Internet Engineering Task Force                             D. Farinacci
Intended status: Experimental                                    B. Weis
Expires: November 2, 2015                                  cisco Systems
                                                             May 1, 2015

                    LISP Data-Plane Confidentiality


   This document describes a mechanism for encrypting LISP encapsulated
   traffic.  The design describes how key exchange is achieved using
   existing LISP control-plane mechanisms as well as how to secure the
   LISP data-plane from third-party surveillance attacks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 2, 2015.

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   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Encoding and Transmitting Key Material  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Shared Keys used for the Data-Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Data-Plane Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Procedures for Encryption and Decryption  . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Dynamic Rekeying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  SAAG Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  LISP-Crypto Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix B.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     B.1.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01.txt  . . . . . . . .  15
     B.2.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-00.txt  . . . . . . . .  15
     B.3.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01.txt . . . . . .  15
     B.4.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-00.txt . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The Locator/ID Separation Protocol [RFC6830] defines a set of
   functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non-
   routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators
   (RLOCs).  LISP ITRs and PITRs encapsulate packets to ETRs and RTRs.
   Packets that arrive at the ITR or PITR are typically not modified.
   Which means no protection or privacy of the data is added.  If the
   source host encrypts the data stream then the encapsulated packets
   can be encrypted but would be redundant.  However, when plaintext
   packets are sent by hosts, this design can encrypt the user payload
   to maintain privacy on the path between the encapsulator (the ITR or
   PITR) to a decapsulator (ETR or RTR).  The encrypted payload is
   unidirectional.  However, return traffic uses the same procedures but
   with different key values by the same xTRs or potentially different
   xTRs when the paths between LISP sites are asymmetric.

   This draft has the following requirements for the solution space:

   o  Do not require a separate Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is
      out of scope of the LISP control-plane architecture.

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   o  The budget for key exchange MUST be one round-trip time.  That is,
      only a two packet exchange can occur.

   o  Use symmetric keying so faster cryptography can be performed in
      the LISP data plane.

   o  Avoid a third-party trust anchor if possible.

   o  Provide for rekeying when secret keys are compromised.

   o  Support Authenticated Encryption with packet integrity checks.

   o  Support multiple cipher suites so new crypto algorithms can be
      easily introduced.

2.  Overview

   The approach proposed in this draft is to NOT rely on the LISP
   mapping system (or any other key infrastructure system) to store
   security keys.  This will provide for a simpler and more secure
   mechanism.  Secret shared keys will be negotiated between the ITR and
   the ETR in Map-Request and Map-Reply messages.  Therefore, when an
   ITR needs to obtain the RLOC of an ETR, it will get security material
   to compute a shared secret with the ETR.

   The ITR can compute 3 shared-secrets per ETR the ITR is encapsulating
   to.  And when the ITR encrypts a packet before encapsulation, it will
   identify the key it used for the crypto calculation so the ETR knows
   which key to use for decrypting the packet after decapsulation.  By
   using key-ids in the LISP header, we can also get real-time rekeying

3.  Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

   LISP will use a Diffie-Hellman [RFC2631] key exchange sequence and
   computation for computing a shared secret.  The Diffie-Hellman
   parameters will be passed via Cipher Suite code-points in Map-Request
   and Map-Reply messages.

   Here is a brief description how Diff-Hellman works:

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   |              ITR           |         |           ETR              |
   |Secret| Public | Calculates |  Sends  | Calculates | Public |Secret|
   |  i   |  p,g   |            | p,g --> |            |        |  e   |
   |  i   | p,g,I  |g^i mod p=I |  I -->  |            | p,g,I  |  e   |
   |  i   | p,g,I  |            |  <-- E  |g^e mod p=E |  p,g   |  e   |
   | i,s  |p,g,I,E |E^i mod p=s |         |I^e mod p=s |p,g,I,E | e,s  |

        Public-key exchange for computing a shared private key [DH]

   Diffie-Hellman parameters 'p' and 'g' must be the same values used by
   the ITR and ETR.  The ITR computes public-key 'I' and transmits 'I'
   in a Map-Request packet.  When the ETR receives the Map-Request, it
   uses parameters 'p' and 'g' to compute the ETR's public key 'E'.  The
   ETR transmits 'E' in a Map-Reply message.  At this point, the ETR has
   enough information to compute 's', the shared secret, by using 'I' as
   the base and the ETR's private key 'e' as the exponent.  When the ITR
   receives the Map-Reply, it uses the ETR's public-key 'E' with the
   ITR's private key 'i' to compute the same 's' shared secret the ETR
   computed.  The value 'p' is used as a modulus to create the width of
   the shared secret 's'.

4.  Encoding and Transmitting Key Material

   The Diffie-Hellman key material is transmitted in Map-Request and
   Map-Reply messages.  Diffie-Hellman parameters are encoded in the
   LISP Security Type LCAF [LCAF].

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     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    |           AFI = 16387         |     Rsvd1     |     Flags     |
    |   Type = 11   |      Rsvd2    |             6 + n             |
    |   Key Count   |      Rsvd3    |A| Cipher Suite|   Rsvd4     |R|
    |           Key Length          |     Public Key Material ...   |
    |                    ... Public Key Material                    |
    |              AFI = x          |       Locator Address ...     |

   Cipher Suite field contains DH Key Exchange and Cipher/Hash Functions

   The 'Key Count' field encodes the number of {'Key-Length', 'Key-
   Material'} fields included in the encoded LCAF.  The maximum number
   of keys that can be encoded are 3, each identified by key-id 1,
   followed by key-id 2, an finally key-id 3.

   The 'R' bit is not used for this use-case of the Security Type LCAF
   but is reserved for [LISP-DDT] security.

   When the A-bit is set, it indicates that Authentication only is
   performed according to the Integrity hash function defined in the
   Cipher Suites.  That is an encapsulator will perform an Integrity
   computation over an unencrypted packet and include an ICV value.
   Since the packet contains no ciphertext, there is no IV value
   included in the message.  The 7-bit 'Cipher Suite' field defines the
   following code-points:

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   Cipher Suite 0:

   Cipher Suite 1:
     Diffie-Hellman Group: 1024-bit Modular Exponential (MODP) [RFC2409]
     Encryption:           AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode [AES-CBC]
     Integrity:            HMAC-SHA1-96 [RFC2404]

   Cipher Suite 2:
     Diffie-Hellman Group: 2048-bit MODP [RFC3526]
     Encryption:           AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode [AES-CBC]
     Integrity:            HMAC-SHA1-96 [RFC2404]

   Cipher Suite 3:
     Diffie-Hellman Group: 3072-bit MODP [RFC3526]
     Encryption:           AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode [AES-CBC]
     Integrity:            HMAC-SHA1-96 [RFC2404]

   The "Public Key Material" field contains the public key generated by
   one of the Cipher Suites defined above.  The length of the key in
   octets is encoded in the "Key Length" field.

   When an ITR or PITR send a Map-Request, they will encode their own
   RLOC in the Security Type LCAF format within the ITR-RLOCs field.
   When a ETR or RTR sends a Map-Reply, they will encode their RLOCs in
   Security Type LCAF format within the RLOC-record field of each EID-
   record supplied.

   If an ITR or PITR sends a Map-Request with the Security Type LCAF
   included and the ETR or RTR does not want to have encapsulated
   traffic encrypted, they will return a Map-Reply with no RLOC records
   encoded with the Security Type LCAF.  This signals to the ITR or PITR
   that it should not encrypt traffic (it cannot encrypt traffic anyways
   since no ETR public-key was returned).

   Likewise, if an ITR or PITR wish to include multiple key-ids in the
   Map-Request but the ETR or RTR wish to use some but not all of the
   key-ids, they return a Map-Reply only for those key-ids they wish to

5.  Shared Keys used for the Data-Plane

   When an ITR or PITR receives a Map-Reply accepting the Cipher Suite
   sent in the Map-Request, it is ready to create data plane keys.  The
   same process is followed by the ETR or RTR returning the Map-Reply.

   The first step is to create a shared secret, using the peer's shared
   Diffie-Hellman Public Key Material combined with device's own private

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   keying material as described in Section 3.  The Diffie-Hellman group
   used is defined in the Cipher Suite sent in the Map-Request and
   copied into the Map-Reply.

   The resulting shared secret is used to compute Encryption and
   Integrity keys for the algorithms specified in the Cipher Suite.  A
   Key Derivation Function (KDF) in counter mode as specified by
   [NIST-SP800-108] is used to generate the data-plane keys.  The amount
   of keying material that is derived depends on the algorithms in the
   cipher suite.

   The inputs to the KDF are as follows:

   o  KDF function.  This is HMAC-SHA-256.

   o  A key for the KDF function.  This is the most significant 16
      octets of the computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret.

   o  Context that binds the use of the data-plane keys to this session.
      The context is made up of the following fields, which are
      concatenated and provided as the data to be acted upon by the KDF


   o  A counter, represented as a two-octet value in network-byte order.

   o  The null-terminated string "lisp-crypto".

   o  The ITR's nonce from the the Map-Request the Cipher Suite was
      included in.

   o  The number of bits of keying material required (L), represented as
      a two-octet value in network byte order.

   The counter value in the context is first set to 1.  When the amount
   of keying material exceeds the number of bits returned by the KDF
   function, then the KDF function is called again with the same inputs
   except that the counter increments for each call.  When enough keying
   material is returned, it is concatenated and used to create keys.

   For example, AES with 128-bit keys requires 16 octets (128 bits) of
   keying material, and HMAC-SHA1-96 requires another 16 octets (128
   bits) of keying material in order to maintain a consistent 128-bits
   of security.  Since 32 octets (256 bits) of keying material are
   required, and the KDF function HMAC-SHA-256 outputs 256 bits, only
   one call is required.  The inputs are as follows:

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   key-material = HMAC-SHA-256(dh-shared-secret, context)

       where: context = 0x0001 || "lisp-crypto" || <itr-nonce> || 0x0100

   In contrast, a cipher suite specifying AES with 256-bit keys requires
   32 octets (256 bits) of keying material, and HMAC-SHA256-128 requires
   another 32 octets (256 bits) of keying material in order to maintain
   a consistent 256-bits of security.  Since 64 octets (512 bits) of
   keying material are required, and the KDF function HMAC-SHA-256
   outputs 256 bits, two calls are required.

   key-material-1 = HMAC-SHA-256(dh-shared-secret, context)

       where: context = 0x0001 || "lisp-crypto" || <itr-nonce> || 0x0200

   key-material-2 = HMAC-SHA-256(dh-shared-secret, context)

       where: context = 0x0002 || "lisp-crypto" || <itr-nonce> || 0x0200

   key-material = key-material-1 || key-material-2

   If the key-material is longer than the required number of bits (L),
   then only the most significant L bits are used.

   From the derived key-material, the most significant bits are used for
   the Encryption key, and least significant bits are used for the
   Integrity key.  For example, if the Cipher Suite contains both AES
   with 128-bit keys and HMAC-SHA1-96, the most significant 128 bits
   become the ITR's data-plane encryption key, and the next 128-bit
   become the ITR's Integrity key.

6.  Data-Plane Operation

   The LISP encapsulation header [RFC6830] requires changes to encode
   the key-id for the key being used for encryption.

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     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 4341        |
UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
L / |N|L|E|V|I|P|K|K|            Nonce/Map-Version                  | \
I   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
S \ |                 Instance ID/Locator-Status-Bits               |  |
P   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
    |                   Initialization Vector (IV)                  |  I
E   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  C
n / |                                                               |  V
c   |                                                               |  |
r   |                Packet Payload with EID Header ...             |  |
y   |                                                               |  |
p \ |                                                               | /
t   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                   Integrity Check Value (ICV)                 |

        K-bits indicate when packet is encrypted and which key used

   When the KK bits are 00, the encapsulated packet is not encrypted.
   When the value of the KK bits are 1, 2, or 3, it encodes the key-id
   of the secret keys computed during the Diffie-Hellman Map-Request/
   Map-Reply exchange.  When the KK bits are not 0, the payload is
   prepended with an Initialization Vector (IV) and appended with an
   Integrity Check Value (ICV).  The length of the IV and ICV fields
   depend on the Cipher Suite negotiated in the control-plane.

   When an ITR or PITR receives a packet to be encapsulated, they will
   first decide what key to use, encode the key-id into the LISP header,
   and use that key to encrypt all packet data that follows the LISP
   header.  Therefore, the outer header, UDP header, and LISP header
   travel as plaintext.

   There is an open working group item to discuss if the data
   encapsulation header needs change for encryption or any new
   applications.  This draft proposes changes to the existing header so
   experimentation can continue without making large changes to the
   data-plane at this time.

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7.  Procedures for Encryption and Decryption

   When an ITR, PITR, or RTR encapsulate a packet and have already
   computed an encryption-key and integrity-key (detailed in section
   Section 5) that is associated with a destination RLOC, the following
   encryption and encapsulation procedures are performed:

   1.  The encapsulator creates a random number used as the IV.
       Prepends the IV value to the packet being encapsulated.  The IV
       is incremented for every packet sent to the destination RLOC.

   2.  Next encrypt with cipher function AES-CBC using the encryption-
       key over the packet payload.  This does not include the IV.  The
       IV must be transmitted as plaintext so the decrypter can use it
       as input to the decryption cipher.  The payload should be padded
       to an integral number of bytes a block cipher may require.

   3.  Prepend the LISP header.  The key-id field of the LISP header is
       set to the key-id value that corresponds to key-pair used for the
       encryption cipher and for the ICV hash.

   4.  Next compute the ICV value by hashing the packet (which includes
       the LISP header, the IV, and the packet payload) with the HMAC-
       SHA1 function using the integrity-key.  The resulting ICV value
       is appended to the packet.  The ICV is not ciphertext so a fast
       integrity check can be performed without decryption at the

   5.  Lastly, prepend the UDP header and outer IP header onto the
       encrypted packet and send packet to destination RLOC.

   When an ETR, PETR, or RTR receive an encapsulated packet, the
   following decapsulation and decryption procedures are performed:

   1.  The outer IP header and UDP header are stripped from the start of
       the packet and the ICV is stripped from the end of the packet.

   2.  Next the ICV is computed by running the Integrity function from
       the cipher suite using the integrity-key over the packet (which
       includes the LISP header, the IV and packet payload) using the
       integrity-key.  If the result does not match the ICV value from
       the packet, the packet was been tampered with, and is dropped,
       and an optional log message may be issued.  The integrity-key is
       obtained from a local-cache associated with the key-id value from
       the LISP header.

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   3.  If the hashed result matches the ICV value from the packet, then
       the LISP header is stripped and decryption occurs over the packet
       payload using the plaintext IV in the packet.

   4.  The IV is stripped from the packet.

   5.  The packet is decrypted using the encryption-key and the IV from
       the packet.  The encryption-key is obtained from a local-cache
       associated with the key-id value from the LISP header.  The
       result of the decryption function is a plaintext packet payload.

   6.  The resulting packet is forwarded to the destination EID.

8.  Dynamic Rekeying

   Since multiple keys can be encoded in both control and data messages,
   an ITR can encapsulate and encrypt with a specific key while it is
   negotiating other keys with the same ETR.  Soon as an ETR or RTR
   returns a Map-Reply, it should be prepared to decapsulate and decrypt
   using the new keys computed with the new Diffie-Hellman parameters
   received in the Map-Request and returned in the Map-Reply.

   RLOC-probing can be used to change keys or cipher suites by the ITR
   at any time.  And when an initial Map-Request is sent to populate the
   ITR's map-cache, the Map-Request flows across the mapping system
   where a single ETR from the Map-Reply RLOC-set will respond.  If the
   ITR decides to use the other RLOCs in the RLOC-set, it MUST send a
   Map-Request directly to negotiate security parameters with the ETR.
   This process may be used to test reachability from an ITR to an ETR
   initially when a map-cache entry is added for the first time, so an
   ITR can get both reachability status and keys negotiated with one
   Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange.

   A rekeying event is defined to be when an ITR or PITR changes the
   cipher suite or public-key in the Map-Request.  The ETR or RTR
   compares the cipher suite and public-key it last received from the
   ITR for the key-id, and if any value has changed, it computes a new
   public-key and cipher suite requested by the ITR from the Map-Request
   and returns it in the Map-Reply.  Now a new shared secret is computed
   and can be used for the key-id for encryption by the ITR and
   decryption by the ETR.  When the ITR or PITR starts this process of
   negotiating a new key, it must not use the corresponding key-id in
   encapsulated packets until it receives a Map-Reply from the ETR with
   the same cipher suite value it expects (the values it sent in a Map-

   Note when RLOC-probing continues to maintain RLOC reachability and
   rekeying is not desirable, the ITR or RTR can either not include the

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   Security Type LCAF in the Map-Request or supply the same key material
   as it received from the last Map-Reply from the ETR or RTR.  This
   approach signals to the ETR or RTR that no rekeying event is

9.  Future Work

   For performance considerations, newer Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman
   (ECDH) groups can be used as specified in [RFC4492] and [RFC6090] to
   reduce CPU cycles required to compute shared secret keys.

   For better security considerations as well as to be able to build
   faster software implementations, newer approaches to ciphers and
   authentication methods will be researched and tested.  Some examples
   are chacha20 and poly1305 [CHACHA-POLY].

10.  Security Considerations

10.1.  SAAG Support

   The LISP working group has and will continue to seek help from the
   SAAG working group for security advice.  The SAAG has been involved
   early in the design process so they have early input and review.

10.2.  LISP-Crypto Security Threats

   Since ITRs and ETRs participate in key exchange over a public non-
   secure network, a man-in-the-middle (MITM) could circumvent the key
   exchange and compromise data-plane confidentiality.  This can happen
   when the MITM is acting as a Map-Replier, provides its own public key
   so the ITR and the MITM generate a shared secret key among each
   other.  If the MITM is in the data path between the ITR and ETR, it
   can use the shared secret key to decrypt traffic from the ITR.

   Since LISP can secure Map-Replies by the authentication process
   specified in [LISP-SEC], the ITR can detect when a MITM has signed a
   Map-Reply for an EID-prefix it is not authoritative for.  When an ITR
   determines the signature verification fails, it discards and does not
   reuse the key exchange parameters, avoids using the ETR for
   encapsulation, and issues a severe log message to the network
   administrator.  Optionally, the ITR can send RLOC-probes to the
   compromised RLOC to determine if can reach the authoritative ETR.
   And when the ITR validates the signature of a Map-Reply, it can begin
   encrypting and encapsulating packets to the RLOC of ETR.

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11.  IANA Considerations

   This draft may require the use of the registry that selects Security
   parameters.  Rather than convey the key exchange parameters and
   crypto functions directly in LISP control packets, the cipher suite
   values can be assigned and defined in a registry.  For example,
   Diffie-Hellman group-id values can be used from [RFC2409] and

   This draft specifies how the 7-bit cipher suite values from the
   Security Type LCAF are partitioned.  The partitions are:

   0:      Reserved
   1-96:   Allocated by registry, but first 3 values defined in this document
   97-127: Private use

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC2631]  Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", RFC
              2631, June 1999.

   [RFC3526]  Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
              Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
              RFC 3526, May 2003.

   [RFC4106]  Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
              (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
              4106, June 2005.

   [RFC4492]  Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
              Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.

   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011.

   [RFC6830]  Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
              Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830, January

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12.2.  Informative References

   [AES-CBC]  McGrew, D., Foley, J., and K. Paterson, "Authenticated
              Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA", draft-mcgrew-aead-
              aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-05.txt (work in progress).

              Langley, A., "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites
              for TLS", draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-00 (work in

   [DH]       "Diffie-Hellman key exchange", Wikipedia

   [LCAF]     Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Snijders, "LISP Canonical
              Address Format", draft-ietf-lisp-lcaf-04.txt (work in

              Fuller, V., Lewis, D., Ermaagan, V., and A. Jain, "LISP
              Delegated Database Tree", draft-fuller-lisp-ddt-03 (work
              in progress).

              Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos, A., and D. Saucez,
              "LISP-Secuirty (LISP-SEC)", draft-ietf-lisp-sec-06 (work
              in progress).

              "National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
              Functions NIST SP800-108"", NIST SP 800-108, October 2009.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   The author would like to thank Dan Harkins, Joel Halpern, Fabio
   Maino, Ed Lopez, Roger Jorgensen, Watson Ladd, and Ilari Liusvaara
   for their interest, suggestions, and discussions about LISP data-
   plane security.

   In addition, the support and suggestions from the SAAG working group
   were helpful and appreciative.

Appendix B.  Document Change Log

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B.1.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-01.txt

   o  Posted May 2015.

   o  Create cipher suites and encode them in the Security LCAF.

   o  Add IV to beginning of packet header and ICV to end of packet.

   o  AEAD procedures are now part of encrpytion process.

B.2.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-00.txt

   o  Posted January 2015.

   o  Changing draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01 to draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-
      00.  This draft has become a working group document

   o  Add text to indicate the working group may work on a new data
      encapsulation header format for data-plane encryption.

B.3.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-01.txt

   o  Posted July 2014.

   o  Add Group-ID to the encoding format of Key Material in a Security
      Type LCAF and modify the IANA Considerations so this draft can use
      key exchange parameters from the IANA registry.

   o  Indicate that the R-bit in the Security Type LCAF is not used by

   o  Add text to indicate that ETRs/RTRs can negotiate less number of
      keys from which the ITR/PITR sent in a Map-Request.

   o  Add text explaining how LISP-SEC solves the problem when a man-in-
      the-middle becomes part of the Map-Request/Map-Reply key exchange

   o  Add text indicating that when RLOC-probing is used for RLOC
      reachability purposes and rekeying is not desired, that the same
      key exchange parameters should be used so a reallocation of a
      pubic key does not happen at the ETR.

   o  Add text to indicate that ECDH can be used to reduce CPU
      requirements for computing shared secret-keys.

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B.4.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-crypto-00.txt

   o  Initial draft posted February 2014.

Authors' Addresses

   Dino Farinacci
   San Jose, California  95120

   Phone: 408-718-2001

   Brian Weis
   cisco Systems
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, California  95124-1706

   Phone: 408-526-4796

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