eppext H. Ribbers
Internet-Draft M. Groeneweg
Intended status: Standards Track SIDN
Expires: December 31, 2015 R. Gieben
A. Verschuren
June 29, 2015
Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-04
Abstract
This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material
between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in [RFC5730].
This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator
of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. <keyRelayData> element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.5. EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. XML Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. EPP Extension Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.1. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.2. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.3. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.4. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.5. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.6. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.7. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.8. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.9. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS-operator, which
require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS-
operators. Often, there is no direct channel between these parties
or it is non-scalable and insecure.
One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when
changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC signed zones. We suggest that
DNS-operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the
delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone.
In this document we define an EPP extension to support and automate
this transaction.
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC2119].
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
character case presented in order to develop a conforming
implementation.
In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and
"S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. Indentation and
white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element
relationships and is not a mandatory feature of this protocol.
1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material
Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name
transfer is one of the phases in the lifecycle of a domain name
[I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change].
DNS-operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the
registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust
intact. This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining
registrar.
The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each
other (the ~ arrow in Figure 1) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often
there is no trusted path between the two. As both can securely
interact with the registry over the administrative channel through
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the registrar, the registry can act as a relay for the key material
exchange.
The registry is merely used as a relay channel. Therefore it is up
to the losing DNS-operator to complete the intended transaction. The
registry SHOULD have certain policies in place that require the
losing DNS operator to cooperate with this transaction, however this
is beyond this I-D. This I-D focusses on the EPP protocol syntax.
+--------------------+ DNSKEY +---------------------+
|gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| ^
| |
V |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| gaining registrar | | registrar of record |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+
| ^
EPP keyrelay | | EPP poll
V |
+-----------------------------+
| registry |
+-----------------------------+
Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC key material.
There is no distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and
DNS-operators, there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP server.
Therefore the term EPP client will be used for the interaction with
the EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material.
2. Object Attributes
2.1. DNSSEC Key Material
The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData>
element.
2.1.1. <keyRelayData> element
The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements:
o One REQUIRED <keyData> element that contains the DNSSEC key
material as described in [RFC5910], Section 4.2.
o An OPTIONAL <expiry> element that describes the expected lifetime
of the relayed key(s) in the zone. When the <expiry> element is
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provided the losing DNS operator SHOULD remove the inserted key
material from the zone after the expire time. This may be because
the transaction that needed the insertion should either be
completed or abandoned by that time. If a client receives a key
relay object that has been sent previously it MUST update the
expire time of the key material. This enables the clients to
update the lifetime of the key material when a transfer is
delayed.
The <expiry> element MUST contain one of the following child
elements:
* <absolute>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date and
time until it expires on the specified date and time. If a date
in the past is provided this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a
previously send key relay object.
* <relative>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date and
time until the end of the specified duration. If a negative period is
provided this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a previously send key
relay object.
3. EPP Command Mapping
A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730]. The command
mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay
mapping.
3.1. EPP Query Commands
EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
retrieve object transfer status information.
3.1.1. EPP <check> Command
Check semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check>
response.
3.1.2. EPP <info> Command
Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so
there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> Command.
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The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll
response, as described in [RFC5730]. The key relay object created
with the <create> command, described in Section 3.2.1 is inserted
into the receiving client's poll queue. The receiving client will
receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as
described in [RFC5730].
When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay
poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child
<keyrelay:infData> element that is identified by the keyrelay
namespace. The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following
child elements:
o A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the
DNSSEC key material is relayed.
o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],
Section 3.2.1).
o One or more REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be
relayed, as defined in Section 2.1. A server MAY apply a server
policy that specifies the number of <keyRelayData> elements that can
be incorporated. When a server policy is violated, a server MUST
respond with an EPP result code 2308 "Data management policy
violation".
o An OPTIONAL <crDate> element that contains the date and time of the
submitted <create> command.
o An OPTIONAL <reID> element that contains the identifier of the
client that requested the key relay.
o An OPTIONAL <acID> element that contains the identifier of the
client that SHOULD act upon the key relay.
Example <poll> response:
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S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
S: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
S: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1301">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully; ack to dequeue</msg>
S: </result>
S: <msgQ count="5" id="12345">
S: <qDate>1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z</qDate>
S: <msg>Keyrelay action completed successfully.</msg>
S: </msgQ>
S: <resData>
S: <keyrelay:infData>
S: <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
S: <keyrelay:authInfo>
S: <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw>
S: </keyrelay:authInfo>
S: <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
S: <keyrelay:keyData>
S: <s:flags>256</s:flags>
S: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
S: <s:alg>8</s:alg>
S: <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey>
S: </keyrelay:keyData>
S: <keyrelay:expiry>
S: <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative>
S: </keyrelay:expiry>
S: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
S: <keyrelay:crDate>
S: 1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z
S: </keyrelay:crDate>
S: <keyrelay:reID>
S: ClientX
S: </keyrelay:reID>
S: <keyrelay:acID>
S: ClientY
S: </keyrelay:acID>
S: </keyrelay:infData>
S: </resData>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
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3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command
Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command.
3.2. EPP Transform Commands
EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create
an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an
object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
<transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
change information associated with an object.
3.2.1. EPP <create> Command
The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and
DNSSEC key material to be relayed. When the <create> command is
validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the
key relay info response (See Section 3.1.2), in the receiving
client's poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the
provided domain name.
In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create>
command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that is identified
by the keyrelay namespace. The <keyrelay:create> element contains
the following child elements:
o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for
which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.
o One or more REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> element containing
data to be relayed, as defined in Section 2.1
Example <create> commands:
Note that in the provided example the second <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
element had a negative period and thus represents the revocation of a
previouly send key relay object (see Section 2.1.1).
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C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
C: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
C: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <command>
C: <create>
C: <keyrelay:create>
C: <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
C: <keyrelay:authInfo>
C: <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw>
C: </keyrelay:authInfo>
C: <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: <keyrelay:keyData>
C: <s:flags>256</s:flags>
C: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
C: <s:alg>8</s:alg>
C: <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey>
C: </keyrelay:keyData>
C: <keyrelay:expiry>
C: <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative>
C: </keyrelay:expiry>
C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: <keyrelay:keyData>
C: <s:flags>256</s:flags>
C: <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
C: <s:alg>8</s:alg>
C: <s:pubKey>bWFyY2lzdGhlYmVzdA==</s:pubKey>
C: </keyrelay:keyData>
C: <keyrelay:expiry>
C: <keyrelay:relative>-P1D</keyrelay:relative>
C: </keyrelay:expiry>
C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: </keyrelay:create>
C: </create>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command>
C:</epp>
When a server has succesfully processed the <create> command it MUST
respond with a standard EPP response. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.
Example <create> response:
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S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
When a server cannot process the <create> command due to the server
policy it MUST return an EPP 2308 error message. This might be the
case when the server knows that the receiving client does not support
keyrelay transactions. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.
Example <create> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
S: <response>
S: <result code="2308">
S: <msg>Data management policy violation</msg>
S: </result>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command
Delete semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <delete> command and the EPP <delete>
response.
3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command
Renew semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <renew> command and the EPP <renew>
response.
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3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command
Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command and the EPP <transfer>
response.
3.2.5. EPP <update> Command
Update semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <update> command and the EPP <update>
response.
4. Formal Syntax
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:epp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
xmlns:eppcom="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<annotation>
<documentation>
Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 protocol
extension schema for relaying DNSSEC key material.
</documentation>
</annotation>
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
schemaLocation="epp-1.0.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
schemaLocation="eppcom-1.0.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
schemaLocation="secdns-1.1.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
schemaLocation="domain-1.0.xsd" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" />
<element name="infData" type="keyrelay:infDataType" />
<element name="create" type="keyrelay:createType" />
<complexType name="createType">
<sequence>
<element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" />
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</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="infDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
<element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="crDate" type="dateTime"/>
<element name="reID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
<element name="acID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="keyRelayDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType" />
<element name="expiry" type="keyrelay:keyRelayExpiryType" minOccurs="0" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="keyRelayExpiryType">
<choice>
<element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />
<element name="relative" type="duration" />
</choice>
</complexType>
</schema>
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. XML Namespace
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
conforming to a registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The
following URI assignment is requested of IANA:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0
Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this
document.
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
5.2. EPP Extension Registry
The EPP extension described in this document should be registered by
the IANA in the EPP Extension Registry described in [RFC7451]. The
details of the registration are as follows:
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Name of Extension: "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning
Protocol"
Document status: Standards Track
Reference: (insert reference to RFC version of this document)
Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org
TLDs: Any
IPR Disclosure: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2393/
Status: Active
Notes: None
6. Security Considerations
A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server
management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command.
Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message
queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial
of service attack. However this can, and SHOULD be detected by the
server. A server MAY set a server policy which limits or rejects a
<keyrelay:create> command if it detects the mechanism is being
abused.
For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data a correct <domain:authInfo>
element SHOULD be used as an indication that putting the key material
on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the
_registrant_ of that domain name. The authorization of EPP clients
to perform DNS changes is not covered in this I-D as it depends on
registry specific policy.
7. Acknowledgements
We like to thank the following individuals for their valuable input,
review, constructive criticism in earlier revisions or support for
the concepts described in this document:
Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal,
Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth
Goldman, Maarten Bosteels, Ulrich Wisser and Kees Monshouwer.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009.
[RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009.
[RFC5910] Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS)
Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910, May 2010.
[RFC7451] Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol", RFC 7451, February 2015.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change]
Koch, P., Sanz, M., and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS
Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", draft-koch-dnsop-
dnssec-operator-change-06 (work in progress), February
2014.
Appendix A. Changelog
[This section should be removed by the RFC editor before publishing]
A.1. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-00
1. Initial document.
A.2. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01
1. Style and grammar changes;
2. Added an expire element as per suggestion by Klaus Malorny;
3. Make the authInfo element mandatory and make the registry check
it as per feedback by Klaus Malorny and James Gould.
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A.3. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-02
1. Added element to identify the relaying EPP client as suggested by
Klaus Malorny;
2. Corrected XML for missing and excess clTRID as noted by Patrick
Mevzek;
3. Added clarifications for the examples based on feedback by
Patrick Mevzeck;
4. Reviewed the consistency of using DNS operator versus registrar
after review comments by Patrick Faltstrom and Ed Lewis.
A.4. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-03
1. Style and grammar changes
2. Corrected acknowledgement section
3. Corrected XML for Expire element to not be mandatory but only
occur once.
A.5. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-00
1. Added feedback from Seth Goldman and put him in the
acknowledgement section.
2. IDnits formatting ajustments
A.6. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-01
1. Introducing the <relay> command, and thus separating the data and
the command.
2. Updated the Introduction, describing the general use of relay vs
the intended use-case of relaying DNSSEC key data.
3. Restructuring the document to make it more inline with existing
EPP extensions.
A.7. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02
1. Updated the XML structure based on WG feedback
2. Updated the wording
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A.8. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03
1. Updated the document title in the EPP Extension Registry section
2. Restored Acknowledgement section, thanks to Marco Davids
3. Incorperated feedback from Patrick Mevzek
A.9. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-04
1. Incorperated feedback from James Gould
2. Added additional text when server is aware that receiving clients
do not support keyrelay transactions or DNSSEC as suggested by
Kees Monshouwer.
3. Added additional text for supporting key revocation as suggested
by Kees Monshouwer
4. Updated some of the wording
5. Fix the usage of multiple keys in a create message
Authors' Addresses
Rik Ribbers
SIDN
Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD
NL
Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl
URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
Marc Groeneweg
SIDN
Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD
NL
Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl
URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
Miek Gieben
Email: miek@miek.nl
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Antoin Verschuren
Email: ietf@antoin.nl
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