Network Working Group C. Lonvick
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Expires: August 13, 2004 February 13, 2004
RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support
draft-lonvick-sobgp-radius-04.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 13, 2004.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document defines a set of RADIUS attributes designed to support
the provisioning of the soBGP protocol. A router will encapsulate
the components of a soBGP certificate into a profile composed of
ordered TLVs and transport them to a centralized server capable of
verifying the associated signature. The certralized will respond
notifying the client of the validity of the signed information.
This draft goes along with other IDs submitted for Secure Origin BGP
(soBGP) both of which are edited by James Ng and Russ White.
draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01.txt [1],
draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions-01.txt [2] Mostly this work relates to
"Extensions to BGP to Support Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)" and is
explained in additional detail in "Deployment Considerations for
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)". This draft should also be consistent
with the formats of the information exchanged in the "Secure Origin
BGP (soBGP) Certificates" ID written by Brian Weis.
draft-weis-sobgp-bgp-certificates-01.txt [3]
The purpose of this draft is to explain the concept of offloading the
validation steps of soBGP certificates, Authcerts, PrefixPolicycerts,
and ASPolicycerts. RADIUS may not be the best way to do this but it's
the best that I know of at this moment. Once the concepts of soBGP
are discussed, the transport to support offload should be reviewed
and a proper mechanism should be chosen.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Stored-Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Stored-Policy-Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2 Stored-Policy-End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1 IPv4-Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 IPv6-Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.3 AFI/SAFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.4 Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.5 URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.6 Signature Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.7 Autonomous System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.8 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.9 PP Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.10 Entitycert Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Authcert Validation Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Authcert-Accept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Authcert-Reject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Certificate Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 soBGP Certificate Validation Request . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.1 Cert-Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.2 Authcert Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.3 PrefixPolicycert Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.4 ASPolicycert Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Useage Notes and Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1 Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2 Usernames and Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3 Stored Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.4 Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.5 Authcert Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.6 Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Changes from Prior Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . 26
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
1. Introduction
A router participating in soBGP will need to validate received
Authcerts, PrefixPolicycerts, and ASPolicycerts. Each of these are
validated with the Entitycert named within them. The best way to do
this is by having their associated Entitycerts contained on the
router and using the information stored in them to perform the
necessary validation steps. Unfortunately, this would entail the
storage and consistent maintenance of Entitycerts on all
participating routers in the AS. One way to centralize this would be
for a device to store all of the Entitycerts and then have each of
the participating routers submit the pertinent information from each
received Authcert, PrefixPolicycert and ASPolicycert to it for the
computationally intensive validation steps. This centralized device,
henceforth to be known as the sob-server in this document, could then
transmit a pass/fail message back to the router. This would reduce
the amount of administration of the Entitycert database to one device
- with appropriate backup. This document defines a set of RADIUS
attributes designed to support the provisioning of the soBGP
protocol. The participating routers are expected to form and
transmit a RADIUS RFC 2865 [4] Access-Request message with the
appropriate pieces of information from a received Authcert,
PrefixPolicycert or ASPolicycert. This Access-Request will go to the
sob-server which will perform the steps necessary to validate the
information. It will then form and transmit an Access-Accept or
Access-Reject response to the router.
Since many components of the soBGP certs are reused, it seems best to
define a profile for each of the certs. Section 2 will define the
specific TLVs and Section 3 will define the Profiles for the
Authcert, PrefixPolicycert, and ASPolicycert.
If Brian goes along with the use of "codes" in his ID, then most of
the atributes will be expanded to inclue that concept. Until then,
the Types will be static.
Discussion of this draft may be directed to the author, or to the
mailing list discussing soBGP. sobgp@external.cisco.com
More information about soBGP may be found on the web page. ftp://
ftp-eng.cisco.com/sobgp/index.html
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
2. Attributes
The Attributes are listed in this section. In all cases, each RADIUS
message may only include Attributes pertaining to a single AS. There
are useage notes later in this document which should answer any
questions outstanding from the Attribute section.
2.1 Stored-Policy
This set of Attributes requests any policy information stored on the
sob-server in an Access-Request message, and delivers the policies
through Access-Challenge messages using the Prefix set of of
Attributes described below. Each Access-Challenge message will
describe a policy associated with a single AS. The router will
continue requesting more policies through additional Access-Requests.
When there are no additional policies stored on the sob-server, or if
there were no policies stored there to begin with, then an
Access-Accept message with an appropriate attribute will be sent to
the router.
2.1.1 Stored-Policy-Request
A summary of the Stored-Policy-Request Attribute format is shown
below. This format will only be used in the Access-Request message
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value Continued |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [SPR] for Stored-Policy-Request
Length - The length of the Attribute; 6 octets.
Value - The Value field is four octets. In an Access-Request
message, it contains the request number for the available policies
stored on the sob-server. The first value will be 0x00000001. If the
sob-server responds with a policy (described next), then the router
will send a request with a value of 0x00000002. This will continue
until the sob-server has no more policies to send. At that point, the
sob-server will respond with an Access-Accept message described
below.
This Attribute is also used in Access-Challenge messages. In that
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
case, the Value is the AS number of the Authorized Originator. This
is the autonomous system number of an entity authorized to advertise
the associated IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes.
2.1.2 Stored-Policy-End
A summary of the Stored-Policy-End Attribute format is shown below.
This format will only be used in the Access-Accept message. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
The Time component in this attribute is needed due to a concern of
RADIUS. In soBGP, a peer will be able to send a notification of a
change in the status of an Entitycert. Also a participating soBGP
router should have the resources to be able to keep track of the
expiration times of certificates. This will not be assumed by
routers using the plan detailed in this document. For that reason,
some communications should occur periodically so the router may
ascertain that the status of the certificates has not changed. It
would be best if the sob-server were to contact the router, but that
is not a property of RADIUS. Therefore, the router SHOULD contact
the sob-server periodically.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Time |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [SPE] for Stored-Policy-End
Length - The length of the Attribute; 8 octets.
Count - The Count field is two octets and contains the number of
policies that have been transmitted to the router. The router should
verify that the value returned in this message is the same value that
was most recently transmitted in the associated request message.
Time - The Time field is the number of seconds for which the
downloaded policies should be considered valid. The receiver is not
obligated to honor this timer. A value of 0 is not valid and MUST
NOT be used.
2.2 Prefixes
Multiple instances of each of the attributes defined in this section
may be included in a single RADIUS packet. In all cases, each RADIUS
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
message may only include these Attributes pertaining to a single AS.
2.2.1 IPv4-Prefix
A summary of the IPv4-Prefix Attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Pref-Length | IPv4 Prefix
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
continued ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [IP4] for IPv4-Prefix.
Length - The length of this Attribute; >=4.
Pref-Length - In accordance with Section 4 of RFC 2858 [6], this is
NLRI information. The Pref-Length decribes the lenth of the prefix
used. A special value of 0x00 is reserved to indicate that no IPv4
address block announcements should be received from the originating
AS.
IPv4 Prefix - The non-zero octets of the IPv4 Prefix. A special
value of 0x0000 is reserved when the Pref-Length is 0x00. When that
value is used in an Access-Accept message in response to a
Stored-Policy-Request message, this will denote that no IPv4 address
block announcements should be received from that originating AS.
Consistent with RFC 2858, unused bits after the Pref-Length bits are
considered to be meaningless padding.
2.2.2 IPv6-Prefix
A summary of the IPv6-Prefix Attribute is shown below. The fields
are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Pref-Length | IPv6 Prefix..
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [IP6] for IPv6-Prefix
Length - The entire length of this message in octets; >=4
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
Pref-Length - The Pref-Length decribes the lenth of the prefix used.
A special value of 0x00 is reserved to indicate that no IPv6 address
block announcements should be received from the originating AS.
IPv6 Prefix - The IPv6 Address Block represented as a prefix. A
special value of 0x00 is reserved when the Pref-Length is 0x00. This
will denote that no IPv6 address block announcements should be
received from that originating AS. Unused bits after the Pref-Length
bits are considered to be meaningless padding.
2.2.3 AFI/SAFI
This Attribute provides the Adress Family Identifier and Subsequent
Address Family Identifier.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | AFI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SAFI | Context | Count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [AFI] for AFI/SAFI
Length - The entire length of this message is 8 octets.
AFI - The Address Family Identifier.
SAFI - The Subsequent Address Family Identifier.
Context - Since this TLV is reused in different manners, this field
will denote the context in which it should be interpreted. The
following table will lay out the values of Context and Count.
Value of Value of Subsequent TLVs
Context Count needed to complete
the Context.
0x00 0x1 Only ONE [IPV4] or [IPV6]
0x01 0x1 or more ONE or MORE [AS]
0x02 0x1 or more ONE or MORE [AS]
A Context of 0x00 denotes a true AFI/SAFI to be used in the Authcert.
The Count MUST be 1 and only one IPv4 or IPv6 NLRI value will be
accepted after this TLV.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
A context of 0x01 denotes the Attached Transit Autonomous Systems.
The Count must be 1 more more and only that number of AS's will be
accepted after this TLV.
A context of 0x02 denotes the Attached Non-transit Autonomous
Systems. The Count must be 1 or more and only that number of AS's
will be accepted after this TLV.
2.2.4 Serial Number
This Attribute provides the Serial Number used in all of the soBGP
certificates. A summary of the Serial Number Attribute is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Serial Number
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
continued |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [SN] for Serial Number
Length - The entire length of this message is 6 octets.
The Serial Number is 4 octets and identifies the cert.
2.2.5 URL
A summary of the URL Attribute format is given below. The fields are
transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | URL ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [URL] for URL
Length - The entire length of this message in octets.
URL - A uniform resource locator indicating a location where
information about a certificate, key, revocation list, etc., may be
found.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
2.2.6 Signature Type
A summary of the Signature Type Attribute format is given below. The
fields are transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Signature Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Number of Issuers |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [SgT] for Signature Type
Length - The entire length of this message in octets.
Signature Type - A two byte unsigned integer denoting the type of
signature (the algorithm used to build this signature). Each
possible signing algorithm is assigned a value in this field.
Number of Issuers - The number of Entitycert references included in
the signature payload. If more than one Entitycert reference
follows, all Entitycert MUST contain the same public key for the same
authorizing autonomous system.
2.2.7 Autonomous System
A summary of the Autonomous System Attribute format is given below.
The fields are transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Autonomous System
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
continued.. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [AS] for Autonomous System
Length - The entire length of this message in octets, 6 octets.
Autonomous System - the AS number.
2.2.8 Signature
A summary of the Signature Attribute format is given below. The
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
fields are transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Signature ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [Sig] for Signature
Length - The entire length of this message in octets, 6 octets.
The signature itself. The signature will be as taken from
draft-ng-sobgp-extensions-01.txt [2]. The signature is calculated
using the private key of the authorizing entity across all TLV values
in the profile in their order.
2.2.9 PP Options
A summary of the PP Options (for PrefixPolicycert) Attribute format
is given below. The fields are transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Options...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
continued | SubTVs...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [PPO] for PP Options
Length - The entire length of this message in octets.
The *******************
2.2.10 Entitycert Revocation List
A summary of the ECR Attribute format is given below. The fields are
transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | EC Revocation List
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [ECR] for EC Revocation List
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
Length - The entire length of this message in octets.
A list of revoked ECs issued by the AS. This must be in the format
specified in RFC 3280 [10].
2.3 Authcert Validation Responses
The following Attributes will be sent in response to a group of
Authcert Validation Request Attributes. The Authcert-Accept
Attribute will be sent in an Access-Accept message while the
Authcert-Reject Attribute will be sent in an Access-Reject message.
2.3.1 Authcert-Accept
A summary of the Authcert-Accept Attribute format is shown below.
This format will only be used in the Access-Accept message. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Authorized Originator
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Continued.. | Time
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Continued.. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [ACA] for Authcert-Accept
Length - The length of the attribute; 10 octets.
Authorized Originator - The autonomous system number of an entity
authorized to advertise the associated IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes.
Time - The Time field is the number of seconds for which the
downloaded policies should be considered valid. The receiver is not
obligated to honor this timer. A value of 0 is not valid and MUST
NOT be used.
2.3.2 Authcert-Reject
A summary of the Authcert-Reject Attribute format is shown below.
This format will only be used in the Access-Reject message. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Authorized Originator |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Continued.. | Reason Code
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [ACR] for Authcert-Reject
Length - The length of the attribute; >=7 octets.
Authorized Originator - The autonomous system number of an entity
authorized to advertise the associated IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes.
Reason Code - The reason for the rejection. It may be a local policy
decision on the router to accept the information contained in the
received Authcert even if it is rejected by the sob-server. As an
example of that, if the URL is not found but the Authcert is
validated otherwise, the router may choose to accept the information
in the Authcert but at a lower trust level than if the signature is
valid and the URL is found and properly processed. The table below
gives the Reason Codes and their explanations.
Reason Code Explanation
0-filled Invalid Code - This value MUST NOT be used.
0b10000000 No Entitycert found matching this Authorized Originator.
0b01000000 Entitycert found for this Authorized Originator but the
Serial Number in the Authcert is out of range.
0b00100000 The Signature in the Authcert doesn't match the
calculated signature.
0b000100000 The Entitycert found on the sob-server has expired.
0b000010000 The URL could not be found.
0b00000nnnn Reserved for future use.
0x00nn and beyond are also reserved for future use.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
3. Certificate Profiles
This section defines the possible profiles that may be sent in an
Access-Request packet. At the time of this writing, three profiles
are defined in the other soBGP works and will be defined here;
Authcerts, PrefixPolicycerts, and ASPolicycerts. The profiles will
be composed of a header and then will contain Attributes described in
Section 2. The format of these profiles MUST be followed explicity
as maintaining the order is vital for the signature to be calculated
correctly.
3.1 soBGP Certificate Validation Request
This Attribute requests that the sob-server validate an soBGP
certificate received by a router through soBGP. This will first be
requested in an Access-Request message with the pertinent information
described in the profile. The sob-server will respond with either an
Access-Accept or an Access-Reject message with specific information
as described below.
3.1.1 Cert-Header
A summary of the Cert-Header Attribute format is given below. The
fields are transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Cert Marker | Type ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [HDR] for Authcert-Header
Length - The entire length of this message in octets; 4.
Cert Marker - 0xa2 (0d162) identifying this as an SoBGP certificate
validation request.
Type ID - The specific type of soBGP Certificate as identified in the
following table.
Type ID Value Denotes this type of soBGP Certificate
0x01 Authcert
0x02 PrefixPolicycert
0x03 ASPolicycert
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
3.1.2 Authcert Profile
The following profile displays the order and components required to
transport an Authcert validation request.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [HDR] | Length | 0xa2 | 0x01 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AS] | AS-Len | Autonomous System...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AS] | AS-Len | Autonomous System...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SN] | SN-Len | Serial Number...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [URL] | URL-Len | URL ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [URL] | URL-Len | URL ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AFI] | Length | AFI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | SAFI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [IP4] or [IP6]| Length | Pref-Length | IP Prefix
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SgT] | Length | Signature Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Number of Issuers |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AS] | AS-Len | Autonomous System...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SN] | SN-Len | Serial Number...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SIG] | Length | Signature ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
3.1.3 PrefixPolicycert Profile
The following profile displays the order and components required to
transport an PrefixPolicycert validation request.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [HDR] | Length | 0xa2 | 0x02 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AS] | AS-Len | Autonomous System...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [URL] | URL-Len | URL ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
insert Authcert here
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [PPO] | Length | Options...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
continued | SubTVs...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SgT] | Length | Signature Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Number of Issuers |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AS] | AS-Len | Autonomous System...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SN] | SN-Len | Serial Number...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SIG] | Length | Signature ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
3.1.4 ASPolicycert Profile
The following profile displays the order and components required to
transport an AS Policycert validation request.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
| [HDR] | Length | 0xa2 | 0x03 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AS] | AS-Len | Autonomous System...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SN] | SN-Len | Serial Number...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [URL] | URL-Len | URL ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [URL] | URL-Len | URL ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AFI] | Length | AFI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | SAFI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [IP4] or [IP6]| Length | Pref-Length | IP Prefix
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SgT] | Length | Signature Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Number of Issuers |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [AS] | AS-Len | Autonomous System...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SN] | SN-Len | Serial Number...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [SIG] | Length | Signature ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
4. Table of Attributes
The following table provides a guide to which of the above
attributes may be found in which kinds of packets, and in what
quantity.
Request Accept Reject Challenge Acct-Request # Attribute
0-1 0 0 0-1 0 SPR Stored-Policy-Request
0 0-1 0 0 0 SPE Stored-Policy-End
0+ 0+ 0 0 0 IP4 IPv4-Prefix
0+ 0+ 0 0 0 IP6 IPv6-Prefix
0-1 0 0 0 0 HDR AC-Header
0-1 0 0 0 0 SN Serial Number
0-1 0 0 0 0 URL URL
0-1 0 0 0 0 SIG Signature
0-1 0-1 0-1 0 0 AS Autonomous System
0 0-1 0 0 0 ACA AC-Accept
0 0 0-1 0 0 ACR AC-Reject
The following table defines the meaning of the above table entries.
0 This attribute MUST NOT be present in packet.
0+ Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be present in packet.
0-1 Zero or one instance of this attribute MAY be present in packet.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
5. Useage Notes and Examples
This section describes the expected implementation of the ideas
presented in this document.
5.1 Certificate Validation
Any device receiving an Entitycert can verify it by separating its
components into appropriate segments and sending them to the
sob-server. The sob-server will return either an accept or reject
message.
Likewise a router may submit a signed AuthCert or PolicyCert so an
sob-server for validation.
Note: I need to review Brian's work to ensure that the components of
each of these certificates or signed information has an associated
RADIUS attribute in this document.
5.2 Usernames and Passwords
Some latitude is given in this area so that different policies may be
enforced on different routers. In the most expected case, all
routers will be configured with identical Usernames and Passwords
which will be sent in the Access-Request Attributes as described in
[1].
While it is not currently expected to be needed, a differentiated
policy may be applied through the use of different Usernames on
different routers when they initiate the policy download in the
Access-Request Attribute. For example, southern-facing routers could
be configured with a Username of "South" and northern-facing routers
could be given a Username of "North". When the sob-server receives a
policy download request from a router using a Username of "North", it
will deliver a policy for the northern-facing routers. Similarly for
"South" and southern-facing routers.
5.3 Stored Policy
A router SHOULD attempt to gather the stored policy from the
sob-server when it first awakes. It should be a local policy
decision of how to proceed if the router cannot obtain the stored
policy.
If the router can gather policies, then these MAY be enforced above
information received in the Authcerts since this will be locally
defined and administered policy. If the sob-server replies that it
has no policies to deliver then the router should accept routing
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
updates in the manner described in
draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01.txt [1].
5.4 Time
Policies - The router should associate a countdown timer with a
received policy. Before the timer has reached 0, the router should
request a new set of policies. (Note: It may be a problem to
associate all of the downloaded policies with a single timer.)
Authcert - The router should associate a countdown timer with a
validated Authcert. Before that timer reches 0, the router should
reaffirm the validity of the Authcert but only if the associated AS
is still advertising routes.
5.5 Authcert Verification
An Authcert will contain all of the policies which must be sent to
the sob-server in the order they are placed within the Authcert. It
is very important that the elements be kept in order as the signature
is calculated over them in that order. (Note: Perhaps XML signing
would be better?)
5.6 Redundancy
As with all RADIUS solutions, it is usually important that the client
devices be able to access an authoritative RADIUS server at all
times. For this reason, it should be stressed that soBGP devices
utilizing the procedure described in this document should have
redundant sob-servers in their network with consistent databases of
stored policies and certificates.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
6. Security Considerations
The security concerns of the mechanisms described in this document
may be separated into two parts: concerns with the transport, and
concerns with the content.
The security concerns dealing with the transport of this mechanism
are described in RFCs 2865 [4] and 2865 [7]. No further discussion
is warranted in this document.
The security concerns with the contents are identical to the security
concerns of the contens of the Authcerts, Entitycerts and Policycerts
in the other soBGP IDs.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
7. IANA Considerations
Need stuff here.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
8. Acknowledgments
Glen Zorn suggested using Access-Challenge to convey Stored Policy.
This seems to be much better than trying to use a stream of
Access-Requests and a finale of an Access-Reject.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
9. Changes from Prior Drafts
-00 : Contained the basics but had poor formatting.
-01 : The content was transferred to XML to be used with RFC 2629
formatting using "xml2rfc". (Thanks Marshall Rose.)
-02 : Restructured the Stored Policy section to utilize
Access-Challenges. Added things to the tail-end sections.
-03 : tried to harmonize with draft-weis-sobgp-certificates-00.txt
This includes a change to the length of the Serial Number. And I
fixed some spelling errors. Not many of course.
-04 : More harmonization and the introduction of the Profiles. This
allows for the reuse of previously defined TLVs.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
References
[1] White, R., "Deployment Considerations for Secure Origin BGP
(soBGP)", draft-white-sobgp-bgp-extensions-01.txt (work in
progress), June 2003.
[2] Ng, J., "Extensions to BGP to Support Secure Origin BGP
(soBGP)", draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions-01.txt (work in
progress), June 2003.
[3] Weis, J., "Extensions to BGP to Support Secure Origin BGP
(soBGP)", draft-weis-sobgp-certificates-00.txt (work in
progress), June 2003.
[4] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial in User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
2000.
[5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", RFC 2119, STD 14, March 1997.
[6] Rigney, C., Willats, W. and P. Calhoun, "NLRI stuff - need to
work on this", RFC 2858, June 2000.
[7] Rigney, C., Willats, W. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS Extensions",
RFC 2869, June 2000.
[8] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2869, BCP 26, October
1998.
[9] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 2373, July 1998.
[10] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "revocation list stuff goes here",
RFC 3280, July 1998.
Author's Address
Chris Lonvick
Cisco Systems
12515 Research Blvd.
Austin, TX 78759
US
Phone: +1 512 378 1182
EMail: clonvick@cisco.com
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support February 2004
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Lonvick Expires August 13, 2004 [Page 27]