OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura, Ed.
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: May 14, 2015 Ping Identity
N. Agarwal
Google
November 12, 2014
Symmetric Proof of Possession for the OAuth Authorization Code Grant
draft-ietf-oauth-spop-03
Abstract
The OAuth 2.0 public client utilizing Authorization Code Grant (RFC
6749 - 4.1) is susceptible to the code interception attack. This
specification describes a mechanism that acts as a control against
this threat.
Status of this Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 14, 2015.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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1.1. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Client creates a code verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Client creates the code challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Client sends the code challenge with the authorization
request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.4. Server returns the code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.5. Client sends the code and the secret to the token endpoint 6
4.6. Server verifies code_verifier before returning the tokens 6
5. Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. OAuth Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Entropy of the code verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Protection against eavesdroppers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.3. Checking the Server support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.4. OAuth security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Notes on implementing base64url encoding without paddi 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
Public clients in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are susceptible to the
authorization "code" interception attack. A malicious client
intercepts the authorization code returned from the authorization
endpoint and uses it to obtain the access token. This is possible on
a public client as there is no client secret associated for it to be
sent to the token endpoint. This is especially true on Smartphone
applications where the authorization code can be returned through
custom URL Schemes where the same scheme can be registered by
multiple applications. Under this scenario, the mitigation strategy
stated in section 4.4.1 of [RFC6819] does not work as they rely on
per-client instance secret or per client instance redirect URI.
To mitigate this attack, this extension utilizes a dynamically
created cryptographically random key called 'code verifier'. The code
verifier is created for every authorization request and its
transformed value, called 'code challenge', is sent to the
authorization server to obtain the authorization code. The
authorization "code" obtained is then sent to the token endpoint with
the 'code verifier' and the server compares it with the previously
received request code so that it can perform the proof of possession
of the 'code verifier' by the client. This works as the mitigation
since the attacker would not know this one-time key.
1.1. Protocol Flow
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+--------+ +---------------+
| |--(A)-- Authorization Request --->| |
| | + t(code_verifier), t | Resource |
| | | Owner |
| |<-(B)--- Authorization Grant -----| |
| | +---------------+
| Client |
| | +---------------+
| |--(C)--- Access Token Request --->| |
| | + code_verifier | Authorization |
| | | Server |
| |<-(D)------ Access Token ---------| |
+--------+ +---------------+
This specification adds additional parameters to the OAuth 2.0
Authorization and Access Token Requests, shown in abstract form in
Figure 1.
A. The client creates and records a secret named the "code_verifier",
and derives a transformed version "t(code_verifier)" (referred to
as the "code_challenge") which is sent in the OAuth 2.0
Authorization Request, along with the transformation method "t".
B. The resource owner responds as usual, but records
"t(code_verifier)" and the transformation method.
C. The client then sends the code to the Access Token Request as
usual, but includes the "code_verifier" secret generated at (A).
D. The authorization server transforms "code_verifier" and compares
it to "t(code_verifier)" from (B). Access is denied if they are
not equal.
An attacker who intercepts the Authorization Grant at (B) is unable
to redeem it for an Access Token, as they are not in possession of
the "code_verifier" secret.
2. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key
words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119]. If
these words are used without being spelled in uppercase then they are
to be interpreted with their normal natural language meanings.
This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
notation of [RFC5234].
BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per
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Section 3 producing a [US-ASCII] STRING.
BASE64URL-DECODE(STRING) denotes the base64url decoding of STRING,
per Section 3, producing a UTF-8 sequence of octets.
SHA256(STRING) denotes a SHA2 256bit hash [RFC4634] of STRING.
UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation
of STRING.
ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [US-ASCII]
representation of STRING.
The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B.
3. Terminology
In addition to the terms defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], this
specification defines the following terms:
code verifier A cryptographically random string that is used to
correlate the authorization request to the token request.
code challenge A challenge derived from the code verifier that is
sent in the authorization request, to be verified against later.
Base64url Encoding Base64 encoding using the URL- and filename-safe
character set defined in Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648], with all
trailing '=' characters omitted (as permitted by Section 3.2) and
without the inclusion of any line breaks, whitespace, or other
additional characters. (See Appendix Appendix A for notes on
implementing base64url encoding without padding.)
4. Protocol
4.1. Client creates a code verifier
The client first creates a code verifier, "code_verifier", for each
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] Authorization Request, in the following manner:
code_verifier = high entropy cryptographic random [US-ASCII] sequence
using the url and filename safe Alphabet [A-Z] / [a-z] / [0-9] / "-"
/ "_" from Sec 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648], with length less than 128
characters.
ABNF for "code_verifier" is as follows.
code_verifier = 42*128unreserved
unreserved = [A-Z] / [a-z] / [0-9] / "-" / "_"
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NOTE: code verifier SHOULD have enough entropy to make it impractical
to guess the value. It is RECOMMENDED that the output of a suitable
random number generator be used to create a 32-octet sequence. The
Octet sequence is then BASE64URL encoded to produce a 42-octet URL
safe string to use as the code verifier.
4.2. Client creates the code challenge
The client then creates a code challenge, "code_challenge", derived
from the "code_verifier" by using one of the following
transformations on the "code_verifier":
plain "code_challenge" = "code_verifier"
S256 "code_challenge" = BASE64URL(SHA256("code_verifier"))
It is RECOMMENDED to use the S256 transformation when possible.
ABNF for "code_challenge" is as follows.
code_challenge = 42*128unreserved
unreserved = [A-Z] / [a-z] / [0-9] / "-" / "_"
4.3. Client sends the code challenge with the authorization request
The client sends the code challenge as part of the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] Authorization Request (Section 4.1.1.) using the following
additional parameters:
code_challenge REQUIRED. Code challenge.
code_challenge_method OPTIONAL, defaults to "plain". Code verifier
transformation method, "S256" or "plain".
4.4. Server returns the code
When the server issues the "code" in the Authorization Response, it
MUST associate the "code_challenge" and "code_challenge_method"
values with the "code" so it can be verified later.
Typically, the "code_challenge" and "code_challenge_method" values
are stored in encrypted form in the "code" itself, but could
alternatively be stored on the server, associated with the code. The
server MUST NOT include the "code_challenge" value in client requests
in a form that other entities can extract.
The exact method that the server uses to associate the
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"code_challenge" with the issued "code" is out of scope for this
specification.
4.5. Client sends the code and the secret to the token endpoint
Upon receipt of the "code", the client sends the Access Token Request
to the token endpoint. In addition to the parameters defined in
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] Access Token Request (Section 4.1.3.), it sends
the following parameter:
code_verifier REQUIRED. Code verifier
4.6. Server verifies code_verifier before returning the tokens
Upon receipt of the request at the Access Token endpoint, the server
verifies it by calculating the code challenge from received
"code_verifier" and comparing it with the previously associated
"code_challenge", after first transforming it according to the
"code_challenge_method" method specified by the client.
If the "code_challenge_method" from 3.2 was "S256", the received
"code_verifier" is first hashed with SHA-256 then compared to the
base64url decoded "code_challenge". i.e.,
SHA256("code_verifier" ) == BASE64URL-DECODE("code_challenge").
If the "code_challenge_method" from 3.2 was "none", they are compared
directly. i.e.,
"code_challenge" == "code_verifier".
If the values are equal, the Access Token endpoint MUST continue
processing as normal (as defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]). If the
values are not equal, an error response indicating "invalid_grant" as
described in section 5.2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] MUST be returned.
5. Compatibility
Server implementations of this specification MAY accept OAuth2.0
Clients that do not implement this extension. If the "code_verifier"
is not received from the client in the Authorization Request, servers
supporting backwards compatibility SHOULD revert to a normal OAuth
2.0 [RFC6749] protocol.
As the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] server responses are unchanged by this
specification, client implementations of this specification do not
need to know if the server has implemented this specification or not,
and SHOULD send the additional parameters as defined in Section 3. to
all servers.
6. IANA Considerations
This specification makes a registration request as follows:
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6.1. OAuth Parameters Registry
This specification registers the following parameters in the IANA
OAuth Parameters registry defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
o Parameter name: code_verifier
o Parameter usage location: Access Token Request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): this document
o Parameter name: code_challenge
o Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): this document
o Parameter name: code_challenge_method
o Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): this document
7. Security Considerations
7.1. Entropy of the code verifier
The security model relies on the fact that the code verifier is not
learned or guessed by the attacker. It is vitally important to
adhere to this principle. As such, the code verifier has to be
created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random and has
high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess. It
is RECOMMENDED that the output of a suitable random number generator
be used to create a 32-octet sequence.
7.2. Protection against eavesdroppers
Unless there is a compelling reason, implementations SHOULD use
"S256" method to protect against eavesdroppers intercepting the
"code_challenge". If the no transformation algorithm, which is the
default algorithm, is used, the client SHOULD make sure that the
authorization request is adequately protected from an eavesdropper.
If "code_challenge" is to be returned inside authorization "code", it
has to be encrypted in such a manner that only the server can decrypt
and extract it.
7.3. Checking the Server support
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Before starting the authorization process, the client SHOULD check if
the server supports this specification. Confirmation of the server
support may be obtained out-of-band or through some other mechanisms
such as the discovery document in OpenID Connect Discovery
[OpenID.Discovery]. The exact mechanism on how the client obtains
this information, or the action it takes as a result is out of scope
of this specification.
7.4. OAuth security considerations
All the OAuth security analysis presented in [RFC6819] applies so
readers SHOULD carefully follow it.
8. Acknowledgements
The initial draft of this specification was created by the OpenID AB/
Connect Working Group of the OpenID Foundation, most notably by the
following people:
o Naveen Agarwal, Google
o Dirk Balfanz, Google
o Sergey Beryozkin
o John Bradley, Ping Identity
o Brian Campbell, Ping Identity
o William Denniss, Google
o Eduardo Gueiros, Jive Communications
o Phil Hunt, Oracle
o Ryo Ito, mixi
o Michael B. Jones, Microsoft
o Torsten Lodderstedt, Deutsche Telekom
o Breno de Medeiros, Google
o Prateek Mishra, Oracle
o Anthony Nadalin, Microsoft
o Axel Nenker, Deutsche Telekom
o Nat Sakimura, Nomura Research Institute
9. Revision History
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-03
o Added an abstract protocol diagram and explanation
-02
o Copy edits
-01
o Specified exactly two supported transformations
o Moved discovery steps to security considerations.
o Incorporated readability comments by Eduardo Gueiros.
o Changed MUST in 3.1 to SHOULD.
-00
o Initial IETF version.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC4634] Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
[US-ASCII]
American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.
10.2. Informative References
[OpenID.Discovery]
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Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M.B. and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", February 2014.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M. and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
January 2013.
Appendix A. Notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding
This appendix describes how to implement base64url encoding and
decoding functions without padding based upon standard base64
encoding and decoding functions that do use padding.
To be concrete, example C# code implementing these functions is shown
below. Similar code could be used in other languages.
static string base64urlencode(byte [] arg)
{
string s = Convert.ToBase64String(arg); // Regular base64 encoder
s = s.Split('=')[0]; // Remove any trailing '='s
s = s.Replace('+', '-'); // 62nd char of encoding
s = s.Replace('/', '_'); // 63rd char of encoding
return s;
}
static byte [] base64urldecode(string arg)
{
string s = arg;
s = s.Replace('-', '+'); // 62nd char of encoding
s = s.Replace('_', '/'); // 63rd char of encoding
switch (s.Length % 4) // Pad with trailing '='s
{
case 0: break; // No pad chars in this case
case 2: s += "=="; break; // Two pad chars
case 3: s += "="; break; // One pad char
default: throw new System.Exception(
"Illegal base64url string!");
}
return Convert.FromBase64String(s); // Standard base64 decoder
}
As per the example code above, the number of '=' padding characters
that needs to be added to the end of a base64url encoded string
without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic
function of the length of the encoded string. Specifically, if the
length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two
'=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '='
padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is
malformed.
An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values
follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string below,
which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence.
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3 236 255 224 193
A-z_4ME
Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura, editor
Nomura Research Institute
1-6-5 Marunouchi, Marunouchi Kitaguchi Bldg.
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0005
Japan
Phone: +81-3-5533-2111
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Casilla 177, Sucursal Talagante
Talagante, RM
Chile
Phone: +44 20 8133 3718
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
Naveen Agarwal
Google
1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Phone: +1 650-253-0000
Email: naa@google.com
URI: http://google.com/
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