UTA Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Porticor
Intended status: Best Current Practice R. Holz
Expires: February 25, 2015 TUM
P. Saint-Andre
&yet
August 24, 2014
Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS
draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-02
Abstract
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Security Layer
(DTLS) are widely used to protect data exchanged over application
protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP, SIP, and XMPP. Over the
last few years, several serious attacks on TLS have emerged,
including attacks on its most commonly used cipher suites and modes
of operation. This document provides recommendations for improving
the security of both software implementations and deployed services
that use TLS and DTLS.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 25, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. General Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Fallback to SSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Always Use TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.5. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.6. Renegotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.7. Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Recommendations: Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Cipher Suite Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Public Key Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Cipher Suite Negotiation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Modular vs. Elliptic Curve DH Cipher Suites . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Host Name Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. AES-GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4. Diffie Hellman Exponent Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.5. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.1. draft-ietf-tls-bcp-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.2. draft-ietf-tls-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.3. draft-ietf-tls-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.4. draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.5. draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.6. draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Security Layer
(DTLS) are widely used to protect data exchanged over application
protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP, SIP, and XMPP. Over the
last few years, several serious attacks on TLS have emerged,
including attacks on its most commonly used cipher suites and modes
of operation. For instance, both AES-CBC and RC4, which together
comprise most current usage, have been attacked in the context of
TLS. A companion document [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-attacks] provides
detailed information about these attacks.
Because of these attacks, those who implement and deploy TLS and DTLS
need updated guidance on how TLS can be used securely. Note that
this document provides guidance for deployed services, as well as
software implementations. In fact, this document calls for the
deployment of algorithms that are widely implemented but not yet
widely deployed.
The recommendations herein take into consideration the security of
various mechanisms, their technical maturity and interoperability,
and their prevalence in implementations at the time of writing.
These recommendations apply to both TLS and DTLS. TLS 1.3, when it
is standardized and deployed in the field, should resolve the current
vulnerabilities while providing significantly better functionality,
and will very likely obsolete this document.
These are minimum recommendations for the general use of TLS.
Individual specifications may have stricter requirements related to
one or more aspects of the protocol, based on their particular
circumstances. When that is the case, implementers MUST adhere to
those stricter requirements.
Community knowledge about the strength of various algorithms and
feasible attacks can change quickly, and experience shows that a
security BCP is a point-in-time statement. Readers are advised to
seek out any errata or updates that apply to this document.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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3. General Recommendations
This section provides general recommendations on the secure use of
TLS. Recommendations related to cipher suites are discussed in the
following section.
3.1. Protocol Versions
It is important both to stop using old, less secure versions of SSL/
TLS and to start using modern, more secure versions. Therefore:
o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 2.
Rationale: SSLv2 is considered today as insecure [RFC6176].
o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 3.
Rationale: SSLv3 [RFC6101] was an improvement over SSLv2 and
plugged some significant security holes, but did not support
strong cipher suites. In addition, SSLv3 does not support TLS
extensions, some of which are considered security-critical today.
o Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246].
Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many
modern, strong cipher suites.
o Implementations MAY negotiate TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346].
Rationale: TLS 1.1 (published in 2006) is a security improvement
over TLS 1.0, but still does not support certain stronger cipher
suites.
o Implementations MUST support, and prefer to negotiate, TLS version
1.2 [RFC5246].
Rationale: Several stronger cipher suites are available only with
TLS 1.2 (published in 2008).
This BCP applies to TLS 1.2. It is not safe for readers to assume
that the recommendations in this BCP apply to any future version of
TLS.
3.2. Fallback to SSL
Some client implementations revert to lower versions of TLS or even
to SSLv3 if the server rejected higher versions of the protocol.
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This fall back can be forced by a man in the middle (MITM) attacker.
By default, such clients MUST NOT fall back to SSLv3.
Rationale: TLS 1.0 and SSLv3 are significantly less secure than TLS
1.2, the version recommended by this document. While TLS 1.0-only
servers are still quite common, IP scans show that SSLv3-only servers
amount to only about 3% of the current Web server population.
3.3. Always Use TLS
Combining unprotected and TLS-protected communication opens the way
to SSL Stripping and similar attacks. Therefore:
o In cases where an application protocol allows implementations or
deployments a choice between strict TLS configuration and dynamic
upgrade from unencrypted to TLS-protected traffic (such as
STARTTLS), clients and servers SHOULD prefer strict TLS
configuration.
o When applicable, Web servers SHOULD advertise that they are
willing to accept TLS-only clients, using the HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS) header [RFC6797].
3.4. Compression
Implementations and deployments SHOULD disable TLS-level compression
([RFC5246], Sec. 6.2.2), because it has been subject to security
attacks.
Implementers should note that compression at higher protocol levels
can allow an active attacker to extract cleartext information from
the connection. The BREACH attack is one such case. These issues
can only be mitigated outside of TLS and are thus out of scope of the
current document. See Sec. 2.5 of [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-attacks] for
further details.
3.5. Session Resumption
If TLS session resumption is used, care ought to be taken to do so
safely. In particular, the resumption information (either session
IDs [RFC5246] or session tickets [RFC5077]) MUST be authenticated and
encrypted to prevent modification or eavesdropping by an attacker.
Further recommendations apply to session tickets:
o A strong cipher suite MUST be used when encrypting the ticket (as
least as strong as the main TLS cipher suite).
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o Ticket keys MUST be changed regularly, e.g. once every week, so as
not to negate the benefits of forward secrecy (see Section 6.3 for
details on forward secrecy).
o Session ticket validity SHOULD be limited to a reasonable duration
(e.g. 1 day), for similar reasons.
3.6. Renegotiation
Where handshake renegotiation is implemented, both clients and
servers MUST implement the renegotiation_info extension, as defined
in [RFC5746].
To counter the Triple Handshake attack, we adopt the recommendation
from [triple-handshake]: TLS clients SHOULD ensure that all
certificates received over a connection are valid for the current
server endpoint, and abort the handshake if they are not. In some
usages, it may be simplest to refuse any change of certificates
during renegotiation.
3.7. Server Name Indication
TLS implementations MUST support the Server Name Indication (SNI)
extension for those higher level protocols which would benefit from
it, including HTTPS. However, unlike implementation, the use of SNI
in particular circumstances is a matter of local policy.
4. Recommendations: Cipher Suites
TLS and its implementations provide considerable flexibility in the
selection of cipher suites. Unfortunately many available cipher
suites are insecure, and so misconfiguration can easily result in
reduced security. This section includes recommendations on the
selection and negotiation of cipher suites.
4.1. Cipher Suite Selection
It is important both to stop using old, insecure cipher suites and to
start using modern, more secure cipher suites. Therefore:
o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate the NULL cipher suites.
Rationale: The NULL cipher suites offer no encryption whatsoever
and thus are completely insecure.
o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate RC4 cipher suites
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Rationale: The RC4 stream cipher has a variety of cryptographic
weaknesses, as documented in [I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4].
o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate cipher suites offering only so-
called "export-level" encryption (including algorithms with 40
bits or 56 bits of security).
Rationale: These cipher suites are deliberately "dumbed down" and
are very easy to break.
o Applications MUST NOT negotiate cipher suites of less than 112
bits of security.
o Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites that use
algorithms offering less than 128 bits of security. Note that
some legacy cipher suites (e.g. 168-bit 3DES) have an effective
key length which is smaller than their nominal key length (112
bits in the case of 3DES). Such cipher suites should be evaluated
according to their effective key length.
Rationale: Although these cipher suites are not actively subject
to breakage, their useful lifespan is short enough that stronger
cipher suites are desirable. 128-bit ciphers are expected to
remain secure for at least several years, and 256-bit ciphers
"until the next fundamental technology breakthrough".
o Implementations MUST support, and SHOULD prefer to negotiate,
cipher suites offering forward secrecy, such as those in the
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Ephemeral Diffie
Hellman ("DHE" and "ECDHE") families.
Rationale: Forward secrecy (sometimes called "perfect forward
secrecy") prevents the recovery of information that was encrypted
with older session keys, thus limiting the amount of time during
which attacks can be successful.
Given the foregoing considerations, implementation of the following
cipher suites is RECOMMENDED (see [RFC5289] for details):
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
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We suggest that TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 be preferred in
general.
It is noted that those cipher suites are supported only in TLS 1.2
since they are authenticated encryption (AEAD) algorithms [RFC5116].
[RFC4492] allows clients and servers to negotiate ECDH parameters
(curves). For interoperability, clients and servers SHOULD support
the NIST P-256 (secp256r1) curve [RFC4492]. In addition, clients
SHOULD send an ec_point_formats extension with a single element,
"uncompressed".
4.2. Public Key Length
With a key exchange based on modular Diffie-Hellman ("DHE" cipher
suites), key lengths of at least 2048 bits are RECOMMENDED.
Rationale: because Diffie-Hellman keys of 1024 bits are estimated to
be roughly equivalent to 80-bit symmetric keys, it is better to use
longer keys for the "DHE" family of cipher suites. Unfortunately,
some existing software cannot handle (or cannot easily handle) key
lengths greater than 1024 bits. The most common workaround for these
systems is to prefer the "ECDHE" family of cipher suites instead of
the "DHE" family. For modular groups, key lengths of at least 2048
bits are estimated to be roughly equivalent to 112-bit symmetric keys
and might be sufficient for at least the next 10 years.
Servers SHOULD authenticate using 2048-bit certificates. In
addition, the use of SHA-256 fingerprints is RECOMMENDED (see
[CAB-Baseline] for more details). Clients SHOULD indicate to servers
that they request SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms"
extension defined in TLS 1.2.
4.3. Cipher Suite Negotiation Details
Clients SHOULD include TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as the
first proposal to any server, unless they have prior knowledge that
the server cannot respond to a TLS 1.2 client_hello message.
Servers SHOULD prefer this cipher suite whenever it is proposed, even
if it is not the first proposal.
Both clients and servers SHOULD include the "Supported Elliptic
Curves" extension [RFC4492].
Clients are of course free to offer stronger cipher suites, e.g.
using AES-256; when they do, the server SHOULD prefer the stronger
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cipher suite unless there are compelling reasons (e.g., seriously
degraded performance) to choose otherwise.
Note that other profiles of TLS 1.2 exist that use different cipher
suites. For example, [RFC6460] defines a profile that uses the
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 cipher suites.
This document is not an application profile standard, in the sense of
Sec. 9 of [RFC5246]. As a result, clients and servers are still
REQUIRED to support the mandatory TLS cipher suite,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
4.4. Modular vs. Elliptic Curve DH Cipher Suites
Not all TLS implementations support both modular and EC Diffie-
Hellman groups, as required by Section 4.1. Some implementations are
severely limited in the length of DH values. When such
implementations need to be accommodated, we recommend using (in
priority order):
1. Elliptic Curve DHE with negotiated parameters [RFC5289]
2. TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 [RFC5288], with 2048-bit
Diffie-Hellman parameters
3. The same cipher suite, with 1024-bit parameters.
Rationale: Elliptic Curve Cryptography is not universally deployed
for several reasons, including its complexity compared to modular
arithmetic and longstanding IPR concerns. On the other hand, there
are two related issues hindering effective use of modular Diffie-
Hellman cipher suites in TLS:
o There are no protocol mechanisms to negotiate the DH groups or
parameter lengths supported by client and server.
o There are widely deployed client implementations that reject
received DH parameters if they are longer than 1024 bits.
We note that with DHE and ECDHE cipher suites, the TLS master key
only depends on the Diffie Hellman parameters and not on the strength
of the RSA certificate; moreover, 1024 bit modular DH parameters are
generally considered insufficient at this time.
With modular ephemeral DH, deployers SHOULD carefully evaluate
interoperability vs. security considerations when configuring their
TLS endpoints.
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5. IANA Considerations
This document requests no actions of IANA. [Note to RFC Editor:
please remove this whole section before publication.]
6. Security Considerations
This entire document discusses security practices, and this section
adds a few security considerations and includes further discussion of
particular recommendations.
6.1. Host Name Validation
Application authors should take note that TLS implementations
frequently do not validate host names, and must therefore determine
if the TLS implementation they are using does, and if not write their
own validation code or consider changing the TLS implementation.
It is noted that the requirements regarding host name validation (and
in general, binding between the TLS layer and the protocol that runs
above it) vary between different protocols. For HTTPS, these
requirements are defined by Sec. 3 of [RFC2818].
Readers are referred to [RFC6125] for further details regarding
generic host name validation in the TLS context. In addition, the
RFC contains a long list of example protocols, some of which
implement a policy very different from HTTPS.
6.2. AES-GCM
Please refer to [RFC5246], Sec. 11 for general security
considerations when using TLS 1.2, and to [RFC5288], Sec. 6 for
security considerations that apply specifically to AES-GCM when used
with TLS.
6.3. Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy (also often called Perfect Forward Secrecy or "PFS")
is a defense against an attacker who records encrypted conversations
where the session keys are only encrypted with the communicating
parties' long-term keys. Should the attacker be able to obtain these
long-term keys at some point later in time, he will be able to
decrypt the session keys and thus the entire conversation. In the
context of TLS and DTLS, such compromise of long-term keys is not
entirely implausible. It can happen, for example, due to:
o A client or server being attacked by some other attack vector, and
the private key retrieved.
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o A long-term key retrieved from a device that has been sold or
otherwise decommissioned without prior wiping.
o A long-term key used on a device as a default key [Heninger2012].
o A key generated by a Trusted Third Party like a CA, and later
retrieved from it either by extortion or compromise
[Soghoian2011].
o A cryptographic break-through, or the use of asymmetric keys with
insufficient length [Kleinjung2010].
PFS ensures in such cases that the session keys cannot be determined
even by an attacker who obtains the long-term keys some time after
the conversation. It also protects against an attacker who is in
possession of the long-term keys, but remains passive during the
conversation.
PFS is generally achieved by using the Diffie-Hellman scheme to
derive session keys. The Diffie-Hellman scheme has both parties
maintain private secrets and send parameters over the network as
modular powers over certain cyclic groups. The properties of the so-
called Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) allow to derive the session
keys without an eavesdropper being able to do so. There is currently
no known attack against DLP if sufficiently large parameters are
chosen. A variant of the Diffie-Hellman scheme uses Elliptic Curves
instead of the originally proposed modular arithmetics.
Unfortunately, many TLS/DTLS cipher suites were defined that do not
feature PFS, e.g. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256. We thus advocate
strict use of PFS-only ciphers.
6.4. Diffie Hellman Exponent Reuse
For performance reasons, many TLS implementations reuse Diffie-
Hellman and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exponents across multiple
connections. Such reuse can result in major security issues:
o If exponents are reused for a long time (e.g., more than a few
hours), an attacker who gains access to the host can decrypt
previous connections. In other words, exponent reuse negates the
effects of forward secrecy.
o TLS implementations that reuse exponents should test the DH public
key they receive, in order to avoid some known attacks. These
tests are not standardized in TLS at the time of writing. See
[RFC6989] for recipient tests required of IKEv2 implementations
that reuse DH exponents.
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6.5. Certificate Revocation
Unfortunately there is currently no effective, Internet-scale
mechanism to affect certificate revocation:
o Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are non-scalable and therefore
rarely used.
o The On-Line Certification Status Protocol (OCSP) presents both
scaling and privacy issues when used for heavy traffic Web
servers. In addition, clients typically "soft-fail", meaning they
do not abort the TLS connection if the OCSP server does not
respond.
o OCSP stapling (Sec. 8 of [RFC6066]) resolves the operational
issues with OCSP, but is still ineffective in the presence of a
MITM attacker because they can simply ignore the client's request
for a stapled OCSP response.
o OCSP stapling as defined in [RFC6066] does not extend to
intermediate certificates used in a certificate chain. [RFC6961]
addresses this shortcoming, but is a recent addition without much
deployment.
o Proprietary mechanisms that embed revocation lists in the Web
browser's configuration database cannot scale beyond a small
number of the most heavily used Web servers.
The current consensus appears to be that OCSP stapling, combined with
a "must staple" mechanism similar to HSTS, would finally resolve this
problem; in particular when used together with the extension defined
in [RFC6961]. But such a mechanism has not been standardized yet.
7. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Stephen Farrell, Simon Josefsson, Watson Ladd,
Johannes Merkle, Bodo Moeller, Yoav Nir, Kenny Paterson, Patrick
Pelletier, Tom Ritter, Rich Salz, Aaron Zauner for their review.
Thanks to Brian Smith whose "browser cipher suites" page is a great
resource. Finally, thanks to all others who commented on the TLS,
UTA and other lists and are not mentioned here by name.
8. References
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8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
August 2008.
[RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
August 2008.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, March 2011.
8.2. Informative References
[CAB-Baseline]
CA/Browser Forum, , "Baseline Requirements for the
Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates
Version 1.1.6", 2013, <https://www.cabforum.org/
documents.html>.
[Heninger2012]
Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J.
Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
Weak Keys in Network Devices", Usenix Security Symposium
2012, 2012.
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[I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4]
Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", draft-ietf-
tls-prohibiting-rc4-00 (work in progress), July 2014.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-attacks]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Current Attacks on TLS and DTLS", draft-ietf-uta-tls-
attacks-01 (work in progress), June 2014.
[Kleinjung2010]
Kleinjung, T., "Factorization of a 768-Bit RSA Modulus",
CRYPTO 10, 2010, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/006.pdf>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, January 2008.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
[RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.
[RFC6101] Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0", RFC 6101,
August 2011.
[RFC6460] Salter, M. and R. Housley, "Suite B Profile for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6460, January 2012.
[RFC6797] Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797, November 2012.
[RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
June 2013.
[RFC6989] Sheffer, Y. and S. Fluhrer, "Additional Diffie-Hellman
Tests for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", RFC 6989, July 2013.
Sheffer, et al. Expires February 25, 2015 [Page 14]
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[Soghoian2011]
Soghoian, C. and S. Stamm, "Certified lies: Detecting and
defeating government interception attacks against SSL.",
Proc. 15th Int. Conf. Financial Cryptography and Data
Security , 2011.
[triple-handshake]
Delignat-Lavaud, A., Bhargavan, K., and A. Pironti,
"Triple Handshakes Considered Harmful: Breaking and Fixing
Authentication over TLS", 2014, <https://secure-
resumption.com/>.
Appendix A. Change Log
Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.
A.1. draft-ietf-tls-bcp-02
o Rearranged some sections for clarity and re-styled the text so
that normative text is followed by rationale where possible.
o Removed the recommendation to use Brainpool curves.
o Triple Handshake mitigation.
o MUST NOT negotiate algorithms lower than 112 bits of security.
o MUST implement SNI, but use per local policy.
o Changed SHOULD NOT negotiate or fall back to SSLv3 to MUST NOT.
o Added hostname validation.
o Non-normative discussion of DH exponent reuse.
A.2. draft-ietf-tls-bcp-01
o Clarified that specific TLS-using protocols may have stricter
requirements.
o Changed TLS 1.0 from MAY to SHOULD NOT.
o Added discussion of "optional TLS" and HSTS.
o Recommended use of the Signature Algorithm and Renegotiation Info
extensions.
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o Use of a strong cipher for a resumption ticket: changed SHOULD to
MUST.
o Added an informational discussion of certificate revocation, but
no recommendations.
A.3. draft-ietf-tls-bcp-00
o Initial WG version, with only updated references.
A.4. draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-02
o Reorganized the content to focus on recommendations.
o Moved description of attacks to a separate document (draft-
sheffer-uta-tls-attacks).
o Strengthened recommendations regarding session resumption.
A.5. draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-01
o Clarified our motivation in the introduction.
o Added a section justifying the need for PFS.
o Added recommendations for RSA and DH parameter lengths. Moved
from DHE to ECDHE, with a discussion on whether/when DHE is
appropriate.
o Recommendation to avoid fallback to SSLv3.
o Initial information about browser support - more still needed!
o More clarity on compression.
o Client can offer stronger cipher suites.
o Discussion of the regular TLS mandatory cipher suite.
A.6. draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00
o Initial version.
Authors' Addresses
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Yaron Sheffer
Porticor
29 HaHarash St.
Hod HaSharon 4501303
Israel
Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
Ralph Holz
Technische Universitaet Muenchen
Boltzmannstr. 3
Garching 85748
Germany
Email: holz@net.in.tum.de
Peter Saint-Andre
&yet
Email: ietf@stpeter.im
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