dnsext C. Contavalli
Internet-Draft W. van der Gaast
Intended status: Standards Track Google
Expires: July 30, 2010 S. Leach
D. Rodden
Neustar
January 26, 2010
Client IP information in DNS requests
draft-vandergaast-edns-client-ip-00
Abstract
This draft defines an EDNS0 extension to allow Authoritative
Nameservers to return varying replies based upon the network address
of the client that initiated the query rather than of the client's
Recursive Resolver.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 30, 2010.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Option format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Protocol description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Querying Authoritative Nameservers . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Generating a response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Handling edns-client-ip replies and caching . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. DNSSEC Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. NAT Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Attack scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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1. Introduction
Authoritative Nameservers of most major web sites today return
different replies based on the perceived vicinity of the user to a
particular location and knowledge of available resources. This
significantly reduces the overall latency of connections established
by the end user and optimizes network resource usage.
To find the best reply for a given query, most nameservers use the IP
address of the incoming query to attempt to establish the location of
the end user.
Most users today, however, do not query the Authoritative Nameserver
directly. Instead, queries are relayed by Recursive Resolvers
operated by their ISP or third parties.
When the Recursive Resolver does not use an IP address that appears
to be topologically close to the end user, the results returned by
those Authoritative Nameservers will be at best sub-optimal.
This draft proposes a DNS protocol extension to enable Authoritative
Nameservers to return answers based on the network address of the
actual client, by allowing Recursive Resolvers to include it in
queries.
This draft also includes guidelines on how to best cache those
results and provides recommendations on when this protocol extension
should be used.
1.1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Terminology
Authoritative Nameserver: A nameserver that has authority over one
or more DNS zones. These are normally not contacted by clients
directly but by Recursive Resolvers. Described in [RFC1035]
chapter 6.
Recursive Resolver: A nameserver that is responsible for resolving
domain names for clients by following the domain's delegation
chain, starting at the root. Recursive Resolvers frequently use
caches to be able to respond to client queries quickly. Described
in [RFC1035] chapter 7.
Third-party nameserver: Recursive Resolvers provided by parties that
are not Internet Service Providers (ISPs). These services are
often offered as substitutes for ISP-run nameservers.
Optimized reply: A reply from a nameserver that is optimized for the
node that sent the request, normally based on performance (i.e.
lowest latency, least number of hops, topological distance, ...).
Topologically close: Refers to two hosts being close in terms of
number of hops or time it takes for a packet to travel from one
host to the other. The concept of topological distance is only
loosely related to the concept of geographical distance: two
geographically close hosts can still be very distant from a
topological perspective.
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3. Option format
This draft uses an EDNS0 ([RFC2671]) option to include client IP
information in DNS messages. The option is structured as follows:
+0 (MSB) +1 (LSB)
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0: | OPTION-CODE |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
2: | OPTION-LENGTH |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
4: | FAMILY |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
6: | NETMASK | ADDRESS... /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
o (Defined in [RFC2671]) OPTION-CODE, 2 octets, for edns-client-ip
is TBD.
o (Defined in [RFC2671]) OPTION-LENGTH, 2 octets, contains the
length of the payload (everything after OPTION-LENGTH) in bytes.
o FAMILY, 2 octets, indicates the family of the address contained in
the option, using address family codes as assigned by IANA in
IANA-AFI [1].
The format of the address part depends on the value of FAMILY. This
document only defines the format for FAMILY 1 (IP version 4) and 2
(IP version 6), which are as follows:
o NETMASK, 1 octet, indicating how many most-significant bits of the
original ADDRESS are included (i.e. a netmask in CIDR notation).
o ADDRESS, variable number of octets, contains either an IPv4 or
IPv6 address (depending on FAMILY), truncated to the number of
bits indicated by the NETMASK field, with bits set to 0 to pad up
to the end of the last octet used.
All fields are in network byte order.
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4. Protocol description
The edns-client-ip extension allows DNS servers to propagate the
network address of the client that initiated the resolution through
to Authoritative Nameservers during recursion.
Servers that receive queries containing an edns-client-ip option can
generate answers based on the original network address of the client.
Those answers will generally be optimized for that client and other
clients in the same network.
The option also allows Authoritative Nameservers to specify the
network range for which the reply can be cached and re-used.
4.1. Querying Authoritative Nameservers
When a Recursive Resolver performs recursion for an incoming query,
it MAY include an edns-client-ip option in queries to Authoritative
Namesevers.
If an edns-client-ip option is included, the FAMILY and ADDRESS
fields MUST be populated with the IP address of the client that
originally initiated the resolution. The address SHOULD be truncated
to an arbitrary NETMASK chosen by the owners of the Recursive
Resolver as described in Section 3, following the recommendations
provided in Section 8, and the NETMASK field populated accordingly.
If the incoming query originally contained an edns-client-ip option,
its FAMILY, ADDRESS and NETMASK information MUST be used instead,
with the only exceptions being listed in Section 8.
A Recursive Resolver set up to serve clients in private address space
(as defined in [RFC1918] and [RFC4193]) MUST NOT add edns-client-ip
options containing a non-public address to its queries. An edns-
client-ip option MUST never contain a non-public address.
For privacy reasons, and because the whole IP address is rarely
required to determine an optimized reply, the address MUST be
truncated to a certain number of bits, indicated by the NETMASK
field, as described in Section 8.
A Recursive Resolver MAY be configured to omit the edns-client-ip
option completely when querying servers from which a delegation
response is expected, for example TLD servers or root servers.
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4.2. Generating a response
When a query containing an edns-client-ip option is received, an
Authoritative Nameserver supporting edns-client-ip MAY use the
ADDRESS and NETMASK specified in the option in order to generate an
optimized reply.
Requests with an edns-client-ip option considered invalid (i.e. wrong
formatting, unsupported address family, private address space) MUST
be treated as if no edns-client-ip option was specified.
In the reply, the server MUST include an edns-client-ip option. The
ADDRESS and FAMILY specified MUST match the ADDRESS and FAMILY in the
request, while the NETMASK in the reply indicates how many bits of
that ADDRESS were actually used or would have been required to
calculate an optimal reply, as described below.
Note that the NETMASK value in the reply can actually be higher than
the NETMASK value in the request, indicating that the address range
provided in the query was not specific enough to select a single,
best response, and that an optimal reply would require at least
NETMASK bits of address information. The additional bits of the
ADDRESS in the reply MUST be set to 0, and if octet boundaries are
crossed, extra octets must be added.
Conversely, a lower NETMASK indicates that more bits than necessary
were provided. In this case, the ADDRESS in the reply MUST be
truncated according to the new NETMASK value, as described in
Section 3.
In both cases, the value of the NETMASK in the reply has strong
implications with regard to how the reply should be cached by
Recursive Resolvers, as described in Section 4.3.
Servers MUST NOT include an edns-client-ip option in replies if an
edns-client-ip option was not present in the request.
If the edns-client-ip option in the request is not used at all (for
example if an optimized reply was temporarily unavailable or not
supported for the requested domain name), a server supporting edns-
client-ip MUST indicate that no bits of the ADDRESS in the request
have been used by specifying a NETMASK of 0 and no ADDRESS
(equivalent to the networks 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0).
If no optimized answer could be found at all for the ADDRESS and
NETMASK indicated in the query, the Authoritative Nameserver SHOULD
still return the best result it knows of (i.e. by using the query
source IP address instead, or a sensible default), and indicate that
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this result should only be cached for the FAMILY, ADDRESS and NETMASK
indicated in the request.
4.3. Handling edns-client-ip replies and caching
When a Recursive Resolver receives a reply containing an
edns-client-ip option, it will return a reply to the client and cache
the result as usual.
In the cache, any resource record in the answer section will be tied
to the network specified by the FAMILY, ADDRESS and NETMASK fields,
as detailed below.
If another query is received matching the entry in the cache, the
resolver will verify that the FAMILY and ADDRESS that represent the
client match any of the networks in the cache for that entry.
If the address of the client is within any of the networks in the
cache, then the cached response MUST be returned as usual. In case
the address of the client matches multiple networks in the cache, the
entry with the highest NETMASK value MUST be returned, as with most
route-matching algorithms.
If the address of the client does not match any network in the cache,
then the Recursive Resolver MUST behave as if no match was found and
perform resolution as usual. This is necessary to avoid sub-optimal
replies in the cache from being returned to the wrong clients, and to
avoid a single request coming from a client on a different network
from polluting the cache with a sub-optimal reply for all the users
of that resolver.
Note that every time a Recursive Resolver queries an Authoritative
Nameserver by forwarding the edns-client-ip option that it received
from another client, a low NETMASK in the original request could
cause a sub-optimal reply to be returned by the Authoritative
Nameserver.
To avoid this sub-optimal reply from being served from cache for
clients for which a better reply would be available, the Recursive
Resolver MUST check the NETMASK that was returned by the
Authoritative Nameserver:
o If the NETMASK in the reply is higher than the NETMASK in the
request, it means that the reply might be sub-optimal. A
Recursive Resolver MUST return this entry from cache only to
queries that do not allow a higher NETMASK to be forwarded.
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o If the NETMASK in the reply is lower or equal to the NETMASK in
the request, the reply is optimal, and SHOULD be returned from
cache to any client in a subnet matching the ADDRESS and NETMASK
indicated by the Authoritative Nameserver.
When another request is performed, the existing entries SHOULD be
kept in the cache until their TTL expires, as per standard behavior.
As another reply is received, the reply will be tied to a different
network. The server MAY keep in cache both replies, and return the
most appropriate one depending on the address of the client.
Any reply containing an edns-client-ip option considered invalid
should be treated as if no edns-client-ip option was specified at
all.
Replies coming from servers not supporting edns-client-ip or
otherwise not containing an edns-client-ip option SHOULD be
considered as containing a NETMASK of 0 (e.g., 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0) for
all the supported families.
In any case, the response from the resolver to the client MUST NOT
contain the edns-client-ip option if none was present in the client's
original request. If the original client request contained a valid
edns-client-ip option that was used during recursion, the Recursive
Resolver MUST include the edns-client-ip option from the
Authoritative Nameserver response in the response to the client.
Enabling support for edns-client-ip in a recursive resolver will
significantly increase the size of the cache, reduce the number of
results that can be served from cache, and increase the load on the
server. Implementing the mitigation techniques described in
Section 8 is strongly recommended.
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5. IANA Considerations
We request IANA to assign an option code for edns-client-ip, as
specified in [RFC2671]. Within this document, the text 'TBD' should
be replaced with the option code assigned by IANA.
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6. DNSSEC Considerations
The presence or absence of an OPT resource record containing an edns-
client-ip option in a DNS query does not change the usage of those
resource records and mechanisms used to provide data origin
authentication and data integrity to the DNS, as described in
[RFC4033], [RFC4034] and [RFC4035].
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7. NAT Considerations
Special awareness of edns-client-ip in devices that perform NAT as
described in [RFC2663] is not required, queries can be passed through
as-is. The client's network address MUST NOT be added, and existing
edns-client-ip options, if present, MUST NOT be modified by NAT
devices.
Recursive Resolvers sited behind NAT devices MUST NOT add their
external network address in an edns-client-ip options, and MUST
behave exactly as described in the previous sections.
Note that Authoritative Nameservers or Recursive Resolvers can still
provide an optimized reply by looking at the source IP of the query.
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8. Security Considerations
8.1. Privacy
With the edns-client-ip option, the network address of the client
that initiated the resolution becomes visible to all servers involved
in the resolution process. Additionally, it will be visible from any
network traversed by the DNS packets.
To protect users' privacy, Recursive Resolvers are strongly
encouraged to conceal part of the IP address of the user by
truncating IPv4 addresses to 24 bits. No recommendation is provided
for IPv6 at this time, but IPv6 addresses should be similarly
truncated in order to not allow to uniquely identify the client.
Users who wish their full IP address to be hidden can include an
edns-client-ip option specifying the wildcard address 0.0.0.0/0 (i.e.
FAMILY set to 1 (IPv4), NETMASK to 0 and no ADDRESS). As described
in previous sections, this option will be forwarded across all the
Recursive Resolvers supporting edns-client-ip, which MUST NOT modify
it to include the network address of the client.
Note that even without edns-client-ip options, any server queried
directly by the user will be able to see the full client IP address.
Recursive Resolvers or Authoritative Nameservers MAY use the source
IP address of requests to return a cached entry or to generate an
optimized reply that best matches the request.
8.2. Attack scenarios
It is simple for an arbitrary resolver or client to provide false
information in the edns-client-ip option, or to send UDP packets with
forged source IP addresses.
This could be used to pollute the cache of intermediate resolvers, by
filling it with results that will rarely (if ever) be used, or to
reverse engineer the algorithms (or data) used by the Authoritative
Nameserver to calculate the optimized answers.
Even without malicious intent, third-party Recursive Resolvers
providing answers to clients in multiple networks will need to cache
different replies for different networks, putting significantly more
pressure on the cache.
To mitigate those problems:
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o Recursive Resolvers implementing edns-client-ip should only enable
it in deployments where it is expected to bring clear advantages
to the end users. For example, when expecting clients from a
variety of networks or from a wide geographical area. Due to the
high cache pressure introduced by edns-client-ip, the feature must
be disabled in all default configurations.
o Recursive Resolvers should limit the number of networks and
answers they keep in the cache for a given query.
o Recursive Resolvers should limit the number of total different
networks that they keep in cache.
o Recursive Resolvers should never send edns-client-ip options with
NETMASKs providing more bits in the ADDRESS than they are willing
to cache responses for.
o Recursive Resolvers should implement algorithms to improve the
cache hit rate, given the size constraints indicated above.
Recursive Resolvers may, for example, decide to discard more
specific cache entries first.
o Authoritative Nameservers and Recursive Resolvers should discard
known to be wrong or known to be forged edns-client-ip options.
They must at least ignore unroutable addresses, including the ones
defined in [RFC1918] and [RFC4193], and should ignore and never
forward edns-client-ip options specifying networks or addresses
that are known not to be served by those servers when feasible.
o Authoritative Nameservers consider the edns-client-ip option just
as a hint to provide better results. They can decide to ignore
the content of the edns-client-ip option based on black or white
lists, rate limiting mechanisms, or any other logic implemented in
the software.
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9. Example
1. A stub resolver SR with IP address 192.0.2.37 tries to resolve
www.example.com, by forwarding the query to the Recursive
Resolver R from IP address IP, asking for recursion.
2. R, supporting edns-client-ip, looks up www.example.com in its
cache. An entry is found neither for www.example.com, nor for
example.com.
3. R builds a query to send to the root and .com servers. The
implementation of R does not include an edns-client-ip option
when querying TLD or root nameservers, because there is no
expectation to receive a client-network-specific response.
Thus, no edns-client-ip option is added, and resolution is
performed as usual.
4. R now knows the Authoritative Nameserver ANS responsible for
example.com.
5. R prepares a new query for www.example.com, including an edns-
client-ip option with:
* OPTION-CODE, set to TBD.
* OPTION-LENGTH, set to 0x00 0x06.
* FAMILY, set to 0x00 0x01 as IP is an IPv4 address.
* NETMASK, set to 0x18, as it is configured to conceal the last
8 bits of every IPv4 address.
* ADDRESS, set to 0xC0 0x00 0x02, providing only the first 24
bits of the IPv4 address.
6. The query is sent. Authoritative Nameserver ANS understands and
uses edns-client-ip. It parses the edns-client-ip option, and
generates an optimized reply.
7. Due to the internal implementation of the Authoritative
Nameserver ANS, ANS finds a reply that is optimal for the whole
/16 of the client that performed the request.
8. The Authoritative Nameserver ANS adds an edns-client-ip option
in the reply, containing:
* OPTION-CODE, set to TBD.
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* OPTION-LENGTH, set to 0x00 0x05.
* FAMILY, set to 0x00 0x01.
* NETMASK, set to 0x10.
* ADDRESS, set to 0xC0 0x00: the first 2 octets of the ADDRESS
included in the request.
9. The Recursive Resolver R receives the reply containing an edns-
client-ip option. The resolver:
* Verifies that FAMILY is set to 1, as it was in the request.
* Sees that NETMASK was lowered to 16, and truncates the IP
address of stub resolver SR to that size.
* Verifies that this address matches ADDRESS in the response.
If not, the option is discarded.
10. The reply is interpreted as usual. Since the reply still
contains an edns-client-ip option, the ADDRESS, NETMASK, and
FAMILY in the response are used to cache the entry.
11. R sends a response to stub resolver SR, without including an
edns-client-ip option.
12. R receives another request to resolve www.example.com. This
time, a reply is cached. The reply, however, is tied to a
particular network. If the address of the client matches any
network in the cache, then the reply is returned from the cache.
Otherwise, another query is performed. If multiple results
match, the one with the longest NETMASK is chosen, as per common
best-network match algorithms.
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10. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the following people for reviewing early
drafts of this document and for providing useful feedback: Paul S. R.
Chisholm, B. Narendran, Leonidas Kontothanassis, David Presotto,
Philip Rowlands, Chris Morrow, Kara Moscoe, Alex Nizhner, Warren
Kumari, Richard Rabbat from Google, Terry Farmer, Mark Teodoro,
Edward Lewis, Eric Burger from Neustar, David Ulevitch from OpenDNS,
Patrick W. Gilmore from Akamai, Colm MacCartaigh, Richard Sheehan and
all the other people that replied to our emails on various mailing
lists.
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11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2671] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
RFC 2671, August 1999.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC2663] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address
Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations",
RFC 2663.
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URIs
[1] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/>
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Authors' Addresses
Carlo Contavalli
Google
Gordon House, Barrow Street
Dublin 4
IE
Email: ccontavalli@google.com
Wilmer van der Gaast
Google
Gordon House, Barrow Street
Dublin 4
IE
Email: wilmer@google.com
Sean Leach
Neustar
46000 Center Oak Plaza
Sterling, VA 20166
VA
Email: sean.leach@neustar.com
Darryl Rodden
Neustar
46000 Center Oak Plaza
Sterling, VA 20166
VA
Email: darryl.rodden@neustar.com
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