Mipshop V. Narayanan
Internet-Draft Motorola
Expires: December 30, 2005 N. Venkitaraman
Motorola Labs
H. Tschofenig
Siemens
G. Giaretta
TILab
J. Bournelle
GET/INT
June 28, 2005
Handover Keys Using AAA
draft-vidya-mipshop-handover-keys-aaa-00.txt
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
This document describes a AAA-assisted key management protocol to
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generate session keys between a mobile node (MN) and an access router
(AR) for the purpose of securing handoff signaling messages. As
such, it specifies a message exchange between the MN and the AR,
payloads to carry keying material and parameters in the AAA
infrastructure, and assumptions that must hold in order for this
protocol to work. The idea is that the key derived between a mobile
node and an access router through this protocol can be used in fast
handovers (both IPv4 and IPv6).
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Goals and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Mobile Node Handoff Related Operation . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1 Handover Key Request (HKReq) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2 Handover Key Response (HKResp) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1 Mobile Node Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2 Access Router Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3 AAA Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1 Procedure to establish a Handover Master Key . . . . . . . 15
6.2 Authentication and key exchange protocol . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3 AAA infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.4 FMIPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A. Deriving the Handover Master Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.1 Identity Derivation for the Mobile Node . . . . . . . . . 23
B. RADIUS Handover Key Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C. Diameter Handover Key Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
C.1 New Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
C.2 AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
C.3 Diameter Flow of Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
D. Alternate Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
E. Formal Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 32
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1. Introduction
Fast Mobile IPv6 FMIPv6 [1] specifies a fast handoff protocol for
IPv6 mobile nodes. It requires tunneling of packets from an old
access router to the mobile node. For this purpose, the FMIPv6
signaling messages between the mobile node and the access router must
be secured to ensure FMIPv6 support for a legitimate mobile node that
has been authorized to obtain such services. The FMIPv6 protocol
itself does not provide a method to establish a session key and the
corresponding parameters between the mobile node and the access
router required for this purpose.
This document describes a AAA-assisted key management protocol to
generate session keys between a mobile node and an access router for
usage in the context of FMIPv6. As such, it specifies:
o A message exchange between the MN and the AR
o Payloads to carry keying material and parameters in the AAA
infrastructure
o Derivation of a new session key for handoff purposes based on a
shared secret
1.1 Goals and Assumptions
This document has been written with the following goals and
assumptions in mind.
o The protocol is designed to leverage the existence of AAA
infrastructure to establish session keys for securing Fast MIPv6
signaling messages. AAA is widely deployed today due to the usage
of AAA-based network access authentication infrastructure. The
AAA server is used to authenticate and authorize the MN for fast
handovers prior to generation of the handover key. The solution
presented in this document relies on the AAA infrastructure
components to derive and distribute keying material keys for
handover support.
o A Handover Master Key (HMK) between the MN and the home AAA server
(AAAH ) is required for this protocol to be able to derive
handover keys between the MN and AR. The exact method of
establishing or deriving this HMK is outside the scope of this
document. No particular method is mandated for this protocol to
work but we illustrate an example approach using the Application
Master Session Key (AMSK), as defined in EAP, in Appendix A. Due
to deployment considerations, it may be practical to use the
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method to derive the HMK.
o Key naming of the HMK is provided using the Network Access
Identifier (NAI). In order to provide identity protection, it may
be undesirable to reuse the same NAI as used for network access
authentication. For sake of identity protection, it may be
desirable to have the AAA server to derive an ephemeral identity
at the time of HMK creation that can be used in subsequent
creation of handover keys.
o It is further assumed that a security association exists between
each AR and the AAA server. If a AAAL or other proxies are used
(as it is typical in a roaming environment) then the AR will
likely share a security association only with its local AAA server
(AAAL) instead of the user's home AAA server (AAAH). The AAAL in
this case acts as a AAA proxy between the AR and the AAAH server.
These security associations protect the signaling message exchange
including the transport of keying material and other security
sensitive parameters.
o The protocol does not introduce any new required steps at the time
of handover. Any new messages introduced for deriving handover
keys can be exchanged prior to the handover process.
o The protocol has been designed such that the compromise of one AR
does not lead to the compromise of any other AR. No AR is able to
view the key of another AR - keys are transferred securely from
the AAA server directly to the AR requesting it.
1.2 Applicability
Although this document is focused on FMIPv6, it is applicable to
other protocols as well. In the context of FMIPv6, the key derived
using this protocol can be used to secure the Fast Binding Update
(FBU) sent from the MN to the PAR as specified in FMIPv6 [1]. This
protocol can be used to derive keys for fast handovers in IPv4 as
well. Keys can be derived for secure IPv4 low latency handoffs
LOWLAT [5] based on this protocol. CxTP [6] can also use this
protocol to derive keys between the AR and MN to secure the CTAR
message. Additionally, keys between an MN and a MAP can be derived
using this protocol for HMIPv6 [7] operation. In order for this
protocol to be used to create session keys for more than one
application (e.g. FMIPv6 and CxTP) between the same {MN, AR} pair,
application specific key derivation will be addressed in a future
revision of this draft.
The document is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
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terminology used in this document. Section 3 provides a general
protocol overview. Section 4 details the message formats. Section 5
provides protocol details on mobile node and access router operation.
Section 6 describes the security considerations for this protocol.
Appendix A provides a method of deriving the handover master key
using EAP. Appendices B and C describe the AAA messages and
attributes necessary for this protocol in RADIUS [2] and Diameter [3]
respectively. Appendix D provides brief descriptions of alternate
approaches for handover key derivation along with the disadvantages
of those alternatives.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC- 2119 RFC2119 [4].
In addition, this document uses the following terms:
MN-AAA Handover Master Key (HMK):
A key that is shared between the Mobile Node and the AAAH server,
hereby referred to simply as the Handover Master Key.
Handover Key (HK):
Session key used to secure messages between the Mobile Node and
Access Router. A given HK between an MN and ARn is termed as HKn.
ARn-AAA Key:
A key that is shared between an Access Router ARn and the AAA
server. In a roaming case, the ARn shares this key with the AAAL
server.
3. Protocol Overview
This section provides a description of the procedure to obtain the
Handover Key (HK). We assume that the MN shares a session key,
called Handover Master Key (HMK), with the AAA (AAAH) server. This
key, for instance, may be the derived from the EAP key hierarchy.
Appendix A describes a method of deriving the HMK and an identity for
the MN from the EAP Application Master Session Key (AMSK). This
method can be used whenever possible. For the purpose of the
protocol itself, the HMK may simply be a handover specific master key
pre-shared between the MN and the AAA server.
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Figure 1 depicts the high-level protocol interaction.
MN AR AAAH Server
| HKReq. | |
| ---------> | |
| | AAA (RADIUS Access Request) |
| | ----------------------> |
| | AAA (RADIUS Access Accept) |
| | <----------------------- |
| HKResp. | (Keying material) |
| <--------- | |
Figure 1: Protocol Operation
The MN, upon attaching to an AR (say AR1) in a given administrative
domain, sends a Handover Key Request (HKReq) message to the AR. The
very first time the MN attaches to the domain, it completes
successful Mobile IP registration prior to sending the HKReq message.
The MN then creates a HKReq message including a NAI alike identifier
(that was derived possibly during the time of HMK derivation), a
message ID, a sequence number and a keyed message digest of these
fields by using the HMK. AR1 forwards the HKReq message to the AAA
Server via the AAA infrastructure. The keyed message digest allows
the home AAA server to authenticate the MN and to perform
authorization for fast handoffs before deriving unique and fresh
session key, the Handover Key (HK1). The keyed message digest is
calculated as follows:
MN-AAA MAC = PRF(HMK, MN ID | Message ID | Sequence Number), where |
indicates concatenation.
HK1 will subsequently be used between the MN and the AR1 after a
successful protocol execution. The key derivation procedure for the
Handover Key is defined as follows:
HK1 = PRF(HMK, AAA-MN Nonce | AR1 ID | MN ID, "Handover Key"), where
| indicates concatenation
The AR1 ID is the IP address of AR1. The MN ID is the NAI of the MN
that is sent by the MN in the HKReq message. The AAA-MN Nonce is a
nonce generated by the AAA server for the purpose of HK1 derivation.
After successful authentication and authorization the AAA Server then
sends two different parameters to AR1 - one of the parameters
includes the session key HK1 and the lifetime associated with it.
The other parameter, to be sent to the MN, includes the AAA-MN Nonce.
A keyed message digest computed based on the HMK is included with
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this parameter to the MN. The message is protected with the AR1-AAA
SA when forwarded to AR1.
AR1 sends a Handover Key Response (HKResp) to the MN, including the
material (nonce) sent by the AAA server and also the key lifetime it
received from the AAA server. Using this keying material, the MN
derives HK1.
When the MN is ready to send an FBU to AR1 (in accordance with FMIPv6
[1]), it uses HK1 to secure the FBU message.
3.1 Mobile Node Handoff Related Operation
The MN may learn about the neighboring ARs while it is attached to
AR1. This may be done by exchanging the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv messages
as defined in FMIPv6 [1] or via layer 2 mechanisms. As soon as it
learns about its neighboring ARs, the MN sends HKReq message to those
ARs. Assuming that AR2 is a neighbor of AR1, the MN sends a HKReq to
AR2 through AR1, while still attached to AR1. AR2 correspondingly
sends the message in a AAA protocol to the AAA server. The AAA
server generates HK2 for the MN as a derivative of HMK as shown
below:
HK2 = PRF (HMK, AAA-MN Nonce | AR2 ID | MN ID, "Handover Key"), where
| indicates concatenation.
Fresh nonces are generated by the AAA server for every handover key
generation and sent to the MN through the AR in every HKResp. The
AAA server sends HK2 and the corresponding lifetime to AR2, protected
by the AR2-AAA SA. As before, the AAA server also sends the keying
material for the MN (AAA-MN Nonce, hashed with HMK). AR2 sends the
parameters from the AAA server to the MN via AR1, in a HKResp
message.
If the MN hands off prior to receiving the HKResp from AR2, it re-
sends the HKReq message with the same message ID, to AR2, upon
attaching to it. AR2 re-sends the HKResp sent earlier via AR1 to the
MN directly in this case. This does not add to the handoff delay,
since HK2 is required to authenticate the FBU sent only when the MN
is performing a handoff from AR2 to a third AR. The MN sends a new
HKReq to any new neighbors it receives information about, while
attached to AR2.
4. Message Formats
This protocol will run over UDP well known port number <to be
assigned by IANA>. This section presents the description of the
HKReq and HKResp messages that this protocol uses. The description
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of AAA attributes that are needed for this protocol are described in
Appendices B and C. Appendix B provides the attributes for RADIUS and
Appendix C describes a Diameter handover application.
4.1 Handover Key Request (HKReq)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Type |V| Reserved | Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Identifier | Message Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=1 | Length | MN ID .......|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=2 | Length | MN-AAA-MAC .......|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=3 | Length | MN-AR-MAC .... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Padding...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This message is sent from a mobile node to an access router, either
directly or via another access router to which the MN is attached.
IP Addresses
IP Source Address = Care-of-address of MN
IP Destination Address = AR IP address
HKReq Fields
Message Type = 1
v - Verify flag. This is set by the MN to indicate that it may
already share a key with MN.
Message length = length of message including all the TLVs but
excluding padding
Message ID - A value that can uniquely identify the message to
both the AR and MN
Sequence number - MUST be set to 1 for the first transmission
and incremented by 1 for every retransmission
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MN-ID TLV - The NAI of the MN. This value MUST always be
included
MN-AAA MAC - TLV of type 2 MUST be present if v=0. This is the
hash of the message ID, sequence number and the MN-ID TLV. It
MAY be present if v=1
MN-AR MAC - TLV of type 3; this MUST be present if v=1. This
is the hash of the message up to this TLV
4.2 Handover Key Response (HKResp)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Type |V| Reserved | Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Status Code | Lifetime |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Identifier | Message Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=4 | Length | AAA-MN Nonce .......|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=2 | Length | MN-AAA MAC .......|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=3 | Length | MN-AR-MAC .... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Padding...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This message is sent from an access router to a mobile node, either
directly or via another access router to which the MN is attached.
IP Addresses
IP Source Address = AR IP address
IP Destination Address = Care-of-address of MN
HKResp Fields
Message Type = 2
V - Verified Flag - Set by the AR in response to a HKReq with
the V bit set, if it verified the request
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Reserved - set to zero
Message Length - Length of the full message excluding padding
Status Code - Indicates status of the message; the following
values are defined:
0 - success
1 - unable to verify
2 - invalid MN-AR MAC
3 - MN-AR MAC TLV needed
4 - MN-AAA MAC TLV needed
5 - Invalid MN-AAA MAC (sent by AAA server)
Lifetime - Recommended lifetime from AAA server when received
from the AAA server; when AR is verifying a request from MN,
this field MUST be set to the remaining lifetime of the
handover key maintained by the AR.
Message ID - uniquely identifies the message (copied from the
corresponding HKReq)
Sequence number - MUST be set to 1 for the first transmission
and incremented by 1 for every retransmission
AAA-MN nonce - TLV of type 4; a random value of at least 128
bits generated by the AAA server to be used to derive the key
to be shared between MN and AR
MN-AAA MAC - MUST be present if V=0 and Status Code = 0; MUST
NOT be present when V=1; This field is the hash of the AAA-MN
Nonce, when V=0
MN-AR MAC - MUST be present if V=1 and Status Code = 0; MUST
NOT be present when V=0; This is a hash of the message up to
this TLV
5. Protocol Details
The proposed protocol enables a MN to derive session keys (HKs) with
its current AR and with neighboring ARs. This section describes the
processing rules for the mobile node and the access router. AAA
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server considerations are addressed in Appendices B and C, along with
the description of the AAA attributes.
5.1 Mobile Node Considerations
After completing MIPv6 signaling the mobile node SHOULD immediately
proceed to obtain a session key between itself and its current AR.
It does not have to wait for information about any neighbor AR
information. If the MN does not receive a response after a
configured timeout (HKEY_REQ_TOUT), it SHOULD retransmit the request
for a maximum of N HO_KEYTRIES. In each of the retry attempts, the
MN MUST use the same message ID. The default value of N_HO_KEYTRIES
is 3.
When the MN receives information about neighboring routers it SHOULD
first determine whether the MN already shares keys with the one or
more of the identified access routers. With each neighboring AR with
which a MN does not share a key, the MN SHOULD start the process by
sending HKReq even when connected to the current AR.
If the MN, which had sent a HKReq corresponding to a nAR, hands off
before receiving a response, the MN MAY receive the HKResp directly
when it gets connected to the nAR (provided the AR still has the
response buffered). This response MAY be sent unsolicited, i.e., nAR
may forward the HKResp to MN once it realizes the presence of the
mobile (e.g., receives the FNA from MN). If the MN does not receive
this response it MAY retransmit a HKReq after a configured timeout
(UNSOLICITED_HKRSP_TO). As indicated before, the retransmission MUST
use the same message id to enable the nAR respond immediately if it
has already received a response from AAA for the corresponding HKReq.
It is up to the end points (MN/AR) to enforce the key lifetimes. The
AAA server does not store or enforce the lifetime. A new session key
(HK) should be derived before the lifetime expires on the current
key.
When a MN attaches an AR with which the MN believes it has a shared
key, i.e., the MN has already received a HKResp from the AR, the MN
MUST verify that by sending a HKReq with the verify flag set and a
hash of the message with the MN-AR key. The MN MUST include this
hash in the MN-AR MAC TLV in this case. This procedure serves two
purposes. It is used to verify the validity of the key and also bind
the key with the MN CoA. In a protocol like FMIPv6, the FBU only
contains the CoA of the MN. Hence, when receiving an FBU secured
with the handover key, the AR must be able to retrieve the correct
key corresponding to the MN, based on the contents of the FBU. This
message makes it possible. For this purpose, this message MUST be
sourced with the CoA that the MN acquired at the AR. The MN MAY
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include its CoA in an Alternate CoA Option (defined in FMIPv6 [1]).
This verification procedure is also needed to accommodate cases where
an AR rebooted after getting the shared key leading the MN to believe
that is shared a key with the AR. In response, the MN may receive a
HKResp with verified bit set and a hash of the HKResp message. If
the AR did not have the key, the MN will receive a standard HKResp
with verified bit set to 0. Note that the message id must be
different from the one used to create the previous MN-AR key because
this is not a retransmission and if the AR did not have the key this
message may simply trigger normal HKReq reception procedure.
If the MN receives a HKResp message with the 'V' bit set, but without
the MN-AR MAC TLV, it MUST silently discard the message. If the MN
receives a HKResp with the 'V' bit set to zero, but without the AAA
Auth TLV, it MUST silently discard the message. If the MN receives a
HKResp with the 'V' bit set to one and with the MN-AAA MAC TLV, it
MUST silently discard the message. If the MN receives the HKResp
with the 'V' bit set to zero and with the MN-AR MAC TLV, it SHOULD
discard the message.
5.2 Access Router Considerations
When an AR receives a HKReq from a MN it MUST first determine if it
has the 'V' bit set. If so, the AR MUST use the included MN ID to
lookup the MN and obtain the key. If a key is present and the
computed keyed message digest matches the values included in the
HKReq message, the AR MUST send a response with the verified bit set
including the hash of the response. Also, the AR MUST record the CoA
of the MN as the IP address associated with the handover key for that
MN, in addition to the MN ID (NAI). This is required so that the AR
can pull up the correct key upon receiving a message (like the FBU)
from the MN with the CoA. If the HKReq message included an Alternate
CoA Option (as defined in FMIPv6 [1]), the AR MUST use the IP address
in that option as the MN CoA. If not, the AR MUST use the source IP
address of the HKReq message as the CoA of the MN. If the MN-AR MAC
TLV is not present in the HKReq in this case, the AR MUST drop the
message and return a HKResp with the error code set to 3. Also, if
the MN-AR MAC TLV was included but the AR was unable to verify the
keyed message digest, it MUST drop the message and return a HKResp
with the error code set to 2. If the AR does not have the key or if
the HKReq does not have the verify bit set, the AR does the
following.
It MUST first determine if it has already seen the same message
request by checking its tables using the message id and the included
MN ID as index. If so and if the AR has already received the HKResp,
the AR SHOULD retransmit the response to the MN. If the received
message has the same message ID and the sequence number as before,
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the AR MUST drop the packet. The sequence number alone cannot
entirely thwart replay attacks, since a HKReq that does not have the
verify bit set, only has a hash with the HMK that the MN shares with
the AAA server. Hence, there is no way for the AR to verify the
legitimacy of the hash in the message. This could lead to replay
attacks going unnoticed at the AR when the attacker increments the
sequence number, but replays the message with the same hash. This
message will only be dropped at the AAA server. For simple replay
protection, the AR MUST drop packets that are sent with the same
sequence number for the same message ID. For further protection from
replays, the rate of retransmissions of responses to MN MUST not be
more than a preconfigured RETRANS_RATE. If the AR already forwarded
this message to the home AAA Server but has not yet received a
response from AAA server, the AR MUST silently discard the
retransmitted request from the MN. Note that the AAA protocol should
independently perform its own retransmission. If this is a new
request, the AR MUST check to determine if the MN-AAA MAC TLV has
been included in this message by the MN. If it has been included,
then the AR MUST forward the request to the home AAA Server. If it
has not been included, the AR MUST drop the message and return a
HKResp to the MN with the error code set to 1.
The AR MUST construct a AAA message using the appropriately defined
attributes (defined in Appendix B for RADIUS and Appendix C for
Diameter). For instance, the AR MUST include the MN ID from the
HKReq message in a HK-MN-ID attribute in a RADIUS Access Request
message. Also, the MN-AAA MAC TLV MUST be included in the HK-MN-AAA-
Authenticator attribute.
The AR MUST include the NAS-IP-Address AVP in the AAA message (e.g.
RADIUS Access Request) sent to the AAA server. The AR MUST use its
IP address as seen by the MN in this AVP. This will be used as the
AR ID in deriving the handover key.
The domain name in the NAI is used to determine the AAA server to be
contacted. Note that if there is a local AAA server that is
different from the MNs AAA server, then the AR may send the message
via the AAA protocol to the Local AAA server which in turn would
forward the request. The AAAL will act as a AAA proxy in this case.
If the AR receives a RADIUS Access Accept message from the AAA
server, it MUST send the AAA-MN Nonce and the AAA Authenticator from
the HK-MN-AAA-SHASH attribute in the RADIUS message in the HKResp
message to the MN. It MUST also send the key lifetime sent by the
AAA server to the MN in the same message. If the AR receives a
RADIUS Access Reject message from the AAA server, the AR MUST send an
appropriate error code to the MN in the HKResp message.
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When the AR sends a HKResp, it SHOULD determine if the MN is directly
connected to it. If so it should forward the packet to the MN
directly. If the MN is not attached directly then the AR SHOULD send
the packet to the MN via the current AR. In any case the AR SHOULD
buffer the packet for a maximum value of HKEY_REQ_TOUT, so that it
can be retransmitted if needed.
An AR SHOULD maintain the keys such that it could be looked up based
on the MN ID, last CoA that the MN has with the AR. It must also
maintain the message id that was used to create the key. The MN ID
is needed to verify the HK, while the message ID is required to
determine retransmitted HKReq messages. The CoA is needed to
determine the key to use when the FBU is received. Since the MN ID
is not included in the FBU, tracking the key only based on the MN ID
is insufficient for using it with FMIPv6. If the MN that returns to
a AR and obtain a new CoA, this message should be updated based on
HKReq from the MN for verification.
If a pAR receives a HKResp destined to a MN that is no longer
connected to it, indicating that the MN roamed away from the pAR, it
SHOULD silently discard it.
5.3 AAA Server Considerations
A description of the actual AAA attributes is included in Appendices
B and C. This section provides a brief description of the operation
of the AAA server for this protocol.
Upon receiving a handover key request, the AAA server MUST verify
that the MN-AAA MAC TLV is present in the message. If the MN-AAA MAC
TLV is absent, the AAA server MUST silently discard the message.
Otherwise, the AAA server MUST verify the keyed message digest
included in the MN-AAA MAC TLV. If the MN-AAA MAC TLV is invalid,
the AAA server MUST silently discard the message. If the hash is
valid, the AAA server must proceed with the handover key generation
as follows.
If the NAS-IP-Address AVP was not included in the request, the AAA
server MUST return an error to the AR, indicating that it is
required. The AAA Server calculates the Handover Key for the {MN,AR}
pair as follows.
HK = PRF(HMK, AAA-MN Nonce | AR ID | MN ID, "Handover Key"), where |
indicates concatenation.
The AR ID is the IP address of the AR included in the NAS-IP-Address
AVP in the request. The MN ID is obtained from the HK-MN-NAI
attribute included in the RADIUS Access Request. The AAA-MN Nonce is
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generated by the AAA Server. The Handover Master Key (HMK) is shared
between the MN and the AAA server.
The AAA server MUST send a response back to the AR, including the
AAA-MN Nonce as well as the derived HK, encrypted with the AR-AAA SA.
The AAA server SHOULD include a lifetime for the HK in the RADIUS
Access Accept message. The AAA server is, however, not required to
store the key or the lifetime. The MN-AAA MAC TLV MUST be calculated
as a hash of the AAA-MN-Nonce using the HMK that the AAA Server
shares with the MN and MUST be included in the RADIUS Access Accept
message.
6. Security Considerations
This document uses a number of building blocks that need to interwork
in order to secure the protocol described in this document. The
extensions defined for RADIUS and Diameter will be separated from
this document in a future version.
The following aspects need to be considered from a security point of
view:
1. Mechanism to establish a Handover Master Key
2. Authentication and key exchange protocol executed between the MN
and the AAA server (via the AR)
3. AAA infrastructure to exchange the necessary parameters and
session keys between the AR and the AAA server
4. FMIPv6 protocol (or other signaling protocols)
6.1 Procedure to establish a Handover Master Key
Appendix A provides an example for the establishment of the Handover
Master Key (HMK) but does not mandate a particular procedure. The
aspect of user identity privacy (i.e., the linking between the
identity used for network access authentication and the identify used
for the MN-HA authentication protocol) needs to be considered to
prevent impacting the privacy properties of the underlying EAP-based
network access authentication procedure. Furthermore, the lifetime
of the established HMK and a new NAI-based identity need to be
created to allow proper key naming.
Further details are discussed in Appendix A.
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6.2 Authentication and key exchange protocol
This document defines a shared secret based authentication protocol
with the following properties:
Authentication:
The protocol provides mutual authentication based on a pre-shared
secret, the Handover Master Key (HMK). Authentication of the
server is provided implicitly since the server's identity is not
transmitted. As such, a proof of possession is provided.
Freshness of the authentication protocol run is provided with the
help of sequence numbers. Loss of synchronization is not yet
dealt with.
Dictionary Attacks:
The HK is a derived key that is not subject of off-line and online
dictionary attacks assuming the underlying HMK is resistant to
dictionary attacks as well. Even with the HMK key derivation
procedure suggested in Appendix A dictionary attacks can be
defeated largely because of the requirements placed on EAP
methods.
Replay Protection:
The authentication and key exchange protocol prevents replay
attacks by using 16-bit sequence numbers. Sequence numbers must
not used twice with the same keying material. Once the sequence
number space is exhausted a new HK must be established.
Key Derivation and Key Strength:
No assumptions are made about the length of the HK. The derived
HK is 160 bit due to the usage of the output length of the SHA-1
hash function. The key strength depends on the chosen nonce,
which is a variable length input value with at least 128 bits
chosen by the AAA server, and the HK.
Key Control:
Key derivation is controlled by the AAA server. Joint key control
is therefore not provided.
Key Naming:
The HMK is selected based on the NAI provided by the MN. The NAI
will most likely be different for the network access
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authentication protocol and for the protocol described in this
document. As a consequence of successful protocol execution the
MN and the AR establish the HK. FMIPv6 does not consider naming
keys other than by the IP address of the MN. Hence, the same
mechanisms has to be used. If multiple session keys exist then
the available keys need to be verified in order to find the
suitable one. This aspect requires further coordination with the
FMIPv6 authors since their document is work in progress.
Lifetime:
The Handover Key (HK) is associated with a lifetime. Section 3
discusses the aspects regarding enforcing lifetime of a key. The
HMK also has a lifetime parameter associated with it although this
document does not discuss this aspect since it is largely out of
scope. For generation of the HMK only suggestions are provided in
Appendix A.
Denial of Service Resistance:
The authentication and key exchange protocol itself is resistant
to denial of service attacks. Flooding the AAA client with
requests might cause problems to the AAA infrastructure since the
AAA client cannot verify the validity of the request, needs to
perform processing and forwards the message to the backend AAA
server.
To some extend it might be reasonable to think about a cookie- or
puzzle-based approach as done in IKEv2/HIP to thwart this. When
the AAA client (AR) thinks it is under attack, it may send a
cookie to the source address of the request it received for the MN
to send another request including that cookie. This will be
included in future revisions of the protocol.
Loss of synchronization between the MN, AR and the AAA server will
be described in a future version of this document.
Session Independence:
Each individual protocol run is independent based on the usage of
the nonce value chosen by the AAA server and the sequence numbers
chosen independently by the two parties.
Fragmentation:
This protocol does not suffer from fragmentation due to its
conservative usage of symmetric cryptography.
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Channel Binding:
Channel binding is not provided by this protocol.
Fast Reconnect:
This protocol does not provide a concept of session resumption or
fast reconnects. This is, however, not necessary since a single
roundtrip protocol is already a highly optimized authentication
protocol. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the
established HK at the AR (with a given lifetime) also prevents the
need to perform the interaction with the AAA server frequently.
Identity Protection:
This protocol does not provide active or passive user identity
confidentiality. The assumptions is made that the identity used
during network access authentication is NOT used as part of this
protocol exchange and a new identity is created periodically as
part of the HK bootstrapping procedure.
Protected Ciphersuite Negotiation:
This protocol does not provide ciphersuite negotiation.
Confidentiality:
Confidentiality protection of individual payloads exchanged with
the authentication protocol is not provided.
Cryptographic Binding:
The concept of crytographic bindings is not applicable to this
document.
Perfect Forward Secrecy:
Perfect forward secrecy is not provided by this protocol.
Key confirmation:
Key confirmation of the established HK is not provided as part of
the protocol exchange. However, implicit key confirmation is
offered when the session key is established for protection of the
FMIP protocol.
An attempt to formally verify the protocol is shown in Appendix E.
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6.3 AAA infrastructure
This document aims to reuse the existing AAA infrastructure. As
such, additional RADIUS attributes and/or a Diameter application
needs to be defined to exchange the necessary parameters. The
security of RADIUS and Diameter is outside the scope of this
document. The standard security mechanisms available for these
protocols will be utilized.
6.4 FMIPv6
The main goal of this document is to establish session keys and
security parameters in order to secure FMIPv6. Although other
protocols can also be benefit from the approach suggested by this
document, the focus is on FMIPv6.
The security threats and the need for securing FMIPv6 signaling
messages is investigated in [1].
7. IANA Considerations
TBD: Details will be provided in a future draft version.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Madjid Nakhjiri of Motorola Labs for
his helpful discussions during the early stages of development of
this protocol. The authors would also like to acknowledge Mike Korus
and George Popovich of Motorola for their reviews and comments on
this document.
9. References
9.1 Normative References
[1] Koodli, R., "Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6",
draft-ietf-mipshop-fast-mipv6-03 (work in progress),
October 2004.
[2] Rigney, C., "Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
(RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000.
[3] Calhoun, P., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[4] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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9.2 Informative References
[5] El Malki, K., "Low Latency Handoffs in Mobile IPv4",
draft-ietf-mobileip-lowlatency-handoffs-v4-09 (work in
progress), June 2004.
[6] Loughney, J., "Context Transfer Protocol",
draft-ietf-seamoby-ctp-11 (work in progress), August 2004.
[7] Soliman, H., "Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 Mobility Management
(HMIPv6)", draft-ietf-mipshop-hmipv6-04 (work in progress),
December 2004.
[8] Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-06 (work in
progress), April 2005.
[9] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "AAA Key Management",
draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-00 (work in progress), June 2005.
[10] "Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications Webpage, http://www.avispa-project.org/",
http://www.avispa-project.org/, June 2005.
[11] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility for IPv6",
RFC 3775, June 2004.
Authors' Addresses
Vidya Narayanan
Motorola
1301 E. Algonquin Road
Schaumburg, IL 60196
US
Email: vidya@motorola.com
Narayanan Venkitaraman
Motorola Labs
1301 E. Algonquin Road
Schaumburg, IL 60196
US
Email: narayanan.venkitaraman@motorola.com
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Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bavaria 81739
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Gerardo Giaretta
TILab
via G. Reiss Romoli, 274
TORINO 10148
Italy
Email: gerardo.giaretta@telecomitalia.it
Julien Bournelle
GET/INT
9 rue Charles Fourier
Evry 91011
France
Email: julien.bournelle@int-evry.fr
Appendix A. Deriving the Handover Master Key
A Handover Master Key (HMK) between the MN and AAAH server is
required for this protocol to be able to derive handover keys between
the MN and AR. As mentioned earlier in the document, the exact
method of derivation of this HMK is outside the scope of this
document. One method of HMK derivation is presented in this Appendix
and it is based on the Application Master Session Key (AMSK) defined
in EAP EAPKEY [8]. The basic idea is that during the authentication
for network access, the MN and the AAA server derive an AMSK and
subsequently an HMK from the EAP method derived keying material.
The procedure requires that the authentication for network access is
based on an EAP method capable of exporting session keys. Deriving
the Handover Master Key (HMK) involves requires the following steps:
1. The MN and the AAA server of the home domain undertake the EAP
exchange for network access authentication.
2. At the end of the EAP exchange the EAP peers derive the Master
Session Key (MSK) and the Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). As
such, the EAP method MUST be capable of deriving these session
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keys.
3. The MN and the AAA server derive an AMSK from the EMSK to be used
as HMK. The key derivation function is described below. The
lifetime of the HMK is managed as a system parameter and must not
be higher than the lifetime of the EMSK (as stated in EAPKEY
[8]). As a default choice the two lifetimes should be equal.
Figure 4 shows how the AMSK and the HMK-AMSK is derived.
EAP Peer EAP Server
(MN) (AAA Server)
+--------------------------------+
/-------------------------\
/ EAP \
MSK \ exchange / MSK
\-------------------------/
+------+ +------+
| EMSK | | EMSK |
+------+ +------+
+------------+ +------------+
| HMK-AMSK | | HMK-AMSK |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 4: Key Hierarchy
The HMK is derived through the key derivation function specified for
AMSK in EAPKEY [8] and shown below for the sake of clarity.
KDF (K,L,D,O) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ...
where:
T1 = prf (K, S | 0x01)
T2 = prf (K, T1 | S | 0x02)
T3 = prf (K, T2 | S | 0x03)
T4 = prf (K, T3 | S | 0x04)
prf = HMAC-SHA1
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K = EMSK
L = key label
D = application data
O = OutputLength (2 bytes)
S = L | " " | D | O
The application specific parameters are set as follows:
o key label = "Handover Master Key"
o application data =
o output length = 128 bits
A.1 Identity Derivation for the Mobile Node
Based on the protocol defined in this document, the MN provides its
identity in the HKReq message. As this message is not encrypted, the
identity used by the MN in this exchange can be seen by other,
possible malicious, nodes. This should be avoided since it exposes
the identity of the MN implying identity privacy concerns. To solve
this issue, several EAP methods provide user identity
confidentiality. Thus, an exchange of HKReq/HKResp messages that
carries the MN identity in clear, will destroy the security
properties of the EAP method used for network authentication. One
possible approach to solve this issue is to use in the HKReq/HKResp
exchange a derived identity based on a pseudonym - during the EAP
method used for network access authentication and based on the
cryptographic material exported by the EAP method itself, the AAA
server can send to the MN an identity that the MN can use for
subsequent HKReq/HKResp exchanges. Moreover, different MN identities
can be derived so that the MN can use different entities in different
exchanges of the protocol, in order that malicious nodes are unable
to trace its movements based on the same pseudonym. Alternatively,
the capability of certain EAP to establish an encrypted channel to
securely exchange parameters can be exploited to secure provisioning
a temporal identity.
Appendix B. RADIUS Handover Key Attributes
This section provides an overview of the protocol interaction between
the access router and the RADIUS server to request a key for FMIPv6.
The proposal assumes that the AAA exchange is authenticated, replay
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protected, integrity protected and encrypted. For RADIUS, the usage
of IPsec between the AR and the AAAH server is recommended. The AR
acts as a AAA client in order to get a Handover Key in order to
secure FMIPv6 signaling messages.
A more detailed version of this section will be provided in the near
future.
MN AR AAAH Server
| HKReq. | |
| ---------> | |
| | Access Request |
| | ----------------------> |
| | Access Accept (key mtrl)|
| | <----------------------- |
| HKResp. | |
| <--------- | |
Figure 5: RADIUS Messages
As shown in Figure 5 the MN sends a HKReq to the AR. This message
contains an NAI of the Mobile node and the MN-AAA Authenticator.
This authenticator is the keyed message digest computed with the HMK
(see Appendix A). The access router extracts the necessary
information to from the attributes to be included in a RADIUS Access
Request messages. This message is sent to the AAA infrastructure.
The AR includes at least the IP address used with the MN in the
NAS-IP attributes.
The message is the following:
RADIUS-Access-Request {
HK-MN-MSGID-SEQ (Message ID | Sequence number from HKReq)
HK-MN-NAI
NAS-IP (IP Address of the AR)
HK-MN-AAA Authenticator
Message Authenticator(80)}
The home RADIUS server receives the message and checks the validity
of the HK-MN-AAA Authenticator. This authenticator value is
calculated on the HK-MN-MSGID-SEQ and HK-MN-NAI. The RADIUS server
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generates a Nonce of at least 128 bits (AAA-MN Nonce) and computes
the Handover Key (HK1) as follows:
HK1 = PRF(HMK, AAA-MN Nonce, AR1 ID, MN ID, "Handover Key")
where, AR1 ID is extracted from the NAS-IP Attribute, MN ID is
extracted from the NAI, and the HMK is the shared key between MN and
its RADIUS server.
The RADIUS server answers to the AR by sending a RADIUS-Access-
Accept message.
RADIUS-Access-Accept{
HK-MN-AR-Key (HK1)
HK-MN-AR-Key-Lifetime (HK1's lifetime)
HK-AAA-MN-Nonce (Nonce generated by AAAH)
HK-MN-AAA-SHASH (PRF(HMK, Nonce || Lifetime HK1)
Message Authenticator(80)}
If the authentication failed (wrong MN-AAA MAC), the AAAH generates a
RADIUS Access-Reject message.
The AR receives the message, extracts the HK1 and its associated
lifetime and creates the HKResp containing the Nonce AAA-MN, the
HK1's lifetime and the signed hash.
Thus, this proposal needs the following attributes to be defined:
o HK-MN-NAI
o HK-MN-MSGID-SEQ
o HK-MN-AAA Authenticator
o HK-MN-AR-Key (HK1)
o HK-MN-AR-Key-Lifetime (HK1's lifetime)
o HK-AAA-MN-Nonce (Nonce generated by AAAH)
o HK-MN-AR-SHASH (PRF(HMK, Nonce || Lifetime HK1)
It may be possible to reuse some attributes defined for Mobile IPv4
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here - such as the MIP-MN-NAI or the MIP-MN-AAA-Authenticator
attribute - this possibility will be explored in later revisions of
this document.
Appendix C. Diameter Handover Key Application
To support this proposal a new Diameter application must be defined.
The intent of this section is to provide an overview of what is
needed to support the proposal. Note that the proposal assumes that
AAA exchanges between AR and the AAAH server is protected. Use of
IPsec or TLS is recommended for this purpose. In this section, we
describe needed Diameter messages and AVPs. A more detailed version
of this section will be provided in the near future.
C.1 New Messages
As for RADIUS, the AR will act as a AAA client and thus as a Diameter
client. However, new Diameter command could be defined for this
proposal:
o HK-Mobile-Node-Request (HMR) - Command Code (TBD) and 'R' bit set
in Command Flags field. This message is sent by AR acting as a
Diameter client to a AAAH in order to request the handover key for
the mobile node. The AR uses the information provided in the
HKreq to construct the needed AVPs.
o HK-Mobile-Node-Answer (HMA) - The HK-Mobile-Node-Answer (HMA)
indicated by the Command-Code field set to TBD and 'R' bit cleared
in Command Flags field is sent by the AAAH in response to a HMR
message.
For backward compatibility, attributes defined for RADIUS can be
reused within this new Diameter Application.
C.3 Diameter Flow of Messages
The AAA exchanges between AR and its home AAA server is basically the
same as for RADIUS. However, the Diameter application will benefit
from all of the advantages that Diameter provides.
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MN AR AAAH Server
| HKReq. | |
| ---------> | |
| | HMR |
| | ----------------------> |
| | HMA |
| | <----------------------- |
| HKResp. | |
| <--------- | |
Figure 6: Diameter Handover Key Messaging
Appendix D. Alternate Approaches
Several alternative approaches are available for AAA-assisted
handover key derivation between the MN and the AR. In this section,
brief details about these alternatives are provided.
One alternate approach to preserve air interface bandwidth could be
for the MN to send a single HKReq to AR1, including a list of ARs,
requesting handover keys to be derived for each AR. AR1 may then
forward the request to the appropriate ARs (via say, a Handover Key
Notify (HKNot) message). The ARs should then send the AAA request
for handover key generation as described in the previous section.
Hence, the difference in this approach is that the MN, instead of
individually sending a HKReq message to every neighboring AR, allows
the AR to distribute the request to the other ARs. While this
approach saves some bytes over the air, it adds complexity to the
signaling.
A second approach will be for AR1 to send the first HKReq from the MN
to the AAA server along with a list of neighboring ARs. The AAA
Server may derive handover keys for each AR in the list and send all
the HKs back in a AAA message to AR1. AR1 will then use the HKNot
message to transfer the key to the corresponding AR. This approach
adds some complexity as follows:
o In order to satisfy the criteria described in AAAKEY [9], the
compromise of one AR must not lead to the compromise of any other
AR. Hence, this means that each HK must be encrypted with the
corresponding AR-AAA SA. In the presence of a AAAL, each AR will
only share an SA with the AAAL. Hence, this will require the AAAL
to receive the keys via its SA with the AAAH and then individually
encrypt each attribute separately with the correct AR SA. This
deviates from the model of having the AAAL as simply a proxy.
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o It may be possible if the AAA protocol allows unsolicited messages
to the AAA client - in that case, the AAA server may derive a set
of HKs and send each one separately to the corresponding AR
directly. However, this is not feasible, since RADIUS is strictly
a request-response style protocol.
o There are obvious vulnerabilities in letting one AR see the keys
of the other ARs in the clear - hence, this option must not be
considered.
It is also possible for the AR itself to generate keys for the MN to
share with neighboring ARs - however, it suffers from some of the
same disadvantages outlined above.
A third approach is to use an approach similar to the one described
in irtf-aaaarch-handoff - the AAA server in this case can derive HKs
for multiple neighboring ARs and notify the ARs about the
availability of this key. This, however, requires support for
unsolicited AAA messaging, which is absent at the present time.
Other approaches where the AAAL performs handover key derivation are
also feasible. This requires the AAAL to be more than just a proxy
and hence introduces complexity in the AAAL.
Hence, given the shortcomings of these alternate approaches, the
protocol is simplest and most efficient as described in section 5.
This section aims to provide a formal analysis of the MN-AAAH
authentication protocol described in this document.
We used the tool OFMC (On-the-Fly Model-Checker), from the AVISPA
project [10] (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications), which uses a rich specification language for
formalizing protocols, security goals, and threat models of
industrial complexity.
This HIPSL file is then translated into an Intermediate format using
another tool named HLPSL2IF, which is a translator, which maps
security protocol specifications into rewriting systems. This
intermediate format can be executed to analyze the threats of the
protocol.
The verified protocol has the structure shown in Figure 7 and is a
simplified version of the protocol discussed in this document. The
analysis considers only two parties and some attributes are omitted.
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[NAI, Sequence number N1]HMK
--------------------------->
Handover Key Response (HKResp)
[Sequence Number N2, nonce]HMK
<---------------------------
Figure 7: Modeled Protocol
[x]key respresents the keyed message digest computed over the field
'x'. HMK is the long-term key shared between the MN and the AAA
server. Sequence numbers N1 and N2 are independent from each other
and non-repeating numbers. The nonce value is primarily used for key
derivation.
This is the HLPSL format of the authentication protocol executed
between the MN and the AAA server. A web-based tool is available at
http://www.avispa-project.org/web-interface/
%%HLPSL:
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
role mobile(M,S:agent,
Snd, Rec: channel(dy),
HMK: symmetric_key,
NAI: text,
Seq: text
)
played_by M
def=
local State :nat,
Seq1 :text,
Nonce :text(fresh)
const r1,r2 : protocol_id,
add : function
init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 /\ Rec(start) =|>
State'= 2 /\ Snd({NAI.Seq}_HMK)
2. State = 2 /\ Rec({seq1.Nonce'}_HMK) =|>
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State'= 3 /\ Seq1' := add(Seq1,1)
% /\ Secret(Nonce',S)
end role
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
role server(S,M : agent,
Snd, Rec: channel(dy),
HMK: symmetric_key,
Seq1 : text
)
played_by S
def=
local State : nat,
NAI : text,
Nonce :text(fresh),
Seq :text
const r1,r2 : protocol_id,
add : function
init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 /\ Rec({NAI.Seq}_HMK)
=|>
State' := 2 /\ Snd({seq1.Nonce'}_HMK)
/\ Seq' := add(Seq',1)
%/\ secret(Nonce',M)
end role
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
role session(M,S: agent,
HMK: symmetric_key,
Seq,Seq1: text,
NAI:text,
SA,RA,SB,RB: channel(dy)) def=
composition
mobile(M,S,SA,RA,HMK,NAI,Seq)
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/\ server(S,M,SB,RB,HMK,Seq1)
end role
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
role environment() def=
local Sa1,Ra1,Ss1,Rs1 : channel (dy)
const r1, r2 : protocol_id,
a, i, s : agent,
k_as, k_is, kai : symmetric_key,
nai : text,
seq_as, seq_is, seq_ai : text
intruder_knowledge={a,s,i}
composition
session(a,s,k_as,seq_as,seq_ai,nai,Sa1,Ra1,Ss1,Rs1)
end role
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
goal
secrecy_of seq,seq1
%Mobile weakly authenticates Server on r1 % the nonce R
authentication_on r1
%Server weakly authenticates Mobile on r2 % the nonce R
authentication_on r2
end goal
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
environment()
Our preliminary analysis did not show vulnerabilities.
Narayanan, et al. Expires December 30, 2005 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Handover Keys Using AAA June 2005
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Narayanan, et al. Expires December 30, 2005 [Page 32]