) upon a failure recovery
   condition is time-consuming, especially when an IPsec peer, such as a
   VPN gateway, needs to re-establish a large number of SAs with various
   end points.  A high number of concurrent sessions might cause
   additional problems for an IPsec peer.

   In many failure cases it would be useful to provide an efficient way
   to resume an interrupted IKE/IPsec session.  This document proposes
   an extension to IKEv2 that allows a client to re-establish an IKE SA
   with a gateway in a highly efficient manner, utilizing a previously
   established IKE SA.

   A client can reconnect to a gateway from which it was disconnected,
   or alternatively migrate to another gateway that is associated with
   the previous one.  This document proposes to maintain IKEv2 state in
   a "ticket", an opaque data structure created and used by a server and
   stored by a client, which the client cannot understand or tamper
   with.  The IKEv2 protocol is extended to allow a client to request
   and present a ticket.  When two gateways mutually trust each other,
   one can accept a ticket generated by the other.

   This approach is similar to the one taken by TLS session resumption
   [RFC4507] with the required adaptations for IKEv2, e.g., to
   accommodate the two-phase protocol structure.  We have borrowed
   heavily from that specification.

1.1.  Goals

   The high-level goal of this extension is to provide an IPsec failover
   solution, according to the requirements defined in
   [I-D.vidya-ipsec-failover-ps].

   Specifically, the proposed extension should allow IPsec sessions to
   be recovered from failures in remote access scenarios, in a more
   efficient manner than the basic IKE solution.  This efficiency is
   primarily on the gateway side, since the gateway might have to deal
   with many thousands of concurrent requests.  We should enable the
   following cases:





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   o  Failover from one gateway to another, where the two gateways do
      not share state but do have mutual trust.  For example, the
      gateways may be operated by the same provider and share the same
      keying materials to access an encrypted ticket.
   o  Recovery from an intermittent connectivity, where clients
      reconnect into the same gateway.  In this case, the gateway would
      typically have detected the clients' absence and removed the state
      associated with them.
   o  Recovery from a gateway restart, where clients reconnect into the
      same gateway.

   The proposed solution should additionally meet the following goals:

   o  Using only symmetric cryptography to minimize CPU consumption.
   o  Allowing a gateway to push state to clients.
   o  Providing cryptographic agility.
   o  Having no negative impact on IKEv2 security features.

1.2.  Non-Goals

   The following are non-goals of this solution:
   o  Providing load balancing among gateways.
   o  Specifying how a client detects the need for a failover.


2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   This document uses terminology defined in [RFC4301], [RFC4306], and
   [RFC4555].  In addition, this document uses the following terms:

   Secure domain:  A secure domain comprises a set of gateways that are
      able to resume an IKEv2 session that may have been established by
      any other gateway within the domain.  All gateways in the secure
      domain are expected to share some secrets, so that they can
      generate an IKEv2 ticket, verify the validity of the ticket and
      extract the IKEv2 policy and session key material from the ticket.
   IKEv2 ticket:  An IKEv2 ticket is a data structure that contains all
      the necessary information that allows any gateway within the same
      secure domain as the gateway that created the ticket to verify the
      validity of the ticket and extract IKEv2 policy and session keys
      to re-establish an IKEv2 session.






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   Stateless failover:  When the IKEv2 session state is stored at the
      client, the IKEv2 responder is "stateless" until the client
      restores the SA with one of the gateways within the secure domain;
      thus, we refer to SA resumption with SA storage at the client as
      stateless session resumption.
   Stateful failover:  When the infrastructure maintains IKEv2 session
      state, we refer to the process of IKEv2 SA re-establishment as
      stateful session resumption.


3.  Usage Scenarios

   This specification envisions two usage scenarios for efficient IKEv2
   and IPsec SA session re-establishment.

   The first is similar to the use case specified in Section 1.1.3 of
   the IKEv2 specification [RFC4306], where the IPsec tunnel mode is
   used to establish a secure channel between a remote access client and
   a gateway; the traffic flow may be between the client and entities
   beyond the gateway.

   The second use case focuses on the usage of transport (or tunnel)
   mode to secure the communicate between two end points (e.g., two
   servers).  The two endpoints have a client-server relationship with
   respect to a protocol that runs using the protections afforded by the
   IPsec SA.

3.1.  Recovering from a Remote Access Gateway Failover























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    (a)

    +-+-+-+-+-+                          +-+-+-+-+-+
    !         !      IKEv2/IKEv2-EAP     !         !     Protected
    ! Remote  !<------------------------>! Remote  !     Subnet
    ! Access  !                          ! Access  !<--- and/or
    ! Client  !<------------------------>! Gateway !     Internet
    !         !      IPsec tunnel        !         !
    +-+-+-+-+-+                          +-+-+-+-+-+


    (b)

    +-+-+-+-+-+                          +-+-+-+-+-+
    !         !    IKE_SESSION_RESUME    !         !
    ! Remote  !<------------------------>! New/Old !
    ! Access  !                          ! Gateway !
    ! Client  !<------------------------>!         !
    !         !      IPsec tunnel        !         !
    +-+-+-+-+-+                          +-+-+-+-+-+



                  Figure 1: Remote Access Gateway Failure

   In this scenario, an end-host (an entity with a host implementation
   of IPsec [RFC4301] ) establishes a tunnel mode IPsec SA with a
   gateway in a remote network using IKEv2.  The end-host in this
   scenario is sometimes referred to as a remote access client.  When
   the remote gateway fails, all the clients associated with the gateway
   either need to re-establish IKEv2 sessions with another gateway
   within the same secure domain of the original gateway, or with the
   original gateway if the server is back online soon.

   The clients may choose to establish IPsec SAs using a full IKEv2
   exchange or the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange (shown in Figure 1).

   In this scenario, the client needs to get an IP address from the
   remote network so that traffic can be encapsulated by the remote
   access gateway before reaching the client.  In the initial exchange,
   the gateway may acquire IP addresses from the address pool of a local
   DHCP server.  The new gateway that a client gets associated may not
   receive addresses from the same address pool.  Thus, the session
   resumption protocol needs to support the assignment of a new IP
   address.

   The protocol defined in this document supports the re-allocation of
   an IP address to the client, if this capability is provided by the



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   network.  For example, if routing tables are modified so that traffic
   is rerouted through the new gateway.  This capability is implicit in
   the use of the IKE Config mechanism, which allows the client to
   present its existing IP address and receive the same address back, if
   allowed by the gateway.

   The protocol defined here supports both stateful and stateless
   scenarios.  In other words, tickets can be stored wholly on the
   client, or the ticket can be stored on the gateway (or in a database
   shared between multiple gateways), with the client only presenting a
   handle that identifies a particular ticket.  In fact these scenarios
   are transparent to the protocols, with the only change being the non-
   mandatory ticket format.

3.2.  Recovering from an Application Server Failover


     (a)

    +-+-+-+-+-+                          +-+-+-+-+-+
    !   App.  !      IKEv2/IKEv2-EAP     !   App.  !
    !  Client !<------------------------>!  Server !
    !    &    !                          !    &    !
    !  IPsec  !<------------------------>!  IPsec  !
    !   host  !  IPsec transport/        !   host  !
    +-+-+-+-+-+        tunnel mode SA    +-+-+-+-+-+


    (b)

    +-+-+-+-+-+                          +-+-+-+-+-+
    !   App.  !    IKE_SESSION_RESUME    !   New   !
    !  Client !<------------------------>!  Server !
    !    &    !                          !    &    !
    !  IPsec  !<------------------------>!  IPsec  !
    !   host  !  IPsec transport/        !   host  !
    +-+-+-+-+-+        tunnel mode SA    +-+-+-+-+-+


                   Figure 2: Application Server Failover

   The second usage scenario is as follows: two entities with IPsec host
   implementations establish an IPsec transport or tunnel mode SA
   between themselves; this is similar to the model described in Section
   1.1.2. of [RFC4306].  At the application level, one of the entities
   is always the client and the other is a server.  From that view
   point, the IKEv2 exchange is always initiated by the client.  This
   allows the Initiator (the client) to authenticate itself using EAP,



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   as long as the Responder (or the application server) allows it.

   If the application server fails, the client may find other servers
   within the same secure domain for service continuity.  It may use a
   full IKEv2 exchange or the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange to re-
   establish the IPsec SAs for secure communication required by the
   application layer signaling.

   The client-server relationship at the application layer ensures that
   one of the entities in this usage scenario is unambiguously always
   the Initiator and the other the Responder.  This role determination
   also allows the Initiator to request an address in the Responder's
   network using the Configuration Payload mechanism of the IKEv2
   protocol.  If the client has thus received an address during the
   initial IKEv2 exchange, when it associates with a new server upon
   failure of the original server, it needs to request an address,
   specifying its assigned address.  The server may allow the client to
   use the original address or if it is not permitted to use that
   address, assign a new address.


4.  Protocol Details

   This section provides protocol details and contains the normative
   parts.  This document defines two protocol exchanges, namely
   requesting a ticket and presenting a ticket.  Section 4.1 describes
   the procedure to request a ticket and Section 4.2 illustrates how to
   present a ticket.

4.1.  Requesting a Ticket

   A client MAY request a ticket in the following exchanges:

   o  In an IKE_AUTH exchange, as shown in the example message exchange
      in Figure 3 below.
   o  In a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, when an IKE SA is rekeyed.
   o  In an Informational exchange, if the gateway previously replied
      with an N(TICKET_ACK) instead of providing a ticket.
   o  In an Informational exchange, when the ticket lifetime is about to
      expire.
   o  In an IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, see Section 4.2.3.

   Normally, a client requests a ticket in the third message of an IKEv2
   exchange (the first of IKE_AUTH).  Figure 3 shows the message
   exchange for this typical case.






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     Initiator                Responder
     -----------              -----------
    HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni  -->

                        <--    HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]

    HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,] [IDr,]
    AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr, N(TICKET_REQUEST)}     -->

        Figure 3: Example Message Exchange for Requesting a Ticket

   The notification payloads are described in Section 4.3.  The above is
   an example, and IKEv2 allows a number of variants on these messages.
   A complete description of IKEv2 can be found in [RFC4718].

   When an IKEv2 responder receives a request for a ticket using the
   N(TICKET_REQUEST) payload it MUST perform one of the following
   operations if it supports the extension defined in this document:
   o  it creates a ticket and returns it with the N(TICKET_OPAQUE)
      payload in a subsequent message towards the IKEv2 initiator.  This
      is shown in Figure 4.
   o  it returns an N(TICKET_NACK) payload, if it refuses to grant a
      ticket for some reason.
   o  it returns an N(TICKET_ACK), if it cannot grant a ticket
      immediately, e.g., due to packet size limitations.  In this case
      the client MAY request a ticket later using an Informational
      exchange, at any time during the lifetime of the IKE SA.

   Provided the IKEv2 exchange was successful, the IKEv2 initiator can
   accept the requested ticket.  The ticket may be used later with an
   IKEv2 responder which supports this extension.  Figure 4 shows how
   the initiator receives the ticket.



     Initiator                Responder
     -----------              -----------
            <--    HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi,
                        TSr, N(TICKET_OPAQUE) [,N(TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST)]}


                       Figure 4: Receiving a Ticket

4.2.  Presenting a Ticket

   Following a communication failure, a client re-initiates an IKE
   exchange to the same gateway or to a different one, and includes a
   ticket in the first message.  A client MAY initiate a regular (non-



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   ticket-based) IKEv2 exchange even if it is in possession of a valid
   ticket.  A client MUST NOT present a ticket after the ticket's
   lifetime has expired.

   It is up to the client's local policy to decide when the
   communication with the IKEv2 responder is seen as interrupted and a
   new exchange needs to be initiated and the session resumption
   procedure to be initiated.

   Tickets are intended for one-time use: a client MUST NOT reuse a
   ticket, either with the same or with a different gateway.  A gateway
   SHOULD reject a reused ticket.  Note however that a gateway can elect
   not to retain a list of already-used tickets.  Potential replay
   attacks on such gateways are mitigated by the cookie mechanism
   described in Section 4.2.2.

   This document specifies a new IKEv2 exchange type called
   IKE_SESSION_RESUME whose value is TBA by IANA.  This exchange is
   somewhat similar to the IKE_AUTH exchange, and results in the
   creation of a Child SA.  The client SHOULD NOT use this exchange type
   unless it knows that the gateway supports it, either through
   configuration, by out-of-band means or by using the Gateway List
   provision.



    Initiator                Responder
    -----------              -----------
    HDR, Ni, N(TICKET_OPAQUE), [N+,]
         SK {IDi, [IDr,] SAi2, TSi, TSr [, CP(CFG_REQUEST)]} -->

   The exchange type in HDR is set to 'IKE_SESSION_RESUME'.

   See Section 4.2.1 for details on computing the protected (SK)
   payload.

   When the IKEv2 responder receives a ticket using the N(TICKET_OPAQUE)
   payload it MUST perform one of the following steps if it supports the
   extension defined in this document:
   o  If it is willing to accept the ticket, it responds as shown in
      Figure 5.
   o  It responds with an unprotected N(TICKET_NACK) notification, if it
      rejects the ticket for any reason.  In that case, the initiator
      should re-initiate a regular IKE exchange.  One such case is when
      the responder receives a ticket for an IKE SA that has previously
      been terminated on the responder itself, which may indicate
      inconsistent state between the IKEv2 initiator and the responder.
      However, a responder is not required to maintain the state for



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      terminated sessions.
   o  When the responder receives a ticket for an IKE SA that is still
      active and if the responder accepts it, then the old SAs SHOULD be
      silently deleted without sending a DELETE informational exchange.



    Initiator                Responder
    -----------              -----------
                    <--  HDR, SK {IDr, Nr, SAr2, [TSi, TSr],
                         [CP(CFG_REPLY)]}

               Figure 5: IKEv2 Responder accepts the ticket

   Again, the exchange type in HDR is set to 'IKE_SESSION_RESUME'.

   The SK payload is protected using the cryptographic parameters
   derived from the ticket, see Section 4.2.1 below.

   At this point a new IKE SA is created by both parties, see
   Section 4.6.  This is followed by normal derivation of a child SA,
   per Sec. 2.17 of [RFC4306].

4.2.1.  Protection of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME Exchange

   The two messages of this exchange are protected by a "subset" IKE SA.
   The key material is derived from the ticket, as follows:


        {SK_d2 | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er} = prf+(SK_d_old, Ni)

   where SK_d_old is the SK_d value of the original IKE SA, as retrieved
   from the ticket.  Ni guarantees freshness of the key material.  SK_d2
   is used later to derive the new IKE SA, see Section 4.6.

   See [RFC4306] for the notation. "prf" is determined from the SA value
   in the ticket.

4.2.2.  Presenting a Ticket: The DoS Case

   When receiving the first message of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange,
   the gateway may decide that it is under a denial-of-service attack.
   In such a case, the gateway SHOULD defer the establishment of session
   state until it has verified the identity of the client.  We use a
   variation of the IKEv2 Cookie mechanism, where the cookie is
   protected.

   In the two messages that follow, the gateway responds that it is



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   unwilling to resume the session until the client is verified, and the
   client resubmits its first message, this time with the cookie:



 Initiator                Responder
 -----------              -----------
                 <-- HDR, SK{N(COOKIE)}
HDR, Ni, N(TICKET_OPAQUE), [N+,]
      SK {N(COOKIE), IDi, [IDr,] SAi2, TSi, TSr [, CP(CFG_REQUEST)]} -->

   Assuming the cookie is correct, the gateway now replies normally.

   This now becomes a 4-message exchange.  The entire exchange is
   protected as defined in Section 4.2.1.

   See Sec. 2.6 and Sec. 3.10.1 of [RFC4306] for more guidance regarding
   the usage and syntax of the cookie.  Note that the cookie is
   completely independent of the IKEv2 ticket.

4.2.3.  Requesting a ticket during resumption

   When resuming a session, a client will typically request a new ticket
   immediately, so it is able to resume the session again in the case of
   a second failure.  Therefore, the N(TICKET_REQUEST), N(TICKET_OPAQUE)
   and N(TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST) notifications may be piggybacked as
   protected payloads to the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange.

   The returned ticket (if any) will correspond to the IKE SA created
   per the rules described in Section 4.6.

4.3.  IKE Notifications

   This document defines a number of notifications.  The notification
   numbers are TBA by IANA.

            +---------------------+--------+-----------------+
            | Notification Name   | Number | Data            |
            +---------------------+--------+-----------------+
            | TICKET_OPAQUE       | TBA1   | See Section 4.4 |
            | TICKET_REQUEST      | TBA2   | None            |
            | TICKET_ACK          | TBA3   | None            |
            | TICKET_NACK         | TBA4   | None            |
            | TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST | TBA5   | See Section 4.5 |
            +---------------------+--------+-----------------+






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4.4.  TICKET_OPAQUE Notify Payload

   The data for the TICKET_OPAQUE Notify payload consists of the Notify
   message header, a lifetime field and the ticket itself.  The four
   octet lifetime field contains the number of seconds until the ticket
   expires as an unsigned integer.  Section 5.2 describes a possible
   ticket format, and Section 5.3 offers further guidelines regarding
   the ticket's lifetime.


        0                     1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ! Next Payload  !C!  Reserved   !      Payload Length           !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ! Protocol ID   ! SPI Size = 0  !    Notify Message Type        !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       !                       Lifetime                                !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       !                                                               !
       ~                        Ticket                                 ~
       !                                                               !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                  Figure 6: TICKET_OPAQUE Notify Payload

4.5.  TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST Notify Payload

   The TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST Notify payload contains the Notify payload
   header followed by a sequence of one or more gateway identifiers,
   each of the format depicted in Figure 8.


        0                     1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ! Next Payload  !C!  Reserved   !      Payload Length           !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ! Protocol ID   ! SPI Size = 0  !    Notify Message Type        !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       !                                                               !
       ~                   Gateway Identifier List                     ~
       !                                                               !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


               Figure 7: TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST Notify Payload



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        0                     1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       !    ID Type    !   Reserved    !             Length            !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       !                                                               !
       ~                     Identification Data                       ~
       !                                                               !
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


               Figure 8: Gateway Identifier for One Gateway

   ID Type:

      The ID Type contains a restricted set of the IKEv2 ID payloads
      (see [RFC4306], Section 3.5).  Allowed ID types are: ID_IPV4_ADDR,
      ID_IPV6_ADDR, ID_FQDN and the various reserved values.

   Reserved:

      This field must be sent as 0 and must be ignored when received.

   Length:

      The length field indicates the total size of the Identification
      data.

   Identification Data:

      The Identification Data field is of variable length and depends on
      the ID type.  The length is not necessarily a multiple of 4.

4.6.  Processing Guidelines for IKE SA Establishment

   When a ticket is presented, the gateway parses the ticket to retrieve
   the state of the old IKE SA, and the client retrieves this state from
   its local store.  Both peers now create state for the new IKE SA as
   follows:

   o  The SA value (transforms etc.) is taken directly from the ticket.
   o  The sequence numbers are reset to 0.
   o  The IDi value is obtained from the ticket.
   o  The IDr value is obtained from the new exchange.  The gateway MAY
      make policy decisions based on the IDr value encoded in the
      ticket.





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   o  The SPI values are created anew, similarly to a regular IKE
      exchange.  SPI values from the ticket SHOULD NOT be reused.  This
      restriction is to avoid problems caused by collisions with other
      SPI values used already by the initiator/responder.  The SPI value
      should only be reused if collision avoidance can be ensured
      through other means.

   The cryptographic material is refreshed based on the ticket and the
   nonce values, Ni, and Nr, from the current exchange.  A new SKEYSEED
   value is derived as follows:


        SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d2, Ni | Nr)

   where SK_d2 was computed earlier (Section 4.2.1).

   The keys are derived as follows, unchanged from IKEv2:


       {SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr} =
                                   prf+(SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)

   where SPIi, SPIr are the SPI values created in the new IKE exchange.

   See [RFC4306] for the notation. "prf" is determined from the SA value
   in the ticket.


5.  The IKE Ticket

   This section lists the required contents of the ticket, and
   recommends a non-normative format.  This is followed by a discussion
   of the ticket's lifecycle.

5.1.  Ticket Contents

   The ticket MUST encode at least the following state from an IKE SA.
   These values MUST be encrypted and authenticated.

   o  IDi, IDr.
   o  SPIi, SPIr.
   o  SAr (the accepted proposal).
   o  SK_d.

   In addition, the ticket MUST encode a protected ticket expiration
   value.





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5.2.  Ticket Format

   This document does not specify a mandatory-to-implement or a
   mandatory-to-use ticket format.  The following format is RECOMMENDED,
   if interoperability between gateways is desired.


  struct {
      [authenticated] struct {
          octet format_version;    // 1 for this version of the protocol
          octet reserved[3];       // sent as 0, ignored by receiver.
          octet key_id[8];         // arbitrary byte string
          opaque IV[0..255];       // actual length (possibly 0) depends
                                   // on the encryption algorithm

          [encrypted] struct {
              opaque IDi, IDr;     // the full payloads
              octet SPIi[8], SPIr[8];
              opaque SA;           // the full SAr payload
              octet SK_d[0..255];  // actual length depends on SA value
              int32 expiration;    // an absolute time value, seconds
                                   // since Jan. 1, 1970
          } ikev2_state;
      } protected_part;
      opaque MAC[0..255];          // the length (possibly 0) depends
                                   // on the integrity algorithm
  } ticket;

   Note that the key defined by "key_id" determines the encryption and
   authentication algorithms used for this ticket.  Those algorithms are
   unrelated to the transforms defined by the SA payload.

   The reader is referred to a recent draft
   [I-D.rescorla-stateless-tokens] that recommends a similar (but not
   identical) ticket format, and discusses related security
   considerations in depth.

5.3.  Ticket Identity and Lifecycle

   Each ticket is associated with a single IKE SA.  In particular, when
   an IKE SA is deleted, the client MUST delete its stored ticket.

   A ticket is therefore associated with the tuple (IDi, IDr).  The
   client MAY however use a ticket to approach other gateways that are
   willing to accept it.  How a client discovers such gateways is
   outside the scope of this document.

   The lifetime of the ticket carried in the N(TICKET_OPAQUE)



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   notification should be the minimum of the IKE SA lifetime (per the
   gateway's local policy) and its re-authentication time, according to
   [RFC4478].  Even if neither of these are enforced by the gateway, a
   finite lifetime MUST be specified for the ticket.

5.4.  Exchange of Ticket-Protecting Keys

   This document does not define an interoperable mechanism for the
   generation and distribution of the keys that protect IKE keys.  Such
   a mechanism can be developed, based on the GDOI group key exchange
   protocol [RFC3547].  There is on-going work to enable the generation
   of non-IPsec keys by means of GDOI, e.g. to provide RSVP router
   groups with a single key [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp].  This work can be
   generalized for our purposes.  We note that there are no significant
   performance requirements on such a protocol, as key rollover can be
   at a daily or even more leisurely rate.


6.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires a number of IKEv2 notification status types in
   Section 4.3, to be registered by IANA.  The corresponding registry
   was established by IANA.

   The document defines a new IKEv2 exchange in Section 4.2.  The
   corresponding registry was established by IANA.


7.  Security Considerations

   This section addresses security issues related to the usage of a
   ticket.

7.1.  Stolen Tickets

   An eavesdropper or man-in-the-middle may try to obtain a ticket and
   use it to establish a session with the IKEv2 responder.  This can
   happen in different ways: by eavesdropping on the initial
   communication and copying the ticket when it is granted and before it
   is used, or by listening in on a client's use of the ticket to resume
   a session.  However, since the ticket's contents is encrypted and the
   attacker does not know the corresponding secret key (specifically,
   SK_d), a stolen ticket cannot be used by an attacker to resume a
   session.  An IKEv2 responder MUST use strong encryption and integrity
   protection of the ticket to prevent an attacker from obtaining the
   ticket's contents, e.g., by using a brute force attack.





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7.2.  Forged Tickets

   A malicious user could forge or alter a ticket in order to resume a
   session, to extend its lifetime, to impersonate as another user, or
   to gain additional privileges.  This attack is not possible if the
   ticket is protected using a strong integrity protection algorithm.

7.3.  Denial of Service Attacks

   The key_id field defined in the recommended ticket format helps the
   server efficiently reject tickets that it did not issue.  However, an
   adversary could generate and send a large number of tickets to a
   gateway for verification.  To minimize the possibility of such denial
   of service, ticket verification should be lightweight (e.g., using
   efficient symmetric key cryptographic algorithms).

7.4.  Ticket Protection Key Management

   A full description of the management of the keys used to protect the
   ticket is beyond the scope of this document.  A list of RECOMMENDED
   practices is given below.
   o  The keys should be generated securely following the randomness
      recommendations in [RFC4086].
   o  The keys and cryptographic protection algorithms should be at
      least 128 bits in strength.
   o  The keys should not be used for any other purpose than generating
      and verifying tickets.
   o  The keys should be changed regularly.
   o  The keys should be changed if the ticket format or cryptographic
      protection algorithms change.

7.5.  Ticket Lifetime

   An IKEv2 responder controls the lifetime of a ticket, based on the
   operational and security requirements of the environment in which it
   is deployed.  The responder provides information about the ticket
   lifetime to the IKEv2 initiator, allowing it to manage its tickets.

   An IKEv2 client may present a ticket in its possession to a gateway,
   even if the IKE SA associated with this ticket had previously been
   terminated by another gateway (the gateway that originally provided
   the ticket).  Where such usage is against the local security policy,
   an Invalid Ticket List (ITL) may be used, see
   [I-D.rescorla-stateless-tokens].  Management of such lists is outside
   the scope of the current document.  Note that a policy that requires
   tickets to have shorter lifetimes (e.g., 1 hour) significantly
   mitigates this risk.




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7.6.  Alternate Ticket Formats and Distribution Schemes

   If the ticket format or distribution scheme defined in this document
   is not used, then great care must be taken in analyzing the security
   of the solution.  In particular, if confidential information, such as
   a secret key, is transferred to the client, it MUST be done using
   secure communication to prevent attackers from obtaining or modifying
   the key.  Also, the ticket MUST have its integrity and
   confidentiality protected with strong cryptographic techniques to
   prevent a breach in the security of the system.

7.7.  Identity Privacy, Anonymity, and Unlinkability

   This document mandates that the content of the ticket MUST be
   encrypted in order to avoid leakage of information, such as the
   identities of an IKEv2 initiator and a responder.  Thus, it prevents
   the disclosure of potentially sensitive information carried within
   the ticket.

   When an IKEv2 initiator presents the ticket as part of the
   IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, confidentiality is not provided for the
   exchange.  Although the ticket itself is encrypted there might still
   be a possibility for an on-path adversary to observe multiple
   exchange handshakes where the same ticket is used and therefore to
   conclude that they belong to the same communication end points.
   Administrators that use the ticket mechanism described in this
   document should be aware that unlinkability may not be provided by
   this mechanism.  Note, however, that IKEv2 does not provide active
   user identity confidentiality for the IKEv2 initiator either.

7.8.  Replay Protection in the IKE_SESSION_RESUME Exchange

   A major design goal of this protocol extension has been the two-
   message exchange for session resumption.  There is a tradeoff between
   this abbreviated exchange and replay protection.  It is RECOMMENDED
   that the gateway should cache tickets, and reject replayed ones.
   However some gateways may not do that in order to reduce state size.
   In addition, an adversary may replay a ticket last presented to
   gateway A, into gateway B. Our cookie-based mechanism (Section 4.2.2)
   mitigates both scenarios by ensuring that the client presenting the
   ticket is indeed its "owner": the client can be required by the
   gateway to prove that it knows the ticket's secret, before any state
   is committed on the gateway.  Note that this is a stronger guarantee
   than the regular IKE cookie mechanism, which only proves IP return
   routability of the client.  This is enabled by including the cookie
   in the protected portion of the message.

   For performance reasons, the cookie mechanism is optional, and



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   invoked by the gateway only when it suspects that it is the subject
   of a denial-of-service attack.

   In any case, a ticket replayed by an adversary only causes partial
   IKE state to be created on the gateway.  The IKE exchange cannot be
   completed and an IKE SA cannot be created unless the client knows the
   ticket's secret values.


8.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Paul Hoffman, Pasi Eronen, Florian Tegeler,
   Yoav Nir and Tero Kivinen for their many helpful comments.


9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.friedman-ike-short-term-certs]
              Friedman, A., "Short-Term Certificates",
              draft-friedman-ike-short-term-certs-02 (work in progress),
              June 2007.

   [I-D.rescorla-stateless-tokens]
              Rescorla, E., "How to Implement Secure (Mostly) Stateless
              Tokens", draft-rescorla-stateless-tokens-01 (work in
              progress), March 2007.

   [I-D.vidya-ipsec-failover-ps]
              Narayanan, V., "IPsec Gateway Failover and Redundancy -
              Problem Statement and Goals",
              draft-vidya-ipsec-failover-ps-02 (work in progress),
              December 2007.

   [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp]
              Weis, B., "Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) support
              for RSVP", draft-weis-gdoi-for-rsvp-01 (work in progress),
              February 2008.




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   [RFC3547]  Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
              Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4478]  Nir, Y., "Repeated Authentication in Internet Key Exchange
              (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 4478, April 2006.

   [RFC4507]  Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
              Server-Side State", RFC 4507, May 2006.

   [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, June 2006.

   [RFC4718]  Eronen, P. and P. Hoffman, "IKEv2 Clarifications and
              Implementation Guidelines", RFC 4718, October 2006.


Appendix A.  Related Work

   [I-D.friedman-ike-short-term-certs] is on-going work that discusses
   the use of short-term certificates for client re-authentication.  It
   is similar to the ticket approach described in this document in that
   they both require enhancements to IKEv2 to allow information request,
   e.g., for a certificate or a ticket.  However, the changes required
   by the former are fewer since an obtained certificate is valid for
   any IKE responder that is able to verify them.  On the other hand,
   short-term certificates, while eliminating the usability issues of
   user re-authentication, do not reduce the amount of effort performed
   by the gateway in failover situations.


Appendix B.  Change Log

B.1.  -03

   Removed counter mechanism.  Added an optional anti-DoS mechanism,
   based on IKEv2 cookies (removed previous discussion of cookies).
   Clarified that gateways may support reallocation of same IP address,
   if provided by network.  Proposed a solution outline to the problem
   of key exchange for the keys that protect tickets.  Added fields to
   the ticket to enable interoperability.  Removed incorrect MOBIKE
   notification.



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B.2.  -02

   Clarifications on generation of SPI values, on the ticket's lifetime
   and on the integrity protection of the anti-replay counter.
   Eliminated redundant SPIs from the notification payloads.

B.3.  -01

   Editorial review.  Removed 24-hour limitation on ticket lifetime,
   lifetime is up to local policy.

B.4.  -00

   Initial version.  This draft is a selective merge of
   draft-sheffer-ike-session-resumption-00 and
   draft-dondeti-ipsec-failover-sol-00.


Authors' Addresses

   Yaron Sheffer
   Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
   5 Hasolelim St.
   Tel Aviv  67897
   Israel

   Email: yaronf@checkpoint.com


   Hannes Tschofenig
   Nokia Siemens Networks
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Bavaria  81739
   Germany

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.priv.at


   Lakshminath Dondeti
   QUALCOMM, Inc.
   5775 Morehouse Dr
   San Diego, CA
   USA

   Phone: +1 858-845-1267
   Email: ldondeti@qualcomm.com




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   Vidya Narayanan
   QUALCOMM, Inc.
   5775 Morehouse Dr
   San Diego, CA
   USA

   Phone: +1 858-845-2483
   Email: vidyan@qualcomm.com











































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