OPSEC Working Group                                              E. Wang
Internet-Draft                                                A. Ossipov
Intended status: Informational                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: December 5, 2020                                      R. DuToit
                                                           June 03, 2020

                        TLS Proxy Best Practice


   TLS proxies are widely deployed by organizations to enable security
   features and apply enterprise policies.  This document defines a TLS
   proxy and discusses a wide range of security requirements to guide
   TLS proxy implementations.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 5, 2020.

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Security and Privacy Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Securely provision within the administrative domain . . .   4
       4.1.1.  Outbound provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.1.2.  Inbound provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Maintain security posture and limit modifications . . . .   6
     4.3.  Be secure by default  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Use independent key material  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.5.  Protect against known vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.6.  Detect and handle protocol version downgrade markers  . .   7
     4.7.  Implement special measures to handle session resumption .   8
     4.8.  Adapt to protocol changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.9.  Respect regulations and privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.10. Respect sensitivity of decrypted payload  . . . . . . . .   9
     4.11. Enforce certificate validation standards  . . . . . . . .   9
     4.12. Provide a secure operating environment  . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Usability and Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Provide the ability to enforce policy without intercept .  10
     5.2.  Use caution when enforcing policy with SNI  . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Selectively decrypt based on policy . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.4.  Limit performance impact  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Security & Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   A TLS proxy refers to a set of network functions and products that
   intercept TLS sessions per an organizational security policy.  A TLS
   proxy is deployed between endpoints such as TLS clients and servers.
   Based on an organizational policy, it may proxy a TLS handshake by
   terminating it on the client side and starting a new handshake with
   the server.  As a result, the TLS proxy is able to decrypt the
   traffic from each side of the TLS session for various purposes, and
   then optionally re-encrypt the traffic before forwarding it to the
   other side of the session.  A TLS proxy may leverage the session

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   handshake information as well as decrypted traffic data to satisfy
   organization's policy requirements.

                     |     Application Stack     |
+------------+     . +----------+-----+----------+ .      +------------+
|            |    .  |          |     |          |  .     |            |
|            |    .  |TLS Server|Proxy|TLS Client|  .     |            |
| TLS CLIENT |-------|   Stack  |     |   Stack  |--------| TLS SERVER |
|            |    .  |          |     |          |  .     |            |
|            |    .  +----------+-----+----------+  .     |            |
+------------+     .          TLS PROXY            .      +------------+
                     |       Network Stack       |

                            Figure 1: TLS Proxy

   Industrial and academic studies have been conducted on TLS proxies
   and the associated benefits and risks [SECURITY_IMPACT]
   [APPLIANCE_ANALYSIS] [PROXY_DETECTION].  Readers are encouraged to
   refer to those studies to better understand the trade-offs in the
   design, implementation and deployment of a TLS proxy.

   This document does not attempt to establish a position on whether a
   TLS proxy is "good" or "bad".  However, it is important to have a
   clear set of requirements for a TLS proxy implementation, given its
   sensitive nature with regards to the TLS client and server data being
   intercepted, and the fact that many vendors and providers have
   offered such functions to their customers.

   This document specifies such requirements and best practices for
   implementing TLS proxy functions.  Discussions and guidelines in this
   document cover proxy for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and earlier versions (e.g.

   A detailed explanation of use cases and functions utilizing TLS proxy
   can be found in [TLS_IMPACT].  This document does not address any
   malicious use of the proxy techniques.  However, readers would be
   able to benefit from the discussion for a better understanding and
   mitigation against unintentional or deliberate misuse.  Last but not
   least, we acknowledge that some of the problems that a TLS proxy
   solves can be addressed through other methods; however, this document
   assumes that the reader has already made an implementation decision
   to pursue a TLS proxy network function.

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2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Terminology

   We adopt the following definitions for TLS proxy deployments in the

   An outbound TLS proxy serves a scenario where a device that performs
   the TLS proxy function is in the same administrative domain as the
   TLS client, and the TLS server is located in an external zone such as
   the Internet.  Usually the goal is to protect the client endpoint and
   the organization by controlling application behaviors and enforcing
   an acceptable use policy for the organizational network.

   An inbound TLS proxy is deployed in front of one or a set of
   application services.  A network device that implements the TLS proxy
   function is located in the same administrative domain as the
   application which provides a network service to clients.  Usually it
   is not predictable or controllable which TLS client would initiate a

4.  Security and Privacy Requirements

   A TLS proxy acts as both a TLS server (to the TLS client) and a TLS
   client (to the TLS server).  Its design MUST abide by the general TLS
   server and client endpoint requirements.  This section does not
   repeat the requirements from [RFC8446] and [RFC5246], including those
   on middleboxes in the "Protocol Invariants" section.  It assumes full
   compliance with those TLS RFCs.  Instead, this section highlights
   those specific to the proxy behavior.

4.1.  Securely provision within the administrative domain

   The TLS proxy MUST be provisioned as a trusted party for the TLS
   client.  It MAY also be provisioned as a trusted party for the
   server.  In most cases, only the client side needs to be provisioned
   for TLS server authentication, excluding TLS applications that use
   client certificate authentication.  Given that client certificate
   authentication typically employs unique per-client certificates, it
   is impractical to provision such client-specific certificates on the
   TLS proxy and each application server at scale.

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   During a TLS handshake, the proxy needs to supply a certificate on
   behalf of the server with the same identity (e.g. subjectAltName) as
   the server.  This is to ensure the same client-side experience while
   the proxy negotiates a session with the client.

4.1.1.  Outbound provisioning

   For the outbound TLS proxy scenario, the administrator has no control
   of the TLS server side since it is typically outside of their
   administrative domain.  The administrator may provision an enterprise
   CA certificate on each client, either into the shared trust store of
   the operating system or individual applications, such as a web
   browser; describing a specific provisioning process falls outside of
   the scope of this document.

   The proxy uses the CA certificate to issue a proxy certificate for
   each of the unique TLS servers that are accessed through it.  Once
   the proxy generates a certificate on behalf of a particular server,
   these are typically cached locally and re-used for connections to the
   same server for some period of time.

   It has to be noted that this scenario may not work if the application
   uses client certificate authentication or if the client obtains and
   stores the actual server's public key and the corresponding
   certificate through a network path that does not include the TLS
   proxy in question (a.k.a. certificate pinning).  In certain cases,
   the administrator may be able to configure the client to accept an
   alternative CA or the trust list from the operating system.  However,
   if such options is not available, the proxy SHOULD be able to either
   block the connection or bypass decryption based on a configured

   The fact that TLS sessions that bypass decryption on the TLS proxy
   could still use post-handshake authentication (TLS 1.3) or
   renegotiation (TLS 1.2 and below) does not negate the responsibility
   of the TLS proxy to enforce secure policy using the visible elements
   of the TLS sessions.  However, those measures are limited thus new
   methods are required to be developed for such scenarios.  The
   increased adoption of application level encryption also calls for
   alternative technologies to be developed, which is outside the scope
   of this document.

4.1.2.  Inbound provisioning

   Provisioning for inbound TLS proxy is much more straightforward.  The
   administrator may import certificates and key pairs exported from a
   server into the proxy.  Alternatively, the proxy may need to
   periodically retrieve server key pairs and corresponding certificates

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   from a shared secure repository (e.g. a Hardware Security Module
   (HSM)).  Frequent server key rotation helps to minimize security
   exposure if a participating TLS proxy device is compromised.  The
   proxy may also enroll for a certificate on behalf of the server.
   Once the proxy has been provisioned, the TLS client will be able to
   complete TLS handshakes with the server through the TLS proxy.

4.2.  Maintain security posture and limit modifications

   Because a TLS proxy effectively builds two TLS sessions, one with a
   TLS client and one with a server respectively, the two sessions MUST
   maintain the same or higher level security posture (such as using
   stronger ciphers) than the direct session between the client and the
   server.  The TLS server and client stacks in the TLS proxy MUST be
   conformant to [RFC8446] and [RFC5246].

   The proxy MAY remove cipher suites from a client-initiated Client
   Hello message, add new cipher suites, and re-order them in the proxy-
   initiated Client Hello message.  The purpose may be to increase the
   security posture of the combined sessions by removing weak cipher
   suites, or to optimize decryption and encryption performance (e.g.
   due to hardware acceleration capabilities), or from other business
   policy criteria.  These changes MUST NOT negatively impact the
   security posture of the session.

   TLS proxy stacks MAY provide user configurable options, such as an
   option to accept self-signed server certificates, an option to let
   the handshake continue with expired but otherwise valid server
   certificates, etc.  However, the administrator MUST be provided with
   full information about any associated risks, such as from accepting a
   self-signed server certificate.  The administrator MUST have complete
   control over the use of such options.

4.3.  Be secure by default

   The TLS proxy configuration and policy should be secure by default.
   The configuration of a TLS proxy requires special knowledge, and few
   users have the skillset to do it securely and correctly.  TLS proxy
   vendors SHOULD educate users and TLS proxy developers SHOULD
   anticipate areas of configuration that could potentially create
   confusion.  TLS proxy developers SHOULD simplify decisions that a
   user must make as long as sufficient configuration flexibility is
   maintained.  A product that implements a TLS proxy MUST also provide
   default configuration settings that guarantee a high level of
   security.  Configuration choices that deviate from the secure
   defaults SHOULD be presented alongside clear explanations of the
   impact of each option.

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4.4.  Use independent key material

   The server and client sides of a TLS stack in a TLS proxy MUST
   negotiate key material independently.  The proxy MUST NOT reuse and
   propagate key material or nonces received from the TLS client or the
   server.  The TLS proxy MUST NOT inadvertently reuse the same random
   values for different TLS sessions; for example, the random generator
   MUST be fork-safe.

4.5.  Protect against known vulnerabilities

   Malicious entities rapidly exploit vulnerabilities in applications
   and protocols.  TLS proxy vendors, and the developers in particular,
   SHOULD actively track vulnerabilities and respond with fixes in a
   timely manner.  Issues in TLS stack implementations, or the TLS
   protocol itself, usually have far-reaching implications because other
   applications depend on the confidentiality, authentication, and data
   integrity properties of TLS.  TLS proxy developers should go beyond
   just reading technical news articles, and should also follow
   discussions about current and future TLS related standards, track
   changes in open source TLS stacks as well as major open source TLS
   endpoint applications (e.g., Chrome, Firefox), and be familiar with
   application level protocols, especially in the context of how
   endpoint applications integrate with the TLS protocol.

4.6.  Detect and handle protocol version downgrade markers

   An in-path attacker may downgrade a TLS session to a protocol version
   lower than what is supported by both endpoints in order to exploit
   some known vulnerability in the lower version.  The recommended
   downgrade protection mechanism for TLS 1.2 is the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV,
   as described in [RFC7507].  The TLS 1.3 downgrade detection mechanism
   in [RFC8446] utilizes markers in the Server Hello random field.  A
   TLS proxy MUST implement both mechanisms, correctly process downgrade
   markers sent by [RFC8446] compliant TLS servers, and be able to
   generate such markers toward a compliant TLS client.

   The TLS 1.3 capable proxy MUST ignore the TLS 1.3 downgrade marker
   from the TLS 1.3 server if it has generated a TLS 1.2 ClientHello.
   Similarly, if the TLS 1.3 capable proxy prefers to generate a TLS 1.2
   ServerHello, it MUST include the TLS 1.3 downgrade marker in response
   to a TLS 1.2 ClientHello, and it MUST NOT include the marker in
   response to a TLS 1.3 ClientHello.

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4.7.  Implement special measures to handle session resumption

   If a TLS client attempts to resume a TLS session with an identifier
   (ID/ticket/PSK) that is not known to the TLS proxy then the TLS proxy
   MUST NOT indiscriminately exempt those sessions from decryption.  At
   a minimum, the TLS proxy SHOULD enforce a configured policy for such

   Should a TLS client use another network path to the TLS server, or
   should the TLS proxy be removed from its on-path network position
   then TLS session resumption attempts using TLS key material
   previously negotiated between the TLS client and TLS proxy SHOULD NOT
   result in TLS session resumption failures on the TLS server.  A naive
   example of this is a TLS proxy that propagates the session ID
   generated by the TLS server to the TLS client, resulting in the same
   session ID referring to different master keys on the two sides of the
   TLS proxy and creating the potential for a decrypt_error alert if the
   TLS proxy is not involved in the TLS client's resumption attempt.

   Applications that send TLS 1.3 early data rely on specific knowledge
   about the security properties of said payload.  A TLS proxy most
   likely does not have access to the application level security
   properties of the payload, which implies that the TLS proxy MUST NOT
   inadvertently upgrade the security properties of early data received
   from the TLS client by forwarding it to the TLS server as post-
   handshake payload.  The TLS proxy upper network stack SHOULD take
   into account the security properties of the decrypted early data as
   part of payload processing.

4.8.  Adapt to protocol changes

   The TLS proxy MUST minimize protocol ossification between the TLS
   client and server, specifically following the TLS protocol
   extensibility guidance from the Protocol Invariants section of
   [RFC8446].  The TLS proxy SHOULD be readily updateble, so that when
   ossification problems are discovered, they can be fixed.

   The TLS proxy SHOULD be able to identify the start of a new TLS
   handshake.  The static approach is through a pre-configured list of
   destination ports such as 443, 8443, etc.  Dynamic approaches include
   parsing the application layer protocols to identify the STARTTLS
   message, and using signatures to identify TLS handshake messages.
   Those functions MAY be provided by the underlying platform, not part
   of the TLS proxy implementation.  However, the TLS proxy MUST conduct
   proper TLS protocol checks to avoid false identification of TLS
   handshakes, while taking special care not to contribute to protocol
   ossification.  Implementations SHOULD perform a consistency check for

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   TLS sessions started within a tunnel or following a previous
   transaction, such as an HTTP CONNECT request.

4.9.  Respect regulations and privacy

   Due to the privileged network location of the TLS proxy it
   potentially has access to a user's data such as PII (Personally
   identifiable information) and PHI (Protected Health Information).
   The TLS proxy MUST act responsibly to protect the privacy of the user
   and SHOULD allow masking of personal data by all the security tools
   that touch the decrypted payload.  A product implementing TLS proxy
   SHOULD also allow to limit interception of certain categories of
   data, which could include evaluation of risk level and geolocation.

4.10.  Respect sensitivity of decrypted payload

   The TLS proxy SHOULD, similarly to respecting privacy and
   regulations, respect the sensitivity of the decrypted payload.
   Unless specifically required by an upper-level function per the
   organizational security policy, the decrypted payload MUST NOT be
   stored on the product that implements TLS proxy beyond the lifetime
   of the TLS session.  The decrypted data SHOULD be securely destroyed
   upon completing any necessary inspection functions of that particular
   application message.  The TLS proxy SHOULD also provide an option
   that guarantees that changes to decrypted content are not propagated
   to the endpoints, which would limit the impact of misbehaving upper-
   level functions while also simplifying compliance with regulations.

4.11.  Enforce certificate validation standards

   A TLS proxy MUST maintain a local certificate truststore populated
   with well-known public CA certificates.  This trust store MUST be
   regularly updated by the product vendor in an automated manner,
   similarly to how commonly used web browsers manage it.  It MUST allow
   an administrator to populate this store with locally trusted
   certificates or remove an existing certificate from the store.  The
   proxy MUST validate a presented server's X.509 certificate against
   this trust store according to [RFC5280], including but not limited to
   validating the certificate path and checking the stated validity

   The TLS proxy SHOULD also validate the certificate against a locally
   configured or specified Certificate Revocation List (CRL) repository,
   and MAY also use online status checking as specified in [RFC6960].
   The TLS proxy SHOULD favor in-band OCSP over the out-of-band
   [RFC6960] mechanism, as specified in [RFC6066] and [RFC8446].  The
   TLS proxy SHOULD provide an option to configure a policy for handling
   certificate validation failures and specifying exceptions.

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   Client applications, especially browsers, also validate a server name
   against names listed in the presented X.509 certificate.  TLS proxies
   SHOULD follow the guidelines in [RFC6125] and MAY provide an option
   to enforce checks that would prevent look-alike (e.g.  Cyrillic)
   international domain names from spoofing legitimate domain names.

4.12.  Provide a secure operating environment

   As a single device in the network that can decrypt encrypted
   transmissions, the TLS proxy would be a high value target for a bad
   actor.  Therefore, a device implementing the TLS proxy function MUST
   provide a secure environment.  It MUST comply with any organizational
   product security baseline requirements to achieve a high level of
   product integrity and trust.  While an exact list of such product
   requirements may vary from implementer to implementer and lies
   outside of the scope of this document, some commonly acceptable
   protection elements include:

   o  Hardware and software authenticity attestation (Secure Boot)

   o  Digitally signed software images and configuration files

   o  Utilize a hardware security module, such as Trusted Platform
      Module (TPM), when appropriate and available

   o  No predefined authentication credential (password, certificates,

   o  Secure storage of keys, passwords, and other sensitive data

   o  Use well-established and validated cryptographic libraries

   o  Use an effective random number generator [RFC4086]

5.  Usability and Functional Requirements

5.1.  Provide the ability to enforce policy without intercept

   A TLS proxy MAY facilitate an ability to enforce security policies
   without the need for intercepting the handshake.  Examples are deny
   or blacklist policies based on an observed Server Name Indication
   (SNI), cipher suites and certificates exchanged during the handshake
   (when in the clear).

   The TLS proxy MUST use caution when applying security policies other
   than deny or blacklist based on the TLS handshake information.  The
   TLS proxy SHOULD NOT use the handshake information for permit,
   whitelist, or security exemptions.  This is because the information

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   from the handshake may not accurately reflect actual intentions or
   content carried in the encrypted session.

5.2.  Use caution when enforcing policy with SNI

   TLS proxy implementations tend to utilize the hostname information in
   the SNI for policy decisions.  However, SNI by itself is not a
   trustworthy policy information element.

   There are three categories of TLS clients when it comes to SNI

   1.  Those who properly enforce hostname checks.  Those TLS clients
       will populate the SNI field with the right name and check it.
       The SNI information from those TLS clients are trustworthy.

   2.  Those who do not properly enforce hostname checks.  Those TLS
       clients will probably populate the SNI field but won't check it.
       But note that it is not that they are not checking SNI against
       the hostname but rather that they are not checking the
       certificate against the hostname.

   3.  Those who are intentionally trying to subvert the checks.  The
       TLS client may conduct this behavior on purpose to circumvent the
       organization's access policy.  For instance, it may deliberately
       set the SNI with a fake hostname with "good enough" reputation.
       Because [RFC6066] does not mandate a TLS server to abort the
       handshake when the server does not recognize the server name, the
       handshake may continue with the conformant server sending a
       certificate that contains the real hostname with a low

   In an organization's network, it is unknown to the TLS proxy which
   category a TLS client falls into.  Therefore, even if not
   intercepting the TLS session, the TLS proxy SHOULD passively observe
   the handshake until its successful completion before acting on the
   data from the handshake.

   By doing so, the TLS proxy helps protect those TLS clients in
   category 2, and is able to detect the evasive clients in category 3.

   It should be noted that in a variation of category 3 when both the
   TLS client and server are non-conformant, the TLS proxy will not be
   able to detect the malicious behavior passively even if it observes
   the handshake to its completion.  In this scenario, the non-
   conformant server colludes with the TLS client by responding with a
   certificate containing a matching hostname presented in the SNI.

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   The above scenarios apply even if the SNI is encrypted by the TLS
   client ([ESNI]).

5.3.  Selectively decrypt based on policy

   A TLS proxy SHOULD be able to make policy decisions on whether to
   decrypt a particular session or not.  Such a policy is referred to as
   "decryption policy".  Decryption policy allows the TLS proxy to
   selectively decrypt certain sessions while exempting others, for
   efficiency, privacy and compliance considerations.

   A decryption policy decision MAY be made based on the server
   certificate or other trustworthy parameters.  To verify possession of
   private keys that are associated with a particular server
   certificate, the proxy SHOULD complete an out-of-band TLS handshake
   with the same TLS server IP address and TCP port as targeted by the
   TLS client.

   A decryption policy decision MUST NOT be made solely based on an SNI
   extension for reasons discussed in the previous section.

   The TLS proxy SHOULD provide a configurable option for how to handle
   sessions that it is not able to decrypt.

   The TLS proxy MUST be able to disengage from a proxy session and
   allow the TLS client and server to negotiate a new session directly.
   A use case is to avoid decryption of certain types of traffic such as
   banking, as required by industry regulations.

   There are several points where the TLS proxy can make a "not-to-
   decrypt" or "disengagement" decision.  The decision MAY be made based
   on identifying the server by its IP address or the certificate or
   other techniques.  In any of the cases, the user on the client side
   SHOULD NOT experience any disruption (e.g. a "connection lost"

   A TLS proxy MAY decide to decrypt a session that is supposed to be
   denied (such as a request for a blocked category) for the purpose of
   showing the client a User Information Page to inform the client that
   this session has been denied.  The TLS proxy MUST terminate the TLS
   session immediately after sending the notification, so that no
   additional data is transferred.

5.4.  Limit performance impact

   A TLS proxy SHOULD limit the impact of its functionality on network
   throughput, latency and jitter.  Algorithm selection should be driven

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   by security as well as performance, such as using X25519 as a named
   curve in the calculation of a TLS 1.3 Client Hello key_share value.

   TLS proxies SHOULD cache locally issued server certificates for a
   period of time in order to service similar sessions without the
   additional performance impact from re-issuing the certificate.  A
   specific timeout for certificate cache entries MUST be configurable
   by the TLS proxy administrator.

6.  Security & Privacy Considerations

   This document is about security related requirements for TLS proxy
   implementations.  A TLS proxy enables organizations to apply security
   functions and enforce organizational policy on the traffic.  In that
   sense, the TLS proxy is part of an integrated security solution.  The
   TLS proxy could become a single point of compromise in the
   organization's network.  Implementations must satisfy the
   requirements described in this document to properly protect the TLS
   proxy while facilitating other security functions.

   This document also lays out privacy requirements for TLS proxy
   implementations.  Although a TLS proxy does not introduce new or
   modify existing TLS protocols that would change the privacy posture
   of the protocols, it is prone to introducing the risk of privacy
   invasion given its access to decrypted data.  Implementations MUST
   follow the privacy practices described in this document to ensure
   that the TLS proxy does not weaken the privacy posture of the overall

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,

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   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,

   [RFC7507]  Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
              Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
              Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,

8.2.  Informative References

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              Waked, L., Mannan, M., and A. Youssef, "To Intercept or
              Not to Intercept: Analyzing TLS Interception in Network
              Appliances", 2018,

   [ESNI]     Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood, "TLS
              Encrypted Client Hello", draft-ietf-tls-esni-07 (work in
              progress), June 2020.

              O'Neill, M., Ruoti, S., Seamons, K., and D. Zappala, "TLS
              Proxies: Friend or Foe?", 2016,

              Durumeric, Z., Ma, Z., Springall, D., Barnes, R.,
              Sullivan, N., Bursztein, E., Bailey, M., Halderman, J.,
              and V. Paxson, "The Security Impact of HTTPS
              Interception", 2017, <https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-

              Cam-Winget, N., Wang, E., Danyliw, R., and R. DuToit,
              "Impact of TLS 1.3 to Operational Network Security
              Practices", draft-camwinget-opsec-ns-impact-00 (work in
              progress), May 2020.


   The authors thank Bill Hudson and Tobias Mayer for their
   contributions.  The authors thank Flemming Andreasen, Richard Barnes,
   Nancy Cam-Winget, Alissa Cooper, Jay Iyer, James Kasper, David
   McGrew, Eric Rescorla and Eric Vyncke for their comments.

Authors' Addresses

   Eric Wang
   Cisco Systems, Inc.

   Email: ejwang@cisco.com

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   Andrew Ossipov
   Cisco Systems, Inc.

   Email: aossipov@cisco.com

   Roelof DuToit

   Email: roelof.dutoit@broadcom.com

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