AVT Working Group D. Wing
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track February 15, 2008
Expires: August 18, 2008
Datagram TLS Secure RTP (DTLS-SRTP) Key Transport
draft-wing-avt-dtls-srtp-key-transport-01
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
The existing DTLS-SRTP specification allows SRTP keys to be
established between a pair of SRTP endpoints. However, when there
are more than two participants in an RTP session, DTLS-SRTP is unable
to provide a single key for all of the participants. This existing
limitation of DTLS-SRTP prevents deploying DTLS-SRTP in certain
scenarios.
This document describes an extension to DTLS-SRTP which transports
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SRTP keying material from one DTLS-SRTP peer to another, so the same
SRTP keying material can be used by multiple DTLS-SRTP peers. This
extension reduces (and often eliminates) the need to key each SRTP
session individually, allowing deployment of several DTLS-SRTP
scenarios.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Point to Multipoint using the RFC 3550 mixer model . . . . 3
3.2. Point to Multipoint using Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Point to Multipoint Using Video Switching MCUs . . . . . . 5
3.4. Voicemail Storage and Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. key_transport extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. SRTP Key Transport Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Key Transport SSRC and RTP SSRC Collisions . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. Fragmentation, Reassembly, and Retransmission . . . . . . 13
5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Group Policy when Joining/Leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. Changes from -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
Unique SRTP master keys can be established, in each direction, using
DTLS-SRTP [I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp]. Using DTLS, each peer
contributes part of the keying material to generate the eventual SRTP
master key.
In some scenarios after the DTLS handshake has completed, it is
desirable for one peer to change its SRTP key and to transmit SRTP
packets using an SRTP key that was not derived from the DTLS key
exchange. These scenarios are described in Section 3.
The extensions described in this document allow transporting an SRTP
master key from one DTLS peer to the other. Thus, DTLS Key Transport
differs from normal DTLS-SRTP in that the SRTP master key is not
derived from the TLS handshake.
2. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Scenarios
DTLS Key Transport allows mixers and video switchers to avoid having
to encrypt each packet multiple times under multiple SRTP keys. DTLS
Key Transport causes sharing of SRTP keys.
Several SRTP scenarios that benefit from DTLS-SRTP Key Transport are
described in the following sections, using terminology from RTP
Topologies [RFC5117].
3.1. Point to Multipoint using the RFC 3550 mixer model
This RTP scenario is described in Section 3.4 of RTP Topologies
[RFC5117].
With DTLS-SRTP, this topology is computationally expensive for the
video switcher because it has to encrypt the payload uniquely for
each SRTP listener. Additionally, the architecture of a typical
mixer requires each listener's SRTP to be encrypted serially,
incurring additional delay for each successive listener. This is
depicted below in Figure 1.
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+-------key=F-------+
| |
V +-------+ +------------+
+----+----+ | +--key=C->+ listener 1 |
| speaker +--key=A-->+ | +------------+
+---------+ | | +------------+
| mixer +--key=D->+ listener 2 |
+---------+ | | +------------+
| speaker +--key=B-->+ | +------------+
+----+----+ | +--key=E->+ listener 3 |
^ +---+---+ +------------+
| |
+-------key=G-------+
Figure 1: Point to Multipoint Mixer, without DTLS Key Transport
With DTLS Key Transport, the mixer can maintain one outbound SRTP
cryptographic context, and encrypt the SRTP once for all listeners.
This is depicted below in Figure 2.
In the following figure, "=" indicates sessions where DTLS-SRTP Key
Transport is used, and "-" indicates where only DTLS-SRTP is
necessary. In this topology, only the listeners need support DTLS-
SRTP Key Transport so that the switcher and the listeners can benefit
from DTLS-SRTP Key Transport. In this scenario with DTLS-SRTP Key
Transport, the mixer assumes an additional role -- group's key server
-- and provides a common group SRTP key ("C") to all of the
listeners. This group SRTP key is shared between all of the
listeners.
+=======key=C=======+
| |
V +---+---+ +------------+
+---------+ | +==key=C=>+ listener 1 |
| speaker +--key=A-->+ | +------------+
+---------+ | | +------------+
| mixer +==key=C=>+ listener 2 |
+---------+ | | +------------+
| speaker +--key=B-->+ | +------------+
+----+----+ | +==key=C=>+ listener 3 |
^ +---+---+ +------------+
| |
+=======key=C=======+
Figure 2: Point to Multipoint Mixer, with DTLS Key Transport
The mixer is aware of listeners leaving or joining, and the mixer can
rekey the remaining active listeners.
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3.2. Point to Multipoint using Multicast
This RTP topology is described in Section 3.2 of RTP Topologies
[RFC5117].
With DTLS-SRTP, this scenario is not attainable because each listener
has a unique SRTP key. For this reason, [I-D.ietf-msec-gdoi-srtp]
was developed by the MSEC working group.
With DTLS-SRTP Key Transport, this scenario is attainable because the
same key can be provided to multiple listeners, as depicted below in
Figure 3. This compares favorably with [I-D.ietf-msec-gdoi-srtp]
when the group size is small enough that the speaker can perform key
server functions (i.e., perform DTLS-SRTP Key Transport) for all of
the listeners.
+-------+ +------------+
/ \==key=A===>+ listener 1 |
/ \ +------------+
+---------+ | multicast | +------------+
| speaker +==key=A===>+ network +==key=A==>+ listener 2 |
+---------+ | | +------------+
\ / +------------+
\ /===key=A==>+ listener 3 |
+-------+ +------------+
Figure 3: Point to Multipoint using Multicast with Key Transport
[[For future study: could we express, in SDP, alternate DTLS-SRTP
key servers to support large groups for this scenario, so that the
speaker can be offloaded from DTLS-SRTP Key Transport duties?
That alternate key server would need authorize new participants.
This seems to begin stepping into GDOI territory, but how does a
DTLS-SRTP endpoint know when it will join a large group and need
GDOI code inside the DTLS-SRTP endpoint? Ideally we would want to
split the effort and protocols so that endpoint needs *no*
additional code with really large groups.]]
3.3. Point to Multipoint Using Video Switching MCUs
This RTP topology is described in Section 3.5 of RTP Topologies
[RFC5117].
With DTLS-SRTP, this topology is computationally expensive for the
video switcher because it has to encrypt the payload uniquely for
each SRTP listener. Additionally, the architecture of a typical
video switcher requires each listener's SRTP to be encrypted
serially, incurring additional delay for each successive listener.
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This is depicted below in Figure 4.
In the following figure, DTLS-SRTP Key Transport is used on all
sessions and depicted by "=". In this scenario, both the speakers
and listeners must support DTLS-SRTP Key Transport so that the
switcher and the listeners can benefit from DTLS-SRTP Key Transport.
+-------key=F-------+
| |
V +---+------+ +------------+
+---------+ | +==key=C=>+ listener 1 |
| speaker +==key=A==>+selected | +------------+
+---------+ | | +------------+
| switcher +==key=D=>+ listener 2 |
+---------+ | | +------------+
| speaker +==key=B==>+dropped | +------------+
+----+----+ | +==key=E=>+ listener 3 |
^ +---+------+ +------------+
| |
+-------key=G-------+
Figure 4: Point to Multipoint Video Switching, without DTLS Key
Transport
With DTLS key transport, this becomes easier; in fact, the video
switcher doesn't need to decrypt the SRTP at all, but just make its
decision (select the stream or drop the stream) and transmit the SRTP
packets to the listeners. This is depicted below in Figure 5.
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+-------key=B-------+
| |
V +---+------+ +------------+
+----+----+ | +==key=A=>+ listener 1 |
| speaker +==key=A==>+selected | +------------+
+---------+ | | +------------+
| switcher +==key=A=>+ listener 2 |
+---------+ | | +------------+
| speaker +==key=B==>+prev.spkr | +------------+
+---------+ | +==key=A=>+ listener 3 |
^ +----------+ +------------+
| |
+-------key=A-------+
Figure 5: Point to Multipoint Video Switching, with DTLS Key
Transport
The video switcher is aware of listeners leaving or joining. The
protocol described in this document allows the switcher to dictate,
to the speaker, that the speaker use a new encryption key. This
allows the switcher to enforce security, based on the switcher's
policy (Section 6.1). This is done by the video switcher sending a
DTLS "your_new_srtp_key" message. The speaker will respond with a
DTLS "new_srtp_key" message which echos the same key. The
"new_srtp_key" message is relayed, by the switcher, to each of the
active listeners.
When there are multiple speakers, as shown in Figure 5 above, each
speaker transmits with his own SRTP key. That SRTP key is derived
from the DTLS handshake with the switcher. Each speaker uses DTLS-
SRTP Key Transport to signal the SSRC that it will use.
3.4. Voicemail Storage and Retrieval
With DTLS-SRTP, voicemail storage servers have to decrypt the SRTP
when the message is recorded. In some voicemail server
architectures, the recorded message is re-encrypted, using a new key
to protect the content while it is on disk. Then, later, the
voicemail is retrieved, which involves encrypting the message using
SRTP again. This is depicted below in Figure 6. This SRTP
decryption and encryption can create a significant computational load
on a voicemail storage server.
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+-----------+
+---------+ | |
| speaker +--key=A-->| voicemail |
+---------+ | storage |
| server | +-----------+
| +--key=B-->+ voicemail |
| (store | | retrieval |
| decrypted | +-----------+
| content) |
+-----------+
Figure 6: Voicemail Storage and Retrieval without Key Transport
DTLS-SRTP Key Transport removes the need for the voicemail storage
server to decrypt the incoming SRTP and to re-encrypt upon message
retrieval. With DTLS-SRTP Key Transport, the voicemail storage
server can store the speaker's DTLS-SRTP key along with the encrypted
message (including RTP headers), and then use DTLS-SRTP Key Transport
to communicate that key during voicemail retrieval. This is depicted
below in Figure 7.
In the following figure, DTLS-SRTP Key Transport is used on all
sessions and depicted by "=". In this scenario, only the device
performing the voicemail retrieval needs to implement DTLS-SRTP Key
Transport to help offload SRTP processing from the voicemail storage
server.
+-----------+
+---------+ | |
| speaker +--key=A-->| voicemail |
+---------+ | storage |
| server | +-----------+
| +==key=A==>+ voicemail |
| (store | | retrieval |
| encrypted | +-----------+
| content & |
| SRTP key |
+-----------+
Figure 7: Voicemail Storage and Retrieval with Key Transport
4. Protocol Description
This section describes the extension to the DTLS protocol for DTLS-
SRTP key transport, which allows securely communicating the SRTP key
to the DTLS peer.
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4.1. key_transport extension
This document adds a new negotiated extension called "key_transport",
which MUST only be requested in conjunction with the "use_srtp"
extension (Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp]). The DTLS server
indicates its support for key_transport by including key_transport in
its ServerHello message. If a DTLS client includes key_transport in
its ClientHello, but does not receive key_transport in the
ServerHello, the DTLS client MUST NOT send DTLS packets with the
srtp_key_transport content-type.
Support for the DTLS Key Transport extension is indicated in SDP with
the "srtp-kt" attribute. Advertising support for the extension is
necessary in SDP because in some cases it is required to establish an
SRTP call. For example, a mixer may be able to only support SRTP
listeners if those listeners implement DTLS Key Transport (because it
lacks the CPU cycles necessary to encrypt SRTP uniquely for each
listener).
A message flow showing a DTLS client and DTLS server using the
key_transport extension
Client Server
ClientHello + use_srtp + key_transport
-------->
ServerHello + use_srtp + key_transport
Certificate*
ServerKeyExchange*
CertificateRequest*
<-------- ServerHelloDone
Certificate*
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify*
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->
[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets
Figure 8: Handshake Message Flow
After successful negotiation of the key_transport extension, the DTLS
client and server MAY exchange SRTP packets, encrypted using the KDF
described in [I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp]. This is normal and expected,
even if Key Transport was negotiated by both sides, as neither side
may (yet) have a need to alter the SRTP key. However, it is also
possible that one (or both) peers will immediately send a
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new_srtp_key message before sending any SRTP.
4.2. SRTP Key Transport Protocol
A new protocol is defined, called the srtp_key_transport protocol
which uses srtp_key_transport content-type which consists of the
following message types:
new_srtp_key_request: request that the DTLS peer choose a new key.
Valid responses are new_srtp_key and new_srtp_key_error.
your_new_srtp_key: Dictates a new SRTP key for the peer to use when
the peer transmits its SRTP packets.
new_srtp_key: contains the new SRTP keying material. This message
is sent by a DTLS endpoint that wants to change its SRTP key.
This does not change any cryptographic parameters (a new DTLS
handshake is necessary for that), but only the DTLS key for the
associated SRTP session. This message includes the SSRC that will
be used for this key, which allows listeners to establish one SRTP
crypto-context per speaker (necessary for the video switching
scenario). The key chosen MUST be cryptographically random
[RFC4086].
new_key_activate: indicates receiver is prepared to receive SRTP
packets encrypted with the new key.
delete_srtp_key: indicates the security association related to this
key can be deleted.
new_srtp_key_failure: indicates a failure.
At any time, the DTLS client or DTLS server MAY send a key_transport
message, as shown in Figure 9. The sender of the new_srtp_key
message MAY immediately start transmitting SRTP packets with this new
key. However, to account for loss of the new_srtp_key message it is
RECOMMENDED that the sender wait before changing to the new SRTP key
until it receives the new_key_activate message or it times out
waiting for the new_key_activate_message. The duration of this
timeout may vary depending on the sensitivity of the content (e.g., 1
second or 10 seconds). In any case, the new_srtp_key message is
retransmitted until acknowledged by receipt of a new_key_activate
message.
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Client / Server Server / Client
[new_srtp_key_request] -------->
<-------- new_srtp_key
new_srtp_key_activiate -------->
Figure 9: New Key Message Flow
The following figure shows the state machine for the protocol.
receive new_srtp_key_request from peer
or decide to choose new SRTP key
|
|
send V
new_srtp_key +---------------+ timeout
+---------| Communicate |--------+
| | Key | |
+-------->| | |
+---------------+ |
| ^ |
receive | | +----------------+
new_key_activate| +---| send SRTP using|
| | new SRTP key |
+----------------+ +----------------+
| send SRTP using|
| new SRTP key |
+----------------+
|
V
done
Figure 10: Key Transport protocol state machine
Using the syntax described in TLS [RFC4346], the following structures
are used:
enum {
new_srtp_key_request(0),
your_new_srtp_key(1),
new_srtp_key(2),
new_srtp_key_activate(3),
delete_srtp_key(4),
new_srtp_key_failure(128),
(255)
} SRTPKeyTransportType;
struct {
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SRTPKeyTransportType keytrans_type;
uint24 length;
uint16 message_seq;
uint24 fragment_offset;
uint24 fragment_length;
select (SRTPKeyTransportType) {
case new_srtp_key_request: NewSRTPKeyRequest;
case your_new_srtp_key: YourNewSRTPKey;
case new_srtp_key: NewSRTPKey;
case new_srtp_key_activate: NewSRTPKeyActivate;
case delete_srtp_key: DeleteSRTPKey;
case new_srtp_key_failure: NewSRTPKeyFailure;
};
} KeyTransport;
struct {
uint random<64>; // additional entropy for peer
} NewSRTPKeyRequest;
struct {
uint32 ssrc; // SSRC used for this key
uint key<16..32>; // The last change_cipher_spec
uint auth_tag<4..10> // decides the length of key
// and auth_tag
uint random<64>; // additional entropy for peer
} NewSRTPKey;
struct {
uint key<16..32>; // The last change_cipher_spec
uint auth_tag<4..10> // decides the length of key
// and auth_tag
} YourNewSRTPKey;
struct {
uint random<64>; // additional entropy for peer
} NewSRTPKeyActivate;
struct {
uint32 ssrc; // SSRC used for this key
} DeleteSRTPKey;
struct { } NewSRTPKeyFailure;
Figure 11: Data Structures
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4.3. Key Transport SSRC and RTP SSRC Collisions
Per [RFC3550], if an RTP source notices an RTP SSRC collision, it is
required to change its SSRC. If it has negotiated support for DTLS-
SRTP Key Transport, it then MUST also send a new_srtp_key message
indicating the new SSRC. As part of this procedure, it does not need
to also change its SRTP key.
The communication of the SSRC used for each key is necessary if there
are multiple speakers in the video switching scenario. However,
because a speaker is not able to determine if their audio or their
video is being switched, a speaker MUST always adhere indicate a
change in SSRC by following the procedure in this section for any
SRTP stream (audio, video, or other).
4.4. Fragmentation, Reassembly, and Retransmission
Much like the DTLS handshake itself, this extension also needs to
handle fragmentation and reassembly (to send a large key) and
retransmission (to account for packet loss). Using the same
technique as DTLS's handshake, the message_seq, fragment_offset,
fragment_length are used.
When transmitting the key transport message, the sender divides the
message into a series of N contiguous data ranges. These ranges MUST
NOT be larger than the maximum handshake fragment size and MUST
jointly contain the entire key transport message. The ranges SHOULD
NOT overlap. The sender then creates N key transport messages, all
with the same message_seq value as the original key transport
message. Each new message is labelled with the fragment_offset (the
number of bytes contained in previous fragments) and the
fragment_length (the length of this fragment). The length field in
all messages is the same as the length field of the original message.
An unfragmented message is a degenerate case with fragment_offset=0
and fragment_length=length.
When a DTLS implementation receives a key transport message fragment,
it MUST buffer it until it has the entire key transport message.
DTLS implementations MUST be able to handle overlapping fragment
ranges. This allows senders to retransmit key transport messages
with smaller fragment sizes during path MTU discovery.
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5. Examples
The following example shows how Key Transport would be requested in
an offer, using "a=dtls-srtp-kt".
v=0
o=- 25678 753849 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
s=
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
t=0 0
m=audio 53456 UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVP 0
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=dtls-srtp-kt
Figure 12: Simple SDP offer showing Key Transport is required
Using the SDP syntax described in
[I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation], the following figure
shows an offerer that requires DTLS Key Transport in order to set up
this call as an SRTP call, otherwise it can set up this call as an
RTP call. This is indicated by the ",2" on the "a=pcfg" line. If
the answerer does not understand "a=dtls-srtp-kt" but does understand
DTLS-SRTP and [I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation], this can
cannot be established using DTLS-SRTP; however, it can be established
using RTP.
v=0
o=- 25678 753849 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
s=
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
t=0 0
m=audio 53456 RTP/AVP 0
a=tcap:1 UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVP
a=acap:1 fingerprint:SHA-1 \
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=acap:2 dtls-srtp-kt
a=pcfg:1 t=1 a=1,2
Figure 13: Example SDP offer showing Key Transport is required
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Using the SDP syntax described in
[I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation], the following figure
shows an offerer that indicates support for DTLS Key Transport but
does not require DTLS Key Transport in order to set up this call as
an SRTP call. This is indicated by the ",[2]" on the "a=pcfg" line.
If the answerer does not understand "a=dtls-srtp-kt" but does
understand DTLS-SRTP and
[I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation], this call can still be
established using DTLS-SRTP.
v=0
o=- 25678 753849 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
s=
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
t=0 0
m=audio 53456 RTP/AVP 0
a=tcap:1 UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVP
a=acap:1 fingerprint:SHA-1 \
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=acap:2 dtls-srtp-kt
a=pcfg:1 t=1 a=1,[2]
Figure 14: Example SDP offer showing Key Transport is optional
6. Security Considerations
In the point-to-multipoint scenario, Section 3.1, all of the
listeners know the key being used by the mixer. Any of those
listeners could create SRTP packets that are encrypted with this same
key, and send those SRTP packets to other listeners. In order to
reduce the vulnerability to this threat, it is RECOMMENDED that the
source transport address of received SRTP packets be discarded if
they do not match the source transport address of the associated
DTLS-SRTP session. Additionally, the network SHOULD prevent IP
address spoofing [RFC2827].
6.1. Group Policy when Joining/Leaving
When sharing SRTP keys with several listeners, it is imperative that
the SRTP is changed when a new listener is added or a listener is
removed. This is because a legitimate listener should only be able
to decrypt the SRTP stream while he is listening; he should not be
able to decrypt the SRTP stream prior to joining the conference or
after leaving the conference. Failing to change the key when a
listener joins (or leaves) allows a listener to decrypt SRTP traffic
prior to (or after) they are authorized participants in the
conference.
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Policies for a specific user's access to a conference may be
different from conference to conference. For example, a company-
internal event announcing promotions might be accessible to all
employees and have no need for re-keying when listeners join or leave
the conference. As another example, a conference where a job
candidate is interviewed should be rekeyed when the job candidate
joins the conference and again when the job candidate leaves the
conference.
The protocol described in this document allows whichever policy is
needed for a particular situation. The protocol itself does not
enforce a certain policy; that is, the protocol itself does not
ensure the SRTP key is changed when a listener leaves (or joins) the
conference.
7. Acknowledgements
Thanks to David McGrew for his improvements to this document and to
the underlying protocol. Thanks to Brian Weis, Sheela Rowles, and
Mark Baugher for suggesting how GDOI-SRTP's key management could be
used by DTLS-SRTP; these suggestions have been incorporated into
DTLS-SRTP Key Transport.
8. IANA Considerations
[[This section will be completed in a future version of this
document.]]
To do:
o Register new SDP attribute "dtls-srtp-kt"
o new TLS content-type "key_transport" (26?)
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp]
McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
draft-ietf-avt-dtls-srtp-01 (work in progress),
November 2007.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation]
Andreasen, F., "SDP Capability Negotiation",
draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-capability-negotiation-08 (work in
progress), December 2007.
9.2. Informational References
[RFC5117] Westerlund, M. and S. Wenger, "RTP Topologies", RFC 5117,
January 2008.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[I-D.ietf-msec-gdoi-srtp]
Baugher, M., Rueegsegger, A., and S. Rowles, "GDOI Key
Establishment for the SRTP Data Security Protocol",
draft-ietf-msec-gdoi-srtp-01 (work in progress),
December 2007.
Appendix A. Changes
[[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to
publication]]
A.1. Changes from -00 to -01
o more closely aligned with RTP Topologies [RFC5117]
o added multicast scenario
o added voicemail storage/retrieval scenario
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o added delete_srtp_key
o added your_new_srtp_key
o aligned SDP for DTLS-SRTP with draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-dtls-00
o key change rules are now discussed in Security Considerations
Author's Address
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: dwing@cisco.com
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