Network Working Group L. Xia
Internet-Draft D. Zhang
Intended status: Experimental Huawei
Expires: September 14, 2017 Y. Wu
Aliababa Group
R. Kumar
A. Lohiya
Juniper Networks
H. Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
March 13, 2017
An Information Model for the Monitoring of Network Security Functions
(NSF)
draft-zhang-i2nsf-info-model-monitoring-03
Abstract
The Network Security Functions (NSF) NSF-facing interface exists
between the Service Provider's management system (or Security
Controller) and the NSFs to enforce the security policy provisioning
and network security status monitoring . This document focuses on the
monitoring part of it and proposes the information model for it.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Use cases for NSF Monitoring Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Classification of NSF Monitoring Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Exporting NSF Monitoring Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Basic Information Model for All Monitoring Data . . . . . . . 7
7. Extended Information Model for Monitoring Data . . . . . . . 8
7.1. System Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1.1. Memory Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1.2. CPU Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.3. Disk Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.4. Hardware Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.5. Interface Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. System Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2.1. Access Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2.2. Configuration Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.3. System Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3.1. Access Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3.2. Resource Utilization Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3.3. User Activity Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.4. System Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.4.1. Interface counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.5. NSF Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.5.1. DDoS Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.5.2. Session Table Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.5.3. Virus Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.5.4. Intrusion Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.5.5. Botnet Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.5.6. Web Attack Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.6. NSF Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.6.1. DDoS Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.6.2. Virus Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.6.3. Intrusion Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.6.4. Botnet Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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7.6.5. DPI Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.6.6. Vulnerabillity Scanning Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.6.7. Web Attack Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.7. NSF Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.7.1. Firewall counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.7.2. Policy Hit Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction
According to [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-framework], the interface provided by a
NSF (e.g., FW, IPS, Anti-DDOS, or Anti-Virus) to administrative
entities (e.g., NMS, security controller) for configuring security
function in the NSF and monitoring the NSF is referred to as a 'I2NSF
customer-facing interface'. The monitoring part of it is meant to
monitor the NSF e.g. events, alerts, alarms, logs, counters. The
monitoring of the NSF plays a very important role in the overall
security framework if done in a timely and comprehensive way. The
monitoring information generated by a NSF could very well be an early
indication of malicious activity, or anomalous behavior, or a
potential sign of denial of service attacks.
This draft proposes a comprehensive NSF monitoring information model
that provide visibility into NSFs. This document will not go into
the design details of NSF-facing interface. Instead, this draft is
focused on specifying the information that a NSF needs to provide in
the monitoring part of the NSF-facing interface, as well as its
information model. Besides, [I-D.draft-xibassnez-i2nsf-capability ]
specifies the information model for the security policy provisioning
part of the NSF-facing interface.
2. Terminology
2.1. Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2.2. Definition of Terms
This document uses the terms defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-i2nsf-
terminology].
3. Use cases for NSF Monitoring Data
As mentioned earlier, monitoring plays a very critical role in the
overall security framework. The monitoring of the NSF provides very
valuable information to the security controller in maintaining the
provisioned security posture. Besides this, there are various other
reasons to monitor the NSFs as listed below:
o The security administrator could configure a policy that is
triggered on a specific event happened in the NSF or the network.
The security controller would monitor for the specified event and
once it happens, it configures additional security functions as
per the policy.
o The events triggered by NSFs as a result of security policy
violation could be used by SIEM to detect any suspicious activity.
o The events and activity logs from NSFs could be used to build
advanced analytics such as behavior and predictive to improve the
security posture.
o The security controller could use events from the NSF for
achieving high availability. It could take corrective actions
such as restarting a failed NSF, horizontally scaling the NSF etc.
o The events and activity logs from the NSF could aid in debugging
and root cause analysis of an operational issue.
o The activity logs from the NSF could be used to build historical
data for operational and business reasons.
4. Classification of NSF Monitoring Data
In order to maintain a strong security posture, it is not only
necessary to configure NSF security policies but also to continuously
monitor NSF by consuming acquirable monitoring data. This enables
security admins to assess what is happening in the network timely.
It is not possible to block all the internal and external threats
based on static security posture but requires a very dynamic posture
with constant visibility. This draft defines a set of information
elements (and their scope) that can be acquired from NSF and can be
used as monitoring data. In essence, these types of monitoring data
can be leveraged to support constant visibility on multiple levels of
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granularity and can be consumed by corresponding functions. The
types of monitoring data as ordered below increase in expressiveness
by incorporating more information to the semantics of the monitoring
data. There are two categories of monitoring data. Information that
is produced and emitted by an NSF automatically (published data) and
information that is produced and retained by the NSF and has to be
collected in intervals (retained data):
Published Data:
o Events: the most generic type of monitoring data that can be
emitted by an NSF. An event is defined in [RFC3877] as "something
that happens which may be of interest. A fault, a change in
status, crossing a threshold, or an external input to the system,
for example. In the context of the I2NSF IMM, an event is a
representation of a change of state, configuration, or composition
of an NSF or an entity (e.g. an endpoint) or an activity (e.g. a
PDU flow) that can be observed by the NSF and can be interpreted
as a change of state or behavior by the NSF. An event can be
created without the use of an I2NSF Condition (declarative
guidance) available to the NSF. In the context of I2NSF, in some
cases an event can trigger low level I2NSF actions (which
constitutes an implicit escalation to alert via primate
assessment).
o Alert: an event that is annotated with a criticality assessment
due to non-compliance with I2NSF conditions (declarative guidance)
available to an I2NSF Consumer via I2NSF Actions. The Intrusion
Detection Message Exchange Format [RFC4765] defines a
representation that "systems can use to report alerts about events
that they deem suspicious" and also associates a severity ("an
estimate of the relative severity of the event") with the
corresponding alert. In the context of the I2NSF IMM, an alert is
derived from events that express changes indicating not to conform
with declarative guidance (e.g. an exceeded threshold of a value
or a pattern or signature found in a PDU stream - typically an
I2NSF condition) or due to imperative guidance (e.g. correlation
rules applied to streams of multiple events over time or a black-
list content of an event matches - typically an I2NSF Policy
Rule). An alert is created by an I2NSF Producer with respect to
I2NSF conditions (declarative guidance) or imperative guidance
available to the I2NSF Producer. An alert does not indicate an
immediate impact on operations and are not time-sensitive (but can
be escalated to an alarm nevertheless due to persistence via an
I2NSF Policy Rule).
o Alarms: an alarm that is annotated with the assertion of: 1.)
having immediate impact on operations, or 2.) a persistence that
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in non-compliant in respect to I2NSF conditions (declarative
guidance), or 3.) a correlation result produced by a I2NSF Service
in respect to the result of I2NSF Policy Rules that process
alerts. Alarms are time-sensitive and must be reported to the
security admin as soon as possible. By processing alarms, the
administrator can rapidly locate the root-cause of faults and
rapidly deal with the faults to ensure normal operation of the
NSFs and avoid NSFs going into unknown state or potentially
exposing security vulnerabilities. An analyst can manage the NSF
with via I2NSF Policy Rules. The intend of alarms is to highlight
only critical information and to avoid continuous combing through
large amount alerts (or even events) by analysts.
Retained Data:
o Logs: Logs are information generated by NSF about its operational
and informational data, or various events such as user activities,
network/traffic status and network activity, etc. Logs are
important for debugging, auditing and security forensic. Unlike
events, logs do not require an immediate attention from an analyst
but may be useful for visibility and retroactive cyber forensic.
Hence, logs usually include less structures but potentially more
detailed information in regard to events. For example, the NSF
could generate a log when due to an I2NSF Policy Rule. Logs can
be continuously processed by I2NSF Agent that act as I2NSF
Producer and emit events via function specifically tailored to a
type of log.
o Counters: A specific representation of identical state changes
that potentially occur in high frequency. Examples include
network interface counters (packets, bytes), drop, error counters
etc. Counters are useful in debugging and visibility into
operational behavior of the NSF. An I2NSF Agent that observes the
progress of counters can act as an I2NSF Producer and emit Events
in respect to I2NSF Policy Rules.
5. Exporting NSF Monitoring Data
As per the use cases of NSF monitoring data, the data need to be sent
to various consumers based on the needs and requirements. There are
multiple things to be considered for exporting this data to needed
parties as listed below:
o Pull-Push model: A set of data could be pushed by a NSF to the
needed party or pulled by the needed party from a NSF. A specific
data might need both the models at the same time if there are
multiple consumers with varying requirements. It really depends
upon the need and its usages to the consumer. In general, any
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alarm is considered to be of great importance and must be sent
immediately for any meaningful action so it should be sent using
push model but logs are not as critical so could be pulled by the
consumer. The I2NSF does not mandate a specific scheme for each
data set, it is up to each implementation.
o Export frequency: The monitoring data could be sent immediately
upon generation by a NSF to interested parties or pushed
periodically. The frequency of exporting the data depends upon
its size and timely usefulness. It is out of the scope of I2NSF
and left to each NSF implementation.
o Authentication: There may be a need for authentication between
monitoring data producer (NSF) and consumer to ensure that
critical information does not fall into wrong hands. This may be
necessary if the NSF directly export data to the consumer outside
its admin boundary. The I2NSF does not mandate when and how
specific authentication must be done.
o Subscription method: In order for the consumer to pull the data
from NSF or for NSF to push the data to a consumer, there must be
a mechanism for consumer to subscribe to the NSF data it is
interested in. There are few open source method available and it
is up to each implementation to decide the right one.
o Data transfer mode: The data could be pushed by NSF using a
connection-less model that does require a persistent connection or
streamed over a persistent connection. It depends upon the
requirement of the consumer and the nature of data. A particular
set of data can use either or both the mode based on
implementation.
o Transport method: There are lot of transport mechanism such as IP,
UDP, TCP. There are also open source implementations for specific
set of data such as systems counter. The I2NSF does not mandate
any specific method for a given data set, it is up to each
implementation.
6. Basic Information Model for All Monitoring Data
As explained in the above section, there is a wealth of data
available from the NSF that can be monitored. Firstly, there must be
some general information with each monitoring message sent from an
NSF that helps consumer in identifying meta data with that message,
which are listed as below:
o message_version: Indicate the version of the data format and is a
two-digit decimal numeral starting from 01
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o message_type: Event, Alert, Alarm, Log, Counter, etc
o time_stamp: Indicate the time when the message is generated
o vendor_name: The name of the NSF vendor
o NSF_name: The name (or IP) of the NSF generating the message
o Module_name: The module name outputting the message
o Severity: Indicates the level of the logs. There are total eight
levels, from 0 to 7. The smaller the numeral is, the higher the
severity is.
7. Extended Information Model for Monitoring Data
This section covers the additional information associated with the
system messages. The extended information model is only for the
structured data such as alarm. Any unstructured data is specified
with basic information model only.
[Editors' note]: This section remains the same as -02 version,
although the classification of the monitoring data has been changed
from -02 version. The new inconsistency will be addressed in next
verion.
7.1. System Alarm
7.1.1. Memory Alarm
The following information should be included in a Memory Alarm:
o event_name: 'MEM_USAGE_ALARM'
o module_name: Indicate the NSF module responsible for generating
this alarm
o usage: specifies the amount of memory used
o threshold: The threshold triggering the alarm
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'The memory usage exceeded the threshold'
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7.1.2. CPU Alarm
The following information should be included in a CPU Alarm:
o event_name: 'CPU_USAGE_ALARM'
o usage: Specifies the amount of CPU used
o threshold: The threshold triggering the event
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'The CPU usage exceeded the threshold'
7.1.3. Disk Alarm
The following information should be included in a Disk Alarm:
o event_name: 'DISK_USAGE_ALARM'
o usage: Specifies the amount of disk space used
o threshold: The threshold triggering the event
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'The disk usage exceeded the threshold'
7.1.4. Hardware Alarm
The following information should be included in a Hardware Alarm:
o event_name: 'HW_FAILURE_ALARM'
o component_name: Indicate the HW component responsible for
generating this alarm
o threshold: The threshold triggering the alarm
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'The HW component has failed or degraded'
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7.1.5. Interface Alarm
The following information should be included in a Interface Alarm:
o event_name: 'IFNET_STATE_ALARM'
o interface_Name: The name of interface
o interface_state: 'UP', 'DOWN', 'CONGESTED'
o threshold: The threshold triggering the event
o severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high,
medium, low
o message: 'Current interface state'
7.2. System Events
7.2.1. Access Violation
The following information should be included in this event:
o event_name: 'ACCESS_DENIED'
o user: Name of a user
o group: Group to which a user belongs
o login_ip_address: Login IP address of a user
o authentication_mode: User authentication mode. e.g., Local
Authentication, Third-Party Server Authentication, Authentication
Exemption, SSO Authentication
o message: 'access denied'
7.2.2. Configuration Change
The following information should be included in this event:
o event_name: 'CONFIG_CHANGE'
o user: Name of a user
o group: Group to which a user belongs
o login_ip_address: Login IP address of a user
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o authentication_mode: User authentication mode. e.g., Local
Authentication, Third-Party Server Authentication, Authentication
Exemption, SSO Authentication
o message: 'Configuration modified'
7.3. System Log
7.3.1. Access Logs
Access logs record administrators' login, logout, and operations on
the device. By analyzing them, security vulnerabilities can be
identified. The following information should be included in
operation report:
o Administrator: Administrator that operates on the device
o login_ip_address: IP address used by an administrator to log in
o login_mode: Specifies the administrator logs in mode e.g. root,
user
o operation_type: The operation type that the administrator execute,
e.g., login, logout, configuration, etc
o result: Command execution result
o content: Operation performed by an administrator after login.
7.3.2. Resource Utilization Logs
Running reports record the device system's running status, which is
useful for device monitoring. The following information should be
included in running report:
o system_status: The current system's running status
o CPU_usage: Specifies the CPU usage
o memory_usage: Specifies the memory usage
o disk_usage: Specifies the disk usage
o disk_left: Specifies the available disk space left
o session_number: Specifies total concurrent sessions
o process_number: Specifies total number of system processes
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o in_traffic_rate: The total inbound traffic rate in pps
o out_traffic_rate: The total outbound traffic rate in pps
o in_traffic_speed: The total inbound traffic speed in bps
o out_traffic_speed: The total outbound traffic speed in bps
7.3.3. User Activity Logs
User activity logs provide visibility into users' online records
(such as login time, online/lockout duration, and login IP addresses)
and the actions users perform. User activity reports are helpful to
identify exceptions during user login and network access activities.
o user: Name of a user
o group: Group to which a user belongs
o login_ip_address: Login IP address of a user
o authentication_mode: User authentication mode. e.g., Local
Authentication, Third-Party Server Authentication, Authentication
Exemption, SSO Authentication
o access_mode: User access mode. e.g., PPP, SVN, LOCAL
o online_duration: Online duration
o lockout_duration: Lockout duration
o type: User activities. e.g., Successful User Login, Failed Login
attempts, User Logout, Successful User Password Change, Failed
User Password Change, User Lockout, User Unlocking, Unknown
o cause: Cause of a failed user activity
7.4. System Counters
7.4.1. Interface counters
Interface counters provide visibility into traffic into and out of
NSF, bandwidth usage.
o interface_name: Network interface name configured in NSF
o in_total_traffic_pkts: Total inbound packets
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o out_total_traffic_pkts: Total outbound packets
o in_total_traffic_bytes: Total inbound bytes
o out_total_traffic_bytes: Total outbound bytes
o in_drop_traffic_pkts: Total inbound drop packets
o out_drop_traffic_pkts: Total outbound drop packets
o in_drop_traffic_bytes: Total inbound drop bytes
o out_drop_traffic_bytes: Total outbound drop bytes
o in_traffic_ave_rate: Inbound traffic average rate in pps
o in_traffic_peak_rate: Inbound traffic peak rate in pps
o in_traffic_ave_speed: Inbound traffic average speed in bps
o in_traffic_peak_speed: Inbound traffic peak speed in bps
o out_traffic_ave_rate: Outbound traffic average rate in pps
o out_traffic_peak_rate: Outbound traffic peak rate in pps
o out_traffic_ave_speed: Outbound traffic average speed in bps
o out_traffic_peak_speed: Outbound traffic peak speed in bps.
7.5. NSF Events
7.5.1. DDoS Event
The following information should be included in a DDoS Event:
o event_name: 'SEC_EVENT_DDoS'
o sub_attack_type: Any one of Syn flood, ACK flood, SYN-ACK flood,
FIN/RST flood, TCP Connection flood, UDP flood, Icmp flood, HTTPS
flood, HTTP flood, DNS query flood, DNS reply flood, SIP flood,
and etc.
o dst_ip: The IP address of a victum under attack
o dst_port: The port numbers that the attrack traffic aims at.
o start_time: The time stamp indicating when the attack started
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o end_time: The time stamp indicating when the attack ended. If the
attack is still undergoing when sending out the alarm, this field
can be empty.
o attack_rate: The PPS of attack traffic
o attack_speed: the bps of attack traffic
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches.
7.5.2. Session Table Event
The following information should be included in a Session
Table Event:
o event_name: 'SESSION_USAGE_HIGH'
o current: The number of concurrent sessions
o max: The maximum number of sessions that the session table can
support
o threshold: The threshold triggering the event
o message: 'The number of session table exceeded the threshold'
7.5.3. Virus Event
The following information should be included in a Virus Event:
o event_Name: 'SEC_EVENT_VIRUS'
o virus_type: Type of the virus, e.g., trojan, worm, macro Virus
type
o virus_name
o dst_ip: The destination IP address of the packet where the virus
is found
o src_ip: The source IP address of the packet where the virus is
found
o src_port: The source port of the packet where the virus is found
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o dst_port: The destination port of the packet where the virus is
found
o src_zone: The source security zone of the packet where the virus
is found
o dst_zone: The destination security zone of the packet where the
virus is found
o file_type: The type of the file where the virus is hided within
o file_name: The name of the file where the virus is hided within
o virus_info: The brief introduction of virus
o raw_info: The information describing the packet triggering the
event.
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches.
7.5.4. Intrusion Event
The following information should be included in a Intrustion Event:
o event_name: The name of event: 'SEC_EVENT_Intrusion'
o sub_attack_type: Attack type, e.g., brutal force, buffer overflow
o src_ip: The source IP address of the packet
o dst_ip: The destination IP address of the packet
o src_port:The source port number of the packet
o dst_port: The destination port number of the packet
o src_zone: The source security zone of the packet
o dst_zone: The destination security zone of the packet
o protocol: The employed transport layer protocol, e.g.,TCP, UDP
o app: The employed application layer protocol, e.g.,HTTP, FTP
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o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches
o intrusion_info: Simple description of intrusion
o raw_info: The information describing the packet triggering the
event.
7.5.5. Botnet Event
The following information should be included in a Botnet Event:
o event_name: the name of event: 'SEC_EVENT_Botnet'
o botnet_name: The name of the detected botnet
o src_ip: The source IP address of the packet
o dst_ip: The destination IP address of the packet
o src_port: The source port number of the packet
o dst_port: The destination port number of the packet
o src_zone: The source security zone of the packet
o dst_zone: The destination security zone of the packet
o protocol: The employed transport layer protocol, e.g.,TCP, UDP
o app: The employed application layer protocol, e.g.,HTTP, FTP
o role: The role of the communicating parties within the botnet:
1. the packet from zombie host to the attacker
2. The packet from the attacker to the zombie host
3. The packet from the IRC/WEB server to the zombie host
4. The packet from the zombie host to the IRC/WEB server
5. The packet from the attacker to the IRC/WEB server
6. The packet from the IRC/WEB server to the attacker
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7. The packet from the zombie host to the victim
o botnet_info: Simple description of Botnet
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
o profile: Security profile that traffic matches
o raw_info: The information describing the packet triggering the
event.
7.5.6. Web Attack Event
The following information should be included in a Web Attack Alarm:
o event_name: the name of event: 'SEC_EVENT_WebAttack'
o sub_attack_type: Concret web attack type, e.g., sql injection,
command injection, XSS, CSRF
o src_ip: The source IP address of the packet
o dst_ip: The destination IP address of the packet
o src_port: The source port number of the packet
o dst_port: The destination port number of the packet
o src_zone: The source security zone of the packet
o dst_zone: The destination security zone of the packet
o req_method: The method of requirement. For instance, 'PUT' or
'GET' in HTTP
o req_url: Requested URL
o url_category: Matched URL category
o filtering_type: URL filtering type, e.g., Blacklist, Whitelist,
User-Defined, Predefined, Malicious Category, Unknown
o rule_id: The ID of the rule being triggered
o rule_name: The name of the rule being triggered
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o profile: Security profile that traffic matches.
7.6. NSF Logs
7.6.1. DDoS Logs
Besides the fields in an DDoS Alarm, the following information should
be included in a DDoS Logs:
o attack_type: DDoS
o attack_ave_rate: The average pps of the attack traffic within the
recorded time
o attack_ave_speed: The average bps of the attack traffic within the
recorded time
o attack_pkt_num: The number attack packets within the recorded time
o attack_src_ip: The source IP addresses of attack traffics. If
there are a large amount of IP addresses, then pick a certain
number of resources according to different rules.
o action: Actions against DDoS attacks, e.g., Allow, Alert, Block,
Discard, Declare, Block-ip, Block-service.
7.6.2. Virus Logs
Besides the fields in an Virus Alarm, the following information
should be included in a Virus Logs:
o attack_type: Virus
o protocol: The transport layer protocol
o app: The name of the application layer protocol
o times: The time of detecting the virus
o action: The actions dealing with the virus, e.g., alert, block
o os: The OS that the virus will affect, e.g., all, android, ios,
unix, windows
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7.6.3. Intrusion Logs
Besides the fields in an Intrusion Alarm, the following information
should be included in a Intrusion Logs:
o attack_type: Intrusion
o times: The times of intrusions happened in the recorded time
o os: The OS that the intrusion will affect, e.g., all, android,
ios, unix, windows
o action: The actions dealing with the intrusions, e.g., e.g.,
Allow, Alert, Block, Discard, Declare, Block-ip, Block-service
o attack_rate: NUM the pps of attack traffic
o attack_speed: NUM the bps of attack traffic
7.6.4. Botnet Logs
Besides the fields in an Botnet Alarm, the following information
should be included in a Botnet Logs:
o attack_type: Botnet
o botnet_pkt_num:The number of the packets sent to or from the
detected botnet
o action: The actions dealing with the detected packets, e.g.,
Allow, Alert, Block, Discard, Declare, Block-ip, Block-service,
etc
o os: The OS that the attack aiming at, e.g., all, android, ios,
unix, windows, etc.
7.6.5. DPI Logs
DPI Logs provide statistics on uploaded and downloaded files and
data, sent and received emails, and alert and block records on
websites. It's helpful to learn risky user behaviors and why access
to some URLs is blocked or allowed with an alert record.
o type: DPI action types. e.g., File Blocking, Data Filtering,
Application Behavior Control
o file_name: The file name
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o file_type: The file type
o src_zone: Source security zone of traffic
o dst_zone: Destination security zone of traffic
o src_region: Source region of the traffic
o dst_region: Destination region of the traffic
o src_ip: Source IP address of traffic
o src_user: User who generates traffic
o dst_ip: Destination IP address of traffic
o src_port: Source port of traffic
o dst_port: Destination port of traffic
o protocol: Protocol type of traffic
o app: Application type of traffic
o policy_id: Security policy id that traffic matches
o policy_name: Security policy name that traffic matches
o action: Action defined in the file blocking rule, data filtering
rule, or application behavior control rule that traffic matches.
7.6.6. Vulnerabillity Scanning Logs
Vulnerability scanning logs record the victim host and its related
vulnerability information that should to be fixed. the following
information should be included in the report:
o victim_ip: IP address of the victim host which has vulnerabilities
o vulnerability_id: The vulnerability id
o vulnerability_level: The vulnerability level. e.g., high, middle,
low
o OS: The operating system of the victim host
o service: The service which has vulnerabillity in the victim host
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o protocol: The protocol type. e.g., TCP, UDP
o port: The port number
o vulnerability_info: The information about the vulnerability
o fix_suggestion: The fix suggestion to the vulnerability.
7.6.7. Web Attack Logs
Besides the fields in an Web Attack Alarm, the following information
should be included in a Web Attack Report:
o attack_type: Web Attack
o rsp_code: Response code
o req_clientapp: The client application
o req_cookies: Cookies
o req_host: The domain name of the requested host
o raw_info: The information describing the packet triggering the
event.
7.7. NSF Counters
7.7.1. Firewall counters
Firewall counters provide visibility into traffic signatures,
bandwidth usage, and how the configured security and bandwidth
policies have been applied.
o src_zone: Source security zone of traffic
o dst_zone: Destination security zone of traffic
o src_region: Source region of the traffic
o dst_region: Destination region of the traffic
o src_ip: Source IP address of traffic
o src_user: User who generates traffic
o dst_ip: Destination IP address of traffic
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o src_port: Source port of traffic
o dst_port: Destination port of traffic
o protocol: Protocol type of traffic
o app: Application type of traffic
o policy_id: Security policy id that traffic matches
o policy_name: Security policy name that traffic matches
o in_interface: Inbound interface of traffic
o out_interface: Outbound interface of traffic
o total_traffic: Total traffic volume
o in_traffic_ave_rate: Inbound traffic average rate in pps
o in_traffic_peak_rate: Inbound traffic peak rate in pps
o in_traffic_ave_speed: Inbound traffic average speed in bps
o in_traffic_peak_speed: Inbound traffic peak speed in bps
o out_traffic_ave_rate: Outbound traffic average rate in pps
o out_traffic_peak_rate: Outbound traffic peak rate in pps
o out_traffic_ave_speed: Outbound traffic average speed in bps
o out_traffic_peak_speed: Outbound traffic peak speed in bps.
7.7.2. Policy Hit Counters
Policy Hit Counters record the security policy that traffic matches
and its hit count. It can check if policy configurations are
correct.
o src_zone: Source security zone of traffic
o dst_zone: Destination security zone of traffic
o src_region: Source region of the traffic
o dst_region: Destination region of the traffic
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o src_ip: Source IP address of traffic
o src_user: User who generates traffic
o dst_ip: Destination IP address of traffic
o src_port: Source port of traffic
o dst_port: Destination port of traffic
o protocol: Protocol type of traffic
o app: Application type of traffic
o policy_id: Security policy id that traffic matches
o policy_name: Security policy name that traffic matches
o hit_times: The hit times that the security policy matches the
specified traffic.
8. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
9. Security Considerations
The monitoring information of NSF should be protected by the secure
communication channel, to ensure its confidentiality and integrity.
In another side, the NSF and security controller can all be faked,
which lead to undesireable results, i.e., leakage of NSF's important
operational information, faked NSF sending false information to
mislead security controller. The mutual authentication is essential
to protected against this kind of attack. The current mainstream
security technologies (i.e., TLS, DTLS, IPSEC, X.509 PKI) can be
employed approriately to provide the above security functions.
In addition, to defend against the DDoS attack caused by a lot of
NSFs sending massive monitoring information to the security
controller, the rate limiting or similar mechanisms should be
considered in NSF and security controller, whether in advance or just
in the process of DDoS attack.
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10. Acknowledgements
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3877] Chisholm, S. and D. Romascanu, "Alarm Management
Information Base (MIB)", RFC 3877, DOI 10.17487/RFC3877,
September 2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3877>.
[RFC4765] Debar, H., Curry, D., and B. Feinstein, "The Intrusion
Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)", RFC 4765,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4765, March 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4765>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-framework]
Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-04 (work in
progress), October 2016.
[I-D.xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im]
Xia, L., Strassner, J., Li, K., Zhang, D., Lopez, E.,
Bouthors, N., and L. Fang, "Information Model of Interface
to Network Security Functions Capability Interface",
draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im-06 (work in
progress), July 2016.
Authors' Addresses
Liang Xia
Huawei
Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Dacheng Zhang
Huawei
Email: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com
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Yi Wu
Aliababa Group
Email: anren.wy@alibaba-inc.com
Rakesh Kumar
Juniper Networks
Email: rkkumar@juniper.net
Anil Lohiya
Juniper Networks
Email: alohiya@juniper.net
Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
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