NTP Working Group D. Franke
Internet-Draft Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track D. Sibold
Expires: May 3, 2018 K. Teichel
PTB
October 30, 2017
Network Time Security for the Network Time Protocol
draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-10
Abstract
This memo specifies Network Time Security (NTS), a mechanism for
using Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Authenticated Encryption
with Associated Data (AEAD) to provide cryptographic security for the
Network Time Protocol.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Protocol overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. TLS profile for Network Time Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. The NTS Key Establishment protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. NTS-KE record types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. End of Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.2. NTS Next Protocol Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.3. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.4. Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.5. AEAD Algorithm Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.6. New Cookie for NTPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Key Extraction (generally) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. NTS Extension Fields for NTPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Key Extraction (for NTPv4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Packet structure overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. The Unique Identifier extension field . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. The NTS Cookie extension field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.5. The NTS Cookie Placeholder extension field . . . . . . . 11
5.6. The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields
extension field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.7. Protocol details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Suggested format for NTS cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.1. Avoiding DDoS amplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.2. Initial verification of server certificates . . . . . . . 21
8.3. Usage of NTP pools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.4. Delay attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.5. Random number generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.2. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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1. Introduction
This memo specifies Network Time Security (NTS), a cryptographic
security mechanism for network time synchronization. A complete
specification is provided for application of NTS to the client-server
mode of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [RFC5905].
1.1. Objectives
The objectives of NTS are as follows:
o Identity: Through the use of the X.509 PKI, implementations may
cryptographically establish the identity of the parties they are
communicating with
o Authentication: Implementations may cryptographically verify that
any time synchronization packets are authentic, i.e., that they
were produced by an identified party and have not been modified in
transit.
o Confidentiality: Although basic time synchronization data is
considered non-confidential and sent in the clear, NTS includes
support for encrypting NTP extension fields.
o Replay prevention: Client implementations may detect when a
received time synchronization packet is a replay of a previous
packet.
o Request-response consistency: Client implementations may verify
that a time synchronization packet received from a server was sent
in response to a particular request from the client.
o Unlinkability: For mobile clients, NTS will not leak any
information which would permit a passive adversary to determine
that two packets sent over different networks came from the same
client.
o Non-amplification: implementations (especially server
implementations) may avoid acting as DDoS amplifiers by never
responding to a request with a packet larger than the request
packet.
o Scalability: Server implementations may serve large numbers of
clients without having to retain any client-specific state.
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1.2. Protocol overview
The Network Time Protocol includes many different operating modes to
support various network topologies. In addition to its best-known
and most-widely-used client-server mode, it also includes modes for
synchronization between symmetric peers, a control mode for server
monitoring and administration and a broadcast mode. These various
modes have differing and partly contradictory requirements for
security and performance. Symmetric and control modes demand mutual
authentication and mutual replay protection, and for certain message
types control mode may require confidentiality as well as
authentication. Client-server mode places more stringent
requirements on resource utilization than other modes, because
servers may have vast number of clients and be unable to afford to
maintain per-client state. However, client-server mode also has more
relaxed security needs, because only the client requires replay
protection: it is harmless for servers to process replayed packets.
The security demands of symmetric and control modes, on the other
hand, are in conflict with the resource-utilization demands of
client-server mode: any scheme which provides replay protection
inherently involves maintaining some state to keep track of what
messages have already been seen.
This memo specifies NTS exclusively for the client-server mode of
NTP. To this end, NTS is structured as a suite of two protocols:
The "NTS Extension Fields for NTPv4" are a collection of NTP
extension fields for cryptographically securing NTPv4 using
previously-established key material. They are suitable for
securing client/server mode because the server can implement them
without retaining per-client state, but on the other hand are
suitable *only* for client/server mode because only the client,
and not the server, is protected from replay.
The "NTS Key Establishment" protocol (NTS-KE) is mechanism for
establishing key material for use with the NTS Extension Fields
for NTPv4. It uses TLS to exchange keys and negotiate some
additional protocol options, but then quickly closes the TLS
channel and permits the server to discard all associated state.
The typical protocol flow is as follows. The client connects to the
server on the NTS TCP port and the two parties perform a TLS
handshake. Via the TLS channel, the parties negotiate some
additional protocol parameters and the server sends the client a
supply of cookies. The parties use TLS key export [RFC5705] to
extract key material which will be used in the next phase of the
protocol. This negotiation takes only a single round trip, after
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which the server closes the connection and discards all associated
state. At this point the NTS-KE phase of the protocol is complete.
Time synchronization proceeds over the NTP UDP port. The client
sends the server an NTP client packet which includes several
extension fields. Included among these fields are a cookie
(previously provided by the server), and an authentication tag,
computed using key material extracted from the NTS-KE handshake. The
server uses the cookie to recover this key material (previously
discarded to avoid maintaining state) and send back an authenticated
response. The response includes a fresh, encrypted cookie which the
client then sends back in the clear with its next request. (This
constant refreshing of cookies is necessary in order to achieve NTS's
unlinkability goal.)
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. TLS profile for Network Time Security
Network Time Security makes use of TLS for NTS key establishment.
Since securing time protocols is (as of 2017) a novel application of
TLS, no backward-compatibility concerns exist to justify using
obsolete, insecure, or otherwise broken TLS features or versions. We
therefore put forward the following requirements and guidelines,
roughly representing 2017's best practices.
Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS versions earlier than 1.2.
Implementations willing to negotiate more than one possible version
of TLS SHOULD NOT respond to handshake failures by retrying with a
downgraded protocol version. If they do, they MUST implement
[RFC7507].
TLS clients MUST NOT offer, and TLS servers MUST NOT select, RC4
cipher suites. [RFC7465]
TLS clients SHOULD offer, and TLS servers SHOULD accept, the TLS
Renegotiation Indication Extension [RFC5746]. Regardless, they MUST
NOT initiate or permit insecure renegotiation. (*)
TLS clients SHOULD offer, and TLS servers SHOULD accept, the TLS
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension [RFC7627]. (*)
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Use of the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension [RFC7301]
is integral to NTS and support for it is REQUIRED for
interoperability.
(*): Note that TLS 1.3 or beyond may render the indicated
recommendations inapplicable.
4. The NTS Key Establishment protocol
The NTS key establishment protocol is conducted via TCP port
[[TBD1]]. The two endpoints carry out a TLS handshake in conformance
with Section 3, with the client offering (via an ALPN [RFC7301]
extension), and the server accepting, an application-layer protocol
of "ntske/1". Immediately following a successful handshake, the
client SHALL send a single request (as Application Data encapsulated
in the TLS-protected channel), then the server SHALL send a single
response followed by a TLS "Close notify" alert and then discard the
channel state.
The client's request and the server's response each SHALL consist of
a sequence of records formatted according to Figure 1. The sequence
SHALL be terminated by a "End of Message" record, which has a Record
Type of zero and a zero-length body. Furthermore, requests and non-
error responses each SHALL include exactly one NTS Next Protocol
Negotiation record.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|C| Record Type | Body Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. Record Body .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1
The requirement that all NTS-KE messages be terminated by an End of
Message record makes them self-delimiting.
The fields of an NTS-KE record are defined as follows:
C (Critical Bit): Determines the disposition of unrecognized
Record Types. Implementations which receive a record with an
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unrecognized Record Type MUST ignore the record if the Critical
Bit is 0, and MUST treat it as an error if the Critical Bit is 1.
Record Type: A 15-bit integer in network byte order. The
semantics of record types 0-5 are specified in this memo;
additional type numbers SHALL be tracked through the IANA Network
Time Security Key Establishment Record Types registry.
Body Length: the length of the Record Body field, in octets, as a
16-bit integer in network byte order. Record bodies MAY have any
representable length and need not be aligned to a word boundary.
Record Body: the syntax and semantics of this field SHALL be
determined by the Record Type.
For clarity regarding bit-endianness: the Critical Bit is the most-
significant bit of the first octet. In C, given a network buffer
`unsigned char b[]` containing an NTS-KE record, the critical bit is
`b[0] >> 7` while the record type is `((b[0] & 0x7f) << 8) + b[1]`.
4.1. NTS-KE record types
The following NTS-KE Record Types are defined.
4.1.1. End of Message
The End of Message record has a Record Type number of 0 and an zero-
length body. It MUST occur exactly once as the final record of every
NTS-KE request and response. The Critical Bit MUST be set.
4.1.2. NTS Next Protocol Negotiation
The NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record has a record type of 1. It
MUST occur exactly once in every NTS-KE request and response. Its
body consists of a sequence of 16-bit unsigned integers in network
byte order. Each integer represents a Protocol ID from the IANA
Network Time Security Next Protocols registry. The Critical Bit MUST
be set.
The Protocol IDs listed in the client's NTS Next Protocol Negotiation
record denote those protocols which the client wishes to speak using
the key material established through this NTS-KE session. The
Protocol IDs listed in the server's response MUST comprise a subset
of those listed in the request, and denote those protocols which the
server is willing and able to speak using the key material
established through this NTS-KE session. The client MAY proceed with
one or more of them. The request MUST list at least one protocol,
but the response MAY be empty.
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4.1.3. Error
The Error record has a Record Type number of 2. Its body is exactly
two octets long, consisting of an unsigned 16-bit integer in network
byte order, denoting an error code. The Critical Bit MUST be set.
Clients MUST NOT include Error records in their request. If clients
receive a server response which includes an Error record, they MUST
discard any negotiated key material and MUST NOT proceed to the Next
Protocol.
The following error code are defined.
Error code 0 means "Unrecognized Critical Record". The server
MUST respond with this error code if the request included a record
which the server did not understand and which had its Critical Bit
set. The client SHOULD NOT retry its request without
modification.
Error code 1 means "Bad Request". The server MUST respond with
this error if, upon the expiration of an implementation-defined
timeout, it has not yet received a complete and syntactically
well-formed request from the client. This error is likely to be
the result of a dropped packet, so the client SHOULD start over
with a new TLS handshake and retry its request.
4.1.4. Warning
The Warning record has a Record Type number of 3. Its body is
exactly two octets long, consisting of an unsigned 16-bit integer in
network byte order, denoting a warning code. The Critical Bit MUST
be set.
Clients MUST NOT include Warning records in their request. If
clients receive a server response which includes an Warning record,
they MAY discard any negotiated key material and abort without
proceeding to the Next Protocol. Unrecognized warning codes MUST be
treated as errors.
This memo defines no warning codes.
4.1.5. AEAD Algorithm Negotiation
The AEAD Algorithm Negotiation record has a Record Type number of 4.
Its body consists of a sequence of unsigned 16-bit integers in
network byte order, denoting Numeric Identifiers from the IANA AEAD
registry [RFC5116]. The Critical Bit MAY be set.
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If the NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record offers Protocol ID 0 (for
NTPv4), then this record MUST be included exactly once. Other
protocols MAY require it as well.
When included in a request, this record denotes which AEAD algorithms
the client is willing to use to secure the Next Protocol, in
decreasing preference order. When included in a response, this
record denotes which algorithm the server chooses to use, or is empty
if the server supports none of the algorithms offered. In requests,
the list MUST include at least one algorithm. In responses, it MUST
include at most one. Honoring the client's preference order is
OPTIONAL: servers may select among any of the client's offered
choices, even if they are able to support some other algorithm which
the client prefers more.
Server implementations of NTS extension fields for NTPv4 (Section 5)
MUST support AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256 [RFC5297] (Numeric Identifier 15).
That is, if the client includes AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256 in its AEAD
Algorithm Negotiation record, and the server accepts Protocol ID 0
(NTPv4); in its NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record, then the
server's AEAD Algorithm Negotiation record MUST NOT be empty.
4.1.6. New Cookie for NTPv4
The New Cookie for NTPv4 record has a Record Type number of 5. The
contents of its body SHALL be implementation-defined and clients MUST
NOT attempt to interpret them. See Section 6 for a suggested
construction.
Clients MUST NOT send records of this type. Servers MUST send at
least one record of this type, and SHOULD send eight of them, if they
accept Protocol ID 0 (NTPv4) as a Next Protocol. The Critical Bit
SHOULD NOT be set.
4.2. Key Extraction (generally)
Following a successful run of the NTS-KE protocol, key material SHALL
be extracted according to RFC 5705 [RFC5705]. Inputs to the exporter
function are to be constructed in a manner specific to the negotiated
Next Protocol. However, all protocols which utilize NTS-KE MUST
conform to the following two rules:
The disambiguating label string MUST be "EXPORTER-network-time-
security/1".
The per-association context value MUST be provided, and MUST begin
with the two-octet Protocol ID which was negotiated as a Next
Protocol.
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5. NTS Extension Fields for NTPv4
5.1. Key Extraction (for NTPv4)
Following a successful run of the NTS-KE protocol wherein Protocol ID
0 (NTPv4) is selected as a Next Protocol, two AEAD keys SHALL be
extracted: a client-to-server (C2S) key and a server-to-client (S2C)
key. These keys SHALL be computed according to RFC 5705 [RFC5705],
using the following inputs.
The disambiguating label string SHALL be "EXPORTER-network-time-
security/1".
The per-association context value SHALL consist of the following
five octets:
The first two octets SHALL be zero (the Protocol ID for NTPv4).
The next two octets SHALL be the Numeric Identifier of the
negotiated AEAD Algorithm, in network byte order.
The final octet SHALL be 0x00 for the C2S key and 0x01 for the
S2C key.
Implementations wishing to derive additional keys for private or
experimental use MUST NOT do so by extending the above-specified
syntax for per-association context values. Instead, they SHOULD use
their own disambiguating label string. Note that RFC 5705 provides
that disambiguating label strings beginning with "EXPERIMENTAL" MAY
be used without IANA registration.
5.2. Packet structure overview
In general, an NTS-protected NTPv4 packet consists of:
The usual 48-octet NTP header, which is authenticated but not
encrypted.
Some extension fields which are authenticated but not encrypted.
An extension field which contains AEAD output (i.e., an
authentication tag and possible ciphertext). The corresponding
plaintext, if non-empty, consists of some extension fields which
benefit from both encryption and authentication.
Possibly, some additional extension fields which are neither
encrypted nor authenticated. These are discarded by the receiver.
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Always included among the authenticated or authenticated-and-
encrypted extension fields are a cookie extension field and a unique-
identifier extension field. The purpose of the cookie extension
field is to enable the server to offload storage of session state
onto the client. The purpose of the unique-identifier extension
field is to protect the client from replay attacks.
5.3. The Unique Identifier extension field
The Unique Identifier extension field has a Field Type of [[TBD2]].
When the extension field is included in a client packet (mode 3), its
body SHALL consist of a string of octets generated uniformly at
random. The string SHOULD be 32 octets long. When the extension
field is included in a server packet (mode 4), its body SHALL contain
the same octet string as was provided in the client packet to which
the server is responding. Its use in modes other than client/server
is not defined.
The Unique Identifier extension field provides the client with a
cryptographically strong means of detecting replayed packets. It MAY
also be used standalone, without NTS, in which case it provides the
client with a means of detecting spoofed packets from off-path
attackers. Historically, NTP's origin timestamp field has played
both these roles, but for cryptographic purposes this is suboptimal
because it is only 64 bits long and, depending on implementation
details, most of those bits may be predictable. In contrast, the
Unique Identifier extension field enables a degree of
unpredictability and collision-resistance more consistent with
cryptographic best practice.
5.4. The NTS Cookie extension field
The NTS Cookie extension field has a Field Type of [[TBD3]]. Its
purpose is to carry information which enables the server to recompute
keys and other session state without having to store any per-client
state. The contents of its body SHALL be implementation-defined and
clients MUST NOT attempt to interpret them. See Section 6 for a
suggested construction. The NTS Cookie extension field MUST NOT be
included in NTP packets whose mode is other than 3 (client) or 4
(server).
5.5. The NTS Cookie Placeholder extension field
The NTS Cookie Placeholder extension field has a Field Type of
[[TBD4]]. When this extension field is included in a client packet
(mode 3), it communicates to the server that the client wishes it to
send additional cookies in its response. This extension field MUST
NOT be included in NTP packets whose mode is other than 3.
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Whenever an NTS Cookie Placeholder extension field is present, it
MUST be accompanied by an NTS Cookie extension field, and the body
length of the NTS Cookie Placeholder extension field MUST be the same
as the body length of the NTS Cookie extension field. (This length
requirement serves to ensure that the response will not be larger
than the request, in order to improve timekeeping precision and
prevent DDoS amplification). The contents of the NTS Cookie
Placeholder extension field's body are undefined and, aside from
checking its length, MUST be ignored by the server.
5.6. The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields extension
field
The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields extension field
is the central cryptographic element of an NTS-protected NTP packet.
Its Field Type is [[TBD5]] and the format of its body SHALL be as
follows:
Nonce length: two octets in network byte order, giving the length
of the Nonce field and interpreted as an unsigned integer.
Nonce: a nonce as required by the negotiated AEAD Algorithm.
Ciphertext: the output of the negotiated AEAD Algorithm. The
structure of this field is determined by the negotiated algorithm,
but it typically contains an authentication tag in addition to the
actual ciphertext.
Padding: between 1 and 24 octets of padding, with every octet set
to the number of padding octets included, e.g., "01", "02 02", or
"03 03 03". The number of padding bytes SHOULD be chosen in order
to comply with the RFC 7822 [RFC7822] requirement that (in the
absence of a legacy MAC) extension fields have a total length in
octets (including the four octets for the type and length fields)
which is at least 28 and divisible by 4. At least one octet of
padding MUST be included, so that implementations can
unambiguously delimit the end of the ciphertext from the start of
the padding by examining the last octet to determine the padding
length.
The Ciphertext field SHALL be formed by providing the following
inputs to the negotiated AEAD Algorithm:
K: For packets sent from the client to the server, the C2S key
SHALL be used. For packets sent from the server to the client,
the S2C key SHALL be used.
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A: The associated data SHALL consist of the portion of the NTP
packet beginning from the start of the NTP header and ending at
the end of the last extension field which precedes the NTS
Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields extension field.
P: The plaintext SHALL consist of all (if any) NTP extension
fields to be encrypted. The format of any such fields SHALL be in
accordance with RFC 7822 [RFC7822], and if multiple extension
fields are present they SHALL be joined by concatenation.
N: The nonce SHALL be formed however required by the negotiated
AEAD Algorithm.
The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields extension field
MUST NOT be included in NTP packets whose mode is other than 3
(client) or 4 (server).
5.7. Protocol details
A client sending an NTS-protected request SHALL include the following
extension fields:
Exactly one Unique Identifier extension field, which MUST be
authenticated, MUST NOT be encrypted, and whose contents MUST NOT
duplicate those of any previous request.
Exactly one NTS Cookie extension field, which MUST be
authenticated and MUST NOT be encrypted. The cookie MUST be one
which the server previously provided the client; it may have been
provided during the NTS-KE handshake or in response to a previous
NTS-protected NTP request. To protect client's privacy, the same
cookie SHOULD NOT be included in multiple requests. If the client
does not have any cookies that it has not already sent, it SHOULD
re-run the NTS-KE protocol before continuing.
Exactly one NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields
extension field, generated using an AEAD Algorithm and C2S key
established through NTS-KE.
The client MAY include one or more NTS Cookie Placeholder extension
field, which MUST be authenticated and MAY be encrypted. The number
of NTS Cookie Placeholder extension fields that the client includes
SHOULD be such that if the client includes N placeholders and the
server sends back N+1 cookies, the number of unused cookies stored by
the client will come to eight. When both the client and server
adhere to all cookie-management guidance provided in this memo, the
number of placeholder extension fields will equal the number of
dropped packets since the last successful volley.
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The client MAY include additional (non-NTS-related) extension fields,
which MAY appear prior to the NTS Authenticator and Encrypted
Extension Fields extension fields (therefore authenticated but not
encrypted), within it (therefore encrypted and authenticated), or
after it (therefore neither encrypted nor authenticated). In
general, however, the server MUST discard any unauthenticated
extension fields and process the packet as though they were not
present. Servers MAY implement exceptions to this requirement for
particular extension fields if their specification explicitly
provides for such.
Upon receiving an NTS-protected request, the server SHALL (through
some implementation-defined mechanism) use the cookie to recover the
AEAD Algorithm, C2S key, and S2C key associated with the request, and
then use the C2S key to authenticate the packet and decrypt the
ciphertext. If the cookie is valid and authentication and decryption
succeed, then the server SHALL include the following extension fields
in its response:
Exactly one Unique Identifier extension field, which MUST be
authenticated, MUST NOT be encrypted, and whose contents SHALL
echo those provided by the client.
Exactly one NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields
extension field, generated using the AEAD algorithm and S2C key
recovered from the cookie provided by the client.
One or more NTS Cookie extension fields, which MUST be
authenticated and encrypted. The number of NTS Cookie extension
fields included SHOULD be equal to, and MUST NOT exceed, one plus
the number of valid NTS Cookie Placeholder extension fields
included in the request.
The server MAY include additional (non-NTS-related) extension fields,
which MAY appear prior to the NTS Authenticator and Encrypted
Extension Fields extension field (therefore authenticated but not
encrypted), within it (therefore encrypted and authenticated), or
after it (therefore neither encrypted nor authenticated). In
general, however, the client MUST discard any unauthenticated
extension fields and process the packet as though they were not
present. Clients MAY implement exceptions to this requirement for
particular extension fields if their specification explicitly
provides for such.
If the server is unable to validate the cookie or authenticate the
request, it SHOULD respond with a Kiss-o'-Death packet (see RFC 5905,
Section 7.4) [RFC5905]) with kiss code "NTSN" (meaning "NTS NAK").
Such a response MUST include exactly one Unique Identifier extension
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field whose contents SHALL echo those provided by the client. It
MUST NOT include any NTS Cookie or NTS Authenticator and Encrypted
Extension Fields extension fields.
Upon receiving an NTS-protected response, the client MUST verify that
the Unique Identifier matches that of an outstanding request, and
that the packet is authentic under the S2C key associated with that
request. If either of these checks fails, the packet MUST be
discarded without further processing.
Upon receiving an NTS NAK, the client MUST verify that the Unique
Identifier matches that of an outstanding request. If this check
fails, the packet MUST be discarded without further processing. If
this check passes, the client SHOULD wait until the next poll for a
valid NTS-protected response and if none is received, discard all
cookies and AEAD keys associated with the server which sent the NAK
and initiate a fresh NTS-KE handshake.
6. Suggested format for NTS cookies
This section is non-normative. It gives a suggested way for servers
to construct NTS cookies. All normative requirements are stated in
Section 4.1.6 and Section 5.4.
The role of cookies in NTS is closely analogous to that of session
cookies in TLS. Accordingly, the thematic resemblance of this
section to RFC 5077 [RFC5077] is deliberate, and the reader should
likewise take heed of its security considerations.
Servers SHOULD select an AEAD algorithm which they will use to
encrypt and authenticate cookies. The chosen algorithm SHOULD be one
such as AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256 [RFC5297] which resists accidental
nonce reuse, and it need not be the same as the one that was
negotiated with the client. Servers SHOULD randomly generate and
store a master AEAD key `K`. Servers SHOULD additionally choose a
non-secret, unique value `I` as key-identifier for `K`.
Servers SHOULD periodically (e.g., once daily) generate a new pair
(I,K) and immediately switch to using these values for all newly-
generated cookies. Immediately following each such key rotation,
servers SHOULD securely erase any keys generated two or more rotation
periods prior. Servers SHOULD continue to accept any cookie
generated using keys that they have not yet erased, even if those
keys are no longer current. Erasing old keys provides for forward
secrecy, limiting the scope of what old information can be stolen if
a master key is somehow compromised. Holding on to a limited number
of old keys allows clients to seamlessly transition from one
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generation to the next without having to perform a new NTS-KE
handshake.
The need to keep keys synchronized across load-balanced clusters can
make automatic key rotation challenging. However, the task can be
accomplished without the need for central key-management
infrastructure by using a ratchet, i.e., making each new key a
deterministic, cryptographically pseudo-random function of its
predecessor. A recommended concrete implementation of this approach
is to use HKDF [RFC5869] to derive new keys, using the key's
predecessor as Input Keying Material and its key identifier as a
salt.
To form a cookie, servers SHOULD first form a plaintext `P`
consisting of the following fields:
The AEAD algorithm negotiated during NTS-KE
The S2C key
The C2S key
Servers SHOULD then generate a nonce `N` uniformly at random, and
form AEAD output `C` by encrypting `P` under key `K` with nonce `N`
and no associated data.
The cookie SHOULD consist of the tuple `(I,N,C)`.
To verify and decrypt a cookie provided by the client, first parse it
into its components `I`, `N`, and `C`. Use `I` to look up its
decryption key `K`. If the key whose identifier is `I` has been
erased or never existed, decryption fails; reply with an NTS NAK.
Otherwise, attempt to decrypt and verify ciphertext `C` using key `K`
and nonce `N` with no associated data. If decryption or verification
fails, reply with an NTS NAK. Otherwise, parse out the contents of
the resulting plaintext `P` to obtain the negotiated AEAD algorithm,
S2C key, and C2S key.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to allocate two entries, identical except for the
Transport Protocol, in the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port
Number Registry as follows:
Service Name: nts
Transport Protocol: tcp, udp
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Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: Network Time Security
Reference: [[this memo]]
Port Number: [[TBD1]], selected by IANA from the user port range
IANA is requested to allocate the following entry in the Application-
Layer Protocol Negotation (ALPN) Protocol IDs registry:
Protocol: Network Time Security Key Establishment, version 1
Identification Sequence:
0x6E 0x74 0x73 0x6B 0x65 0x2F 0x31 ("ntske/1")
Reference: [[this memo]]
IANA is requested to allocate the following entry in the TLS Exporter
Label Registry:
+----------------------------------+---------+---------------+------+
| Value | DTLS-OK | Reference | Note |
+----------------------------------+---------+---------------+------+
| EXPORTER-network-time-security/1 | Y | [[this memo]] | |
+----------------------------------+---------+---------------+------+
IANA is requested to allocate the following entry in the registry of
NTP Kiss-o'-Death codes:
+------+---------+
| Code | Meaning |
+------+---------+
| NTSN | NTS NAK |
+------+---------+
IANA is requested to allocate the following entries in the NTP
Extensions Field Types registry:
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+-----------+-----------------------------------------+-------------+
| Field | Meaning | Reference |
| Type | | |
+-----------+-----------------------------------------+-------------+
| [[TBD2]] | Unique Identifier | [[this |
| | | memo]] |
| [[TBD3]] | NTS Cookie | [[this |
| | | memo]] |
| [[TBD4]] | NTS Cookie Placeholder | [[this |
| | | memo]] |
| [[TBD5]] | NTS Authenticator and Encrypted | [[this |
| | Extension Fields | memo]] |
+-----------+-----------------------------------------+-------------+
IANA is requested to create a new registry entitled "Network Time
Security Key Establishment Record Types". Entries SHALL have the
following fields:
Type Number (REQUIRED): An integer in the range 0-32767 inclusive
Description (REQUIRED): short text description of the purpose of
the field
Set Critical Bit (REQUIRED): One of "MUST", "SHOULD", "MAY",
"SHOULD NOT", or "MUST NOT"
Reference (REQUIRED): A reference to a document specifying the
semantics of the record.
The policy for allocation of new entries in this registry SHALL vary
by the Type Number, as follows:
0-1023: IETF Review
1024-16383: Specification Required
16384-32767: Private and Experimental Use
Applications for new entries SHALL specify the contents of the
Description, Set Critical Bit and Reference fields and which of the
above ranges the Type Number should be allocated from. Applicants
MAY request a specific Type Number, and such requests MAY be granted
at the registrar's discretion.
The initial contents of this registry SHALL be as follows:
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+-------------+-----------------------------+----------+------------+
| Field | Description | Critical | Reference |
| Number | | | |
+-------------+-----------------------------+----------+------------+
| 0 | End of message | MUST | [[this |
| | | | memo]] |
| 1 | NTS next protocol | MUST | [[this |
| | negotiation | | memo]] |
| 2 | Error | MUST | [[this |
| | | | memo]] |
| 3 | Warning | MUST | [[this |
| | | | memo]] |
| 4 | AEAD algorithm negotiation | MAY | [[this |
| | | | memo]] |
| 5 | New cookie for NTPv4 | SHOULD | [[this |
| | | NOT | memo]] |
| 16384-32767 | Reserved for Private & | MAY | [[this |
| | Experimental Use | | memo]] |
+-------------+-----------------------------+----------+------------+
IANA is requested to create a new registry entitled "Network Time
Security Next Protocols". Entries SHALL have the following fields:
Protocol ID (REQUIRED): a integer in the range 0-65535 inclusive,
functioning as an identifier.
Protocol Name (REQUIRED): a short text string naming the protocol
being identified.
Reference (RECOMMENDED): a reference to a relevant specification
document. If no relevant document exists, a point-of-contact for
questions regarding the entry SHOULD be listed here in lieu.
Applications for new entries in this registry SHALL specify all
desired fields, and SHALL be granted upon approval by a Designated
Expert. Protocol IDs 32768-65535 SHALL be reserved for Private or
Experimental Use, and SHALL NOT be registered.
The initial contents of this registry SHALL be as follows:
+-------------+-------------------------------+---------------------+
| Protocol ID | Human-Readable Name | Reference |
+-------------+-------------------------------+---------------------+
| 0 | Network Time Protocol version | [[this memo]] |
| | 4 (NTPv4) | |
| 32768-65535 | Reserved for Private or | Reserved by [[this |
| | Experimental Use | memo]] |
+-------------+-------------------------------+---------------------+
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IANA is requested to create two new registries entitled "Network Time
Security Error Codes" and "Network Time Security Warning Codes".
Entries in each SHALL have the following fields:
Number (REQUIRED): a integer in the range 0-65535 inclusive
Description (REQUIRED): a short text description of the condition.
Reference (REQUIRED): a reference to a relevant specification
document.
The policy for allocation of new entries in these registries SHALL
vary by their Number, as follows:
0-1023: IETF Review
1024-32767: Specification Required
32768-65535: Private and Experimental Use
The initial contents of the Network Time Security Error Codes
Registry SHALL be as follows:
+--------+---------------------------------+---------------+
| Number | Description | Reference |
+--------+---------------------------------+---------------+
| 0 | Unrecognized Critical Extension | [[this memo]] |
| 1 | Bad Request | [[this memo]] |
+--------+---------------------------------+---------------+
The Network Time Security Warning Codes Registry SHALL initially be
empty.
8. Security considerations
8.1. Avoiding DDoS amplification
Certain non-standard and/or deprecated features of the Network Time
Protocol enable clients to send a request to a server which causes
the server to send a response much larger than the request. Servers
which enable these features can be abused in order to amplify traffic
volume in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks by sending
them a request with a spoofed source IP. In recent years, attacks of
this nature have become an endemic nuisance.
NTS is designed to avoid contributing any further to this problem by
ensuring that NTS-related extension fields included in server
responses will be the same size as the NTS-related extension fields
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sent by the client. In particular, this is why the client is
required to send a separate and appropriately padded-out NTS Cookie
Placeholder extension field for every cookie it wants to get back,
rather than being permitted simply to specify a desired quantity.
8.2. Initial verification of server certificates
NTS's security goals are undermined if the client fails to verify
that the X.509 certificate chain presented by the server is valid and
rooted in a trusted certificate authority. [RFC5280] and [RFC6125]
specifies how such verification is to be performed in general.
However, the expectation that the client does not yet have a
correctly-set system clock at the time of certificate verification
presents difficulties with verifying that the certificate is within
its validity period, i.e., that the current time lies between the
times specified in the certificate's notBefore and notAfter fields,
and it may be operationally necessary in some cases for a client to
accept a certificate which appears to be expired or not yet valid.
While there is no perfect solution to this problem, there are several
mitigations the client can implement to make it more difficult for an
adversary to successfully present an expired certificate:
Check whether the system time is in fact unreliable. If the
system clock has previously been synchronized since last boot,
then on operating systems which implement a kernel-based phase-
locked-loop API, a call to ntp_gettime() should show a maximum
error less than NTP_PHASE_MAX. In this case, the clock SHOULD be
considered reliable and certificates can be strictly validated.
Allow the system administrator to specify that certificates should
*always* be strictly validated. Such a configuration is
appropriate on systems which have a battery-backed clock and which
can reasonably prompt the user to manually set an approximately-
correct time if it appears to be needed.
Once the clock has been synchronized, periodically write the
current system time to persistent storage. Do not accept any
certificate whose notAfter field is earlier than the last recorded
time.
Do not process time packets from servers if the time computed from
them falls outside the validity period of the server's
certificate.
Use multiple time sources. The ability to pass off an expired
certificate is only useful to an adversary who has compromised the
corresponding private key. If the adversary has compromised only
a minority of servers, NTP's selection algorithm ([RFC5905]
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section 11.2.1) will protect the client from accepting bad time
from the adversary-controlled servers.
8.3. Usage of NTP pools
Additional standardization work and infrastructure development is
necessary before NTS can be used with public NTP server pools.
First, a scheme will need to be specified for determining what
constitutes an acceptable certificate for a pool server, such as
establishing a value required to be contained in its Extended Key
Usage attribute, and how to determine, given the DNS name of a pool,
what Subject Alternative Name to expect in the certificates of its
members. Implementing any such specification will necessitate
infrastructure work: pool organizers will need to act as certificate
authorities, regularly monitor the behavior of servers to which
certificates have been issued, and promptly revoke the certificate of
any server found to be serving incorrect time.
8.4. Delay attacks
In a packet delay attack, an adversary with the ability to act as a
man-in-the-middle delays time synchronization packets between client
and server asymmetrically [RFC7384]. Since NTP's formula for
computing time offset relies on the assumption that network latency
is roughly symmetrical, this leads to the client to compute an
inaccurate value [Mizrahi]. The delay attack does not reorder or
modify the content of the exchanged synchronization packets.
Therefore, cryptographic means do not provide a feasible way to
mitigate this attack. However, the maximum error that an adversary
can introduce is bounded by half of the round trip delay.
[RFC5905] specifies a parameter called MAXDIST which denotes the
maximum round-trip latency (including not only the immediate round
trip between client and server but the whole distance back to the
reference clock as reported in the Root Delay field) that a client
will tolerate before concluding that the server is unsuitable for
synchronization. The standard value for MAXDIST is one second,
although some implementations use larger values. Whatever value a
client chooses, the maximum error which can be introduced by a delay
attack is MAXDIST/2.
Usage of multiple time sources, or multiple network paths to a given
time source [Shpiner], may also serve to mitigate delay attacks if
the adversary is in control of only some of the paths.
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8.5. Random number generation
At various points in NTS, the generation of cryptographically secure
random numbers is required. See [RFC4086] for guidelines concerning
this topic.
9. Privacy Considerations
9.1. Unlinkability
Unlinkability prevents a device from being tracked when it changes
network addresses (e.g. because said device moved between different
networks). In other words, unlinkability thwarts an attacker that
seeks to link a new network address used by a device with a network
address that it was formerly using, because of recognizable data that
the device persistently sends as part of an NTS-secured NTP
association. This is the justification for continually supplying the
client with fresh cookies, so that a cookie never represents
recognizable data in the sense outlined above.
NTS's unlinkability objective is merely to not leak any additional
data that could be used to link a device's network address. NTS does
not rectify legacy linkability issues that are already present in
NTP. Thus, a client that requires unlinkability MUST also minimize
information transmitted in a client query (mode 3) packet as
described in the draft [I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization].
The unlinkability objective only holds for time synchronization
traffic, as opposed to key exchange traffic. This implies that it
cannot be guaranteed for devices that function not only as time
clients, but also as time servers (because the latter can be
externally triggered to send authentication data).
It should also be noted that it could be possible to link devices
that operate as time servers from their time synchronization traffic,
using information exposed in (mode 4) server response packets (e.g.
reference ID, reference time, stratum, poll). Also, devices that
respond to NTP control queries could be linked using the information
revealed by control queries.
9.2. Confidentiality
NTS does not protect the confidentiality of information in NTP's
header fields. When clients implement
[I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization], client packet headers do not
contain any information which the client could conceivably wish to
keep secret: one field is random, and all others are fixed.
Information in server packet headers is likewise public: the origin
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timestamp is copied from the client's (random) transmit timestamp,
and all other fields are set the same regardless of the identity of
the client making the request.
Future extension fields could hypothetically contain sensitive
information, in which case NTS provides a mechanism for encrypting
them.
10. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Richard Barnes, Steven Bellovin,
Scott Fluhrer, Sharon Goldberg, Russ Housley, Martin Langer, Miroslav
Lichvar, Aanchal Malhotra, Dave Mills, Danny Mayer, Karen O'Donoghue,
Eric K. Rescorla, Stephen Roettger, Kurt Roeckx, Kyle Rose, Rich
Salz, Brian Sniffen, Susan Sons, Douglas Stebila, Harlan Stenn,
Martin Thomson, and Richard Welty for contributions to this document
and comments on the design of NTS.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ntp-data-minimization]
Franke, D. and A. Malhotra, "NTP Client Data
Minimization", draft-ietf-ntp-data-minimization-00 (work
in progress), May 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC5297] Harkins, D., "Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV)
Authenticated Encryption Using the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES)", RFC 5297, DOI 10.17487/RFC5297, October
2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5297>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
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[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
[RFC7507] Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>.
[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
[RFC7822] Mizrahi, T. and D. Mayer, "Network Time Protocol Version 4
(NTPv4) Extension Fields", RFC 7822, DOI 10.17487/RFC7822,
March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7822>.
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11.2. Informative References
[Mizrahi] Mizrahi, T., "A game theoretic analysis of delay attacks
against time synchronization protocols", in Proceedings
of Precision Clock Synchronization for Measurement Control
and Communication, ISPCS 2012, pp. 1-6, September 2012.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC7384] Mizrahi, T., "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in
Packet Switched Networks", RFC 7384, DOI 10.17487/RFC7384,
October 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7384>.
[Shpiner] "Multi-path Time Protocols", in Proceedings of IEEE
International Symposium on Precision Clock Synchronization
for Measurement, Control and Communication (ISPCS),
September 2013.
Appendix A. Terms and Abbreviations
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data [RFC5116]
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
NTP Network Time Protocol [RFC5905]
NTS Network Time Security
TLS Transport Layer Security
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Authors' Addresses
Daniel Fox Franke
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
150 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Email: dafranke@akamai.com
URI: https://www.dfranke.us
Dieter Sibold
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
Bundesallee 100
Braunschweig D-38116
Germany
Phone: +49-(0)531-592-8420
Fax: +49-531-592-698420
Email: dieter.sibold@ptb.de
Kristof Teichel
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
Bundesallee 100
Braunschweig D-38116
Germany
Phone: +49-(0)531-592-4471
Email: kristof.teichel@ptb.de
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