Network Working Group M. Westerlund
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track October 14, 2011
Expires: April 16, 2012
Multiple RTP Session on a Single Lower-Layer Transport
draft-westerlund-avtcore-transport-multiplexing-00
Abstract
This document specifies how multiple RTP sessions are to be
multiplexed on the same lower-layer transport, e.g. a UDP flow. It
discusses various requirements that have been raised and their
feasibility, which results in a solution with a certain
applicability. A solution is recommended and that solution is
provided in more detail, including signalling and examples.
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 16, 2012.
Copyright Notice
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Support Use of Multiple RTP Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Same SSRC Value in Multiple RTP Sessions . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. SRTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Don't Redefine Used Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Firewall Friendly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.6. Monitioring and Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.7. Usable Also Over Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.8. Incremental Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Possible Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Header Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Multiplexing Shim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Single Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Use the SRTP MKI field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5. Use an Octet in the Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.6. Redefine the SSRC field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Shim Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Signalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3. SRTP Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3.1. Security Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3.2. DTLS-SRTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3.3. MIKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4.1. RTP Packet with Transport Header . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4.2. SDP Offer/Answer example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
There has been renewed interest for having a solution that allows
multiple RTP sessions [RFC3550] to use a single lower layer
transport, such as a bi-directional UDP flow. The main reason is the
cost of doing NAT/FW traversal for each individual flow. ICE and
other NAT/FW traversal solutions are clearly capable of attempting to
open multiple flows. However, there is both increased risk for
failure and an increased cost in the creation of multiple flows. The
increased cost comes as slightly higher delay in establishing the
traversal, and the amount of consumed NAT/FW resources. The latter
might be an increasing problem in the IPv4 to IPv6 transition period.
This document draws up some requirements for consideration on how to
transport multiple RTP sessions over a single lower-layer transport.
These requirements will have to be weighted as the combined set of
requirements result in that no known solution exist that can fulfill
them completely.
A number of possible solutions are then considered and discussed with
respect to their properties. Based on that, the author recommends a
shim layer variant as single solution, which is described in more
detail including signalling solution and examples.
2. Conventions
2.1. Terminology
Some terminology used in this document.
Multiplexing: Unless specifically noted, all mentioning of
multiplexing in this document refer to the multiplexing of
multiple RTP Sessions on the same lower layer transport. It is
important to make this distinction as RTP does contain a number of
multiplexing points for various purposes, such as media formats
(Payload Type), media sources (SSRC), and RTP sessions.
2.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Requirements
This section lists and discusses a number of potential requirements.
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However, it is not difficult to realize that it is in fact possible
to put requirements that makes the set of feasible solutions an empty
set. It is thus necessary to consider which requirements that are
essential to fulfill and which can be compromised on to arrive at a
solution.
3.1. Support Use of Multiple RTP Sessions
This may at first glance appear to be an obvious requirement.
Although the authors are convinced it is a mandatory requirement for
a solution, it warrants some discussion around the implications of
not having multiple RTP sessions and instead use a single RTP
session.
The main purpose of RTP sessions is to allow separation of streams
that have different purposes, for example different media types. A
big reason for establishing this is the knowledge that any SSRC
within the session is supposed to be processed in a similar way.
For simpler cases, where the streams within each media type need the
same processing, it is clearly possible to find other multiplex
solutions, for example based on the Payload Type and the differences
in encoding that allows to describe. This may anyhow be insufficient
when you get into more advanced usages where you have multiple
sources of the same media type, but for different purposes or as
alternatives. For example when you have one set of video sources
that shows session participants and another set of video sources that
shares an application or slides, you likely want to separate those
streams for various reasons such as control, prioritization, QoS,
methods for robustification, etc. In those cases, using the RTP
session for separation of properties is a powerful tool. A tool with
properties that need to be preserved when providing a solution for
how to use only a single lower-layer transport.
3.2. Same SSRC Value in Multiple RTP Sessions
Two different RTP sessions being multiplexed on the same lower layer
transport need to be able to use the same SSRC value. This is a
strong requirement, for two reasons:
1. To avoid mandating SSRC assignment rules that are coordinated
between the sessions. If the RTP sessions multiplexed together
must have unique SSRC values, then additional code that works
between RTP Sessions is needed in the implementations. Thus
raising the bar for implementing this solution. In addition, if
one gateways between parts of a system using this multiplexing
and parts that aren't multiplexing, the part that isn't
multiplexing must also fulfil the requirements on how SSRC is
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assigned or force the gateway to translate SSRCs. Translating
SSRC is actually hard as it requires one to understand the
semantics of all current and future RTP and RTCP extensions.
Otherwise a barrier for deploying new extensions is created.
2. There are some few RTP extensions that currently rely on being
able to use the same SSRC in different RTP sessions:
* XOR FEC (RFC5109)
* RTP Retransmission in session mode (RFC4588)
* Certain Layered Coding
3.3. SRTP
SRTP [RFC3711] is one of the most commonly used security solutions
for RTP. In addition, it is the only one recommended by IETF that is
integrated into RTP. This integration has several aspects that needs
to be considered when designing a solution for multiplexing RTP
sessions on the same lower layer transport.
Determing Crypto Context: SRTP first of all needs to know which
session context a received or to-be-sent packet relates to. It
also normally relies on the lower layer transport to identify the
session. It uses the MKI, if present, to determine which key set
is to be used. Then the SSRC and sequence number are used by most
crypto suites, including the most common use of AES Counter Mode,
to actually generate the correct cipher stream.
Unencrypted Headers: SRTP has chosen to leave the RTP headers and
the first two 32-bit words of the first RTCP header unencrypted,
to allow for both header compression and monitoring to work also
in the presence of encryption. As these fields are in clear text
they are used in most crypto suites for SRTP to determine how to
protect or recover the plain text.
It is here important to contrast SRTP against a set of other possible
protection mechanisms. DTLS, TLS, and IPsec are all protecting and
encapsulating the entire RTP and RTCP packets. They don't perform
any partial operations on the RTP and RTCP packets. Any change that
is considered to be part of the RTP and RTCP packet is transparent to
them, but possibly not to SRTP. Thus the impact on SRTP operations
must be considered when defining a mechanism.
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3.4. Don't Redefine Used Bits
As the core of RTP is in use in many systems and has a really large
deployment story and numerous implementations, changing any of the
field definitions is highly problematic. First of all, the
implementations need to change to support this new semantics.
Secondly, you get a large transition issue when you have some session
participants that support the new semantics and some that don't.
Combing the two behaviors in the same session can force the
deployment of costly and less than perfect translation devices.
3.5. Firewall Friendly
It is desirable that current firewalls will accept the solutions as
normal RTP packets. However, in the author's opinion we can't let
the firewall stifle invention and evolution of the protocol. It is
also necessary to be aware that a change that will make most deep
inspecting firewall consider the packet as not valid RTP/RTCP will
have more difficult deployment story.
3.6. Monitioring and Reporting
It is strongly desirable that a third party monitor can still operate
on the multiplexed RTP Sessions. It is however likely that they will
require an update to correctly monitor and report on multiplexed RTP
Sessions.
Another type of function to consider is packet sniffers and their
selector filters. These may be impacted by a change of the fields.
An observation is that many such systems are usually quite rapidly
updated to consider new types of standardized or simply common packet
formats.
3.7. Usable Also Over Multicast
It is desirable that a solution should be possible to use also when
RTP and RTCP packets are sent over multicast, both Any Source
Multicast (ASM) and Single Source Multicast (SSM). The reason for
this requirement is to allow a system using RTP to use the same
configuration regardless of the transport being done over unicast or
multicast. In addition, multicast can't be claimed to have an issue
with using multiple ports, as each multicast group has a complete
port space scoped by address.
3.8. Incremental Deployment
A good solution has the property that in topologies that contains RTP
mixers or Translators, a single session participant can enable
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multiplexing without having any impact on any other session
participants. Thus a node should be able to take a multiplexed
packet and then easily send it out with minimal or no modification on
another leg of the session, where each RTP session is transported
over its own lower-layer transport. It should also be as easy to do
the reverse forwarding operation.
4. Possible Solutions
This section looks at a few possible solutions and discusses their
feasibility.
4.1. Header Extension
The proposal is to define an RTP header extension [RFC5285] that
explicitly enumerates the session identifier in each packet. This
proposal has definite merits regarding RTP. It uses an existing
extension mechanism, it explicitly enumerates the session allowing
for third parties to associate the packet to a given RTP session. It
works with SRTP as currently defined since a header extension is by
default not encrypted and thus readable by the receiving stack
without needing to guess which session it belongs to and attempt to
decrypt it.
If the session ID on the contrary would be in the integrity protected
part of the packet, a translator between multiplexed and non-
multiplexed has the options:
1. to be part of the security context to verify the field
2. to be part of the security context to verify the field and remove
it before forwarding the packet
3. to be outside of the security context and leave the header
extension in the packet. However, that requires successful
negotiation of the header extension, but not of the
functionality, with the receiving end-points.
The biggest existing hurdle for this solution is that there exist no
header extension field in the RTCP packets. This requires defining a
solution for RTCP that allows carrying the explicit indicator,
preferably in a position that isn't encrypted by SRTCP. However, the
current SRTCP definition does not offer such a position in the
packet.
Modifying the RR or SR packets is possible using profile specific
extensions. However, that has issues when it comes to deployability
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and in addition any information placed there would end up in the
encrypted part.
Another alternative could be to define another RTCP packet type that
only contains the common header, using the 5 bits in the first byte
of the common header to carry a session id. That would allow SRTCP
to work correctly as long it accepts this new packet type being the
first in the packet. Allowing a non-SR/RR packet as the first packet
in a compound RTCP packet is also needed if an implementation is to
support Reduced Size RTCP packets [RFC5506]. The remaining downside
with this is that all stack implementations supporting multiplexing
would need to modify its RTCP compound packet rules to include this
packet type first. Thus a translator box between supporting nodes
and non-supporting nodes needs to be in the crypto context.
This solution's per packet overhead is expected to be 64-bits for
RTCP. For RTP it is 64-bits if no header extension was otherwise
used, and an additional 16 bits (short header), or 24 bits plus (if
needed) padding to next 32-bits boundary if other header extensions
are used.
4.2. Multiplexing Shim
This proposal is to prefix or postfix all RTP and RTCP packets with a
session ID field. This field would be outside of the normal RTP and
RTCP packets, thus having no impact on the RTP and RTCP packets and
their processing. An additional step of demultiplexing processing
would be added prior to RTP stack processing to determine in which
RTP session context the packet shall be included. This has also no
impact on SRTP/SRTCP as the shim layer would be outside of its
protection context. The shim layer's session ID is however
implicitly integrity protected as any error in the field will result
in the packet being placed in the wrong or non-existing context, thus
resulting in a integrity failure if processed by SRTP/SRTCP.
This proposal is quite simple to implement in any gateway or
translating device that goes from a multiplexed to a non-multiplexed
domain or vice versa, as only an additional field needs to be added
to or removed from the packet.
The main downside of this proposal is that it is very likely to
trigger a firewall response from any deep packet inspection device.
If the field is prefixed, the RTP fields are not matching the
heuristics field, thus likely preventing classification of the packet
as an RTP packet. If it is postfixed, it is likely classified as an
RTP packet but will not correctly validate if the content validation
is such that the payload length is expected to match certain values.
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This solution's per packet overhead is 1 byte.
4.3. Single Session
One way of trying to avoid multiplexing multiple RTP sessions on a
single lower layer transport is to use only a single RTP session,
including multiple media types such as both audio and video. This
does have a number of implications, the first of which is the
complete loss of RTP session as a separator for different type of
streams.
Lacking different RTP sessions, a node will have to dig deeper into
the packet before determining what to do with it. Care must be taken
in that inspection. For example, you must be careful to ensure that
each real media source uses its own SSRC in the session and that this
SSRC doesn't change media type.
The loss of purpose separator is likely not a big issue if the only
difference between RTP Sessions are the media type. This as you can
use the Payload Type to identify the media type. The loss of the RTP
Session functionality is more severe if you actually use the RTP
Session for separating different treatments, contexts etc. Then you
would need additional signalling to bind the different sources to
groups which can help make the necessary distinctions.
This method has several limitations that makes it unsuitable as
general mechanism to provide multiple RTP sessions on the same lower
layer transport. However, we acknowledge that there are some uses
for which this method may be sufficient and which can accept the
method limitations and other downsides. The RTCWEB WG has a working
assumption to support this method. For more details of this method,
see the relevant drafts under development.
This solution has no per packet overhead. The signalling overhead
will be a different question.
4.4. Use the SRTP MKI field
This proposal is to overload the MKI SRTP/SRTCP identifier to not
only identify a particular crypto context, but also identify the
actual RTP Session. This clearly is a miss use of the MKI field,
however it appears to be with little negative implications. SRTP
already supports handling of multiple crypto contexts.
The two major downsides with this proposal is first the fact that it
requires using SRTP/SRTCP to multiplex multiple sessions on a single
lower layer transport. The second issue is that the session ID
parameter needs to be put into the various key-management schemes and
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to make them understand that the reason to establish multiple crypto
contexts is because they are connected to various RTP Sessions.
Considering that SRTP have at least 3 used keying mechanisms, DTLS-
SRTP [RFC5764], Security Descriptions [RFC4568], and MIKEY [RFC3830],
this is not an insignificant amount of work.
This solution has 32-bit per packet overhead, but only if the MKI was
not already used.
4.5. Use an Octet in the Padding
The basics of this proposal is to have the RTP packet and the last
(required by RFC3550) RTCP packet in a compound to include padding,
at least 2 bytes. One byte for the padding count (last byte) and one
byte just before the padding count containing the session ID.
This proposal uses bytes to carry the session ID that have no defined
value and is intended to be ignored by the receiver. From that
perspective it only causes packet expansion that is supported and
handled by all existing equipment. If an implementation fails to
understand that it is required to interpret this padding byte to
learn the session ID, it will see a mostly coherent RTP session
except where SSRCs overlap or where the payload types overlap.
However, reporting on the individual sources or forwarding the RTCP
RR are not completely without merit.
There is one clear downside of this proposal and that has to do with
SRTP. To be able to determine the crypto context, it is necessary to
access to the encrypted payload of the packet. Thus, the only
mechanism available for a receiver to solve this issue is to try the
existing crypto contexts for any session on the same lower layer
transport and then use the one where the packet decrypts and verifies
correctly. Thus for transport flows with many crypto contexts, an
attacker could simply generate packets that don't validate to force
the receiver to try all crypto contexts they have rather than
immediately discard it as not matching a context.
This solution has a 16-bit per packet overhead.
4.6. Redefine the SSRC field
The Rosenberg et. al. Internet draft "Multiplexing of Real-Time
Transport Protocol (RTP) Traffic for Browser based Real-Time
Communications (RTC)" [I-D.rosenberg-rtcweb-rtpmux] proposed to
redefine the SSRC field. This has the advantage of no packet
expansion. It also looks like regular RTP. However, it has a number
of implications. First of all it prevents any RTP functionality that
require the same SSRC in multiple RTP sessions.
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Secondly its interoperability with normal RTP is problematic. Such
interoperability requires an SSRC translator function in the gateway
to ensure that the SSRCs fulfill the requirements of the different
domains. That translator is actually far from easy as it needs to
understand the semantics of all RTP and RTCP extensions that include
SSRC/CSRC. This as it is necessary to know when a particular
matching 32-bit pattern is an SSRC field and when the field is just a
combination of other fields that create the same matching 32-bit
pattern. Thus any future RTCP extension might not work through the
translator, causing a barrier for deployment of future extensions.
This solution has no per packet overhead.
5. Recommendation
Considering these options, the authors would recommend that AVTCORE
standardize a solution based on a postfixed multiplexing field, i.e.
a shim approach combined with the appropriate signalling as described
in Section 4.2.
6. Specification
This section contains the specification of the solution based on a
SHIM, with the explicit session identifier at the end of the
encapsulated payload.
6.1. Shim Layer
This solution is based on a shim layer that is inserted in the stack
between the regular RTP and RTCP packets and the transport layer
being used by the RTP sessions. Thus the layering looks like the
following:
+---------------------+
| RTP / RTCP Packet |
+---------------------+
| Session ID Layer |
+---------------------+
| Transport layer |
+---------------------+
Stack View with Session ID SHIM
The above stack is in fact a layered one as it does allow multiple
RTP Sessions to be multiplexed on top of the Session ID shim layer.
This enables the example presented in Figure 1 where four sessions,
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S1-S4 is sent over the same Transport layer and where the Session ID
layer will combine and encapsulate them with the session ID on
transmission and separate and decapsulate them on reception.
+-------------------+
| S1 | S2 | S3 | S4 |
+-------------------+
| Session ID Layer |
+-------------------+
| Transport layer |
+-------------------+
Figure 1: Multiple RTP Session On Top of Session ID Layer
The Session ID layer encapsulates one RTP or RTCP packet from a given
RTP session and postfixes a one byte Session ID (SID) field to the
packet. Each RTP session being multiplexed on top of a given
transport layer is assigned either a single or a pair of unique SID
in the range 0-255. The reason for assigning a pair of SIDs to a
given RTP session are for RTP Sessions that doesn't support
"Multiplexing RTP Data and Control Packets on a Single Port"
[RFC5761] to still be able to use a single 5-tuple. The reasons for
supporting this extra functionality is that RTP and RTCP multiplexing
based on the payload type/packet type fields enforces certain
restrictions on the RTP sessions. These restrictions may not be
acceptable. As this solution does not have these restrictions,
performing RTP and RTCP multiplexing in this way has benefits.
Each Session ID value space is scoped by the underlying transport
protocol. Common transport protocols like UDP, DCCP, TCP, and SCTP
can all be scoped by one or more 5-tuple (Transport protocol, source
address and port, destination address and port). The case of
multiple 5-tuples occur in the case of multi-unicast topologies, also
called meshed multiparty RTP sessions.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
|V=2|P|X| CC |M| PT | sequence number | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| timestamp | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| synchronization source (SSRC) identifier | |
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
| contributing source (CSRC) identifiers | |
| .... | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| RTP extension (OPTIONAL) | |
+>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | payload ... | |
| | +-------------------------------+ |
| | | RTP padding | RTP pad count | |
+>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
| ~ SRTP MKI (OPTIONAL) ~ |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| : authentication tag (RECOMMENDED) : |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | Session ID | |
| +---------------+ |
+- Encrypted Portion* Authenticated Portion ---+
SRTP Packet encapsulated by Session ID Layer
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
|V=2|P| RC | PT=SR or RR | length | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| SSRC of sender | |
+>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
| ~ sender info ~ |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| ~ report block 1 ~ |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| ~ report block 2 ~ |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| ~ ... ~ |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |V=2|P| SC | PT=SDES=202 | length | |
| +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
| | SSRC/CSRC_1 | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| ~ SDES items ~ |
| +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
| ~ ... ~ |
+>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
| |E| SRTCP index | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
| ~ SRTCP MKI (OPTIONAL) ~ |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| : authentication tag : |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | Session ID | |
| +---------------+ |
+-- Encrypted Portion Authenticated Portion -----+
SRTCP packet encapuslated by Session ID layer
The processing in a receiver when the Session ID layer is present
will be to
1. Pick up the packet from the lower layer transport
2. Inspect the SID field value
3. Strip the SID field from the packet
4. Forward it to the (S)RTP Session context identified by the SID
value
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6.2. Signalling
The use of the Session ID layer needs to be explicitly agreed on
between the communicating parties. Each RTP Session the application
uses must in addition to the regular configuration such as payload
types, RTCP extension etc, have both the underlying 5-tuple (source
address and port, destination address and port, and transport
protocol) and the Session ID used for the particular RTP session.
The signalling requirement is to assign unique Session ID values to
all RTP Sessions being sent over the same 5-tuple. The same Session
ID shall be used for an RTP session independently of the traffic
direction. Note that nothing prevents a multi-media application from
using multiple 5-tuples if desired for some reason, in which case
each 5-tuple has its own session ID value space.
This section defines how to negotiate the use of the Session ID
layer, using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) Offer/Answer
mechanism [RFC3264]. A new media-level SDP attribute,
'session-mux-id', is defined, in order to be used with the media
multiplex mechanism defined in
[I-D.holmberg-mmusic-sdp-multiplex-negotiation]. The attribute
allows each media description ("m=" line) associated with a
'MULTIPLEX' group to form a separate RTP session.
The 'session-mux-id' attribute is included for a media description,
in order to indicate the Session ID for that particular media
description. Every media description that shares a common attribute
value is assumed to be part of a single RTP session. An SDP Offerer
MUST include the 'session-mux-id' attribute for every media
description associated with a 'MULTIPLEX' group. If the SDP Answer
does not contain 'session-mux-id' attributes, the SDP Offerer MUST
NOT assume that separate RTP sessions will be used. If the SDP
Answer still describes a 'MULTIPLEX' group, the procedures in
[I-D.holmberg-mmusic-sdp-multiplex-negotiation] apply.
An SDP Answerer MUST NOT include the 'session-mux-id' attribute in an
SDP Answer, unless included in the SDP Offer.
The attribute has the following ABNF [RFC5234] definition.
Session-mux-id-attr = "a=session-mux-id:" SID *SID-prop
SID = SID-value / SID-pairs
SID-value = 1*3DIGIT / "NoN"
SID-pairs = SID-value "/" SID-value ; RTP/RTCP SIDs
SID-prop = SP assignment-policy / prop-ext
prop-ext = token "=" value
assignment-policy = "policy=" ("tentative" / "fixed")
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The following parameters MUST be configured as specified:
o RTP Profile SHOULD be the same, but MUST be compatible, like AVP
and AVPF.
o RTCP bandwidth parameters are the same
o RTP Payload type values are not overlapping
In declarative SDP usage, there is clearly no method for fallback
unless some other negotiation protocol is used.
The SID property "policy" is used in negotiation by an end-point to
indicate if the session ID values are merely a tentative suggestion
or if they must have these values. This is used when negotiating SID
for multi-party RTP sessions to support shared transports such as
multicast or RTP translators that are unable to produce renumbered
SIDs on a per end-point basis. The normal behavior is that the offer
suggest a tentative set of values, indicated by "policy=tentative".
These SHOULD be accepted by the peer unless that peer negotiate
session IDs on behalf of a centralized policy, in which case it MAY
change the value(s) in the answer. If the offer represents a policy
that does not allow changing the session ID values, it can indicate
that to the answerer by setting the policy to "fixed". This enables
the answering peer to either accept the value or indicate that there
is a conflict in who is performing the assignment by setting the SID
value to NoN (Not a Number). Offerer and answerer SHOULD always
include the policy they are operating under. Thus, in case of no
centralized behaviors, both offerer and answerer will indicate the
tentative policy.
6.3. SRTP Key Management
Key management for SRTP do needs discussion as we do cause multiple
SRTP sessions to exist on the same underlying transport flow. Thus
we need to ensure that the key management mechanism still are
properly associated with the SRTP session context it intends to key.
To ensure that we do look at the three SRTP key management mechanism
that IETF has specified, one after another.
6.3.1. Security Description
Session Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media
Streams [RFC4568] as being based on SDP has no issue with the RTP
session multiplexing on lower layer specified here. The reason is
that the actual keying is done using a media level SDP attribute.
Thus the attribute is already associated with a particular media
description. A media description that also will have an instance of
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the "a=session-mux-id" attribute carrying the SID value/pair used
with this particular crypto parameters.
6.3.2. DTLS-SRTP
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys
for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [RFC5764] is a
keying mechanism that works on the media plane on the same lower
layer transport that SRTP/SRTCP will be transported over. Thus each
DTLS message must be associated with the SRTP and/or SRTCP flow it is
keying.
The most direct solution is to use the SHIM and the SID context
identifier to be applied also on DTLS packets. Thus using the same
SID that is used with RTP and/or RTCP also for the DTLS message
intended to key that particular SRTP and/or SRTCP flow(s).
6.3.3. MIKEY
MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing [RFC3830] is a key management
protocol that has several transports. In some cases it is used
directly on a transport protocol such as UDP, but there is also a
specification for how MIKEY is used with SDP "Key Management
Extensions for Session Description Protocol (SDP) and Real Time
Streaming Protocol (RTSP)" [RFC4567].
Lets start with the later, i.e. the SDP transport, which shares the
properties with Security Description in that is can be associated
with a particular media description in a SDP. As long as one avoids
using the session level attribute one can be certain to correctly
associate the key exchange with a given SRTP/SRTCP context.
It does appear that MIKEY directly over a lower layer transport
protocol will have similar issues as DTLS.
6.4. Examples
6.4.1. RTP Packet with Transport Header
The below figure contains an RTP packet with SID field encapsulated
by a UDP packet (added UDP header).
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
|V=2|P|X| CC |M| PT | sequence number | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| timestamp | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| synchronization source (SSRC) identifier | |
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ |
| contributing source (CSRC) identifiers | |
| .... | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| RTP extension (OPTIONAL) | |
+>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | payload ... | |
| | +-------------------------------+ |
| | | RTP padding | RTP pad count | |
+>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+
| ~ SRTP MKI (OPTIONAL) ~ |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| : authentication tag (RECOMMENDED) : |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | Session ID | |
| +---------------+ |
+- Encrypted Portion* Authenticated Portion ---+
SRTP Packet Encapsulated by Session ID Layer
6.4.2. SDP Offer/Answer example
This section contains SDP offer/answer examples. First one example
of successful multiplexing, and then two where fallback occurs.
In the below SDP offer, one audio and one video is being offered.
The audio is using SID 0, and the video is using SID 1 to indicate
that they are different RTP sessions despite being offered over the
same 5-tuple.
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v=0
o=alice 2890844526 2890844526 IN IP4 atlanta.example.com
s=
c=IN IP4 atlanta.example.com
t=0 0
a=group:MULTIPLEX foo bar
m=audio 10000 RTP/AVP 0 8 97
b=AS:200
a=mid:foo
a=session-mxu-id:0 policy=suggest
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:97 iLBC/8000
m=video 10000 RTP/AVP 31 32
b=AS:1000
a=mid:bar
a=session-mxu-id:1 policy=suggest
a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000
a=rtpmap:32 MPV/90000
The SDP answer from an end-point that supports this multiplexing:
v=0
o=bob 2808844564 2808844564 IN IP4 biloxi.example.com
s=
c=IN IP4 biloxi.example.com
t=0 0
a=group:MULTIPLEX foo bar
m=audio 20000 RTP/AVP 0
b=AS:200
a=mid:foo
a=session-mux-id:0 policy=suggest
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
m=video 20000 RTP/AVP 32
b=AS:1000
a=mid:bar
a=session-mux-id:1 policy=suggest
a=rtpmap:32 MPV/90000
The SDP answer from an end-point that does not support this
multiplexing or the general signalling of
[I-D.holmberg-mmusic-sdp-multiplex-negotiation].
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v=0
o=bob 2808844564 2808844564 IN IP4 biloxi.example.com
s=
c=IN IP4 biloxi.example.com
t=0 0
m=audio 20000 RTP/AVP 0
b=AS:200
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
m=video 30000 RTP/AVP 32
b=AS:1000
a=rtpmap:32 MPV/90000
The SDP answer of a client supporting
[I-D.holmberg-mmusic-sdp-multiplex-negotiation] but not this
multiplexing would look like this:
v=0
o=bob 2808844564 2808844564 IN IP4 biloxi.example.com
s=
c=IN IP4 biloxi.example.com
t=0 0
a=group:MULTIPLEX foo bar
m=audio 20000 RTP/AVP 0
a=mid:foo
b=AS:200
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
m=video 20000 RTP/AVP 32
a=mid:bar
b=AS:1000
a=rtpmap:32 MPV/90000
In this last case, the result is a sing RTP session with both media
types being established. If that isn't supported or desired, the
offerer will have to either re-invite without the MULTIPLEX grouping
to force different 5-tuples, or simply terminate the session.
7. Open Issues
This is the first version of this draft. It will obviously have a
number of open issues. This section contains a list of open issues
where the author desires some input.
1. Should RTP and RTCP multiplexing without RFC 5761 support be
included?
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8. IANA Considerations
This document request the registration of one SDP attribute. Details
of the registration to be filled in.
9. Security Considerations
The security properties of the Session ID layer is depending on what
mechanism is used to protect the RTP and RTCP packets of a given RTP
session. If IPsec or transport layer security solutions such as DTLS
or TLS are being used then both the encapsulated RTP/RTCP packets and
the session ID layer will be protected by that security mechanism.
Thus potentially providing both confidentiality, integrity and source
authentication. If SRTP is used, the session ID layer will not be
directly protected by SRTP. However, it will be implicitly integrity
protected (assuming the RTP/RTCP packet is integrity protected) as
the only function of the field is to identify the session context.
Thus any modification of the SID field will attempt to retrieve the
wrong SRTP crypto context. If that retrieval fails, the packet will
be anyway be discarded. If it is successful, the context will not
lead to successful verification of the packet.
10. Acknowledgements
This document is based on the input from various people, especially
in the context of the RTCWEB discussion of how to use only a single
lower layer transport. The RTP and RTCP packet figures are borrowed
from RFC3711. The SDP example is extended from the one present in
[I-D.holmberg-mmusic-sdp-multiplex-negotiation]. The authors would
like to thank Christer Holmberg for assistance in utilizing the
multiplex grouping mechanism.
The proposal in Section 4.5 is original suggested by Colin Perkins.
The idea in Section 4.6 is from an Internet Draft
[I-D.rosenberg-rtcweb-rtpmux] written by Jonathan Rosenberg et. al.
The proposal in Section 4.3 is a result of discussion by a group of
people at IETF meeting #81 in Quebec.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.holmberg-mmusic-sdp-multiplex-negotiation]
Holmberg, C., "Multiplexing Negotiation Using Session
Description Protocol (SDP) Port Numbers",
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draft-holmberg-mmusic-sdp-multiplex-negotiation-00 (work
in progress), September 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, March 2004.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
11.2. Informational References
[I-D.rosenberg-rtcweb-rtpmux]
Rosenberg, J., Jennings, C., Peterson, J., Kaufman, M.,
Rescorla, E., and T. Terriberry, "Multiplexing of Real-
Time Transport Protocol (RTP) Traffic for Browser based
Real-Time Communications (RTC)",
draft-rosenberg-rtcweb-rtpmux-00 (work in progress),
July 2011.
[RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
June 2002.
[RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
August 2004.
[RFC4567] Arkko, J., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., Norrman, K., and E.
Carrara, "Key Management Extensions for Session
Description Protocol (SDP) and Real Time Streaming
Protocol (RTSP)", RFC 4567, July 2006.
[RFC4568] Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session
Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media
Streams", RFC 4568, July 2006.
[RFC5285] Singer, D. and H. Desineni, "A General Mechanism for RTP
Header Extensions", RFC 5285, July 2008.
[RFC5506] Johansson, I. and M. Westerlund, "Support for Reduced-Size
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Real-Time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP): Opportunities
and Consequences", RFC 5506, April 2009.
[RFC5761] Perkins, C. and M. Westerlund, "Multiplexing RTP Data and
Control Packets on a Single Port", RFC 5761, April 2010.
[RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764, May 2010.
Author's Address
Magnus Westerlund
Ericsson
Farogatan 6
SE-164 80 Kista
Sweden
Phone: +46 10 714 82 87
Email: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
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