Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-04
Network Working Group M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft Orange
Intended status: Standards Track T. Reddy
Expires: November 30, 2020 McAfee
W. Pan
Huawei Technologies
May 29, 2020
Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service
Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-04
Abstract
This document discusses multi-homing considerations for Distributed-
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). The goal is to
provide some guidance for DOTS clients/gateways when multihomed.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Multi-Homing Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Residential Single CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP . . . . . . . . 7
5. DOTS Multi-homing Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Residential CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream
ISPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. Multi-Homed Enterprise: Single ISP . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to
determine the cause of a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
[RFC4732]. Rather, the network may just realize that some resources
seem to be under attack. To improve such situation, the IETF is
specifying the DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]architecture, where a DOTS client can
inform a DOTS server that the network is under a potential attack and
that appropriate mitigation actions are required. Indeed, because
the lack of a common method to coordinate a real-time response among
involved actors and network domains jeopardizes the efficiency of
DDoS attack mitigation actions, the DOTS protocol is meant to carry
requests for DDoS attack mitigation, thereby reducing the impact of
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