Network Working Group S. Smyshlyaev, Ed.
Internet-Draft E. Alekseev
Intended status: Informational E. Smyshlyaeva
Expires: June 18, 2020 A. Babueva
CryptoPro
December 16, 2019
GOST Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
1.3
draft-smyshlyaev-tls13-gost-suites-01
Abstract
The purpose of this document is to make the Russian cryptographic
standards available to the Internet community for their
implementation in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
1.3.
This specification defines four new cipher suites and seven new
signature schemes based on GOST R 34.12-2015, GOST R 34.11-2012 and
GOST R 34.10-2012 algorithms.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 18, 2020.
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Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Basic Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Cipher Suite Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Record Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.1. AEAD Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1.1. Block Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.1.2. TLSTREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.2. SNMAX parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Hash Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Signature Scheme Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Elliptic Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. SIGN function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Key Exchange and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on Client Side . 14
6.1.1.2. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on Server Side . 16
6.1.1.3. Public ephemeral key representation . . . . . . . 17
6.1.2. Values for the TLS Supported Groups Registry . . . . 17
6.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.3. Handshake Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3.1. Hello Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3.2. CertificateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.3.3. Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.3.4. CertificateVerify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Historical considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Test Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix B. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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1. Introduction
This document defines four new cipher suites (the TLS13_GOST cipher
suites) and seven new signature schemes (the TLS13_GOST signature
schemes) for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3,
that are based on Russian cryptographic standards GOST R 34.12-2015
[GOST3412-2015] (the English version can be found in [RFC7801]), GOST
R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012] (the English version can be found in
[RFC6986]) and GOST R 34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] (the English version
can be found in [RFC7091]).
The TLS13_GOST cipher suites (see Section 4) have the following
values:
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L = {TBD1};
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L = {TBD2};
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S = {TBD3};
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S = {TBD4}.
Each TLS13_GOST cipher suite specifies a pair (record protection
algorithm, hash algorithm) such that:
o The record protection algorithm is the AEAD algorithm (see
Section 4.1.1) based on the GOST R 34.12-2015 block cipher
[RFC7801] in the Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) [DraftMGM] and the
external re-keying approach (see [RFC8645]) intended for
increasing the lifetime of symmetric keys used to protect records.
o The hash algorithm is the GOST R 34.11-2012 algorithm [RFC6986].
Note: The TLS13_GOST cipher suites are divided into two types
(depending on the key lifetime limitations, see Section 4.1.1.2 and
Section 4.1.2): the "_S" (strong) cipher suites and the "_L" (light)
cipher suites.
The TLS13_GOST signature schemes that can be used with the TLS13_GOST
cipher suites have the following values:
gostr34102012_256a = TBD5;
gostr34102012_256b = TBD6;
gostr34102012_256c = TBD7;
gostr34102012_256d = TBD8;
gostr34102012_512a = TBD9;
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gostr34102012_512b = TBD10;
gostr34102012_512c = TBD11.
Each TLS13_GOST signature scheme specifies a pair (signature
algorithm, elliptic curve) such that:
o The signature algorithm is the GOST R 34.10-2012 algorithm
[RFC7091].
o The elliptic curve is one of the curves defined in Section 5.2.
Additionally, this document specifies the key exchange and
authentication process in case of negotiating TLS13_GOST cipher
suites (see Section 6).
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Basic Terms and Definitions
This document uses the following terms and definitions for the sets
and operations on the elements of these sets:
B_t the set of byte strings of length t, t >= 0, for t =
0 the B_t set consists of a single empty string of
zero length. If A is an element of B_t, then A =
(a_1, a_2, ... , a_t), where a_1, a_2, ... , a_t are
in {0, ... , 255};
B* the set of all byte strings of a finite length
(hereinafter referred to as strings), including the
empty string;
A[i..j] the string A[i..j] = (a_i, a_{i+1}, ... , a_j) in
B_{j-i+1}, where A = (a_1, ... , a_t) in B_t and
1<=i<=j<=t;
|A| the byte length of the byte string A;
A | C the concatenation of strings A and C both belonging
to B*, i.e., a string in B_{|A|+|C|}, where the left
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substring in B_|A| is equal to A, and the right
substring in B_|C| is equal to C;
i & j bitwise AND of integers i and j;
STR_t the byte string STR_t(i) = (i_1, ... , i_t) in B_t
corresponding to an integer i = 256^{t-1} * i_1 + ...
+ 256 * i_{t-1} + i_t (the interpretation of the
integer as a byte string in big-endian format);
str_t the byte string str_t(i) = (i_1, ... , i_t) in B_t
corresponding to an integer i = 256^{t-1} * i_t + ...
+ 256 * i_2 + i_1 (the interpretation of the integer
as a byte string in little-endian format);
k the byte-length of the block cipher key;
n the byte-length of the block cipher block;
IVlen the byte-length of the initialization vector;
E_i the elliptic curve indicated by client in
"supported_groups" extension;
m_i the order of group of points belonging to the
elliptic curve E_i;
q_i the cyclic subgroup order of group of points
belonging to the elliptic curve E_i;
h_i the cyclic subgroup cofactor which is equal to m_i /
q_i;
Q_sign the public key stored in endpoint's certificate;
d_sign the private key that corresponds to the Q_sign key;
P_i the point of the elliptic curve E_i of the order q_i;
(d_C^i, Q_C^i) the client's ephemeral key pair which consists of the
private key and the public key corresponding to the
elliptic curve E_i;
(d_S^i, Q_S^i) the server's ephemeral key pair which consists of the
private key and the public key corresponding to the
elliptic curve E_i;
O_i the zero point of the elliptic curve E_i.
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4. Cipher Suite Definition
The cipher suite value is used to indicate a record protection
algorithm and a hash algorithm which an endpoint supports (see
Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446]).
This section defines the following four TLS13_GOST cipher suites that
can be used to support Russian cryptographic algorithms:
CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L = {TBD1};
CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L = {TBD2};
CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S = {TBD3};
CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S = {TBD4};
Each cipher suite specifies a pair of the record protection algorithm
(see Section 4.1) and the hash algorithm (Section 4.2).
4.1. Record Protection
In accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446] the record protection
algorithm translates a TLSPlaintext structure into a TLSCiphertext
structure. If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the
encrypted_record field of the TLSCiphertext structure MUST be set to
the AEADEncrypted value computed as follows:
AEADEncrypted = AEAD-Encrypt'(sender_write_key, nonce,
additional_data, plaintext, seqnum),
where
o the AEAD-Encrypt' function is defined in Section 4.1.1;
o the sender_write_key (either the client_write_key or the
server_write_key) is generated in accordance with Section 7.3 of
[RFC8446];
o the nonce value is derived from the record sequence number seqnum
and the sender_write_iv value (either the client_write_iv or the
server_write_iv) in accordance with Section 5.3 of [RFC8446];
o the additional_data value is the record header that is generated
in accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446]:
o the plaintext value is the TLSInnerPlaintext structure encoded in
accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446];
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o the seqnum value is the record sequence number in the range
0-SNMAX, where the SNMAX value is defined in Section 4.1.2.
Note1: The AEAD-Encrypt' function is exactly the same as the AEAD-
Encrypt function defined in [RFC8446] except one additional argument
(seqnum) intended to support external re-keying approach.
Note2: The SNMAX parameter is specified by the particular TLS13_GOST
cipher suite to limit the amount of data that can be encrypted under
the same traffic key material (sender_write_key, sender_write_iv).
The record deprotection algorithm reverse the process of the record
protection. In order to decrypt and verify the protected record with
sequence number seqnum the algorithm takes as input the
peer_write_key (either the client_write_key or the server_write_key),
nonce, additional data, the AEADEncrypted value and the seqnum value
and outputs the res value which is either the plaintext or an error
indicating that the decryption failed. If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is
negotiated, the res value MUST be computed as follows:
res = AEAD-Decrypt'(peer_write_key, nonce, additional_data,
AEADEncrypted, seqnum),
where the AEAD-Decrypt' function is defined in Section 4.1.1.
Note: The AEAD-Decrypt' function is exactly the same as the AEAD-
Decrypt function defined in [RFC8446] except one additional argument
(seqnum) intended to support external re-keying approach.
4.1.1. AEAD Algorithm
The AEAD-Encrypt' and AEAD-Decrypt' functions are defined as follows.
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+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AEAD-Encrypt'(K, nonce, A, P, seqnum) |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Input: |
| - encryption key K in B_k, |
| - unique vector nonce in B_IVlen, |
| - additional authenticated data A in B_r, r >= 0, |
| - plaintext P in B_t, t >= 0; |
| - record sequence number seqnum: 0 <= seqnum <= SNMAX |
| Output: |
| - ciphertext C in B_{|P|}, |
| - authentication tag T in B_S. |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. K^seqnum = TLSTREE(K, seqnum) |
| 2. MGMnonce = nonce[1..1] & 0x7f | nonce[2..IVlen] |
| 3. (MGMnonce, A, C, T) = MGM-Encrypt(K^seqnum, MGMnonce, A, P) |
| 4. Return C | T. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AEAD-Decrypt'(K, nonce, A, C | T, seqnum) |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Input: |
| - encryption key K in B_k, |
| - unique vector nonce in B_IVlen, |
| - additional authenticated data A in B_r, r >= 0, |
| - ciphertext C in B_t, t >= 0 |
| - authentication tag T in B_S. |
| - record sequence number seqnum: 0 <= seqnum <= SNMAX |
| Output: |
| - plaintext P in B_{|C|} or FAIL. |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. K^seqnum = TLSTREE(K, seqnum) |
| 2. MGMnonce = nonce[1..1] & 0x7f | nonce[2..IVlen] |
| 3. res' = MGM-Decrypt(K^seqnum, MGMnonce, A, C, T) |
| 4. IF res' = FAIL then return FAIL; else return P. |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
where
o MGM-Encrypt and MGM-Decrypt functions are defined in [DraftMGM]
and are used with block ciphers defined in Section 4.1.1.1. The
size of the authentication tag T is equal to n bytes (S = n). The
size of the nonce parameter is equal to n bytes (IVlen = n).
o TLSTREE function is defined in Section 4.1.1.2.
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4.1.1.1. Block Cipher
The cipher suites TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L and
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S MUST use Kuznyechik
[RFC7801] as a base block cipher for the AEAD algorithm (see
Section 4.1.1). The block length n is 16 bytes (n = 16) and the key
length k is 32 bytes (k = 32).
The cipher suites TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L and
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S MUST use Magma [GOST3412-2015]
as a base block cipher for the AEAD algorithm (see Section 4.1.1).
The block length n is 8 bytes (n = 8) and the key length k is 32
bytes (k = 32).
4.1.1.2. TLSTREE
The TLS13_GOST cipher suites use the TLSTREE function for the
external re-keying approach (see [RFC8645]). The TLSTREE function is
defined as follows:
TLSTREE(K_root, i) = KDF_3(KDF_2(KDF_1(K_root, STR_8(i & C_1)),
STR_8(i & C_2)), STR_8(i & C_3)),
where
o K_root in B_32;
o i in {0, 1, ... , 2^64 - 1};
o KDF_j(K, D), j = 1, 2, 3, is the key derivation function defined
as follows:
KDF_1(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level1", D),
KDF_2(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level2", D),
KDF_3(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level3", D),
where the KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function is defined in [RFC7836],
K in B_32, D in B_8.
o C_1, C_2, C_3 are constants defined by the particular cipher suite
as follows:
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+------------------------------------------+----------------------+
| CipherSuites | C_1, C_2, C_3 |
+------------------------------------------+----------------------+
|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L |C_1=0xf800000000000000|
| |C_2=0xfffffff000000000|
| |C_3=0xffffffffffffe000|
+------------------------------------------+----------------------+
|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L |C_1=0xffe0000000000000|
| |C_2=0xffffffffc0000000|
| |C_3=0xffffffffffffff80|
+------------------------------------------+----------------------+
|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S |C_1=0xffffffffe0000000|
| |C_2=0xffffffffffff0000|
| |C_3=0xfffffffffffffff8|
+------------------------------------------+----------------------+
|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S |C_1=0xfffffffffc000000|
| |C_2=0xffffffffffffe000|
| |C_3=0xffffffffffffffff|
+------------------------------------------+----------------------+
Table 1
4.1.2. SNMAX parameter
The SNMAX parameter is the maximum number of records encrypted under
the same traffic key material (sender_write_key and sender_write_iv)
and is defined by the particular cipher suite as follows:
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| CipherSuites | SNMAX |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L | SNMAX = 2^64 - 1 |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L | SNMAX = 2^64 - 1 |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S | SNMAX = 2^42 - 1 |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S | SNMAX = 2^39 - 1 |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
Table 2
4.2. Hash Algorithm
The Hash algorithm is used for key derivation process (see
Section 7.1 of [RFC8446]), Finished message calculation (see
Section 4.4.4 of [RFC8446]), Transcript-Hash function computation
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(see Section 4.4.1 of [RFC8446]), PSK binder value calculation (see
Section 4.2.11.2 of [RFC8446]), external re-keying approach (see
Section 4.1.1.2) and other purposes.
In case of negotiating a TLS13_GOST cipher suite the Hash algorithm
MUST be the GOST R 34.11-2012 [RFC6986] hash algorithm with 32-byte
(256-bit) hash value.
5. Signature Scheme Definition
The signature scheme value is used to indicate a single signature
algorithm and a curve that can be used in digital signature (see
Section 4.2.3 of [RFC8446]).
This section defines the following seven TLS13_GOST signature schemes
that can be used to support Russian cryptographic algorithms:
enum {
gostr34102012_256a(TBD5),
gostr34102012_256b(TBD6),
gostr34102012_256c(TBD7),
gostr34102012_256d(TBD8),
gostr34102012_512a(TBD9),
gostr34102012_512b(TBD10),
gostr34102012_512c(TBD11)
} SignatureScheme;
If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated and authentication via
certificates is required one of the TLS13_GOST signature schemes
listed above SHOULD be used.
Each signature scheme specifies a pair of the signature algorithm
(see Section 5.1) and the elliptic curve (see Section 5.2).
5.1. Signature Algorithm
Signature algorithms corresponding to the TLS13_GOST signature
schemes are defined as follows:
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+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
| SignatureScheme | Signature Algorithm | Refe- |
| Value | | rences |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_256a|GOST R 34.10-2012 , 32-byte key length|RFC 7091|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_256b|GOST R 34.10-2012 , 32-byte key length|RFC 7091|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_256c|GOST R 34.10-2012 , 32-byte key length|RFC 7091|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_256d|GOST R 34.10-2012 , 32-byte key length|RFC 7091|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_512a|GOST R 34.10-2012 , 64-byte key length|RFC 7091|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_512b|GOST R 34.10-2012 , 64-byte key length|RFC 7091|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_512c|GOST R 34.10-2012 , 64-byte key length|RFC 7091|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
Table 3
5.2. Elliptic Curve
Elliptic curves corresponding to the TLS13_GOST signature schemes are
defined as follows:
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
| SignatureScheme | Curve Identifier Value | Refe- |
| Value | | rences |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_256a| id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA |RFC 7836|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_256b|id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet|RFC 4357|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_256c|id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet|RFC 4357|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_256d|id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet|RFC 4357|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_512a| id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA |RFC 7836|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_512b| id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB |RFC 7836|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
|gostr34102012_512c| id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC |RFC 7836|
+------------------+--------------------------------------+--------+
Table 4
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5.3. SIGN function
If TLS13_GOST signature scheme is used, the signature value in
CertificateVerify message (see Section 6.3.4) MUST be calculated
using the SIGN function defined as follows:
+-----------------------------------------------------+
| SIGN(M, d_sign) |
|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Input: |
| - the byte string M in B*; |
| - the sign key d_sign: 0 < d_sign < q. |
| Output: |
| - signature value sgn in B_{2*l}. |
|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 1. (r, s) = SIGNGOST(M, d_sign) |
| 2. Return str_l(r) | str_l(s) |
|-----------------------------------------------------+
where
o q is the subgroup order of group of points of the elliptic curve;
o l is defined as follows:
* l = 32 for gostr34102012_256a, gostr34102012_256b,
gostr34102012_256c and gostr34102012_256d signature schemes;
* l = 64 for gostr34102012_512a, gostr34102012_512b and
gostr34102012_512c signature schemes;
o SIGNGOST is an algorithm which takes as an input message M and
private key d_sign and returns a pair of integers (r, s)
calculated during signature generation process in accordance with
the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm (see Section 6.1 of
[RFC7091]).
Note: The signature value sgn is the concatenation of two strings
that are byte representations of r and s values in the little-endian
format.
6. Key Exchange and Authentication
Key exchange and authentication process in case of using TLS13_GOST
cipher suites is defined in Section 6.1, Section 6.2 and Section 6.3.
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6.1. Key Exchange
TLS13_GOST cipher suites support three basic key exchange modes which
are defined in [RFC8446]: ECDHE, PSK-only and PSK-with-ECDHE.
Note: In accordance with [RFC8446] TLS 1.3 also supports key exchange
modes based on Diffie-Hellman protocol over finite fields. However,
TLS13_GOST cipher suites SHOULD use only modes based on Diffie-
Hellman protocol over elliptic curves.
In accordance with [RFC8446] PSKs can be divided into two types:
o internal PSKs which can be established during the previous
connection;
o external PSKs which can be established out of band.
If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, PSK-only key exchange mode
SHOULD be established only via the internal PSKs, and external PSKs
SHOULD be used only in PSK-with-ECDHE mode (see more in Section 9).
If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated and ECDHE or PSK-with-ECDHE
key exchange mode is used the ECDHE shared secret value SHOULD be
calculated in accordance with Section 6.1.1 on the basis of one of
the elliptic curves defined in Section 6.1.2.
6.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation
If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, ECDHE shared secret value
SHOULD be calculated in accordance with Section 6.1.1.1 and
Section 6.1.1.2. The public ephemeral keys used to obtain ECDHE
shared secret value SHOULD be represented in format described in
Section 6.1.1.3.
6.1.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on Client Side
The client calculates ECDHE shared secret value in accordance with
the following steps:
1. Chooses from all supported curves E_1, ..., E_R the set of curves
E_{i_1}, ..., E_{i_r}, 1 <= i_1 <= i_r <= R, where
o r >= 1 in the case of first ClientHello message;
o r = 1 in the case of responding to HelloRetryRequest message,
E_{i_1} corresponds to the curve indicated in the "key_share"
extension in the HelloRetryRequest message.
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2. Generates ephemeral key pairs (d_C^{i_1}, Q_C^{i_1}), ...,
(d_C^{i_r}, Q_C^{i_r}) corresponding to the curves E_{i_1}, ...,
E_{i_r}, where for each i in {i_1, ..., i_r}:
o d_C^i is chosen from {1, ..., q_i - 1} at random;
o Q_C^i = d_C^i * P_i.
3. Sends ClientHello message specified in accordance with
Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446] and Section 6.3.1, which contains:
o "key_share" extension with public ephemeral keys Q_C^{i_1}, ...,
Q_C^{i_r} generated in accordance with Section 4.2.8 of [RFC8446];
o "supported_groups" extension with supported curves E_1, ..., E_R
generated in accordance with Section 4.2.7 of [RFC8446].
4. In case of receiving HelloRetryRequest message client should
return to step 1 and correct parameters in accordance with
Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446]. In case of receiving ServerHello message
client proceeds to the next step. In other cases client MUST
terminate the connection with "unexpected_message" alert.
5. Extracts curve E_res and ephemeral key Q_S^res, res in {1, ...,
R}, from ServerHello message and checks whether the Q_S^res belongs
to E_res. If this check fails, the client MUST abort the handshake
with "handshake_failure" alert.
6. Generates Q^ECDHE:
Q^ECDHE = (X^ECDHE, Y^ECDHE) = (h_res * d_C^res) * Q_S^res.
7. Client MUST check whether the computed shared secret Q^ECDHE is
not equal to the zero point O_res. If this check fails, the client
MUST abort the handshake with "handshake_failure" alert.
8. Shared secret value ECDHE is the byte representation of the
coordinate X^ECDHE of point Q^ECDHE in the little-endian format:
ECDHE = str_{coordinate_length}(X^ECDHE),
where the coordinate_length value is defined by the particular
elliptic curve (see Section 6.1.2).
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6.1.1.2. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on Server Side
Upon receiving the ClientHello message, the server calculates ECDHE
shared secret value in accordance with the following steps:
1. Chooses the curve E_res, res in {1, ..., R} from the list of the
curves E_1, ..., E_R indicated in "supported_groups" extension in
ClientHello message and the corresponding public ephemeral key value
Q_C^res from the list Q_C^{i_1}, ..., Q_C^{i_r}, 1 <= i_1 <= i_r <=
R, indicated in "key_share" extension. If no corresponding public
ephemeral key value is found (res in {1, ..., R}\{i_1, ..., i_r}),
server MAY send HelloRetryRequest message with "key_share" extension
indicating the selected elliptic curve E_res and wait for the new
ClientHello message.
2. Checks whether Q_C^res belongs to E_res. If this check fails,
the server MUST abort the handshake with "handshake_failure" alert.
3. Generates ephemeral key pair (d_S^res, Q_S^res) corresponding to
E_res:
o d_S^res is chosen from {1, ..., q_res - 1} at random;
o Q_S^res = d_S^res * P_res.
4. Sends ServerHello message generated in accordance with
Section 4.1.3 of [RFC8446] and Section 6.3.1 with "key_share"
extension which contains public ephemeral key value Q_S^res
corresponding to E_res.
5. Generates Q^ECDHE:
Q^ECDHE = (X^ECDHE, Y^ECDHE) = (h_res * d_S^res) * Q_C^res.
6. Server MUST check whether the computed shared secret Q^ECDHE is
not equal to the zero point O_res. If this check fails, the server
MUST abort the handshake with "handshake_failure" alert.
7. Shared secret value ECDHE is the byte representation of the
coordinate X^ECDHE of point Q^ECDHE in the little-endian format:
ECDHE = str_{coordinate_length}(X^ECDHE),
where the coordinate_length value is defined by the particular
elliptic curve (see Section 6.1.2).
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6.1.1.3. Public ephemeral key representation
This section defines the representation format of the public
ephemeral keys generated during ECDHE shared secret calculation (see
Section 6.1.1.1 and Section 6.1.1.2).
If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated and ECDHE or PSK-with-ECDHE
key exchange mode is used, the public ephemeral key Q indicated in
the KeyShareEntry.key_exchange field SHOULD contain the data defined
by the following structure:
struct {
opaque X[coordinate_length];
opaque Y[coordinate_length];
} PlainPointRepresentation;
where X and Y, respectively, contain the byte representations of the
x and the y values of point Q (Q = (x, y)) in the little-endian
format and are specified as follows:
X = str_{coordinate_length}(x);
Y = str_{coordinate_length}(y).
The coordinate_length value is defined by the particular elliptic
curve (see Section 6.1.2).
6.1.2. Values for the TLS Supported Groups Registry
The "supported_groups" extension is used to indicate the set of the
elliptic curves supported by an endpoint and is defined in
Section 4.2.7 [RFC8446].
This section defines the following seven elliptic curves that can be
used to support Russian cryptographic algorithms:
enum {
GC256A(0x22), GC256B(0x23), GC256C(0x24), GC256D(0x25),
GC512A(0x26), GC512B(0x27), GC512C(0x28)
} NamedGroup;
If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated and ECDHE or PSK-with-ECDHE
key exchange mode is established, one of the elliptic curves listed
above SHOULD be used.
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Each curve corresponds to the particular identifier and specifies the
value of coordinate_length parameter (see "cl" column) as follows:
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
|Description| Curve Identifier Value | cl |Reference|
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
| GC256A | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA | 32 | RFC 7836|
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
| GC256B |id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet| 32 | RFC 4357|
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
| GC256C |id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet| 32 | RFC 4357|
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
| GC256D |id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet| 32 | RFC 4357|
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
| GC512A | id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA | 64 | RFC 7836|
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
| GC512B | id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB | 64 | RFC 7836|
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
| GC512C | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC | 64 | RFC 7836|
+-----------+--------------------------------------+----+---------+
Table 5
Note: The identifier values and the corresponding elliptic curves are
the same as in [DraftGostTLS12].
6.2. Authentication
In accordance with [RFC8446] authentication can happen via signature
with certificate or via symmetric pre-shared key (PSK). The server
side of the channel is always authenticated; the client side is
optionally authenticated.
PSK-based authentication happens as a side effect of key exchange.
If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, external PSKs SHOULD be
combined only with the mutual authentication (see more in Section 9).
Certificate-based authentication happens via Authentication messages
and optional CertificateRequest message (sent if client
authentication is required). In case of negotiating TLS13_GOST
cipher suites the signature schemes used for certificate-based
authentication are defined in Section 5 and the Authentication
messages are specified in Section 6.3.3 and Section 6.3.4. The
CertificateRequest message is specified in Section 6.3.2.
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6.3. Handshake Messages
The TLS13_GOST cipher suites specify the ClientHello, ServerHello,
CertificateRequest, Certificate and CertificateVerify handshake
messages that are described in further detail below.
6.3.1. Hello Messages
The ClientHello message is sent when a client first connects to a
server or responds to a HelloRetryRequest message and is specified in
accordance with [RFC8446] as follows.
struct {
ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
Random random;
opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
} ClientHello;
In order to negotiate a TLS13_GOST cipher suite, the ClientHello
message MUST meet the following requirements.
o The ClientHello.cipher_suites field MUST contain the values
defined in Section 4.
o If server authentication via a certificate is required, the
extension_data field of the "signature_algorithms" extension MUST
contain the values defined in Section 5, which correspond to the
GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm.
o If server authentication via a certificate is required and the
client uses optional "signature_algorithms_cert" extension, the
extension_data field of this extension MUST contain the values
defined in Section 5, which correspond to the GOST R 34.10-2012
signature algorithm.
o If client wants to establish TLS 1.3 connection using ECDHE shared
secret value, the extension_data field of the "supported_groups"
extension MUST contain the elliptic curve identifiers defined in
Section 6.1.2.
The ServerHello message is sent by the server in response to a
ClientHello message to negotiate an acceptable set of handshake
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parameters based on the ClientHello and is specified in accordance
with [RFC8446] as follows.
struct {
ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
Random random;
opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
} ServerHello;
In case of negotiating a TLS13_GOST cipher suite, the ServerHello
message MUST meet the following requirements.
o The ServerHello.cipher_suite field MUST contain one of the values
defined in Section 4.
o If server decides to establish TLS 1.3 connection using ECDHE
shared secret value, the extension_data field of the "key_share"
extension MUST contain the elliptic curve identifier and the
public ephemeral key that satisfy the following conditions.
* The elliptic curve identifier corresponds to a value that was
provided in the "supported_groups" and the "key_share"
extensions in the ClientHello message.
* The elliptic curve identifier is one of the values defined in
Section 6.1.2.
* The public ephemeral key corresponds to the elliptic curve
specified by the KeyShareEntry.group identifier.
6.3.2. CertificateRequest
This message is sent when server requests client authentication via a
certificate and is specified in accordance with [RFC8446] as follows.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
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If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the CertificateRequest
message MUST meet the following requirements.
o The extension_data field of the "signature_algorithms" extension
MUST contain only the values defined in Section 5.
o If server uses optional "signature_algorithms_cert" extension, the
extension_data field of this extension MUST contain only the
values defined in Section 5.
6.3.3. Certificate
This message is sent to convey the endpoint's certificate chain to
the peer and is specified in accordance with [RFC8446] as follows.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the Certificate message
MUST meet the following requirements.
o Each endpoint's certificate provided to the peer MUST be signed
using the algorithm which corresponds to a signature scheme
indicated by the peer in its "signature_algoritms_cert" extension,
if present (or in the "signature_algorithms" extension,
otherwise).
o The signature algorithm used for signing certificates MUST
correspond to the one of the signature schemes defined in
Section 5.
6.3.4. CertificateVerify
This message is sent to provide explicit proof that an endpoint
possesses the private key corresponding to the public key indicated
in its certificate and is specified in accordance with [RFC8446] as
follows.
struct {
SignatureScheme algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
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If TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the CertificateVerify
message MUST meet the following requirements.
o The CertificateVerify.algorithm field MUST contain the signature
scheme identifier which corresponds to the value indicated in the
peer's "signature_algorithms" extension and which is one of the
values defined in Section 5.
o The CertificateVerify.signature field contains the sgn value,
which is computed as follows:
sgn = SIGN(M, d_sign),
o where
* the SIGN function is defined in Section 5,
* the message M is defined in accordance with Section 4.4.3 of
[RFC8446],
* d_sign is the sender long-term private key that corresponds to
the sender long-term public key Q_sign from the sender's
certificate.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to assign numbers TBD1, TBD2, TBD3 and TBD4 with the
names TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L,
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L,
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S,
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S to the "TLS Cipher Suites"
registry with this document as reference, as shown below.
+-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+----------+
|Value| Description |DTLS-OK| Reference|
+-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+----------+
|TBD1 |TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L| N | this RFC |
+-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+----------+
|TBD2 |TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L | N | this RFC |
+-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+----------+
|TBD3 |TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S| N | this RFC |
+-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+----------+
|TBD4 |TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S | N | this RFC |
+-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+----------+
Table 6
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IANA is asked to assign numbers TBD5, TBD6, TBD7, TBD8, TBD9, TBD10
and TBD11 with the names gostr34102012_256a, gostr34102012_256b,
gostr34102012_256c, gostr34102012_256d, gostr34102012_512a,
gostr34102012_512b, gostr34102012_512c to the "TLS SignatureScheme"
registry, as shown below.
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
| Value | Description | DTLS-OK | Reference|
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
| TBD5 | gostr34102012_256a | N | this RFC |
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
| TBD6 | gostr34102012_256b | N | this RFC |
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
| TBD7 | gostr34102012_256c | N | this RFC |
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
| TBD8 | gostr34102012_256d | N | this RFC |
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
| TBD9 | gostr34102012_512a | N | this RFC |
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
| TBD10 | gostr34102012_512b | N | this RFC |
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
| TBD11 | gostr34102012_512c | N | this RFC |
+-----------+----------------------+---------+----------+
Table 7
8. Historical considerations
Due to historical reasons in addition to the curve identifier values
listed in Table 5 there exist some additional identifier values that
correspond to the signature schemes as follows.
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Description | Curve Identifier Value |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| gostr34102012_256b | id-GostR3410_2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet |
| | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| gostr34102012_256c | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| gostr34102012_256d | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet |
| | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD |
+--------------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 8
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Client should be prepared to handle any of them correctly if
corresponding signature scheme is included in the
"signature_algorithms" or "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions.
9. Security Considerations
In order to create an effective implementation client and server
SHOULD follow the rules below.
1. While using TLSTREE algorithm function KDF_j, j = 1, 2, 3, SHOULD
be invoked only if the record sequence number seqnum reaches such a
value that
seqnum & C_j != (seqnum - 1) & C_j.
Otherwise the previous value should be used.
2. For each pre-shared key value PSK the binder_key value should be
computed only once within all connections where ClientHello message
contains a "pre_shared_key" extension indicating this PSK value.
In order to ensure the secure TLS 1.3 connection client and server
SHOULD fulfil the following requirements.
1. An internal PSK value is NOT RECOMMENDED to be used to establish
more than one TLS 1.3 connection.
2. 0-RTT data SHOULD NOT be sent during TLS 1.3 connection. The
reasons for this restriction are that the 0-RTT data is not forward
secret and is not resistant to replay attacks (see more in
Section 2.3 of [RFC8446]).
3. If client authentication is required, server SHOULD NOT send
Application Data, NewSessionTicket and KeyUpdate messages prior to
receiving the client's Authentication messages since any data sent at
that point is being sent to an unauthenticated peer.
4. External PSKs SHOULD be used only in PSK-with-ECDHE mode. In
case of using external PSK in PSK-only mode the attack described in
[Selfie] is possible which leads to the situation when client
establishes connection to itself. One of the mitigations proposed in
[Selfie] is to use certificates, however, in that case, an
impersonation attack as in [AASS19] occurs. If the connections are
established with additional usage of key_share extension (in PSK-
with-ECDHE mode), then the adversary which just echoes messages
cannot reveal the traffic key material (as long as the used group is
secure).
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5. In case of using external PSK, the mutual authentication MUST be
provided by the external PSK distribution mechanism between the
endpoints which guarantees that the derived external PSK is unknown
to anyone but the endpoints. In addition, the endpoint roles (i.e.
client and server) MUST be fixed during this mechanism and each role
can match only to one endpoint during the whole external PSK
lifetime.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[DraftGostTLS12]
Smyshlyaev, S., Belyavsky, D., and M. Saarinen, "GOST
Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2", 2019, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
smyshlyaev-tls12-gost-suites-07>.
[DraftMGM]
Smyshlyaev, S., Nozdrunov, V., Shishkin, V., and E.
Smyshlyaeva, "Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)", 2019,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smyshlyaev-mgm-15>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
[RFC7091] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.10-2012:
Digital Signature Algorithm", RFC 7091,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7091, December 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7091>.
[RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
"Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric
Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>.
10.2. Informative References
[AASS19] Akhmetzyanova, L., Alekseev, E., Smyshlyaeva, E., and A.
Sokolov, "Continuing to reflect on TLS 1.3 with external
PSK", Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2019/421, April
2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/421.pdf>.
[GOST3410-2012]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
digital signature", GOST R 34.10-2012, 2012.
[GOST3411-2012]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function", GOST R 34.11-2012, 2012.
[GOST3412-2015]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Block ciphers", GOST R 34.12-2015, 2015.
[Selfie] Drucker, N. and S. Gueron, "Selfie: reflections on TLS 1.3
with PSK", Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2019/347,
April 2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/347.pdf>.
Appendix A. Test Examples
TODO
Appendix B. Contributors
o Lilia Akhmetzyanova
CryptoPro
lah@cryptopro.ru
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o Alexandr Sokolov
CryptoPro
sokolov@cryptopro.ru
o Vasily Nikolaev
CryptoPro
nikolaev@cryptopro.ru
Appendix C. Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
Stanislav Smyshlyaev (editor)
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow 127018
Russian Federation
Phone: +7 (495) 995-48-20
Email: svs@cryptopro.ru
Evgeny Alekseev
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow 127018
Russian Federation
Email: alekseev@cryptopro.ru
Ekaterina Smyshlyaeva
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow 127018
Russian Federation
Email: ess@cryptopro.ru
Alexandra Babueva
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow 127018
Russian Federation
Email: babueva@cryptopro.ru
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