SIDR P. Mohapatra
Internet-Draft Sproute Networks
Intended status: Standards Track K. Patel
Expires: May 15, 2016 Cisco
J. Scudder
Juniper Networks
D. Ward
Cisco
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
November 12, 2015
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07
Abstract
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
policies allowing it to influence their decision process.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
policies allowing it to influence their decision process.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community
The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended
community [RFC4360] with the following encoding:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0x43 | 0x00 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |validationstate|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type Field is 0x43,
which indicates it is non-transitive. The value of the low-order
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octet of the extended type field as assigned by IANA is 0x00. The
Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of this
community. The last octet of the extended community encodes the
route's validation state [RFC6811]. It can assume the following
values:
+-------+-----------------------------+
| Value | Meaning |
+-------+-----------------------------+
| 0 | Lookup result = "valid" |
| 1 | Lookup result = "not found" |
| 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" |
+-------+-----------------------------+
If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
draft, it SHOULD attach the origin validation state extended
community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the
computed validation state in the last octet of the extended
community. Similarly on the receiving IBGP speakers, the validation
state of an IBGP route SHOULD be derived directly from the last octet
of the extended community, if present.
An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the
origin validation state extended community. However, if more than
one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
instances other than the one with the numerically-greatest validation
state value. If the value received is greater than the largest
specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar
to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community
and logging the error for further analysis.
By default, implementations SHOULD drop the origin validation state
extended community if received from an EBGP peer, without further
processing it. However an implementation MAY be configured to accept
the community when warranted, for example when the EBGP session is to
a neighbor AS under control of the same administration. Similarly,
an implementation SHOULD NOT send the community to EBGP peers but MAY
be configured to do so if warranted.
3. Deployment Considerations
In deployment scenarios where not all the speakers in an autonomous
system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in this
document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the origin
validation extended community and set another BGP attribute [RFC6811]
that influences the best path selection the same way as what would
have been enabled by an implementation of this extension.
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4. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and
suggestions from Wesley George, Roque Gagliano and Bruno Decraene on
this document.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned a value 0x00 from the "BGP Opaque Extended
Community" type registry in the non-transitive range, which is called
"BGP Origin Validation State Extended Community".
6. Security Considerations
This document introduces no new security concerns beyond what is
described in [RFC6811].
7. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
Authors' Addresses
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Pradosh Mohapatra
Sproute Networks
Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com
Keyur Patel
Cisco
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124
Email: keyupate@cisco.com
John Scudder
Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
Email: jgs@juniper.net
Dave Ward
Cisco
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124
Email: dward@cisco.com
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
Email: randy@psg.com
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