Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
Network Working Group Paul J. Leach, Microsoft
INTERNET-DRAFT Chris Newman, Innosoft
draft-leach-digest-sasl-00.txt
Category: Standards Track
Expires March 21, 1999 September 21, 1998
Using Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism
Preliminary Draft
Author's draft: 7
STATUS OF THIS MEMO
THIS IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF AN INTERNET-DRAFT. IT DOES NOT REPRESENT
THE CONSENSUS OF ANY WORKING GROUP.
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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Distribution of this document is unlimited. Please send comments to the
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Copyright Notice: Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights
Reserved. See section 8 for the full copyright notice.
ABSTRACT
This specification defines how HTTP Digest Authentication [Digest] can
be used as a SASL [RFC 2222] mechanism for any protocol that has a SASL
profile. It is intended both as an improvement over CRAM-MD5 [RFC2195]
and as a convenient way to support a single authentication mechanism for
web, mail, LDAP, and other protocols.
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 1]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................3
1.1 CONVENTIONS AND NOTATION.........................................3
1.2 REQUIREMENTS.....................................................4
2 AUTHENTICATION......................................................4
2.1 INITIAL AUTHENTICATION...........................................4
2.2 SUBSEQUENT AUTHENTICATION.......................................10
2.2.1 Step one.....................................................10
2.2.2 Step Two.....................................................10
2.3 INTEGRITY PROTECTION............................................10
3 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS............................................11
3.1 AUTHENTICATION OF CLIENTS USING DIGEST AUTHENTICATION...........11
3.2 COMPARISON OF DIGEST WITH PLAINTEXT PASSWORDS...................11
3.3 REPLAY ATTACKS..................................................12
3.4 ONLINE DICTIONARY ATTACKS.......................................12
3.5 OFFLINE DICTIONARY ATTACKS......................................12
3.6 MAN IN THE MIDDLE...............................................12
3.7 CHOSEN PLAINTEXT ATTACKS........................................12
3.8 SPOOFING BY COUNTERFEIT SERVERS.................................13
3.9 STORING PASSWORDS...............................................13
3.10 SUMMARY........................................................13
4 EXAMPLE............................................................13
5 REFERENCES.........................................................14
6 AUTHORS' ADDRESSES.................................................15
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 2]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
7 ABNF...............................................................15
7.1 AUGMENTED BNF...................................................15
7.2 BASIC RULES.....................................................17
8 SAMPLE CODE........................................................18
9 FULL COPYRIGHT STATEMENT...........................................19
1 Introduction
This specification describes the use of HTTP Digest Access
Authentication as a SASL mechanism. The authentication type associated
with the Digest SASL mechanism is "DIGEST-MD5".
This specification is intended to be upward compatible with the "md5-
sess" algorithm of HTTP/1.1 Digest Access Authentication specified in
[Digest]. The only difference in the "md5-sess" algorithm is that some
directives not needed in a SASL mechanism have had their values
defaulted.
There are two new features for use as a SASL mechanism: integrity
protection and confidentiality protection on application protocol
messages after an authentication exchange.
Also, compared to CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5 prevents chosen plaintext
attacks, and permits the use of third party authentication servers,
mutual authentication, and optimized reauthentication if a client has
recently authenticated to a server.
1.1 Conventions and Notation
This specification uses the same ABNF notation and lexical conventions
as HTTP/1.1 specification; see appendix A.
Let { a, b, à } be the concatenation of the strings a, b, à
Let H(s) be the 16 octet MD5 hash of the string s.
Let KD(k, s) be the 16 octet MD5 hash of the concatenation of the string
k, ":" (a 1 character long string consisting of a colon), and the string
s.
Let HEX(n) be the representation of the 16 octet MD5 hash n as a string
of 32 hex digits (with alphabetic characters always in lower case),
since MD5 is case sensitive.
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 3]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
1.2 Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC 2119].
An implementation is not compliant if it fails to satisfy one or more of
the MUST level requirements for the protocols it implements. An
implementation that satisfies all the MUST level and all the SHOULD
level requirements for its protocols is said to be "unconditionally
compliant"; one that satisfies all the MUST level requirements but not
all the SHOULD level requirements for its protocols is said to be
"conditionally compliant."
2 Authentication
The following sections describe how to use Digest as a SASL
authentication mechanism.
2.1 Initial Authentication
If the client has not recently authenticated to the server, then it must
perform "initial authentication", as defined in this section. If it has
recently authenticated, then a more efficient form is available, defined
in the next section.
2.1.1S tep One
The server starts by sending a challenge. The data encoded in the
challenge contains a string formatted according to the rules for a
"digest-challenge" defined as follows:
digest-challenge = 1#( realm | nonce | qop-options | stale |
maxbuf | charset | auth-param )
realm = "realm" "=" <"> realm-value <">
realm-value = 1*(qdtext | quoted-pair )
nonce = "nonce" "=" <"> nonce-value <">
nonce-value = 1*(qdtext | quoted-pair )
qop-options = "qop" "=" <"> qop-list <">
qop-list = 1#qop-value
qop-value = "auth" | "auth-int" | "auth-conf" |
token
stale = "stale" "=" "true"
maxbuf = "maxbuf" "=" maxbuf-value
maxbuf-value = 1*DIGIT
charset = "charset" "=" "utf-8"
algorithm = "algorithm" "=" "md5-sess"
auth-param = token "=" ( token | quoted-string )
The meanings of the values of the directives used above are as follows:
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 4]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
realm
A string to be displayed to users so they know which username and
password to use. This string should contain at least the name of the
host performing the authentication and might additionally indicate
the collection of users who might have access. An example might be
"registered_users@gotham.news.com". This directive is optional; if
not present, it defaults to the realm used by the user to login to
the client system. Multiple realm directives are allowed.
nonce
A server-specified data string which should be different each time a
digest-challenge is sent. It is recommended that this string be
base64 or hexadecimal data. Note that since the string is passed as a
quoted string, the double-quote character is not allowed. The
contents of the nonce are implementation dependent. The quality of
the implementation depends on a good choice. The nonce is opaque to
the client. This directive is required and may appear exactly once;
if not present, or if multiple instances are present, the client
should abort the authentication exchange.
qop-options
A quoted string of one or more tokens indicating the "quality of
protection" values supported by the server. The value "auth"
indicates authentication; the value "auth-int" indicates
authentication with integrity protection; the value "auth-conf" is
reserved to indicate authentication with integrity protection and
encryption. The client MUST ignore unrecognized options; if the
client recognizes no option, it should abort the authentication
exchange.
stale
The "stale" directive is not used in initial authentication. See the
next section for its use in subsequent authentications.
maxbuf
A number indicating the size of the largest buffer the server is able
to receive when using "auth-int". If this directive is missing, the
default value is 65536. This directive may appear at most once; if
multiple instances are present, the client should abort the
authentication exchange.
charset
This directive, if present, specifies that the server supports UTF-8
encoding for the username and password. If not present, the username
and password must be encoded in ISO 8859-1 (of which US-ASCII is a
subset). The directive is needed for backwards compatibility with
HTTP Digest, which only supports ISO 8859-1.
algorithm
This directive is required for backwards compatibility with HTTP
Digest., which supports other algorithms.
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 5]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
auth-param
This directive allows for future extensions. The client MUST ignore
any unrecognized directive.
For use as a SASL mechanism, note that the following changes are made to
"digest-challenge" from HTTP: the following Digest options (called
"directives" in HTTP terminology) are unused (i.e., MUST NOT be sent,
and MUST be ignored if received):
opaque
domain
2.1.2 Step Two
The client makes note of the "digest-challenge" and then responds with a
string formatted and computed according to the rules for a "digest-
response" defined as follows:
digest-response = 1#( username | realm | nonce | cnonce |
nonce-count | qop | digest-uri | response |
maxbuf | charset | auth-param )
username = "username" "=" <"> username-value <">
username-value = 1*(qdtext | quoted-pair )
cnonce = "cnonce" "=" <"> cnonce-value <">
cnonce-value = 1*(qdtext | quoted-pair )
nonce-count = "nc" "=" nc-value
nc-value = 8LHEX
qop = "qop" "=" qop-value
digest-uri = "digest-uri" "=" digest-uri-value
digest-uri-value = serv-type "/" host [ "/" serv-name ]
serv-type = 1*ALPHA
host = 1*( ALPHA | DIGIT | "-" | "." )
service = host
response = "response" "=" <"> response-value <">
response-value = 32LHEX
LHEX = "0" | "1" | "2" | "3" | "4" | "5" | "6" | "7" |
"8" | "9" | "a" | "b" | "c" | "d" | "e" | "f"
username
The user's name in the specified realm, encoded as UTF-8. This
directive is required; if not present, authentication fails.
realm
The realm containing the user's account. It MUST be one of the realms
from the "digest-challenge". This directive is required; if not
present, or not one of the ones in the "digest-challenge",
authentication fails..
nonce
A server-specified data string which should be different each time a
digest-challenge is sent. It is recommended that this string be
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 6]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
base64 or hexadecimal data. The contents of the nonce are
implementation dependent. The quality of the implementation depends
on a good choice. The nonce is opaque to the client. This directive
is required and may appear exactly once; if not present, or if
multiple instances are present, the client should abort the
authentication exchange.
cnonce
The cnonce-value is an opaque quoted string value provided by the
client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen plaintext
attacks, and to provide mutual authentication. This directive is
required; if not present, authentication fails.
nonce-count
The nc-value is the hexadecimal count of the number of requests
(including the current request) that the client has sent with the
nonce value in this request. For example, in the first request sent
in response to a given nonce value, the client sends "nc=00000001".
The purpose of this directive is to allow the server to detect
request replays by maintaining its own copy of this count - if the
same nc-value is seen twice, then the request is a replay. See the
description below of the construction of the response value.
qop
Indicates what "quality of protection" the client accepted. If
present, its value MUST be one of the alternatives the server
indicated it supports in digest-challenge. If not present, it
defaults to "auth". These values affect the computation of the
response. Note that this is a single token, not a quoted list of
alternatives.
serv-type
Indicates the type of service, such as "www" for web service, "ftp"
for FTP service, "SMTP" for mail delivery service, etc..
host
Indicates the host name for the service requested.
serv-name
Indicates the name of the service if it is replicated. For example,
the incoming mail service for "xyz.com" may be replicated through the
use of MX records stored in the DNS, one of which points at an SMTP
server called "mail3.xyz.com"; it's "serv-name" would be "xyz.com",
it's "host" would be "mail3.xyz.com".
digest-uri
Indicates the principal name of the service with which the client
wishes to connect, formed from the serv-type, host, and serv-name.
For example, the FTP service on "ftp.xyz.com" would have a "digest-
uri" value of "ftp/ftp.xyz.com"; the SMTP server from the example
above would have a "digest-uri" value of "smtp/mail3.xyz.com/xyz.com"
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Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
response
A string of 32 hex digits computed as defined below, which proves
that the user knows a password. This directive is required; if not
present, authentication fails.
maxbuf
A number indicating the size of the largest buffer the client is able
to receive. If this directive is missing, the default value is 65536.
This directive may appear at most once; if multiple instances are
present, the server should abort the authentication exchange.
charset
This directive, if present, specifies that the client has used UTF-8
encoding for the username and password. If not present, the username
and password must be encoded in ISO 8859-1 (of which US-ASCII is a
subset). The client should send this directive only if the server has
indicated it supports UTF-8. The directive is needed for backwards
compatibility with HTTP Digest, which only supports ISO 8859-1.
LHEX
32 hex digits, where the alphabetic characters MUST be lower case,
because MD5 is not case insensitive.
2.1.2.1 Response-value
The definition of "response-value" above indicates the encoding for its
value -- 32 lower case hex characters. The following definitions show
how the value is computed.
response-value =
HEX( KD ( HEX(H(A1)),
{ nonce-value, ":" nc-value, ":",
cnonce-value, ":", qop-value, ":", HEX(H(A2))
}))
A1 is
A1 = {
H( { username-value, ":", realm-value, ":", passwd } ),
":", nonce-value, ":", cnonce-value }
where
passwd = *OCTET
The "username-value", "realm-value" and "passwd" are encoded according
to the value of the "charset" directive. If "charset=UTF-8" is present,
and all the characters of either "username-value" or "passwd" are in the
ISO 8859-1 character set, then it must be converted to ISO 8859-1 before
being hashed. A sample implementation of this conversion is in section
8.
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Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
If the "qop" directive's value is "auth", then A2 is:
A2 = { "AUTHENTICATE:", digest-uri-value }
If the "qop" value is "auth-int" then A2 is:
A2 = { "AUTHENTICATE:", digest-uri-value,
":00000000000000000000000000000000" }
i.e., a string of two colons followed by 32 zeros.
These apparently strange values of A2 are for compatibility with HTTP;
they were arrived at by setting "Method" to "AUTHENTICATE" and the hash
of the entity body to zero in the HTTP digest calculation of A2.
Also, in the HTTP usage of Digest, several directives in the "digest-
challenge" sent by the server have to be returned by the client in the
"digest-response". These are:
opaque
algorithm
These directives are not needed when Digest is used as a SASL mechanism
(i.e., MUST NOT be sent, and MUST be ignored if received).
2.1.3 Step Three
The server receives and validates the "digest-response". The server
checks that the nonce-count is 1 (one). If it supports subsequent
authentication, it saves the value of the nonce and the nonce-count. It
sends a message formatted as follows:
response-auth = "rspauth" "=" response-value
where response-value is calculated as above, using the values sent in
step three, except that if qop is "auth", then A2 is
A2 = { ":", digest-uri-value }
And if qop is "auth-int" then A2 is
A2 = { ":", digest-uri-value, ":00000000000000000000000000000000"
}
Compared to its use in HTTP, the following Digest directives in the
"digest-response" are unused:
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Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
nextnonce
qop
cnonce
nonce-count
2.2 Subsequent Authentication
If the client has previously authenticated to the server, and remembers
the values of username, realm, nonce, nonce-count, cnonce, and qop that
it used in that authentication, and the SASL profile for a protocol
permits an initial client response, then it MAY perform "subsequent
authentication", as defined in this section.
2.2.1 Step one
The client uses the values from the previous authentication and sends an
initial response with a string formatted and computed according to the
rules for a "digest-response", as defined above, but with a nonce-count
one greater than used in the last "digest-response".
2.2.2 Step Two
The server receives and validates the "digest-response". In addition,
if it has saved the nonce and nonce-count from a previous
authentication, the server checks that the nonce-count is one greater
than that used in the previous authentication using that nonce, and
saves the new value of nonce-count.
If the response is invalid, then the server sends a "digest-challenge",
and authentication proceeds as in initial authentication (and should be
configurable to log an authentication failure in some sort of security
audit log, since the failure may be a symptom of an attack).
If the response is valid, the server MAY choose to deem that
authentication has succeeded. However, if it has been too long since the
previous authentication, or for any other reason, the server MAY send a
new "digest-challenge" with a new value for nonce. The challenge MAY
contain a "stale" directive with value "true", which says that the
client may respond to the challenge using the password it used in the
previous response; otherwise, the client must solicit a new password
from the user. Except for the handling of "stale", after sending the
"digest-challenge" authentication proceeds as in the case of initial
authentication.
2.3 Integrity Protection
If the server offered "qop=auth-int" and the client responded "qop=auth-
int", then subsequent messages between the client and the server MUST be
integrity protected. Using as a base session key the value of H(A1) as
defined above the client and server calculate a pair of message
integrity keys as follows.
The key for integrity protecting messages from client to server is:
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 10]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
Kic = MD5(H(A1),
"Digest session key to client-to-server signing key magic
constant")
The key for integrity protecting messages from client to server is:
Kis = MD5(H(A1),
"Digest session key to server-to-client signing key magic
constant")
where MD5 is as specified in [RFC 1321]. If message integrity is
negotiated, a MAC for each message is appended to the message. The MAC
is 16 bytes: a 4-byte version number with value 1, the first 8 bytes of
the HMAC-MD5 [RFC 2104] of the message and the sequence number.
MAC(Ki, SeqNum, msg) = (0x00000001, HMAC(Ki, (SeqNum, msg))[0..7],
SeqNum)
where Ki is Kic for messages sent by the client and Kis for those sent
by the server. The sequence number is initialized to zero, and
incremented by one for each message sent.
Upon receipt, MAC(Ki, SeqNum, msg) is computed and compared with the
received value; the message is discarded if they differ.
3 Security Considerations
3.1 Authentication of Clients using Digest Authentication
Digest Authentication does not provide a strong authentication
mechanism, when compared to public key based mechanisms, for example.
However, since it prevents chosen plaintext attacks, it is stronger than
(e.g.) CRAM-MD5, which has been proposed for use with LDAP [10], POP and
IMAP (see RFC 2195 [9]). It is intended to replace the much weaker and
even more dangerous use of plaintext passwords; however, since it is
still a password based mechanism it avoids some of the potential
deployabilty issues with public-key, OTP or similar mechanisms.
Digest Authentication offers no confidentiality protection beyond
protecting the actual password. All of the rest of the challenge
and response are available to an eavesdropper, including the
user's name and authentication realm.
3.2 Comparison of Digest with Plaintext Passwords
The greatest threat to the type of transactions for which these
protocols are used is network snooping. This kind of transaction
might involve, for example, online access to a mail service whose
use is restricted to paying subscribers. With plaintext password
authentication an eavesdropper can obtain the password of the
user. This not only permits him to access anything in the
database, but, often worse, will permit access to anything else
the user protects with the same password.
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 11]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
3.3 Replay Attacks
Replay attacks are defeated if the client or the server chooses a
fresh nonce for each authentication as this specification
requires.
3.4 Online dictionary attacks
If the attacker can eavesdrop, then it can test any overheard
nonce/response pairs against a (potentially very large) list of common
words. Such a list is usually much smaller than the total number of
possible passwords. The cost of computing the response for each password
on the list is paid once for each challenge.
The server can mitigate this attack by not allowing users to select
passwords that are in a dictionary.
3.5 Offline dictionary attacks
If the attacker can choose the challenge, then it can precompute the
possible responses to that challenge for a list of common words. Such a
list is usually much smaller than the total number of possible
passwords. The cost of computing the response for each password on the
list is paid just once.
Offline dictionary attacks are defeated if the client chooses a fresh
nonce for each authentication, as this specification requires.
3.6 Man in the Middle
Digest authentication is vulnerable to "man in the middle" (MITM)
attacks. Clearly, a MITM would present all the problems of
eavesdropping. But it also offers some additional opportunities to the
attacker.
A possible man-in-the-middle attack would be to substitute a weaker qop
scheme for the ones sent by the server. If the algorithm is "md5-sess",
the server will not be able to detect this attack. For this reason, the
client should always use the strongest scheme that it understands from
the choices offered, and should never choose a scheme that does not meet
its minimum requirements. If the algorithm is "md5-neg", then the entire
challenge/response exchange is protected, and the server will detect
that the challenge was modified.
3.7 Chosen plaintext attacks
A chosen plaintext attack is where a MITM or a malicious server can
arbitrarily choose the challenge that the client will use to compute the
response. The ability to choose the challenge is known to make
cryptanalysis much easier [8].
However, Digest does not permit the attack to choose the challenge as
long as the client chooses a fresh nonce for each authentication, as
this specification requires.
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 12]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
3.8 Spoofing by Counterfeit Servers
If a user can be led to believe that she is connecting to a host
containing information protected by a password she knows, when in fact
she is connecting to a hostile server, then the hostile server can
obtain challenge/response pairs where it was able to partly choose the
challenge. There is no known was that this can be exploited.
3.9 Storing passwords
Digest authentication requires that the authenticating agent (usually
the server) store some data derived from the user's name and password in
a "password file" associated with a given realm. Normally this might
contain pairs consisting of username and H(A1), where H(A1) is the
digested value of the username, realm, and password as described above.
The security implications of this are that if this password file is
compromised, then an attacker gains immediate access to documents on the
server using this realm. Unlike, say a standard UNIX password file, this
information need not be decrypted in order to access documents in the
server realm associated with this file. On the other hand, decryption,
or more likely a brute force attack, would be necessary to obtain the
user's password. This is the reason that the realm is part of the
digested data stored in the password file. It means that if one Digest
authentication password file is compromised, it does not automatically
compromise others with the same username and password (though it does
expose them to brute force attack).
There are two important security consequences of this. First the
password file must be protected as if it contained plaintext passwords,
because for the purpose of accessing documents in its realm, it
effectively does.
A second consequence of this is that the realm string should be unique
among all realms that any single user is likely to use. In particular a
realm string should include the name of the host doing the
authentication.
3.10 Summary
By modern cryptographic standards Digest Authentication is weak,
compared to (say) public key based mechanisms. But for a large range of
purposes it is valuable as a replacement for plaintext passwords. Its
strength may vary depending on the implementation.
4 Example
This example shows the use of the Digest SASL mechanism with the IMAP4
AUTHENTICATE command [RFC 2060]. The base64 encoding of the challenges
and responses is part of the IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE command, not part of the
Digest specification itself. (Note: linebreaks added for editorial
clarity are not part of the mechanism):
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 13]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
* OK elwood.innosoft.com IMAP4 Server PMDF5.3-1 at Mon, 28 Sep 1998
09:16:30 -0700 (PDT)
c CAPABILITY
* CAPABILITY IMAP4 IMAP4REV1 NAMESPACE STARTTLS AUTH=CRAM-MD5
AUTH=DIGEST-MD5 AUTH=LOGIN AUTH=PLAIN
c OK CAPABILITY completed
a AUTHENTICATE DIGEST-MD5
+ cmVhbG09ImVsd29vZC5pbm5vc29mdC5jb20iLG5vbmNlPSJENlBpNXVvT2xp
RzI4WFZidVRYQ0l3Iixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
dXNlcm5hbWU9ImNocmlzIixyZWFsbT0iZWx3b29kLmlubm9zb2Z0LmNvbSIsbm
9uY2U9IkQ2UGk1dW9PbGlHMjhYVmJ1VFhDSXciLG5jPTAwMDAwMDAxLGNub25j
ZT0iZS9nWG5wRW94ODNzVzNERXU3b1FoZyIscmVzcG9uc2U9IjRmNjA2NTBhYW
FmNDQxNzkyOWViNjg3Zjc2NmNlOTMyIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
a OK AUTHENTICATE completed
---
Decoding the base64, gets:
realm="elwood.innosoft.com",nonce="D6Pi5uoOliG28XVbuTXCIw",qop="auth
"
and
username="chris",realm="elwood.innosoft.com",nonce="D6Pi5uoOliG28XVb
uTXCIw",
nc=00000001,cnonce="e/gXnpEox83sW3DEu7oQhg",
response="4f60650aaaf4417929eb687f766ce932",qop="auth"
The password was "secret".
The server uses the values of all the directives, plus knowledge of the
users password (or the hash of the userÆs name, serverÆs realm and the
userÆs password) to verify the computations above. If they check, then
the user has authenticated.
5 References
[Digest] Franks, J., et. al., "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest
Access Authentication", <draft-ietf-http-authentication-03>, Work in
Progress of the HTTP Working Group, August, 1998
[ISO-8859] ISO-8859. International Standard -- Information Processing --
8-bit Single-Byte Coded Graphic Character Sets --
Part 1: Latin alphabet No. 1, ISO-8859-1:1987.
Part 2: Latin alphabet No. 2, ISO-8859-2, 1987.
Part 3: Latin alphabet No. 3, ISO-8859-3, 1988.
Part 4: Latin alphabet No. 4, ISO-8859-4, 1988.
Part 5: Latin/Cyrillic alphabet, ISO-8859-5, 1988.
Part 6: Latin/Arabic alphabet, ISO-8859-6, 1987.
Part 7: Latin/Greek alphabet, ISO-8859-7, 1987.
Part 8: Latin/Hebrew alphabet, ISO-8859-8, 1988.
Part 9: Latin alphabet No. 5, ISO-8859-9, 1990.
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 14]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
[RFC 822] D. H. Crocker, "Standard for The Format of ARPA Internet Text
Messages," STD 11, RFC 822, UDEL, August 1982.
[RFC 1321] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April 1992
[RFC 2047] Moore, K., "MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) Part
Three: Message Header Extensions for Non-ASCII Text", RFC 2047,
University of Tennessee, November 1996.
[RFC 2060] Crispin, "Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1",
RFC 2060, University of Washington, December 1996.
[RFC 2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, 02/05/1997
[RFC2195] Klensin, J., et. al., "IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension for Simple
Challenge/Response", RFC 2195, September, 1997.
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels," RFC 2119, Harvard University, March 1997.
[USASCII] US-ASCII. Coded Character Set - 7-Bit American Standard Code
for Information Interchange. Standard ANSI X3.4-1986, ANSI, 1986.
6 Authors' Addresses
Paul Leach
Microsoft
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
paulle@microsoft.com
Chris Newman
Innosoft International, Inc.
1050 Lakes Drive
West Covina, CA 91790 USA
chris.newman@innosoft.com
7 ABNF
7.1 Augmented BNF
All of the mechanisms specified in this document are described in both
prose and an augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) similar to that used by
RFC 822 [RFC 822]. Implementors will need to be familiar with the
notation in order to understand this specification. The augmented BNF
includes the following constructs:
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Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
name = definition
The name of a rule is simply the name itself (without any enclosing
"<" and ">") and is separated from its definition by the equal "="
character. White space is only significant in that indentation of
continuation lines is used to indicate a rule definition that spans
more than one line. Certain basic rules are in uppercase, such as SP,
LWS, HT, CRLF, DIGIT, ALPHA, etc. Angle brackets are used within
definitions whenever their presence will facilitate discerning the
use of rule names.
"literal"
Quotation marks surround literal text. Unless stated otherwise, the
text is case-insensitive.
rule1 | rule2
Elements separated by a bar ("|") are alternatives, e.g., "yes | no"
will accept yes or no.
(rule1 rule2)
Elements enclosed in parentheses are treated as a single element.
Thus, "(elem (foo | bar) elem)" allows the token sequences
"elem foo elem" and "elem bar elem".
*rule
The character "*" preceding an element indicates repetition. The full
form is "<n>*<m>element" indicating at least <n> and at most <m>
occurrences of element. Default values are 0 and infinity so that
"*(element)" allows any number, including zero; "1*element" requires
at least one; and "1*2element" allows one or two.
[rule]
Square brackets enclose optional elements; "[foo bar]" is equivalent
to "*1(foo bar)".
N rule
Specific repetition: "<n>(element)" is equivalent to
"<n>*<n>(element)"; that is, exactly <n> occurrences of (element).
Thus 2DIGIT is a 2-digit number, and 3ALPHA is a string of three
alphabetic characters.
#rule
A construct "#" is defined, similar to "*", for defining lists of
elements. The full form is "<n>#<m>element" indicating at least <n>
and at most <m> elements, each separated by one or more commas (",")
and OPTIONAL linear white space (LWS). This makes the usual form of
lists very easy; a rule such as
( *LWS element *( *LWS "," *LWS element ))
can be shown as
1#element
Wherever this construct is used, null elements are allowed, but do
not contribute to the count of elements present. That is, "(element),
, (element) " is permitted, but counts as only two elements.
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Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
Therefore, where at least one element is required, at least one non-
null element MUST be present. Default values are 0 and infinity so
that "#element" allows any number, including zero; "1#element"
requires at least one; and "1#2element" allows one or two.
; comment
A semi-colon, set off some distance to the right of rule text, starts
a comment that continues to the end of line. This is a simple way of
including useful notes in parallel with the specifications.
implied *LWS
Except where noted otherwise, linear white space ("LWS") can be
included between any adjacent "token", "quoted-string", or
"separators" constructs, as these are defined in the basic rules
below; such LWS is ignored.
7.2 Basic Rules
The following rules are used throughout this specification to describe
basic parsing constructs. The US-ASCII coded character set is defined by
ANSI X3.4-1986 [USASCII].
OCTET = <any 8-bit sequence of data>
CHAR = <any US-ASCII character (octets 0 - 127)>
UPALPHA = <any US-ASCII uppercase letter "A".."Z">
LOALPHA = <any US-ASCII lowercase letter "a".."z">
ALPHA = UPALPHA | LOALPHA
DIGIT = <any US-ASCII digit "0".."9">
CTL = <any US-ASCII control character
(octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
CR = <US-ASCII CR, carriage return (13)>
LF = <US-ASCII LF, linefeed (10)>
SP = <US-ASCII SP, space (32)>
HT = <US-ASCII HT, horizontal-tab (9)>
<"> = <US-ASCII double-quote mark (34)>
All linear white space, including folding, has the same semantics as SP.
A recipient MAY replace any linear white space with a single SP before
interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.
LWS = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
The TEXT rule is only used for descriptive field contents and values
that are not intended to be interpreted by the message parser. Words of
*TEXT MAY contain characters from character sets other than ISO-8859-1
[ISO 8859] only when encoded according to the rules of RFC 2047 [RFC
2047].
TEXT = <any OCTET except CTLs,
but including LWS>
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A CRLF is allowed in the definition of TEXT only as part of a header
field continuation. It is expected that the folding LWS will be replaced
with a single SP before interpretation of the TEXT value.
Hexadecimal numeric characters are used in several protocol elements.
HEX = "A" | "B" | "C" | "D" | "E" | "F"
| "a" | "b" | "c" | "d" | "e" | "f" | DIGIT
Many HTTP/1.1 header field values consist of words separated by LWS or
special characters. These special characters MUST be in a quoted string
to be used within a parameter value.
token = 1*<any CHAR except CTLs or separators>
separators = "(" | ")" | "<" | ">" | "@"
| "," | ";" | ":" | "\" | <">
| "/" | "[" | "]" | "?" | "="
| "{" | "}" | SP | HT
A string of text is parsed as a single word if it is quoted using
double-quote marks.
quoted-string = ( <"> *(qdtext | quoted-pair ) <"> )
qdtext = <any TEXT except <">>
The backslash character ("\") MAY be used as a single-character quoting
mechanism only within quoted-string and comment constructs.
quoted-pair = "\" CHAR
8 Sample Code
The sample implementation in [Digest] also applies to DIGEST-MD5.
The following code implements the conversion from UTF-8 to 8859-1 if
necessary.
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Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
/* if the string is entirely in the 8859-1 subset of UTF-8, then
translate
* to 8859-1 prior to MD5
*/
void MD5_UTF8_8859_1(MD5_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *base, int
len)
{
const unsigned char *scan, *end;
unsigned char cbuf;
end = base + len;
for (scan = base; scan < end; ++scan) {
if (*scan > 0xC3) break; /* abort if outside 8859-1 */
if (*scan >= 0xC0 && *scan <= 0xC3) {
if (++scan == end || *scan < 0x80 || *scan > 0xBF)
break;
}
}
/* if we found a character outside 8859-1, don't alter string
*/
if (scan < end) {
MD5Update(ctx, base, len);
return;
}
/* convert to 8859-1 prior to applying hash
*/
do {
for (scan = base; scan < end && *scan < 0xC0; ++scan)
;
if (scan != base) MD5Update(ctx, base, scan - base);
if (scan + 1 >= end) break;
cbuf = ((scan[0] & 0x3) << 6) | (scan[1] & 0x3f);
MD5Update(ctx, &cbuf, 1);
base = scan + 2;
} while (base < end);
}
9 Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or
assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included
on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself
may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice
or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations,
except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in
which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 19]
Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism September 1998
Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into
languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT
INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Leach, Newman Standards Track [Page 20]