Operations Area Working Group S. Winter
Internet-Draft RESTENA
Intended status: Standards Track February 10, 2014
Expires: August 14, 2014
A Configuration File Format for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Deployments
draft-winter-opsawg-eap-metadata-00
Abstract
This document specifies a file format for transfering configuration
information of deployments of the Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP). Such configuration files are meant to be discovered, consumed
and used by EAP supplicant software to achieve secure and automatic
EAP configuration on the consuming device.
Status of This Memo
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Other Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. XML Schema for EAP Metadata File Format . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Location of XML Schema and Sample XML file . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Description of Schema Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1. Overall structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.2. <AuthenticationMethods> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.3. <ProviderInfo> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Internationalisation / Multi-language support . . . . . . 10
3. Issuer Authentication, Integrity Protection and Encryption of
EAP Metadata configuration files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. File Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. By MIME-Type: application/eap-config . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. By filename extension: .eap-config . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. By network location: SCAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Existing Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Design Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. Why XML and not $FOO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. Shallow vs. Deep definition of EAP method properties . . 12
6.3. EAP tunneling inside EAP tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.4. Placement of <OuterIdentity> inside
<AuthenticationMethod> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Appendix A: MIME Type Registration Template . . . . 15
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Statement
The IETF has produced the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP,
[RFC3748] and numerous EAP methods (for example EAP-TTLS [RFC5281],
EAP-TLS [RFC5216] and [RFC5931]); the methods have many properties
which need to be setup on the EAP server and matched as configuration
items on the EAP peer for a secure EAP deployment.
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Setting up these configuration items is comparatively easy if the
end-user devices which implement the EAP peer functionality are under
central administrative control, e.g. in closed enterprise
environments. Group policies or device provisioning by the IT
department can push the settings to user devices.
In other environments, for example "BYOD" scenarios where users bring
their own devices which are not under enterprise control, or in EAP-
based WISP environments (see e.g. [HS20] and
[I-D.wierenga-ietf-eduroam]) where it is not desired neither for the
ISP nor for his user that the device control is in the ISPs hands,
configuration of EAP is significantly harder as it has to be done by
potentially very non-technical end users.
Correct configuration of all EAP deployment parameters is required to
make the resulting authentications
o functional (i.e. the end user can authenticate to an EAP server at
all)
o secure (i.e. the end user device can unambiguously authenticate
the EAP server prior to releasing any sensitive client-side
credentials)
o privacy-preserving (i.e. the end user is able to conceal his
username from the EAP authenticator)
It would be desirable to be able to convey the EAP configuration
information of a deployment in a machine parseable way to the end-
user device, so that all the gory details need not be known/
understood by the user. Instead, the EAP peer software on the device
could consume the configuration information and set up all EAP
authentication details automatically.
However, there is currently no standard way of communicating
configuration parameters about an EAP setup to the EAP peer.
This specification defines such a file format for EAP configuration
metadata.
The specification allows for unique identification of an EAP identity
provider by scoping it into a namespace and giving it a unique name
inside that namespace. Using this unique identification, other
configuration files (e.g. which detail an Enterprise Wi-Fi setup) can
then refer to this particular instance of EAP identity information as
authentication source.
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1.2. Other Approaches
Device manufacturers sometimes have developed their own proprietary
configuration formats, examples include Apple's "mobileconfig" (MIME
type application/x-apple-aspen-config), Microsoft's XML schemata for
EAP methods for use with the command-line "netsh" tool, or Intel's
"PRO/Set Wireless" binary configuration files. The multitude of
proprietary file formats and their different levels of richness in
expression of EAP details create a very heterogenous and non-
interoperable landscape.
New devices which would like to benefit from machine-parseable EAP
configuration currently either have to choose to follow a
competitor's approach and use that competitor's file format or have
to develop their own. This situation is very unsatisfactory.
1.3. Requirements Language
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
RFC 2119. [RFC2119]
1.4. Terminology
2. XML Schema for EAP Metadata File Format
2.1. Location of XML Schema and Sample XML file
The schema files are currently hosted on this preliminary location:
o Schema: http://ticker.eduroam.lu/cat/EAP-metadata/eap-metadata.xsd
o Sample: http://ticker.eduroam.lu/cat/EAP-metadata/eap-metadata.xml
2.2. Description of Schema Elements
2.2.1. Overall structure
The root element is the <EAPIdentityProviderList> tag, which contains
a sequence of <EAPIdentityProvider> elements; these carry the actual
installer information. In most practical applications, the
<EAPIdentityProviderList> will contain only a single element; a
longer list can be used for metadata transfers between systems or to
allow users to select from a set of providers in one file.
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Every <EAPIdentityProvider> has two attributes which make it globally
unique: one attribute is the 'namespace' attribute which defines the
namespace inside which this EAPIdentityProvider is unique; the other
attribute is the 'ID' attribute which specifies the unique name
inside the namespace. The element contains the following sub-
elements:
o zero or one <ValidUntil> timestamp with an indication of possible
expiry of the information in the configuration file. EAP peers
importing the configuration file can use this information for
example to re-assess whether the account is still valid (e.g. if
the ValidUnil timestamp has passed, and authentication attempts
consistently fail, the supplicant should consider the information
stale and ask the user to verify his access authorisation with the
EAP identity provider)
o exactly one <AuthenticationMethods> block contains a list of EAP
methods which the EAPIdentityProvider supports. This element is
described in more detail in section Section 2.2.2
o zero or one <ProviderInfo> blocks provide additional information
about the EAPIdentityProvider, e.g. a logo to allow visual
identification of the provider to the user in a user interface, or
Acceptable Use Policies pertaining to the use of this EAP
identity. This element is described in more detail in section
Section 2.2.3
o zero or more <VendorSpecific> elements with undefined structure
for cases where particular implementations of this specification
need to convey additional data which is not covered by the other
elements of this specification and does not require cross-vendor
interoperability. The attribute "vendor" of the element MUST
contain the vendor's IANA Enterprise Number.
2.2.2. <AuthenticationMethods>
<AuthenticationMethods> is a sequence of <AuthenticationMethod>
elements. Each such element specifies the properties of one
supported authentication method with various elements. These
elements are enumerated in section Section 2.2.2.1 The set of
configuration parameters depends on the particular EAP method to be
configured.
For instance, EAP-PWD [RFC5931] does not require any server
certificate parameters; EAP-FAST and TEAP are the only ones making
use of Protected Access Credential (PAC) provisioning. On the other
hand, properties such as outer ("anonymous") identity or the need for
a trusted root Certification Authority are common to several EAP
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methods. The server- and client-side credential types of EAP methods
are defined as a flat list of elements to choose from (see
<ServerSideCredential> and <ClientSideCredential> below); see section
Section 6.2 for a rationale.
Where the sequence of <AuthenticationMethod> elements contains more
than one element, the order of appearance in the file indicates the
server operator's preference for the supported EAP types; occurences
earlier in the file indicate a more preferred authentication method.
When a consuming device receives multiple <AuthenticationMethod>
elements, it should attempt to install more preferred methods first.
If the configuration information for that method is insufficient
(e.g. the <AuthenticationMethod> is EAP-TLS, but the configuration
file does not contain the client certificate/private key and the
device's credential store is not pre-loaded with the client's
certificate), the device should query whether the more preferred
method should be used (requiring the user to supplement the missing
data) or whether a less-preferred method should be configured. In
non-interactive provisioning scenarios, all methods should be tried
in order until one method can be installed; if no method can be
installed in a fully automated way, provisioning is aborted.
2.2.2.1. Authentication Method Properties
The <AuthenticationMethod> element contains
o exactly one <EAPMethod> element, which is an integer of the EAP
method identifier as assigned by IANA
o zero or one <ServerSideCredential> elements which are a complex
type containing elements which define means to authenticate the
EAP server to the EAP peer (for a list of these elements, see
section Section 2.2.2.2)
o zero or one <ClientSideCredential> elements which are a complex
type containing elements which define means to authenticate the
EAP peer to the EAP server (for a list of these elements, see
section Section 2.2.2.3)
o zero or more <InnerAuthenticationMethod> elements. Elements of
this type indicate that a tunneled EAP method is in use, and that
further server-side and/or client-side credentials are defined
inside the tunnel. The presence of more than one
InnerAuthenticationMethod indicates that EAP Method Chaining is in
use, i.e. that several inner EAP methods are to be executed in
sequence inside the tunnel.
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The <InnerAuthenticationMethod> element itself contains the same
<EAPMethod>, <ServerSideCredentials> and <ClientSideCredentials> as
described in the preceding list, but differs in two points:
o It can optionally contain the element <NonEAPAuthMethod> (an
enumerated integer of authentication methods not based on EAP)
instead of <EAPMethod> because some tunneled EAP types do not
necessarily contain EAP inside the tunnel (e.g. TTLS-PAP, TEAP).
Note that the XML Schema formally allows to specify both
<EAPMethod> and <NonEAPAuthMethod>. This situation MUST NOT occur
in configuration files to ensure deterministic interpretability.
o It can NOT contain further <InnerAuthenticationMethod> elements
because establishing a secure tunnel inside an already established
secure tunnel is considered a pathological case which needs not be
considered. See section Section 6.3 for a rationale.
2.2.2.2. <ServerSideCredential> Properties
The server-side authentication of a mutually authenticating EAP
method is typically based on X.509 certificates, which requires the
EAP peer to be pre-provisioned with one or more trusted root
Certification Authority prior to authenticating. A server is
uniquely identified by presenting a certificate which is signed by
these trusted CAs, and by the EAP peer verifying that the name of the
server matches the expected one. Consequently, a (set of) CAs and a
(set of) server names make up the ServerSideCredentials block.
Note that different EAP methods use different terminology when
referring to trusted CA roots, server certificates, and server name
identification. They also differ or have inherent ambiguity in their
interpretation on where to extract the server name from (e.g. is the
server name the CN part of the DistinguishedName, or is the server
name one of the subjectAltName:DNS entries; what to do if there is a
mismatch?). This specification introduces one single element for CA
trust roots and naming; these notions map into the naming of the
particular EAP methods very naturally. This specification can not
remove the CN vs. sAN:DNS ambiguity in many EAP methods.
o zero or more <CA> elements: a Certification Authority which is
trusted to sign the expected server certificate. The set of <CA>
elements SHOULD contain self-signed root certificates to establish
trust, and MAY contain additional intermediate CA certificates
which ultimately root in these self-signed root CAs. A
configuration file can, but SHOULD NOT include only an
intermediate CA certificate (i.e. without also including the
corresponding self-signed root) because trusting only an
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intermediate CA without being able to verify to a self-signed root
is an unsupported notion in many EAP peers.
o zero or more <ServerID> elements: these elements contain the
expected server names in incoming X.509 EAP server certificates.
For EAP methods not using X.509 certificates for their mutual
authentication, these elements contain other string-based handles
which identify the server (Example: EAP-pwd).
2.2.2.3. <ClientSideCredential> Properties
There is a variety of means to identify the EAP peer to the EAP
server. EAP methods use a subset of these criteria. As with server-
side credentials, the terminology for the credential type may differ
slightly between EAP types. The naming convention in this
specification maps nicely into the method-specific terminology. Not
all the criteria make sense in all contexts; for EAP methods which do
not support a criterion, configuration files SHOULD NOT contain the
corresponding elements, and consumers of the file MUST ignore these
elements.
Specifying any one of these elements is optional and they can occur
at most once. Consumers of configuration files MUST be able to fall
back to user-interactive configuration for these parts if they are
not specified (e.g. ask for the username and password for an EAP
method during import of the EAP configuration data). Configuration
files which do contain sensitive elements such as <Password> MUST be
handled with due care after the import on the device (e.g. ensure
minimal file permissions, or delete the source file after
installing). The <ClientSideCredential> element has an attribute
'allow_save'; if it is set to false, sensitive parts of the client-
side credentials MUST NOT be permanently saved on the device. See
also section Section 3 for transport security considerations.
<OuterIdentity> is typcially used on the outside of a tunneled EAP
method and allows to specify which user identity should be used
outside the tunnel. This string is not used for actual user
authentication, but may contain routing hints to send the request
to the right EAP server.
<UserName> contains the actual username to be used for user
authentication. For tunneled EAP methods, this element SHOULD
only occur in the <InnerAuthenticationMethod>'s
<ClientSideCredentials> - if differing outer identities are not
desired in the deployment, the <OuterIdentity> element should be
populated for the <AuthenticationMethod> element; but may contain
the actual username then.
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<ClientCertificate> contains a X.509 certificate and private key;
if the key is protected, the <Passphrase> element MAY be used to
indicate the passphrase, see below
<Passphrase> contains the passphrase needed to unlock a
cryptographic credential internally on the device (i.e. it is not
used itself for the actual authentication during the EAP
conversation)
<Password> contains the user's password, or an otherwise secret
string which the user needs to authenticate to the EAP server
<PAC> contains the Protected Access Credential, typically used in
EAP-FAST and TEAP.
<ProvisionPAC> is a boolean which indicates whether a PAC should
be provisioned on the first connection. Note that the
specification allows to use <ProvisionPAC> without a CA nor
ServerID in <ServerSideCredential>. While this allows the
operation mode of "Anonymous PAC Provisioning" as used in EAP-
FAST, due to the known security vulnerabilities of anonymous PAC
provisioning, this combination SHOULD NOT be used.
2.2.3. <ProviderInfo>
This specification needs to consider that user interaction during the
installation time may be required; the user at the very least must be
empowered to decide whether the configuration file was issued by a
provider he has an account with; the provider may have hints for the
user (e.g. which password to use for the login), or may want to
display links to helpdesk pages in case the user has problems with
the setup or use of his identity.
The <ProviderInfo> element allows to specify a range of potentially
useful information for display to the user (some of which is relevant
only during installation time, other pieces of information could be
retained by the EAP peer implementation and displayed e.g. in case of
failed authentication):
o <DisplayName> specifies a user-friendly name for the EAP Identity
Provider. Consumers of this specification should be aware that
this is simple text, and self-asserted by the producer of the
configuration file. If more authoritative information about the
issuer is available (e.g. if the file is signed with S/MIME and
carries an Organisation name (O attribute) in the signing
certificate) then the more authoritative information should be
displayed with more prominence than the self-asserted one.
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o <Description> specifies a generic descriptive text which should be
displayed to the user prior to the installation of the
configuration data.
o <ProviderLocation> specifies the approximate geograhic location(s)
of the EAP Identity Provider and/or his Points of Presence. This
can be useful if the configuration file contains multiple
<EAPIdentityProvider> elements; the user device can then make an
informed guess which of the Identity Providers could be a good
match to suggest to the user
o <ProviderLogo> specifies the logo of the EAP Identity Provider.
The same self-assertion considerations as for <DisplayName> above
apply.
o <TermsOfUse> contains terms of use to be displayed to and
acknowledged by the user prior to the installation of the
configuration on the user's system
o <Helpdesk> is a complex element with three possible sub-elements:
<EmailAddress>, <WebAddress> and <Phone>, all of which can be
displayed to the user.
2.3. Internationalisation / Multi-language support
Some elements in this specification contain text to be displayed in
User Interfaces; depending on the user's language preferences, it
would be desirable to present the information in a local language.
Other elements contain contact information, and those contact points
may only be able to handle requests in a number of languages; it may
be desirable to present only contact points to the user which are
compatible with his language capabilities.
All elements which either contain localisable text, or which point to
external resources in localised languages, have an optional "lang"
attribute. The elements can occur more than once in the
specification, which enables an iteration of the element in all
applicable languages. If the "lang" attribute is omitted or "lang"
is set to "C", the instance of the element is considered a default
choice which is to be displayed if no other instance is a better
match.
If the entire file content consistently uses only one language set,
e.g. all the elements are to be treated as "default" choices, the
language can also be set for the entire <EAPIdentityProvider> element
in its own "lang" attribute.
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3. Issuer Authentication, Integrity Protection and Encryption of EAP
Metadata configuration files
S/MIME or underlying transport security. Nuff said :-)
4. File Discovery
4.1. By MIME-Type: application/eap-config
For transports where the categorisation of file types via MIME types
is possible (e.g. HTTP, E-Mail), this document assigns the MIME type
application/eap-config
Edge devices can associate this MIME type to incoming files on such
transports, and register the application which can consume the EAP
Metadata as the default handler for this file type. By doing so, for
example a single click or tap on a link to the file in the device's
browser will invoke the configuration process.
This method of discovery is analogous to the Apple "mobileconfig"
discovery on recent versions of Mac OS and iOS.
4.2. By filename extension: .eap-config
In situations where file types can not be determined by MIME type
meta-information (e.g. when the file gets stored on a local
filesystem), this document RECOMMENDs that EAP Metadata configuration
files be stored with the extension
.eap-config
to identify the file as containing EAP Metadata configuration
information. Edge devices can register the application which can
consume the EAP Metadata with this file extension. By doing so, for
example a single click or tap on the filename in the device's User
Interface will invoke the configuration process.
4.3. By network location: SCAD
5. Existing Implementations
Producers of the configuration files
o eduroam Configuration Assistant Tool: this existing tool already
produces EAP configuration files in various proprietary formats
for hundreds of EAP Identity Providers. The authors of this
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specification will add a module which will produce configuration
files in the file format as specified in this document.
Consumers of the configuration files
o Android: the authors of this specification are currently
developing an App for the Android operating system (compatible
with API level 18 of Android, i.e. version 4.3 and above) which
can consume the file format as defined in this draft specification
and configure EAP via the WifiEnterpriseConfig API.
o Linux: the authors of this specification are currently developing
an application for UNIX-like operating systems which configure
enterprise networks via the NetworkManager daemon; the application
can consume the file format as defined in this draft specification
and configure the settings via Networkmanager's D-BUS interface.
6. Design Decisions
6.1. Why XML and not $FOO?
XML is a popular choice for EAP configurations: Microsoft's "netsh"
files, Apple's "mobileconfig" files, the Wi-Fi Alliance's
"PerProviderSubscription Managed Object", and other vendor/SDO
definitions are all using XML.
Other possibilities which will be duly considered if sufficient
interest warrants it include, but are not limited to:
o JSON (less rich expressions; no verification of conformity such as
with XML Schema - but it doesn't need many resources to parse and
may thus be advantageous for constrained devices)
o YANG (very rich feature set, and tools can produce automatic
conversions to both XML and JSON - but not as well understood by
the author, and unlikely to be natively supported on consumer
devices)
6.2. Shallow vs. Deep definition of EAP method properties
6.3. EAP tunneling inside EAP tunnels
6.4. Placement of <OuterIdentity> inside <AuthenticationMethod>
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7. Security Considerations
8. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to allocate the MIME type "application/eap-config"
in the MIME Media Types / application registry (see section
Section 4.1). The allocation should contain the following values:
o Name: eap-config
o Template: see Appendix A (RFC editor note: remove this appendix
prior to publication; replace this line with the URL to the
application as posted online)
o Reference: RFCabcd (RFC editor note: replace with the RFC number
of this document)
IANA is requested to allocate the location "TBD" in the "well-known
URIs" registry. The allocation should contain the following values:
o URI Suffix: TBD
o Change Controller: IETF
o Reference: RFCabcd (RFC editor note: replace with the RFC number
of this document)
o Related Information: none
IANA is requested to register the XML namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eap-config" in the "IETF XML Registry / ns".
The allocation should contain the following values:
o ID: eap-config
o URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eap-config
o Filename: https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/ns/eap-
config.txt (to be created by IANA)
o Reference: RFCabcd (RFC editor note: replace with the RFC number
of this document)
IANA is requested to register the XML schema
"urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:eap-config" in the "IETF XML Registry /
schema". The allocation should contain the following values:
o ID: eap-config
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o URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:eap-config
o Filename: https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/schema/
eap-config.xsd (to be created by IANA; current XSD file is linked
to in section Section 2.1)
o Reference: RFCabcd (RFC editor note: replace with the RFC number
of this document)
9. Contributors
Tomasz Wolniewicz of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Poland,
provided significant input into this specification.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.
[RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281, August 2008.
[RFC5931] Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only a Password", RFC
5931, August 2010.
[I-D.wierenga-ietf-eduroam]
Wierenga, K., Winter, S., and T. Wolniewicz, "The eduroam
architecture for network roaming", draft-wierenga-ietf-
eduroam-02 (work in progress), January 2014.
[HS20] Wi-Fi Alliance, "Hotspot 2.0 Technical Specification",
2012, <https://www.wi-fi.org/hotspot-20-technical-
specification-v100>.
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Appendix A. Appendix A: MIME Type Registration Template
The following values will be used for the online MIME type
registration at https://www.iana.org/form/media-types
Your Name: Stefan Winter
Your Email Address: stefan.winter@restena.lu
Media Type Name: Application
Subtype name: (Standards tree) eap-config
Required parameters: (none)
Optional parameters: (none)
Encoding Considerations: 8-Bit text
Security Considerations: This file type carries configuration
information for consumer devices. It has the potential to
substantially alter the consumer's device; particularly to install
a new trusted Certification Authority. Applications consuming
files of this type need to be cautious to explain to the end user
what is being altered, so that they understand the consequences.
For further explanations, see Section 7 of draft-winter-opsawg-
eap-metadata. (Note to IANA: replace this reference with the RFC
number of this document once known)
Interoperability Considerations: The file content is XML version
1.0 or later. The encoding SHOULD be UTF-8, but implementations
consuming the file SHOULD be prepared to encounter different
encodings.
Published Specification: draft-winter-opsawg-eap-metadata (Note to
IANA: replace this reference with the RFC number of this document
once known)
Applications which use this media type: files of this type are
intended for consumption by sortware on edge devices; they consume
the information therein to configure authentication parameters
(EAP protocol and EAP method payload configurations) which are
then applied to network or application authentication scenarios.
Fragment Identifier Considerations: files of this type are
expected to be transmitted in their entirety. If a reference to a
specific part of the content is to be made, XML XPath expressions
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are to be used. I.e. fragment identifier formats are not expected
to be used.
Restrictions on Usage: none
Provisional registration: initial submission of this form will be
executed after adoption in the IETF; it will be a provisional
registration. Final registration will be done after IESG review.
Additional information:
Deprecated alias types for this name: none
Magic numbers: none
File extensions: eap-config
Macintosh File Type Codes: TBD
Object Identifiers or OIDs: none
Intended Usage: Common (no further provisions)
Other Information/General Comment: none
Person to contact for further information:
Name: Stefan Winter
E-Mail: stefan.winter@restena.lu
Author/Change controller: IETF
DATA
Author's Address
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Internet-Draft EAP Metadata File Format February 2014
Stefan Winter
Fondation RESTENA
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
Luxembourg 1359
LUXEMBOURG
Phone: +352 424409 1
Fax: +352 422473
EMail: stefan.winter@restena.lu
URI: http://www.restena.lu.
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