6lo                                                          B. Sarikaya
Internet-Draft                                                Huawei USA
Updates: 6775 (if approved)                                   P. Thubert
Intended status: Standards Track                                   Cisco
Expires: November 25, 2017                                      M. Sethi
                                                            May 24, 2017

 Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks


   This document defines an extension to 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery, RFC
   6775.  Nodes supporting this extension compute a cryptographic Owner
   Unique Interface ID and associate it with one or more of their
   Registered Addresses.  Once an address is registered with a
   Cryptographic ID, only the owner of that ID can modify the anchor
   state information of the Registered Address, and Source Address
   Validation can be enforced.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Updating RFC 6775 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  New Fields and Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  New Crypto-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Updated EARO  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  New Crypto-ID Parameters Option . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Protocol Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Protocol Flows  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Multihop Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     10.2.  Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Requirements Addressed in this Document  . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   Neighbor discovery for IPv6 [RFC4861] and stateless address
   autoconfiguration [RFC4862] and their extensions are collectively
   referred to as the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (IPv6 NDP).  In
   order to enable IPv6 NDP operations over a constrained low-power and
   lossy network (LLN), "Neighbor Discovery optimizations for 6LoWPAN
   networks" [RFC6775] (6LoWPAN ND), reduces the use of multicast in the
   original protocol and introduces a unicast host address registration
   technique.  The registration mechanism leverages a new Address
   Registration Option (ARO) that is carried in the unicast Neighbor
   Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor Advertisement (NA) messages between
   the 6LoWPAN Node (6LN) and the 6LoWPAN Router (6LR), as well as the
   Duplicate Address Request (DAR) and Duplicate Address Confirmation
   (DAC) messages between the 6LR and the 6LoWPAN Border Router (6LBR),
   which is the central repository of all the registered addresses in
   its domain.

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   The registration mechanism in 6LoWPAN ND [RFC6775] was created for
   the original purpose of Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), whereby
   use of an address would be granted as long as the address is not
   already present in the subnet (first come first serve).  In order to
   validate address ownership, the registration mechanism enables the
   6LR and 6LBR to correlate further claims for a registered address
   from the device to which it is granted with a Owner Unique Interface
   IDentifier (OUID).  With 6LoWPAN ND, the OUID is derived from the MAC
   address of the device (EUI-64), which can be spoofed.  Therefore, any
   node connected to the subnet and aware of a registered-address-to-
   OUID mapping may effectively fake the OUID, steal the address and
   attract the traffic for that address towards a different Node.  In
   order to allow a more secured registration mechanism, the "Update to
   6LoWPAN ND" [I-D.ietf-6lo-rfc6775-update] opens the semantics of the
   ARO option and allows to transport alternate forms of OUIDs.

   With this specification, a 6LN generates a cryptographic ID (Crypto-
   ID) and places it in the OUID field in the registration of one (or
   more) of its addresses with the 6LR(s) that it uses as default
   router(s).  Proof of ownership of the cryptographic ID (Crypto-ID) is
   passed with the first registration to a given 6LR, and enforced at
   the 6LR, in a new Crypto-ID Parameters Option (CIPO).  The 6LR
   validates ownership of the cryptographic ID upon the creation of a
   registration state, or a change in the anchor information, such as
   Link-Layer Address and associated Layer-2 cryptographic material.

   The protected address registration protocol proposed in this document
   enables the enforcement of Source Address Validation (SAVI)
   [RFC7039], which ensures that only the correct owner uses a
   registered address in the source address field in IPv6 packets.  With
   this specification, a 6LN that sources a packet has to use a 6LR to
   which the source address of the packet is registered to forward the
   packet.  The 6LR maintains state information for the registered
   addressed along with the MAC address, and link-layer cryptographic
   key associated with that node.  In SAVI-enforcement mode, the 6LR
   allows only packets from a connected Host if the connected Host owns
   the registration of the source address of the packet.

   The 6lo adaptation layer framework ([RFC4944], [RFC6282]) expects
   that a device forms its IPv6 addresses based on Layer-2 address, so
   as to enable a better compression.  This is incompatible with "Secure
   Neighbor Discovery (SEND)" [RFC3971] and "Cryptographically Generated
   Addresses (CGAs)" [RFC3972], which derive the Interface ID (IID) in
   the IPv6 addresses from cryptographic material.  "Privacy
   Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms"
   [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy] places additional
   recommendations on the way addresses should be formed and renewed.

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   This specification allows a device to form and register addresses at
   will, without a constraint on the way the address is formed or the
   number of addresses that are registered in parallel.  It enables to
   protect multiple addresses with a single cryptographic material and
   to send the proof only once to a given 6LR for multiple addresses and
   refresher registrations.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Readers are expected to be familiar with all the terms and concepts
   that are discussed in [RFC3971], [RFC3972], [RFC4861], [RFC4919],
   [RFC6775], and [I-D.ietf-6lo-backbone-router] which proposes an
   evolution of [RFC6775] for wider applicability.

   This document defines Crypto-ID as an identifier of variable size
   which in most cases is 64 bits long.  It is generated using
   cryptographic means explained later in this document.

   The document also conforms to the terms and models described in
   [RFC5889] and uses the vocabulary and the concepts defined in
   [RFC4291] for the IPv6 Architecture.

   This document uses [RFC7102] for Terminology in Low power And Lossy

3.  Updating RFC 6775

   With this specification, a node SHOULD use a cryptographic identifier
   (Crypto-ID) as OUID in its registration; the Crypto-ID is calculated
   as described in Section 4.1.  The fact that a OUID is a Crypto-ID is
   indicated in a new 'C' flag in the NS(ARO) message.

   This specification also introduces a new option, the CIPO, that is
   used to prove ownership of the Crypto-ID.  A node that registers for
   the first time to a 6LR SHOULD place a CIPO option to its
   registration but is not expected to place the option in the next
   periodic refresher registrations for that address, or for the
   registration of other addresses with the same OUID.  When a 6LR
   receives a NS(ARO) registration with a new Crypto-ID as a OUID, then
   it SHOULD challenge by responding with a NA(ARO) with a status of
   "Proof requested".  This whole process MAY be skipped in networks
   where there is no or ultra low expectations of mobility.

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   The challenge will also be triggered in the case of a registration
   for which the Source Link-Layer Address is not consistent with a
   state that already exists either at the 6LR or the 6LBR.  In the
   latter case, the 6LBR returns a status of "Proof requested" in the
   DAR/DAC exchange, which is echoed by the 6LR in the NA (ARO) back to
   the registering node.  This flow should not alter a preexisting state
   in the 6LR or the 6LBR.

   Upon a NA(ARO) with a status of "Proof requested", the registering
   node SHOULD retry its registration with a CIPO option that proves its
   ownership of the Crypto-ID.

   If the 6LR cannot validate the proof, it responds with a status of
   "Incorrect Proof".  Upon a NA(ARO) with a status of "Incorrect
   Proof", the registering node SHOULD NOT use this Crypto-ID for
   registering with that 6LR anymore.

4.  New Fields and Options

4.1.  New Crypto-ID

   Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used in the calculation of the
   Crypto-ID.  The digital signature is constructed by using the 6LN's
   private key over its EUI-64 (MAC) address.  The signature value is
   computed using the ECDSA signature algorithm and the hash function
   used is SHA-256 [RFC6234].  Public Key is the most important
   parameter in CGA Parameters (sent by 6LN in an NS message).  ECC
   Public Key could be in uncompressed form or in compressed form where
   the first octet of the OCTET STRING is 0x04 and 0x02 or 0x03,
   respectively.  Point compression can further reduce the key size by
   about 32 octets.

   First, the modifier is set to a random or pseudo-random 128-bit
   value.  Next, concatenate from left to right the modifier, 9 zero
   octets and the ECC public key.  SHA-256 algorithm is applied on the
   concatenation.  The 112 leftmost bits of the hash value is taken.
   Concatenate from left to right the modifier value, the subnet prefix
   and the encoded public key.  NIST P-256 is executed on the
   concatenation.  The leftmost bits of the result is used as the
   Crypto-ID.  With this specification, the last 64 bits are retained,
   but it could be expanded to more bits in the future by increasing the
   size of the OUID field.

   In respecting the cryptographic algorithm agility [RFC7696], Curve
   25519 [RFC7748] can also be used instead of NIST P-256.  This is
   indicated by 6LN by setting the Crypto Type field in the CIPO option
   to a value of 1.  If 6LBR does not support Curve 25519, it will set

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   Crypto Type field to zero.  This means that the default algorithm
   (NIST P-256) will be used.

4.2.  Updated EARO

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      |     Type      |     Length    |    Status     |    Reserved   |
      | Reserved  |C|T|     TID       |     Registration Lifetime     |
      |                                                               |
      +          Owner Unique ID (EUI-64 or equivalent)               +
      |                                                               |

              Figure 1: Enhanced Address Registration Option




      8-bit unsigned integer.  The length of the option (including the
      type and length fields) in units of 8 bytes.


      8-bit unsigned integer.  Indicates the status of a registration in
      the NA response.  MUST be set to 0 in NS messages.  This
      specification leverages values introduced in the Update to 6LoWPAN
      ND [I-D.ietf-6lo-rfc6775-update], such as 5: Proof Requested, and
      does not require additional values to be defined.


      This field is unused.  It MUST be initialized to zero by the
      sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.


      This specification introduces a C bit, which is set to indicate
      that the Owner Unique ID field contains a Crypto-ID.

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   T and TID:

      Defined in [I-D.ietf-6lo-rfc6775-update].

   Owner Unique ID:

      When using this specification, this field contains a Crypto-ID.

4.3.  New Crypto-ID Parameters Option

   This specification introduces a new option, the Crypto-ID Parameters
   Option (CIPO), that carries the proof of ownership of a crypto-ID.

       0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      |     Type      |    Length     |   Pad Length  |  Crypto Type  |
      |                                                               |
      +                                                               +
      |                                                               |
      +                      Modifier (16 octets)                     +
      |                                                               |
      +                                                               +
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      +                    Subnet Prefix (8 octets)                   +
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      +                  Public Key (variable length)                 +
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      .                                                               .
      .                           Padding                             .
      .                                                               .
      |                                                               |

                   Figure 2: Crypto-ID Parameters Option


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      CIPO, to be assigned by IANA.


      The length of the option in units of 8 octets.

   Pad Length:

      The length of the Padding field.

   Crypto Type:

      The type of cryptographic algorithm used in calculation Crypto-ID.
      Default value of all zeros indicate NIST P-256.  A value of 1 is
      assigned for Curve 25519.  New values may be defined later.


      128 bit random value.

   Subnet Prefix:

      64 bit subnet prefix.

   Public Key:

      ECC public key of 6LN.


      A variable-length field making the option length a multiple of 8,
      containing as many octets as specified in the Pad Length field.

5.  Protocol Overview

5.1.  Protocol Scope

   The scope of the present work is a 6LoWPAN Low Power Lossy Network
   (LLN), typically a stub network connected to a larger IP network via
   a Border Router called a 6LBR per [RFC6775].

   The 6LBR maintains a registration state for all devices in the
   attached LLN, and, in conjunction with the first-hop router (the
   6LR), is in a position to validate uniqueness and grant ownership of
   an IPv6 address before it can be used in the LLN.  This is a
   fundamental difference with a classical network that relies on IPv6
   address auto-configuration [RFC4862], where there is no guarantee of

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   ownership from the network, and any IPv6 Neighbor Discovery packet
   must be individually secured [RFC3971].

               ---+-------- ............
                  |      External Network
               |     | 6LBR
             o    o   o
      o     o   o     o
         o   o LLN   o    o     o
            o   o   o       (6LR)
                    o         (6LN)

                       Figure 3: Basic Configuration

   In a mesh network, the 6LR is directly connected to the host device.
   This specification expects that the peer-wise layer-2 security is
   deployed so that all the packets from a particular host are securely
   identifiable by the 6LR.  The 6LR may be multiple hops away from the
   6LBR.  Packets are routed between the 6LR and the 6LBR via other
   6LRs.  This specification expects that a chain of trust is
   established so that a packet that was validated by the first 6LR can
   be safely routed by the next 6LRs to the 6LBR.

5.2.  Protocol Flows

   The 6TiSCH Architecture [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture] suggests to
   use of RPL [RFC6550] as the routing protocol between the 6LRs and the
   6LBR.  In that model, a registration flow happens as shown in
   Figure 4.

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    6LoWPAN Node        6LR             6LBR
     (RPL leaf)       (router)       (RPL root)
         |               |               |
         |  6LoWPAN ND   |  6LoWPAN ND   |
         |               |               |
         |               |               |
         |  NS(ARO)      |               |
         |-------------->|               |
         | 6LoWPAN ND    | DAR           |
         |               |-------------->|
         |               |(then RPL DAO) |
         |               |               |
         |               | DAC           |
         |               |<--------------|
         |  NA(ARO)      |               |
         |<--------------|               |
         |               |               |
         |               |               |

                     Figure 4: (Re-)Registration Flow

   A new device that joins the network auto-configures an address and
   performs an initial registration to an on-link 6LR with an NS message
   that carries an Address Registration Option (ARO) [RFC6775].  The 6LR
   validates the address with the central 6LBR using a DAR/DAC exchange,
   and the 6LR confirms (or denies) the address ownership with an NA
   message that also carries an Address Registration Option.

   In a multihop 6LoWPAN, the registration with Crypto-ID is propagated
   to 6LBR as described in Section 5.3.  If a chain of trust is present
   between the 6LR and the 6LBR, then there is no need to propagate the
   proof of ownership to the 6LBR.  All the 6LBR needs to know is that
   this particular OUID is randomly generated, so as to enforce that any
   update via a different 6LR is also random.

   Local or on-link protocol interactions are shown in Figure 5.
   Crypto-ID and ARO are passed to and stored by the 6LR/6LBR on the
   first NS and not sent again in the next NS.  The operation starts
   with 6LR sending a Router Advertisement (RA) message to 6LN.

   The 6LR/6LBR ensures first-come/first-serve by storing the ARO and
   the Crypto-ID correlated to the node being registered.  The node is
   free to claim any address it likes as long as it is the first to make
   such a claim.  After a successful registration, the node becomes the
   owner of the registered address and the address is bound to the
   Crypto-ID in the 6LR/6LBR registry.  This binding can be verified
   later, which prevents other nodes from stealing the address and

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   trying to attract traffic for that address or use it as their source

   A node may uses multiple IPv6 addresses at any time.  This condition
   may happen for privacy reasons
   [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy], or when the node
   moves at a different place and auto-configures an new address from a
   different prefix.  In those situations, the node may use the same
   Crypto-ID to protect multiple IPv6 addresses.  The separation of the
   address and the Crypto-ID avoids the constrained device to compute
   multiple keys for multiple addresses.  The registration process
   allows the node to tie all of its addresses to the same Crypto-ID and
   have the 6LR/6LBR enforce first-come first-serve after that.

         6LN                                                6LR
          |                                                  |
          |<------------------- RA --------------------------|
          |                                                  |
          |----------- NS with ARO and Crypto-ID ----------->|
          |                                                  |
          |<---------- NA with ARO (status=proof requested) -|
          |                                                  |
          |----------- NS with ARO and Crypto-ID ----------->|
          |                                                  |
          |<---------------- NA with ARO --------------------|
          |                                                  |
          ...                                              ...
          |                                                  |
          |------------ NS with ARO and Crypto-ID ---------->|
          |                                                  |
          |                                                  |
          |<---------------- NA with ARO --------------------|
          ...                                              ...
          |                                                  |
          |----------- NS with ARO and Crypto-ID ----------->|
          |                                                  |
          |                                                  |
          |<---------------- NA with ARO --------------------|

                   Figure 5: On-link Protocol Operation

5.3.  Multihop Operation

   In multihop 6LoWPAN, 6LBR sends RAs with prefixes downstream and it
   is the 6LR that receives and relays them to the nodes. 6LR and 6LBR
   communicate with the ICMPv6 Duplicate Address Request (DAR) and the
   Duplicate Address Confirmation (DAC) messages.  The DAR and DAC use

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   the same message format as NS and NA with different ICMPv6 type

   In ND-PAR we extend DAR/DAC messages to carry cryptographically
   generated OUID.  In a multihop 6LoWPAN, the node exchanges the
   messages shown in Figure 4.  The 6LBR must be aware of who owns an
   address (EUI-64) to defend the first node if there is an attacker on
   another 6LR.  Because of this the content that the source signs and
   the signature needs to be propagated to the 6LBR in DAR message.  For
   this purpose the DAR message sent by 6LR to 6LBR MUST contain the
   CIPO option.  DAR message also contains ARO.

   It is possible that occasionally, a 6LR may miss the node's OUID
   (that it received in ARO). 6LR should be able to ask for it again.
   This is done by restarting the exchanges shown in Figure 5.  The
   result enables 6LR to refresh the information that was lost. 6LR MUST
   send DAR message with ARO to 6LBR.  6LBR as a reply forms a DAC
   message with the information copied from the DAR and the Status field
   is set to zero.  With this exchange, the 6LBR can (re)validate and
   store the information to make sure that the 6LR is not a fake.

   In some cases 6LBR may use DAC message to signal to 6LR that it
   expects Crypto-ID from 6LR also asks 6LR to verify the EUI-64 6LR
   received from 6LN.  This may happen when a 6LN node is compromised
   and a fake node is sending the Crypto-ID as if it is the node's EUI-
   64.  Note that the detection in this case can only be done by 6LBR
   not by 6LR.

6.  Security Considerations

   The observations regarding the threats to the Local Link Network in
   [RFC3971] also apply to this specification.

   This document inherits threats discussed in 6LoWPAN ND [RFC6775] and
   its update [I-D.ietf-6lo-rfc6775-update] and addresses the potential
   attacks related to address stealing and spoofing within a LLN.
   Compared with SeND, this specification saves about 1Kbyte in every
   NS/NA message.  Also, this specification separates the cryptographic
   identifier from the registered IPv6 address so that a node can have
   more than one IPv6 address protected by the same cryptographic
   identifier.  SeND forces the IPv6 address to be cryptographic since
   it integrates the CGA as the IID in the IPv6 address.  This
   specification frees the device to form its addresses in any fashion,
   so as to enable the classical 6LoWPAN compression which derives IPv6
   addresses from Layer-2 addresses, as well as privacy addresses.

   The threats discussed in Section 9.2 of [RFC3971] are countered by
   the protocol described in this document as well.

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   Collisions of Crypto-ID is a possibility that needs to be considered.
   The formula for calculating probability of a collision is 1 -
   e^{-k^2/(2n)}. If the Crypto-ID is 64-bit long, then the chance of
   finding a collision is 0.01% when the network contains 66 million
   nodes.  It is important to note that the collision is only relevant
   when this happens within one stub network (6LBR).  A collision of ID
   in ND-PAR is a rare event.  However, when such a collision does
   happen, the protocol operation is not affected, although it opens a
   window for a node to hijack an address from another.  The link-layer
   security ensures that the nodes would normally not be aware of a
   collision on the subnet.  If a malicious node is able to gain
   knowledge of a collision through other means, the only thing that it
   could do is to steal addresses from the other honest node.  This
   would be no different from what is already possible in a 6lo network

7.  IANA considerations

   IANA is requested to assign two new option type values for the CIPO
   under the subregistry "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats".

8.  Acknowledgements

   We are grateful to Rene Struik and Robert Moskowitz for their
   comments that lead to many improvements to this document.

9.  Change Log

   o  submitted version -00 as a working group draft after adoption, and
      corrected the order of authors

   o  submitted version -01 with no changes

   o  submitted version -02 with these changes: Moved Requirements to
      Appendix A, Section 4.2 moved to Section 3, New section 4 on New
      Fields and Options, Section 4 changed to Protocol Overview as
      Section 5 with Protocol Scope and Flows subsections.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

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   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
              2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,

   [RFC6775]  Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
              Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
              Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
              RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,

              Thubert, P., Nordmark, E., and S. Chakrabarti, "An Update
              to 6LoWPAN ND", draft-ietf-6lo-rfc6775-update-05 (work in
              progress), May 2017.

10.2.  Informative references

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
              "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,

   [RFC3972]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
              RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005,

   [RFC4944]  Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
              "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
              Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,

   [RFC6282]  Hui, J., Ed. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
              Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011,

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   [RFC4919]  Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
              over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
              Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
              RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,

   [RFC5889]  Baccelli, E., Ed. and M. Townsley, Ed., "IP Addressing
              Model in Ad Hoc Networks", RFC 5889, DOI 10.17487/RFC5889,
              September 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5889>.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,

   [RFC6550]  Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
              Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
              JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
              Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012,

   [RFC7102]  Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and
              Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, DOI 10.17487/RFC7102, January
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7102>.

   [RFC7039]  Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,
              "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework",
              RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, October 2013,

   [RFC7217]  Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
              Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
              Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,

   [RFC7696]  Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
              Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
              BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,

   [RFC7748]  Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
              for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.

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              Thubert, P., "IPv6 Backbone Router", draft-ietf-6lo-
              backbone-router-03 (work in progress), January 2017.

              Thubert, P., "An Architecture for IPv6 over the TSCH mode
              of IEEE 802.15.4", draft-ietf-6tisch-architecture-11 (work
              in progress), January 2017.

              Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Privacy
              Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
              draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-08 (work
              in progress), September 2015.

Appendix A.  Requirements Addressed in this Document

   In this section we state requirements of a secure neighbor discovery
   protocol for low-power and lossy networks.

   o  The protocol MUST be based on the Neighbor Discovery Optimization
      for Low-power and Lossy Networks protocol defined in [RFC6775].
      RFC6775 utilizes optimizations such as host-initiated interactions
      for sleeping resource-constrained hosts and elimination of
      multicast address resolution.

   o  New options to be added to Neighbor Solicitation messages MUST
      lead to small packet sizes, especially compared with existing
      protocols such as SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND).  Smaller
      packet sizes facilitate low-power transmission by resource-
      constrained nodes on lossy links.

   o  The support for this registration mechanism SHOULD be extensible
      to more LLN links than IEEE 802.15.4 only.  Support for at least
      the LLN links for which a 6lo "IPv6 over foo" specification
      exists, as well as Low-Power Wi-Fi SHOULD be possible.

   o  As part of this extension, a mechanism to compute a unique
      Identifier should be provided with the capability to form a Link
      Local Address that SHOULD be unique at least within the LLN
      connected to a 6LBR.

   o  The Address Registration Option used in the ND registration SHOULD
      be extended to carry the relevant forms of Unique Interface

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   o  The Neighbour Discovery should specify the formation of a site-
      local address that follows the security recommendations from

Authors' Addresses

   Behcet Sarikaya
   Huawei USA
   5340 Legacy Dr. Building 3
   Plano, TX  75024

   Email: sarikaya@ieee.org

   Pascal Thubert
   Cisco Systems, Inc
   Building D
   45 Allee des Ormes - BP1200
   MOUGINS - Sophia Antipolis  06254

   Phone: +33 497 23 26 34
   Email: pthubert@cisco.com

   Mohit Sethi
   Jorvas  02420

   Email: mohit@piuha.net

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