TSVWG                                                           J. Touch
Internet Draft                                    Independent Consultant
Intended status: Experimental                              March 3, 2024
Intended updates: TBD
Expires: September 2024

                       The UDP Authentication Option
                   draft-touch-tsvwg-udp-auth-opt-00.txt


Abstract

   This document extends UDP by defining a framework for an
   authentication option.

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 3, 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with



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   respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
   document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
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   warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ..................................................2
   2. Conventions used in this document .............................2
   3. Terminology ...................................................2
   4. Background ....................................................3
   5. Authentication (AUTH) .........................................3
   6. Security Considerations .......................................4
   7. IANA Considerations ...........................................5
   8. References ....................................................5
      8.1. Normative References .....................................5
      8.2. Informative References ...................................5
   9. Acknowledgments ...............................................6
   Appendix A. Implementation Information ...........................8

1. Introduction

   TBD

   This document currently contains a copy of the text from draft-ietf-
   tsvwg-udp-options, to be updated.

2. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   In this document, the characters ">>" preceding an indented line(s)
   indicates a statement using the key words listed above. This
   convention aids reviewers in quickly identifying or finding the
   portions of this RFC covered by these key words.

3. Terminology

   The following terminology is used in this document:

   o  TBD




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4. Background

   TBD

5. Authentication (AUTH)

   The Authentication (AUTH, Kind=9) option is intended to allow UDP to
   provide a similar type of authentication as the TCP Authentication
   Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925]. AUTH covers the UDP user data. AUTH
   supports NAT traversal in a similar manner as TCP-AO [RFC6978].

   Figure 1 shows the UDP AUTH format, whose contents are identical to
   that of the TCP-AO option, with the addition of a 32-bit unsigned
   sequence number. The sequence number is used to differentiate
   otherwise identical datagrams for cryptographic purposes; it is
   intended to not repeat during the lifetime of a security
   association, but are otherwise meaningless (e.g., they can be
   monotonically increased except during rollover). Because AUTH
   sequence numbers are not coordinated and not reliably transmitted,
   in contrast to TCP, they cannot be used to derive session traffic
   keys. During an association, the one-byte KeyID and ReceiveNextKeyID
   (RNKID) fields serve the same purpose as for TCP-AO, allowing the
   active keys used in either direction to change in a coordinated
   manner.

                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                   | Kind=9 |  Len   | KeyID  | RNKID  |
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                   |         Sequence Number           |
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                   | MAC...                            |
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                   ...
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                   | ...MAC                            |
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+

                      Figure 1 UDP AUTH option format

   Like TCP-AO, AUTH is not negotiated in-band. Its use assumes both
   endpoints have populated Master Key Tuples (MKTs), used to exclude
   non-protected traffic.

   TCP-AO generates unique traffic keys from a hash of TCP connection
   parameters. UDP lacks a three-way handshake to coordinate
   connection-specific values, such as TCP's Initial Sequence Numbers
   (ISNs) [RFC9293], thus AUTH's Key Derivation Function (KDF) uses


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   zeroes as the value for both ISNs. This means that the AUTH reuses
   keys when socket pairs are reused, unlike TCP-AO.

   >> UDP packets with incorrect AUTH HMACs MUST be passed to the
   application by default, e.g., with a flag indicating AUTH failure.

   >> UDP fragments with individual incorrect AUTH HMACs MUST be
   accumulated and passed to the application by default as part of the
   reassembled packet.

   >> If used with UDP fragments, AUTH MUST be configured to cover the
   UDP option area (because fragments have an empty UDP data area).

   Like all non-UNSAFE UDP options, AUTH needs to be silently ignored
   when failing. This silently-ignored behavior ensures that option-
   aware receivers operate the same as legacy receivers unless
   overridden.

   In addition to the UDP user data (which is always included), AUTH
   can be configured to either include or exclude the surplus area
   (again, the latter is not allowed for UDP fragments), in a similar
   way as can TCP-AO can optionally exclude TCP options. When UDP
   options are covered, the OCS value and AUTH (and later, UENC) hash
   areas are zeroed before computing the AUTH hash. It is important to
   consider that options not yet defined might yield unpredictable
   results if not confirmed as supported, e.g., if they were to contain
   other hashes or checksums that depend on the surplus area contents.
   This is why such dependencies are not permitted except as defined
   for the OCS and the AUTH (and later, UENC) option.

   Similar to TCP-AO-NAT, AUTH (and later, UENC) can be configured to
   support NAT traversal, excluding (by zeroing out) one or both of the
   UDP ports and corresponding IP addresses [RFC6978].

6. Security Considerations

   TBD

   UDP options are not covered by DTLS (datagram transport-layer
   security). Despite the name, neither TLS [RFC8446] (transport layer
   security, for TCP) nor DTLS [RFC9147] (TLS for UDP) protect the
   transport layer. Both operate as a shim layer solely on the user
   data of transport packets, protecting only their contents. Just as
   TLS does not protect the TCP header or its options, DTLS does not
   protect the UDP header or the new options introduced by this
   document. Transport security is provided in TCP by the TCP
   Authentication Option (TCP-AO [RFC5925]) or in UDP by the


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   Authentication (AUTH) option (Section 5) and UNSAFE Encryption
   (UENC) option (Section Error! Reference source not found.). T
   ransport headers are also protected as payload when using IP
   security (IPsec) [RFC4301].

7. IANA Considerations

   TBD

8. References

8.1. Normative References

   [Fa23]    Fairhurst, G., T. Jones, "Datagram PLPMTUD for UDP
             Options," draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-dplpmtud, Jun.
             2023.

   [RFC768]  Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol," RFC 768, August
             1980.

   [RFC791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol," RFC 791, Sept. 1981.


   [RFC1122] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts --
             Communication Layers," RFC 1122, Oct. 1989.

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels," BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5925] Touch, J., A. Mankin, R. Bonica, "The TCP Authentication
             Option," RFC 5925, June 2010.

   [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
             2119 Key Words," RFC 2119, May 2017.

8.2. Informative References

   [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
             Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, Dec. 2005.

   [RFC6864] Touch, J., "Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field,"
             RFC 6864, Feb. 2013.

   [RFC6978] Touch, J., "A TCP Authentication Option Extension for NAT
             Traversal", RFC 6978, July 2013.





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   [RFC8126] Cotton, M., B. Leiba, T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing
             an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs," RFC 8126, June
             2017.

   [RFC8200] Deering, S., R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol Version 6
             (IPv6) Specification," RFC 8200, Jul. 2017.

   [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
             Version 1.3," RFC 8446, Aug. 2018.

   [RFC8504] Chown, T., J. Loughney, T. Winters, "IPv6 Node
             Requirements," RFC 8504, Jan. 2019.

   [RFC9147] Rescorla, E., H. Tschofenig, N. Modadugu, "Datagram
             Transport Layer Security Version 1.3," RFC 9147, Apr.
             2022.

   [RFC9187] Touch, J., "Sequence Number Extension for Windowed
             Protocols," RFC 9187, Jan. 2022.

   [RFC9293] Eddy, W. (Ed.), "Transmission Control Protocol," STD 7,
             RFC 9293, Aug. 2022.

   [CERT18]  CERT Coordination Center, "TCP implementations vulnerable
             to Denial of Service,", Vulnerability Note VU 962459,
             Software Engineering Institute, CMU, 2018,
             https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/962459.

   [To18]    Touch, J., "A TCP Authentication Option Extension for
             Payload Encryption," draft-touch-tcp-ao-encrypt, Jul.
             2018.

9. Acknowledgments

   This work benefitted from discussions on the IETF TSVWG and SPUD
   email lists.

   This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.











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Authors' Addresses

   Joe Touch
   Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 USA

   Phone: +1 (310) 560-0334
   Email: touch@strayalpha.com










































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Appendix A.Implementation Information

   The following information is provided to encourage interoperable API
   implementations.

   System-level variables (sysctl):

           Name                   default   meaning
           ----------------------------------------------------
           net.ipv4.udp_opt       0         UDP options available
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_ocs   1         Default use OCS
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_apc   0         Default include APC
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_frag  0         Default fragment
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_mds   0         Default include MDS
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_mrds  0         Default include MRDS
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_req   0         Default include REQ
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_resp  0         Default include RES
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_time  0         Default include TIME
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_auth  0         Default include AUTH
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_exp   0         Default include EXP
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_uenc  0         Default include UENC
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_uexp  0         Default include UEXP


   Socket options (sockopt), cached for outgoing datagrams:

           Name           meaning
           ----------------------------------------------------
           UDP_OPT        Enable UDP options (at all)
           UDP_OPT_OCS    Use UDP OCS
           UDP_OPT_APC    Enable UDP APC option
           UDP_OPT_FRAG   Enable UDP fragmentation
           UDP OPT MDS    Enable UDP MDS option
           UDP OPT MRDS   Enable UDP MRDS option
           UDP OPT REQ    Enable UDP REQ option
           UDP OPT RES    Enable UDP RES option
           UDP_OPT_TIME   Enable UDP TIME option
           UDP OPT AUTH   Enable UDP AUTH option
           UDP OPT EXP    Enable UDP EXP option
           UDP_OPT_UENC   Enable UDP UENC option
           UDP OPT UEXP   Enable UDP UEXP option

   Send/sendto parameters:

   Connection parameters (per-socketpair cached state, part UCB):




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           Name          Initial value
           ----------------------------------------------------
           opts_enabled  net.ipv4.udp_opt
           ocs_enabled   net.ipv4.udp_opt_ocs

   >> The JUNK option is included for debugging purposes, and MUST NOT
   be enabled otherwise.

   System variables

   net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk   0






































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   System-level variables (sysctl):

           Name                   default   meaning
           ----------------------------------------------------
           net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk  0         Default use of junk


   Socket options (sockopt):

           Name          params   meaning
           ------------------------------------------------------
           UDP_JUNK      -        Enable UDP junk option
           UDP_JUNK_VAL  fillval  Value to use as junk fill
           UDP_JUNK_LEN  length   Length of junk payload in bytes

   Connection parameters (per-socketpair cached state, part UCB):

           Name          Initial value
           ----------------------------------------------------
           junk_enabled  net.ipv4.udp_opt_junk
           junk_value    0xABCD
           junk_len      4



























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