Network Working Group M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft Orange
Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy
Expires: January 7, 2022 McAfee
W. Pan
Huawei Technologies
July 6, 2021
Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service
Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
Abstract
This document discusses multi-homing considerations for Distributed-
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). The goal is to
provide some guidance for DOTS clients/gateways when multihomed.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Multi-Homing Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Multi-Homed Residential Single CPE . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP . . . . . . . . 7
5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Residential CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to
determine the cause of a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
[RFC4732]. Rather, the network may just realize that some resources
appear to be under attack. To help with such situations, the IETF
has specified the DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) architecture
[RFC8811], where a DOTS client can inform an upstream DOTS server
that its network is under a potential attack and that appropriate
mitigation actions are required. The DOTS protocols can be used to
coordinate real-time mitigation efforts which can evolve as the
attacks mutate, thereby reducing the impact of an attack and leading
to more efficient responsive actions. [RFC8903] identifies a set of
scenarios for DOTS; most of these scenarios involve a Customer
Premises Equipment (CPE).
The high-level base DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1
([RFC8811]):
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+-----------+ +-------------+
| Mitigator | ~~~~~~~~~~ | DOTS Server |
+-----------+ +-------------+
|
|
|
+---------------+ +-------------+
| Attack Target | ~~~~~~ | DOTS Client |
+---------------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture
[RFC8811] specifies that the DOTS client may be provided with a list
of DOTS servers; each of these servers is associated with one or more
IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address
family. The DOTS client establishes one or more DOTS sessions by
connecting to the provided DOTS server(s) addresses (e.g., by using
[RFC8973]).
DOTS may be deployed within networks that are connected to one single
upstream provider. It can also be enabled within networks that are
multi-homed. The reader may refer to [RFC3582] for an overview of
multi-homing goals and motivations. This document discusses DOTS
multi-homing considerations. Specifically, the document aims to:
1. Complete the base DOTS architecture with multi-homing specifics.
Those specifics need to be taken into account because:
* Sending a DOTS mitigation request to an arbitrary DOTS server
will not necessarily help in mitigating a DDoS attack.
* Blindly forking all DOTS mitigation requests among all
available DOTS servers is suboptimal.
* Sequentially contacting DOTS servers may increase the delay
before a mitigation plan is enforced.
2. Identify DOTS deployment schemes in a multi-homing context, where
DOTS services can be offered by all or a subset of upstream
providers.
3. Provide guidelines and recommendations for placing DOTS requests
in multi-homed networks, e.g.,:
* Select the appropriate DOTS server(s).
* Identify cases where anycast is not recommended for DOTS.
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This document adopts the following methodology:
o Identify and extract viable deployment candidates from [RFC8903].
o Augment the description with multi-homing technicalities, e.g.,
* One vs. multiple upstream network providers
* One vs. multiple interconnect routers
* Provider-Independent (PI) vs. Provider-Aggregatable (PA) IP
addresses
o Describe the recommended behavior of DOTS clients and gateways for
each case.
Multi-homed DOTS agents are assumed to make use of the protocols
defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis] and [RFC8783]; no specific
extension is required to the base DOTS protocols for deploying DOTS
in a multi-homed context.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Terminology
This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC8811] and
[RFC4116]. In particular:
Provider-Aggregatable (PA) addresses are globally-unique addresses
assigned by a transit provider to a customer. The addresses are
considered "aggregatable" because the set of routes corresponding
to the PA addresses are usually covered by an aggregate route set
corresponding to the address space operated by the transit
provider, from which the assignment was made (Section 2 of
[RFC4116]).
Provider-Independent (PI) addresses are globally-unique addresses
which are not assigned by a transit provider, but are provided by
some other organisation, usually a Regional Internet Registry
(RIR) (Section 2 of [RFC4116]).
IP indifferently refers to IPv4 or IPv6.
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4. Multi-Homing Scenarios
This section describes some multi-homing scenarios that are relevant
to DOTS. In the following subsections, only the connections of
border routers are shown; internal network topologies are not
elaborated.
This section distinguishes between residential CPEs vs. enterprise
CPEs because PI addresses may be used for enterprises while this is
not the current practice for residential CPEs.
4.1. Multi-Homed Residential Single CPE
The scenario shown in Figure 2 is characterized as follows:
o The home network is connected to the Internet using one single
CPE.
o The CPE is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e., both
fixed and mobile networks). Provisioning domain (PvD) is
explained in [RFC7556].
In a typical deployment scenario, these provisioning domains are
owned by the same provider (see Section 1 of [RFC8803]). Such a
deployment is meant to seamlessly use both fixed and cellular
networks for bonding, faster hand-overs, or better resiliency
purposes.
o Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes
to the CPE and provides additional configuration information such
as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the
network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name
[RFC8973]. These addresses/prefixes are assumed to be Provider-
Aggregatable (PA).
o Because of ingress filtering, packets forwarded by the CPE towards
a given provisioning domain must be sent with a source IP address
that was assigned by that domain [RFC8043].
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+-------+ +-------+
|Fixed | |Mobile |
|Network| |Network|
+---+---+ +---+---+
| | Service Providers
............|....................|.......................
+---------++---------+ Home Network
||
+--++-+
| CPE |
+-----+
... (Internal Network)
Figure 2: Typical Multi-homed Residential CPE
4.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs
The scenario shown in Figure 3 is characterized as follows:
o The enterprise network is connected to the Internet using a single
router.
o That router is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e.,
managed by distinct administrative entities).
Unlike the previous scenario, two sub-cases can be considered for an
enterprise network with regards to assigned addresses:
1. PI addresses/prefixes: The enterprise is the owner of the IP
addresses/prefixes; the same address/prefix is then used when
establishing communications over any of the provisioning domains.
2. PA addresses/prefixes: Each of the provisioning domains assigns
IP addresses/prefixes to the enterprise network.
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+------+ +------+
| ISP1 | | ISP2 |
+---+--+ +--+---+
| | Service Providers
............|....................|.......................
+---------++---------+ Enterprise Network
||
+--++-+
| rtr |
+-----+
... (Internal Network)
Figure 3: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Single CPE connected to
Multiple Networks)
4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream ISPs
This scenario is similar to the one described in Section 4.2; the
main difference is that dedicated routers are used to connect to each
provisioning domain.
+------+ +------+
| ISP1 | | ISP2 |
+---+--+ +--+---+
| | Service Providers
......................|..........|.......................
| | Enterprise Network
+---+--+ +--+---+
| rtr1 | | rtr2 |
+------+ +------+
... (Internal Network)
Figure 4: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Multiple CPEs, Multiple
ISPs)
4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP
This scenario is a variant of Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 in which
multi-homing is supported by the same ISP (i.e., same provisioning
domain).
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5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations
Table 1 provides some sample, non-exhaustive, deployment schemes to
illustrate how DOTS agents may be deployed for each of the scenarios
introduced in Section 4.
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| Scenario | DOTS client | DOTS |
| | | gateway |
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| Residential CPE | CPE | N/A |
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| Single CPE, Multiple | Internal hosts or CPE | CPE |
| provisioning domains | | |
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| Multiple CPEs, Multiple | Internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 |
| provisioning domains | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) |
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
| Multi-homed enterprise, | Internal hosts or all | CPEs (rtr1 |
| Single provisioning | CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2) | and rtr2) |
| domain | | |
+---------------------------+-------------------------+-------------+
Table 1: Sample Deployment Cases
These deployment schemes are further discussed in the following
subsections.
5.1. Residential CPE
Figure 5 depicts DOTS sessions that need to be established between a
DOTS client (C) and two DOTS servers (S1, S2) within the context of
the scenario described in Section 4.1.
For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([RFC8973]) using the
DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain.
IPv6-capable DOTS clients MUST use the source address selection
algorithm defined in [RFC6724] to select the candidate source
addresses to contact each of these DOTS servers. DOTS sessions MUST
be established and MUST be maintained with each of the DOTS servers
because the mitigation scope of each of these servers is restricted.
The DOTS client SHOULD use the certificate provisioned by a
provisioning domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS server(s)
provided by the same provisioning domain.
When conveying a mitigation request to protect the attack target(s),
the DOTS client MUST select an available DOTS server whose network
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has assigned the IP prefixes from which target prefixes/addresses are
derived. This implies that if no appropriate DOTS server is found,
the DOTS client MUST NOT send the mitigation request to any other
available DOTS server.
For example, a mitigation request to protect target resources bound
to a PA IP address/prefix cannot be satisfied by a provisioning
domain other than the one that owns those addresses/prefixes.
Consequently, if a CPE detects a DDoS attack that spreads over all
its network attachments, it MUST contact both DOTS servers for
mitigation purposes.
The DOTS client MUST be able to associate a DOTS server with each
provisioning domain. For example, if the DOTS client is provisioned
with S1 using DHCP when attaching to a first network and with S2
using Protocol Configuration Option (PCO) when attaching to a second
network, the DOTS client must record the interface from which a DOTS
server was provisioned. DOTS signaling session to a given DOTS
server must be established using the interface from which the DOTS
server was provisioned.
+--+
----------|S1|
/ +--+
/ DOTS Server Domain #1
/
+---+/
| C |
+---+\
\
\
\ +--+
----------|S2|
+--+
DOTS Server Domain #2
Figure 5: DOTS Associations for a Multihomed Residential CPE
5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs
Figure 6 illustrates a first set of DOTS associations that can be
established with a DOTS gateway, which is enabled within the context
of the scenario described in Section 4.2. This deployment is
characterized as follows:
o One of more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the
internal network.
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o A DOTS gateway is enabled to aggregate and then relay the requests
towards upstream DOTS servers.
When PA addresses/prefixes are in use, the same considerations
discussed in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS gateway to
contact its DOTS server(s). The DOTS gateways can be reachable from
DOTS clients by using an unicast address or an anycast address.
Nevertheless, when PI addresses/prefixes are assigned, the DOTS
gateway MUST send mitigation requests to all its DOTS servers.
Otherwise, the attack traffic may still be delivered via the ISP
which hasn't received the mitigation request.
+--+
----------|S1|
+---+ / +--+
| C1|----+ / DOTS Server Domain #1
+---+ | /
+---+ +-+-+/
| C3|------| G |
+---+ +-+-+\
+---+ | \
| C2|----+ \
+---+ \ +--+
----------|S2|
+--+
DOTS Server Domain #2
Figure 6: Multiple DOTS Clients, Single DOTS Gateway, Multiple DOTS
Servers
An alternate deployment model is depicted in Figure 7. This
deployment assumes that:
o One or more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the
internal network. These DOTS clients may use [RFC8973] to
discover their DOTS server(s).
o These DOTS clients communicate directly with upstream DOTS
servers.
If PI addresses/prefixes are in use, the DOTS client MUST send a
mitigation request to all the DOTS servers. The use of anycast
addresses to reach the DOTS servers is NOT RECOMMENDED.
If PA addresses/prefixes are used, the same considerations discussed
in Section 5.1 need to be followed by the DOTS clients. Because DOTS
clients are not embedded in the CPE and multiple addreses/prefixes
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may not be assigned to the DOTS client (typically in an IPv4
context), some issues may arise in how to steer traffic towards the
appropriate DOTS server by using the appropriate source IP address.
These complications discussed in [RFC4116] are not specific to DOTS.
..........
. +--+ .
+--------|C1|--------+
| . +--+ . |
| . . |
+--+ . +--+ . +--+
|S2|------|C3|------|S1|
+--+ . +--+ . +--+
| . . |
| . +--+ . |
+--------|C2|--------+
. +--+ .
..........
DOTS Client
Domain
Figure 7: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Servers
Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of
them is responsible for handling communications with a specific DOTS
server (see Figure 8).
..........
. +--+ .
+--------|C1| .
| . +--+ .
+--+ . +--+ . +--+
|S2| . |C2|------|S1|
+--+ . +--+ . +--+
..........
DOTS Client
Domain
Figure 8: Single Homed DOTS Clients
Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix
filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will trigger
DOTS communications with the DOTS servers. Such policies will help
the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS server.
The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding
DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client. If anycast
addresses are used to reach DOTS servers, the CPE may not be able to
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select the appropriate provisioning domain to which the mitigation
request should be forwarded. As a consequence, the request may not
be forwarded to the appropriate DOTS server.
5.3. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream ISPs
The deployments depicted in Figures 7 and 8 also apply to the
scenario described in Section 4.3. One specific problem for this
scenario is to select the appropriate exit router when contacting a
given DOTS server.
An alternative deployment scheme is shown in Figure 9:
o DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the internal network.
o A DOTS gateway is enabled in each CPE (rtr1, rtr2).
o Each of these DOTS gateways communicates with the DOTS server of
the provisioning domain.
When PI addresses/prefixes are used, DOTS clients MUST contact all
the DOTS gateways to send a DOTS message. DOTS gateways will then
relay the request to the DOTS server. Note that the use of anycast
addresses is NOT RECOMMENDED to establish DOTS sessions between DOTS
clients and DOTS gateways.
When PA addresses/prefixes are used, but no filter rules are provided
to DOTS clients, the latter MUST contact all DOTS gateways
simultaneously to send a DOTS message. Upon receipt of a request by
a DOTS gateway, it MUST check whether the request is to be forwarded
upstream (if the target IP prefix is managed by the upstream server)
or rejected.
When PA addresses/prefixes are used, but specific filter rules are
provided to DOTS clients using some means that are out of scope of
this document, the clients MUST select the appropriate DOTS gateway
to reach. The use of anycast addresses is NOT RECOMMENDED to reach
DOTS gateways.
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+---+
+------------| C1|----+
| +---+ |
+--+ +-+-+ +---+ +-+-+ +--+
|S2|------|G2 |------| C3|------|G1 |------|S1|
+--+ +-+-+ +---+ +-+-+ +--+
| +---+ |
+------------| C2|----+
+---+
Figure 9: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Gateways, Multiple
DOTS Servers
5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP
The key difference of the scenario described in Section 4.4 compared
to the other scenarios is that multi-homing is provided by the same
ISP. Concretely, that ISP can decide to provision the enterprise
network with:
o The same DOTS server for all network attachments.
o Distinct DOTS servers for each network attachment. These DOTS
servers need to coordinate when a mitigation action is received
from the enterprise network.
In both cases, DOTS agents enabled within the enterprise network MAY
decide to select one or all network attachments to send DOTS
mitigation requests.
6. Security Considerations
DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of
[RFC8811].
DOTS clients should control the information that they share with peer
DOTS servers. In particular, if a DOTS client maintains DOTS
associations with specific DOTS servers per interconnection link, the
DOTS client SHOULD NOT leak information specific to a given link to
DOTS servers on different interconnection links that are not
authorized to mitigate attacks for that given link. Whether this
constraint is relaxed is deployment-specific and must be subject to
explicit consent from the DOTS client domain administrator. How to
seek for such consent is implementation- and deployment-specific.
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7. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any action from IANA.
8. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Roland Dobbins, Nik Teague, Jon Shallow, Dan Wing, and
Christian Jacquenet for sharing their comments on the mailing list.
Thanks to Kirill Kasavchenko for the comments.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8811] Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F.,
Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811,
August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis]
Boucadair, M., Shallow, J., and T. Reddy.K, "Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal
Channel Specification", draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-06
(work in progress), March 2021.
[RFC3582] Abley, J., Black, B., and V. Gill, "Goals for IPv6 Site-
Multihoming Architectures", RFC 3582,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3582, August 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3582>.
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[RFC4116] Abley, J., Lindqvist, K., Davies, E., Black, B., and V.
Gill, "IPv4 Multihoming Practices and Limitations",
RFC 4116, DOI 10.17487/RFC4116, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4116>.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
[RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain
Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>.
[RFC8043] Sarikaya, B. and M. Boucadair, "Source-Address-Dependent
Routing and Source Address Selection for IPv6 Hosts:
Overview of the Problem Space", RFC 8043,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8043, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8043>.
[RFC8783] Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data
Channel Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783,
May 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>.
[RFC8803] Bonaventure, O., Ed., Boucadair, M., Ed., Gundavelli, S.,
Seo, S., and B. Hesmans, "0-RTT TCP Convert Protocol",
RFC 8803, DOI 10.17487/RFC8803, July 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8803>.
[RFC8903] Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia,
L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use Cases for DDoS Open Threat
Signaling", RFC 8903, DOI 10.17487/RFC8903, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8903>.
[RFC8973] Boucadair, M. and T. Reddy.K, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Agent Discovery", RFC 8973, DOI 10.17487/RFC8973,
January 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8973>.
Authors' Addresses
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
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Tirumaleswar Reddy
McAfee, Inc.
Embassy Golf Link Business Park
Bangalore, Karnataka 560071
India
Email: TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com
Wei Pan
Huawei Technologies
Email: william.panwei@huawei.com
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