Mathematical Mesh: Architecture
draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-04

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04                                                
Network Working Group                                    P. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft                                         Comodo Group Inc.
Intended status: Informational                        September 18, 2017
Expires: March 22, 2018


                    Mathematical Mesh: Architecture
                 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-04

Abstract

   The Mathematical Mesh ?The Mesh? is an end-to-end secure
   infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
   credential data between multiple user devices.  The architecture of
   the Mesh and examples of typical applications are described.

   This document is also available online at
   http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [1] .

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 22, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Document Roadmap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Related Specifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Use Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  What Makes PKI Hard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  The Devil is in the Deployment  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  The Untrusted Cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.5.  Why change is possible  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Architectural Principles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.1.  User Centered Design  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  User Centered Trust.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.3.  A Credential Designed for Persistence . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.4.  Eliminate unnecessary options . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.5.  Strong Public Key Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.1.  Master and Personal Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.2.  Device Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.3.  Application Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.4.  Verifying Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.5.  Key Escrow and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       5.5.1.  Offline Escrow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       5.5.2.  Online Escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  Mesh Portals and the CryptoMesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.1.  Federated Portals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.3.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26








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1.  Introduction

   The Mathematical Mesh is a user centered Public Key Infrastructure
   that uses cryptography to make computers easier to use.

   The Mesh uses cryptography and an untrusted cloud service to make
   management of computer configuration data transparent to the end
   user.  Each Mesh user has a personal profile that is unique to them.
   A user may link devices and applications to their Mesh profile to
   enable transparent sharing of data between them.

   For example, Alice has a laptop computer and a tablet.  They are both
   linked to her Mesh profile which allows either to be used for email
   or to control any devices in her smart home.  Alice has chosen to
   only make her cloud documents available on her laptop but she could
   change that to add her tablet should the need arise (Figure XX).

   [[This figure is not viewable in this format.  The figure is
   available at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [2].]]


   Alice's Mesh profile connections.

   The Mesh allows devices connected to a profile to be provisioned with
   all the network configuration settings and credentials to enable the
   device to be used with the user's applications.  In most cases,
   public key credentials will be provisioned to enable transport layer
   and end-to-end encryption.

   All Mesh profiles are authenticated using digital signatures and all
   private material protected using industry standard end-to-end
   encryption.

   Mesh profiles are typically published to a Mesh portal, an untrusted
   cloud service that provides mailbox-like capabilities to enable a
   seamless user experience for users who do not necessarily have an
   'always on' machine to act as a broker for profile management
   operations.  Sophisticated users MAY operate a personal Mesh portal
   should they choose.

   Mesh portals MAY in turn be members of a federation exchanging
   updates, thus providing users with a guarantee of continued service
   should the portal they selected become unavailable.  Each portal
   belonging to a federation maintains a local linked hash notary log to
   which all transactions are recorded.  The outputs from each local
   portal log are in turn periodically (e.g. once an hour) enrolled in a
   meta-log maintained by the federation as a group.  Thus ensuring that



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   no Portal belonging to a federation can defect un-noticed unless the
   entire federation defects.

1.1.  Document Roadmap

   The specifications describing the Mesh protocols are divided into
   three main groups.  First set of documents describe the architecture,
   data structures and protocols that make up the Mesh core.  The second
   set describes the use of the Mesh to secure existing and experimental
   documents.  The third set of documents describe building blocks that
   were developed to meet requirements arising from the Mesh but are not
   specific to the Mesh and could be applied to the development of other
   Web Services that do not involve the Mesh.

   Mesh Core  This document provides a high level description of the
      Mesh architecture and mode of use.  Detailed specifications
      including schemas and examples are specified in the accompanying
      Mesh Reference document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-reference] .

   Mesh Applications  The use of the Mesh to configure mail and SSH
      clients, and to store catalogs containing passwords, contacts and
      bookmarks is described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-app] .

      The Mesh is also used as the platform for building two new
      applications, Mesh/Recrypt [draft-hallambaker-mesh-recrypt] , and
      Mesh/Confirm [draft-hallambaker-mesh-confirm] .

   Mesh Platform  JSON Web Service Binding
      [draft-hallambaker-json-web-service] , Uniform Data Fingerprint
      [draft-hallambaker-udf] , Strong Internet Names
      [draft-hallambaker-sin] , JSON-BCD [draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd]

   In addition, two additional documents describe the use of the
   reference code base [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] and
   recommendations for implementing Mesh enabled applications to take
   advantage of the cryptographic facilities offered by specific
   operating system platforms [draft-hallambaker-mesh-platform] .

2.  Definitions

   This section presents the related specifications and standards on
   which the Mesh is built, the terms that are used as terms of art
   within the Mesh protocols and applications and the terms used as
   requirements language.







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2.1.  Related Specifications

   Besides the documents that form the Mesh core, the Mesh makes use of
   many existing Internet standards, including:

   Cryptographic Algorithms  Mesh applications use the cryptographic
      algorithm suites specified by the application.  The cryptographic
      algorithms used in the Mesh itself are limited to SHA-2 [SHA-2]
      and SHA-3 [SHA-3] digest functions, AES Encryption [FIPS197] and
      RSA Signature, and Encryption [RFC8017] .

      The use of the Ed25519 and Ed448 algorithms is currently being
      explored for use with both signature [RFC8032] and encryption.
      The Edwards Curve is preferred over the Montgomery for Encryption
      as it affords a more straightforward implementation of techniques
      such as co-generation of public key pairs and proxy re-encryption.

   Transport  All Mesh Services make use of multiple layers of security.
      Protection against traffic analysis and metadata attacks are
      provided by use of Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] . At
      present, the HTTP/1.1 [RFC7231] protocol is used to provide
      framing of transaction messages.

   Encoding  All Mesh protocols and data structures are expressed in the
      JSON data model and all Mesh applications accept data in standard
      JSON encoding [RFC7159] . The JOSE Signature [RFC7515] and
      Encryption [RFC7516] standards are used as the basis for object
      signing and encryption.

2.2.  Defined Terms

   TBS

2.3.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] .

2.4.  Implementation Status

   The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
   the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] .








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3.  Requirements

   Before the Web, most trade was performed in person.  Mail order
   existed but was limited in scope.  Most banking transactions other
   than withdrawing cash from an ATM had to be performed in-line at a
   branch rather than online through the Web. Trade in stocks and shares
   barely existed in its modern form.  The TLS protocol and the WebPKI
   that supported it enabled the e-commerce economy that we live in
   today.

   The WebPKI is a powerful infrastructure but it does have one major
   drawback: It Authenticates the bank to the customer but it does not
   authenticate the customer to the bank.  The use of passwords instead
   of strong cryptographic credentials makes users vulnerable to
   phishing.

   Design of a public key authentication protocol is straightforward.
   Making the use of such a protocol practical is a much greater
   challenge because it requires the user to manage a private key.
   Users cannot perform even the simplest public key cryptography
   algorithm in their head and so some sort of device must perform the
   calculations and this in turn must be provisioned with the private
   key.

   Management of the server private keys for the WebPKI is challenging
   enough and they tend to stay in one place (at least until recently).
   Managing private keys for users is much more challenging than
   managing server keys because:

   o  Users typically own multiple devices and expect them all to work
      in the same way.

   o  User devices are considerably more complex than servers.  They
      have many functions.

   o  Users are more likely to lose devices or lend them to other
      people.

   o  Users cannot be expected to be experts.

   What has made matters worse is the notion that because users are less
   sophisticated than system administrators, they cannot use
   sophisticated technology.  In practice, the exact opposite is the
   case.  To make the user experience completely frictionless, we must
   embrace technologies that are more sophisticated, not avoid them.
   Systems administrators are usually willing to accept technology that
   is less than perfect and shows many 'rough edges' because they are




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   experts and using those tools is their job.  Users are much less
   tolerant of technology that meets their needs.

   Modern cryptography provides us with the tools to secure practically
   any form of Internet interaction.  In almost every case, the main
   constraint that holds us back is the impracticality of using client-
   side private keys:

   o  OpenPGP [RFC4880]

   o  S/MIME [RFC5751]

   o  Jabber [RFC6120]

   o  IPSEC [RFC4301]

   o  SSH [RFC4251]

   The SSH protocol supports the use of public key cryptography for
   authentication, of course.  But this is the exception that proves the
   rule.  The use of client side keys in SSH is highly effective for the
   developer or the systems administrator who only makes use of one
   machine as their client.  Attempting to manage SSH credentials across
   multiple client and server machines under strict operational controls
   is not for the fait hearted.  Not only is it not uncommon for users
   to use a single private key for SSH on all the machines they use,
   there are Web sites that 'explain' how to do this by emailing their
   private key to themselves over SMTP.

   From the user's perspective, a security protocol 'works' when it lets
   them do their job in peace.  The VPN access token works when they
   gain access to the corporate network, SSH works when they gain access
   to the server, passwords work when they can log into their bank Web
   site and pay their bills.  But when evaluating a security protocol,
   it is equally important that the attacker is defeated and that no new
   failure modes are introduced.  The acronym C.I.A. provides a useful
   mnemonic:

   Confidentiality  Protect data from disclosure to unauthorized
      parties.  Prevent unauthorized parties inferring confidential
      information from traffic analysis.

   Integrity  Protect data from unauthorized modification.  Establish
      and verify data authenticity.

   Availability  Ensure that data and data services are available when
      needed.  Restrict access to authorized parties.  Establish
      accountability.



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   While Confidentiality is usually the paramount concern of users,
   Integrity attacks almost invariably inflict more serious damage and
   Availability attacks include some that inflict the greatest damage of
   all.  The typical consumer gets irritated if their bank carelessly
   reveals details of their account but is considerably angrier if it
   has been depleted by fraud.  But as the recent spate of ransomware
   attacks prove, while the consumer becomes angry when they are a
   victim of fraud, many will actually pay money to the criminals if the
   alternative is to lose the pictures of their grandchildren when they
   were five.

   Best practices for managing cryptographic keys present multiple
   operational challenges:

   Separation of Cryptographic Purpose  Each private key SHOULD be used
      for exactly one cryptographic function.  Keys used for encryption
      SHOULD NOT be used for authentication.  Keys used to secure one
      application SHOULD NOT be used to secure another.

   Key Compromise  Revocation of compromised keys MUST be supported.

   Key Rotation  It SHOULD be possible to periodically refresh keys used
      to secure applications, thus ensuring that any compromise of the
      keying material is time bounded.

   Device Isolation  Each device SHOULD have separate keys to protect
      applications on that device.  This limits the consequences should
      the device be compromised, lost or stolen and permits revocation
      to be limited to the keys used in that device.

   Key Escrow  Whenever a key is used to encrypt static data (i.e. data
      stored on a disk or other storage device), provision MUST be made
      to permit (but not require) the decryption key to be escrowed to
      permit recovery should the need arise.

   Provision of Key Escrow is controversial since any mechanism that
   enables the user to recover a cryptographic key voluntarily enables
   the user to disclose the key in case of coercion.  But this state of
   affairs, while unsatisfactory, is a lot more satisfactory than the
   current state of affairs which is to rarely encrypt static data at
   all.

3.1.  Use Case

   Alice works with Bob, Carol, and Doug.  As part of her work she
   exchanges email messages with them which may contain confidential
   information.  She also connects to the machines Server1, Server2 and




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   Server3 to perform system administration tasks.  She has a personal
   desktop, a laptop, and a tablet computer.  She requires:

   o  The ability to send and receive S/MIME end-to-end encrypted email
      with Bob and Carol as per corporate policy.

   o  The ability to send and receive OpenPGP end-to-end encrypted email
      with Doug who does not use S/MIME.

   o  The ability to connect to Server1, Server2 and Server3 from any of
      her personal devices.

   o  The ability to quickly configure a new device for her personal
      use.

   o  The ability to quickly disable further use of a device should it
      be stolen.

   This use case is deliberately limited to configuring Alice's devices
   to enable her to use current security protocols.  A large number of
   use cases and applications were considered during the design
   including configuring IoT devices in Alice's home and configuring a
   borrowed or rented device.  It was discovered that considering the
   end-to-end email case was sufficient because the requirements it
   exposes are a superset of the requirements of the others.

   The only use case that introduced requirements beyond Alice
   configuring end-to-end email and SSH for herself was configuring end-
   to-end email and other secure applications for a remote co-worker.
   Meeting these requirements is deferred as a future work item.

3.2.  What Makes PKI Hard

   Every day, billions of people access Web sites using PKI encryption
   without even being aware that they are doing so.  A smaller but still
   large number of people use PKI for secure payments, the only
   difference they are aware of being that they insert their card rather
   than swiping it through the reader.

   Many of the issues that have made PKI hard in the past are due to
   design choices taken by technologists rather than an intrinsic
   restriction of PKI.  In particular:

   o  Expiry of private keys and credentials.

   o  Poorly designed enrollment protocols.

   o  No provision for use of multiple devices.



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   o  Inappropriate trust models.

   o  Intrusive user experience.

   S/MIME and other client centered security technologies were added to
   many Internet applications in the 1990s in response to enterprise
   requirements.  The people who make the purchasing decisions for
   enterprise software and those who use it on a daily basis are often
   if not invariably different, the enterprise software market has
   prioritized functionality over usability.  An email client that
   requires the user to remember to click on the right button to encrypt
   an email is considered acceptable in the enterprise space, it is not
   acceptable in the consumer space.

   While working on this project, the author attempted to configure a
   very popular email client to make use of the built in S/MIME
   capabilities.  Even with 25 years of experience, this took over half
   an hour and required the user to follow a procedure with 17 different
   steps involving three different applications.  Even though the
   certificate was being issued for use with email, the user had to use
   a Web browser to enroll for the certificate, validate the request
   using the email client, download the certificate using the Web
   browser and then install it using a key management tool.

   The bar for security usability is much higher than most security
   specialists, even those who focus on security admit.  Experience
   should teach us that the iron law of security usability is that a
   security application that requires the user to think about security
   will fail.

   It is noted in passing that security usability is not achieved by
   preventing the user seeing the information they need to make their
   own security decisions.

3.3.  The Devil is in the Deployment

   One of the most important reasons for the failure of PKI applications
   has been the failure of PKI applications.  As with any communication
   tool, the value of end-to-end secure email is a function of the size
   of the network that can be reached.  The community of S/MIME users
   and the community of OpenPGP users have both stalled in the low
   millions, a significant number but falling far short of ubiquity.
   End to end secure email can only realize its full potential when its
   use is the norm and not the vanishingly rare exception.

   After a time, failure becomes a self-reinforcing vicious circle.
   Very few people use end-to-end secure email applications because they
   are difficult to use.  Application providers refuse to invest in



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   developing end-to-end secure email applications because 'there is no
   demand'.

   The Mesh is designed for deployment by providing a stand-alone value
   proposition to early adopters.  The ability to automate the use of
   end-to-end secure email is not a highly attractive proposition for
   most when less than 0.1% of the Internet user population have ever
   registered an S/MIME or OpenPGP key.  But an end-to-end secure
   password manager for Web browsers, or an SSH credential management
   tool do provide a stand-alone value proposition.

3.4.  The Untrusted Cloud

   The Mesh supports multiple mechanisms for connecting devices to an
   account.  Each of these mechanisms provides for strong mutual
   authentication of the device profile to the personal profile it is
   being connected to and vice versa.  In each case, the connection
   request MUST be authorized by the user from a device that has already
   been connected to the profile and granted administration privileges.

   Figure XX shows Alice connecting a new desktop computer to her
   profile, the connection request is initiated from the new device
   (desktop) and approved from the administration device (tablet).

   [[This figure is not viewable in this format.  The figure is
   available at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [3].]]


   Alice connects a new device.

   Implementing a pure peer-to-peer protocol in which the desktop and
   tablet communicate directly would require both machines to be turned
   on at the same time and able to communicate.  Experience has shown
   that this process is considerably more reliable when mediated by some
   form of broker.

   Unlike traditional cloud services that encourage users to rely on and
   trust them to the greatest possible extent, the Mesh Portal is an
   untrusted cloud service.  The Mesh cloud cannot be breached because
   Mesh cloud does not guarantee confidentiality, or integrity or
   availability.

   There are three main functions that a Mesh Portal MAY perform:

   o  Acts as a mailbox to which connection requests and responses are
      posted.




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   o  Acts as an intermediary to third party trust providers.

   o  Acts as an intermediary to credential publication services.

   Only the first of these functions is required.  But the protocol
   requirements for meeting the requirements of the first makes the
   other two a natural fit.

3.5.  Why change is possible

   All four of the open standards based PKIs that have been developed in
   the IETF are based on designs that emerged in the mid-1990s.
   Performing the computations necessary for public key cryptography
   without noticeable impact on the speed of user interaction was a
   constraint for even the fastest machines of the day.  Consequently,
   PKI designs attempted to limit the number of cryptographic operations
   required to the bare minimum necessary.  There were long debates over
   the question of whether certificate chains of more than 3
   certificates were acceptable.

   Today a 32-bit computer with two processing cores running at 1.2GHz
   can be bought for $5 and public key algorithms are available that
   provide a higher level of security than was achievable in the 1990s
   for less computation time.  In 1995, the idea that a single user
   might need a hundred public key pairs and a personal PKI to manage
   them as an extreme scenario.  Today when the typical user has a
   phone, a tablet and a laptop and their home is about to fill up
   dozens if not hundreds of network connected devices, the need to
   manage large numbers of keys for individual users is clear.

   Use of public key cryptography on the scale used in the Mesh would
   have been impractical even for financial applications as recently as
   15 years ago.  Today, the performance and memory overhead is
   negligible.

4.  Architectural Principles

   Over the course of the first quarter century of commercial use of
   PKI, a consensus has emerged as to the principles of robust protocol
   design; All aspects of the design should be public, all cryptographic
   algorithms should be open standards that have been widely reviewed by
   domain experts, etc.

   The Mathematical Mesh is appropriately aligned with this established
   consensus but departs from existing practice in certain areas as set
   out in the following.





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4.1.  User Centered Design

   Traditional enterprise centered PKI keeps the enterprise (and to an
   extent the users) secure but only as long as the users follow a long
   list of often complex instructions.  Even the US National Security
   Agency, an institution whose core competence is cryptography and
   whose principle purpose is to protect US government information
   failed to protect some of its greatest secrets because it was just
   too hard to use the right cryptography.

   A key principle that guides the design of the Mesh is that any set of
   instructions that can be written down and given to a user can be
   written down as code and executed by the computer.  Public key
   cryptography is used to automate the process of managing public keys.
   Instead of telling the user how to register for a certificate and
   install it in their mail client, we tell the computer how to do the
   task for them.

4.2.  User Centered Trust.

   One of the principal ideological battles that has been fought in the
   development of end-to-end email security has been the manner in which
   trust is provided.  In the S/MIME protocol, trust is established
   through a hierarchy of trust providers.  In the OpenPGP protocol,
   trust is in theory established through a 'Web of Trust' but is in
   practice almost invariably established through either a direct trust
   model (exchange of key fingerprints) or on a trust after first use
   basis.

   Perhaps, what we should be willing to learn from the experience of
   attempting to apply these models to real world applications is that
   none is sufficient by itself.  Rather than attempting to impose a
   single model of trust on every circumstance, multiple trust models
   should be supported.

   The trust model appropriate for validating a key depends on the
   context in which it is to be used.  If Alice is sending Bob a
   personal email, it is likely that the best key to use will be the one
   that matches the key fingerprint from the business card he gave her
   when they met in person.  But when Alice is sending Bob an email as
   her stockbroker, the best key is going to be the one that is issued
   to Bob as an employee of the brokerage company.

   Any trust model must be built around the needs of the user.  The Mesh
   does not impose a model for mapping human to machine interaction
   identifiers but it does allow the user to put that mapping under
   their personal control.  Devices connected to a Mesh Personal Profile
   share the same view of the world; the same set of bookmarks and



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   contacts for defining personal names and the same set of trust roots
   for Certification Authorities trusted to provide brokered trust.

   In the traditional model, PKI is used to validate network hosts after
   discovery.  The credential issued by the CA is verified each time the
   user visits the site.

   [[This figure is not viewable in this format.  The figure is
   available at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [4].]]


   Traditional PKI role.

   In the Mesh trust model, the primary role of the CA is to provide
   introductions.  When the user first visits the site, to buy goods,
   the site (and often the vendor it belongs to) is unknown.  At this
   point, the user is looking to the Authority to help decide if they
   wish to purchase from.

   [[This figure is not viewable in this format.  The figure is
   available at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [5].]]


   Trusted Authority as Introducer

   Once users can easily maintain a personal directory of trusted
   vendors and share it across all the devices they use, their personal
   trust directory becomes their primary trust provider.  Thus, the role
   of the authority changes once a trust relationship has been
   established from trust provider to trust revoker.  The user does not
   need the authority to tell them to trust a vendor they are already
   doing business with but they may need the authority to warn them if
   the vendor has defaulted on purchases made by other customers or has
   suffered a major breach, etc.

4.3.  A Credential Designed for Persistence

   One of the main difficulties in using S/MIME for email security is
   that many users stop using the system when their certificate expires.
   It is likely that one of the main reasons that OpenPGP is more
   popular amongst system administrators is that a maintenance-free user
   experience is available to anyone who decides to neglect key
   rollover.

   A Mesh Master Profile fingerprint is designed to provide a user with
   a credential that can be used for a lifetime.  Using the same



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   offline/online key management approaches that have been applied to
   root key management in the WebPKI since it began provides users with
   a credential with a cryptographic lifetime of 20-30 years.  The
   addition of linked notary log technology in the Mesh Portals allows
   such credentials to be securely renewed should the need arise and
   thus enabling indefinite use.

4.4.  Eliminate unnecessary options

   Traditionally cryptographic applications give the user a bewildering
   choice of algorithms and options.  They can choose to have one RSA
   keypair used for encryption and signature or they can have separate
   keys for both, they can encrypt their messages using 3DES or AES at
   128, 192 or 256 bit security.  And so on.

   The Mesh eliminates such choices as unnecessary.  Except where
   required by an application, the Mesh always uses separate keys for
   encryption and signature operations and only uses the highest
   strength on offer.  Currently, Mesh profiles are always encrypted
   using RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 with a 2048 bit key [RFC8017] , AES with a 256
   bit key [FIPS197] and SHA-2-512 [SHA-2] . The use of RSA 2048 will be
   replaced with Ed448 [RFC8032] when sufficiently mature
   implementations become available.

   For similar reasons, every Mesh master profile has an escrow key.
   The use of key escrow by applications is optional, but every profile
   has the capability of using it should circumstances require.

4.5.  Strong Public Key Identifiers

   A key departure from traditional PKI approaches is that all
   cryptographic keys are identified in every circumstance by either the
   UDF fingerprint of the public key in the case of a public key pair or
   the UDF fingerprint of the symmetric key in the case of a symmetric
   key pair.  No other form of key identifier is used.

   This approach greatly simplifies the processes of key discovery,
   management and signature verification.

   Since a UDF fingerprint of sufficient length, uniquely identifies a
   public key pair, it follows that if the attempt to verify the
   signature under a public key whose fingerprint matches that specified
   returns the result false, that the signature is invalid.  Contrawise,
   if the result returned is true, the data is validly signed for a
   given purpose if and only if the key identifier is authorized for
   that purpose.





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5.  Architecture

   All information exchanged through the Mesh is described in a profile.
   Profiles have the following properties.

   o  Profiles are first class objects with a unique, immutable
      identifier that either is or contains a UDF fingerprint of a
      signature key

   o  All profiles are digitally signed.

   o  Profiles are encoded in JSON [RFC7159] .

   At present, four types of Mesh Profile are defined:

   Master Profile  Describes the criteria for validating a user's
      personal profile.

   Personal Profile  Describes the user's personal Trust Mesh, the set
      of device and application profiles connected to it.

   Application Profile  Describes the use of a particular application.

   Device Profile  Describes a device and cryptographic keys specific to
      that device.

   A profile is Valid if and only if it is Verified, Current and
   Correct:

   Verified  A signature is verified if the key identifier specified
      maps to a

   Current  A profile is current if and only if it has not been
      superseded by a new profile published to the Mesh Portal.

   Correct  A profile is correct if the signing key identifier specified
      in the signature data is a legitimate signing key for that type of
      profile as specified in Section YY below.

   A profile is connected to a personal profile if and only if:

   o  The Personal Profile contains an entry for its profile identifier
      that is consistent with the profile type.

   o  The Personal Profile is Valid.

   o  The Application Profile is Valid.




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   This trust model allows Application Profiles and Device Profiles to
   be connected to a Personal Profile by enumerating the identifiers of
   the connected profile in the personal profile.

   [[This figure is not viewable in this format.  The figure is
   available at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [6].]]


   A Master/Personal Profile connected to Application and Device
   profiles.

5.1.  Master and Personal Profiles

   Each Mesh user has a Master Profile and a Personal Profile.

   Personal Profile  Contains a list of all the device profiles and
      application profiles that are currently connected to the user's
      personal Mesh.  The personal profile is signed by an
      administrative key.

   Master Profile  Contains a list of administrative keys used to sign
      personal profiles and the master signature key used to sign the
      Master Profile.

   The use of master signature keys and administration keys to
   authenticate the Master and Personal profiles needs further
   explanation.

   [[This figure is not viewable in this format.  The figure is
   available at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [7].]]


   Master and Personal Profile Signature

   This separation allows the user to add devices and/or change
   application settings frequently without the need for changes to their
   master profile or to access their master signature key.  This allows
   the master signature key to be stored in a safe place, preferably
   using a Hardware Security Module or other precautions without the
   inconvenience this would entail if regular use of the key was
   required.

   A typical user might modify their personal profile hundreds of times
   over their lifetime, conceivably even more in a world where homes are
   filled with hundreds of IoT devices.  Adding or removing
   administrative devices is likely to occur much less frequently.  The



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   master signature key used to authenticate the Master Profile never
   changes.  If it becomes necessary to replace the master signature
   key, it will be necessary to create a new Master profile and perform
   a secure transition to the new key.

   Since the master signature key does not change by definition, the
   fingerprint of the master signature key is a persistent identifier
   that will remain constant and only ever refer to exactly one Master
   Profile.  Furthermore, since at any given time a Master Profile has
   exactly one Personal Profile attached to it (and vice versa), the
   fingerprint of the master signature key is a persistent identifier
   for the Personal Profile as well.

5.2.  Device Profiles

   A device profile contains a description of the device and the public
   keys to be used as the basis for encryption, authentication and
   signature on that device (Figure XXX).  Ideally, the private keys
   associated with the device are generated using a secure procedure on
   the device itself and are bound to the device so that they cannot be
   exported from it.

   [[This figure is not viewable in this format.  The figure is
   available at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [8].]]


   Device Profile

   Application profiles MAY specify additional profiles to be used with
   a particular device for an application specific purpose.

   While it is usually desirable for such keys to be generated on the
   device itself, this is not always possible.  If, for example, the
   application profile is connected to a personal profile with multiple
   existing devices.  In this circumstance, the use of a co-operative
   key generation approach [PHB-CoKey] is preferred but not always
   possible.  If no other options are available, additional application
   private keys may be provisioned to the device by encrypting them
   under the device private key.

   Device profiles are connected to a personal profile by enumerating
   them in the Personal Profile.








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5.3.  Application Profiles

   An application profile describes the configuration of an application.
   An Application Profile MAY contain:

   Public data  Information that is intended for public use that applies
      to all devices.  For example, the user's public encryption key for
      end to end secure email.

   Private Data  Information that applies to all devices that is only
      intended for use by connected devices.  For example, the network
      configuration information describing how to access the inbound and
      outbound mail servers.

   Public Per Device Data  Information that is intended for public use
      that applies to a specific device.  For example, the user's public
      signature key might be different for each device.

   Private Per Device Data  Information that applies to a specific
      device and is only for the use of that device.  For example, a
      per-device signature key.

   Application Profiles are connected to a Personal Profile by an
   Application Device Entry.  The Application Device Entry specifies the
   identifier of the device and the set of privileges delegated to it
   with respect to that application.  These privileges MAY include the
   privilege of signing Application Profile updates.  This allows a
   device that is not an administration device for the personal profile
   to be permitted to update the application profile.  Thus, Alice might
   not want her laptop to be an administration device but would likely
   want to be able to add or update Web Site usernames and passwords.

5.4.  Verifying Profiles

   As described in section XXX, the key identifier in a Mesh Profile
   signature is the UDF fingerprint of the public key to be used for
   verification.  Therefore, a Profile is invalid if either:

   Attempting to validate the profile under a public key whose UDF
   fingerprint matches that specified in the key identifier returns the
   result false.

   The Key Identifier specified in the signature is not explicitly
   authorized for the purpose as described below.

   The Key Identifiers authorized to sign a profile depend on the type
   of profile as follows:




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   Master Profile  The Key Identifier of the key that signs the profile
      MUST be the UDF fingerprint of the Master Signature Key specified
      in that Master Profile.

   Personal Profile  The Key Identifier of the key that signs the
      profile MUST be listed as the identifier of an Administrator Key
      specified in the corresponding Master Profile.

   Device Profile  The Key Identifier of the key that signs the profile
      MUST be the UDF fingerprint of the Device Signature Key specified
      in that Device Profile.

   Application Profile  The Key Identifier of the key that signs the
      profile MUST be listed as the identifier of an Administrator key
      for that Application Profile in the corresponding Personal
      Profile.

5.5.  Key Escrow and Recovery

   Key Escrow and Recovery capabilities are built into the core of the
   Mesh.  Use of these capabilities is RECOMMENDED but not required.

   Encryption of stored data such as email messages and personal
   photographs protects confidentiality but introduces a major
   availability risk: The data will be lost if the user loses access to
   the decryption key.  While the risk of being coerced into disclosure
   of material is a risk for some users, availability is a concern for
   all users.

   The Mesh supports two types of key escrow, Offline and Online.

   Offline Key Escrow  Is used to escrow Master Signature Keys, Master
      Escrow Keys and other private keys that are particularly important
      to a user and are to be preserved.

   Online Key Escrow  Is used to protect all other keys by escrowing the
      key under a Master Escrow Key.

5.5.1.  Offline Escrow

   The use of Shamir Secret Sharing [ShamirXX] to escrow private keys is
   supported as follows:

   o  A 256 bit random session key is generated.

   o  The private key and related data is encrypted under the session
      key to form the key escrow data blob.




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   o  The unique identifier for the key escrow data blob is the UDF
      fingerprint of the session key.

   o  The key escrow data blob is stored in some form of persistent
      storage that is believed to provide a very high degree of
      availability.

   o  The session key is split into n of m shares using Shamir secret
      sharing.

   Since the purpose of the Mesh Portal is in part to provide a high
   availability data storage facility, the use of the Mesh to store the
   key recovery blob is preferred.

   Data recovery is the reverse of the escrow process:

   o  The shared secret is recovered from at least n of the key shares.

   o  The unique identifier for the key escrow data blob is calculated
      from the session key

   o  The unique identifier is used to retrieve the key recovery blob.

   o  The key recovery blob is decrypted using the session key.

   It will be noted that this process is anonymous.  The key recovery
   blob does not identify the profile or user to which it refers in any
   way.

5.5.2.  Online Escrow

   Support for Online escrow requires only that decryption keys for
   application use be encrypted under the master escrow key as if it was
   another device connected to a Personal Profile.

6.  Mesh Portals and the CryptoMesh

   As described earlier, a Mesh Portal is an untrusted cloud services
   that facilitates the management of Mesh profiles by providing
   persistent storage.  A personal profile MAY be registered to one,
   many or no Mesh Portals at a time.

   For the sake of convenience and familiarity, the Mesh Portal Protocol
   makes use of account identifiers in the traditional [RFC5322] format
   <user>@<domain>.  Transactions supported by the Portal Protocol
   include:

   o  Create Account



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   o  Add profile

   o  Update profile

   o  Request device connection*

   o  View pending requests*

   o  Accept or reject a connection request*

   Transactions marked with an asterisk* require administration
   privileges for the personal profile.

   Although the Mesh Architecture regards the Mesh Portal to be an
   untrusted cloud service with respect to Confidentiality and
   Integrity, the information transferred between devices and the portal
   could be susceptible to traffic analysis.  For this reason, all
   exchanges between devices and the portal MUST be protected using a
   transport layer security enhancement such as TLS [RFC5246] .

6.1.  Federated Portals

   A Mesh Portal MAY belong to a Federation.  Portals belonging to a
   Federation periodically synchronize their transaction logs so that
   all the members of the federation have access to the complete set of
   transaction logs for all the portals belonging to the federation.
   This allows the federation to collectively guarantee the availability
   of the user's profile data should one or more portals become
   unavailable either temporarily or permanently.

   The InterMesh protocol is supports Portal Federation.

   The CryptoMesh is proposed open federation of Mesh Portals that
   permits any portal willing to accept its terms of service to join.
   Due to the nature of the network effect it is expected that there
   would be only one such open federation baring major disagreements as
   to terms of service.  Figure XXX

   [[This figure is not viewable in this format.  The figure is
   available at http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
   architecture.html [9].]]


   The Cryptomesh.

   Mesh Portals that are a member of a Federation have a mutual
   responsibility to protect availability by acting to mitigate abuse by




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   users attempting to create excessive numbers of profiles or perform
   excessive numbers of updates.

7.  Security Considerations

   NYI

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not contain actions for IANA

9.  Acknowledgements

   Comodo Group: Egemen Tas, Melhi Abdulhayo?lu, Rob Stradling, Robin
   Alden.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [draft-hallambaker-json-web-service]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "JSON Web Service Binding Version 1.0",
              draft-hallambaker-json-web-service-07 (work in progress),
              September 2017.

   [draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Binary Encodings for JavaScript Object
              Notation: JSON-B, JSON-C, JSON-D", draft-hallambaker-
              jsonbcd-08 (work in progress), September 2017.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-app]
              "[Reference Not Found!]".

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-confirm]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mesh Confirmation Protocol (Mesh/
              Confirm)", draft-hallambaker-mesh-confirm-01 (work in
              progress), August 2017.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
              Implementation", draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer-04 (work
              in progress), September 2017.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-platform]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Platform
              Configuration", draft-hallambaker-mesh-platform-00 (work
              in progress), September 2016.




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   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-recrypt]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mesh/Recrypt: Usable Confidentiality",
              draft-hallambaker-mesh-recrypt-02 (work in progress),
              August 2017.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-reference]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference", draft-
              hallambaker-mesh-reference-06 (work in progress),
              September 2017.

   [draft-hallambaker-sin]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Strong Internet Names (SIN)", draft-
              hallambaker-sin-00 (work in progress), August 2017.

   [draft-hallambaker-udf]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Uniform Data Fingerprint (UDF)", draft-
              hallambaker-udf-06 (work in progress), August 2017.

   [FIPS197]  "[Reference Not Found!]".

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
              (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015.

   [RFC7516]  Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016.





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   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017.

   [SHA-2]    NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", August 2015.

   [SHA-3]    Dworkin, M., "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and
              Extendable-Output Functions", August 2015.

   [ShamirXX]
              "[Reference Not Found!]".

10.2.  Informative References

   [PHB-CoKey]
              "[Reference Not Found!]".

   [RFC4251]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
              January 2006.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
              December 2005.

   [RFC4880]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
              Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007.

   [RFC5322]  Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008.

   [RFC5751]  Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
              Specification", RFC 5751, DOI 10.17487/RFC5751, January
              2010.

   [RFC6120]  Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
              Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
              March 2011.

10.3.  URIs

   [1] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html

   [2] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html



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   [3] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html

   [4] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html

   [5] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html

   [6] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html

   [7] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html

   [8] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html

   [9] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       architecture.html

Author's Address

   Phillip Hallam-Baker
   Comodo Group Inc.

   Email: philliph@comodo.com
























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