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Versions: 00                                                            
Network Working Group                                          M.T. Rose
Internet-Draft                                    Invisible Worlds, Inc.
Expires: December 28, 2000                                 June 29, 2000


                 On the Design of Application Protocols
                       draft-mrose-bxxp-design-00

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 except that the right to
   produce derivative works is not granted. (If this document becomes
   part of an IETF working group activity, then it will be brought into
   full compliance with Section 10 of RFC2026.)

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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   Internet-Drafts.

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   at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2000.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This memo describes the design principles for the Blocks eXtensible
   eXchange Protocol (BXXP). BXXP is a generic application protocol
   framework for connection-oriented, asynchronous request/response
   interactions. The framework permits multiplexing of independent
   request/response streams over a single transport connection,
   supporting both textual and binary messages.






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Table of Contents

   1.  A Problem 19 Years in the Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  You can Solve Any Problem... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Protocol Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3.1 Framing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3.2 Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.3 Error Reporting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.4 Multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.5 User Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   3.6 Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   3.7 Let's Recap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   4.  Protocol Properties  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   4.1 Scalability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   4.2 Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   4.3 Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   4.4 Extensibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.  The BXXP Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   5.1 Framing and Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   5.2 Error Reporting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   5.3 Multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   5.4 User Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   5.5 Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   5.6 Things We Left Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   6.  Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   7.  To Be Determined...  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
       Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28






















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1. A Problem 19 Years in the Making

   SMTP[1] is close to being the perfect application protocol: it
   solves a large, important problem in a minimalist way. It's simple
   enough for an entry-level implementation to fit on one or two
   screens of code, and flexible enough to form the basis of very
   powerful product offerings in a robust and competitive market.
   Modulo a few oddities (e.g., SAML), the design is well conceived and
   the resulting specification is well-written and largely
   self-contained. There is very little about good application protocol
   design that you can't learn by reading the SMTP specification.

   Unfortunately, there's one little problem: SMTP was originally
   published in 1981 and since that time, a lot of application
   protocols have been designed for the Internet, but there hasn't been
   a lot of reuse going on. You might expect this if the application
   protocols were all radically different, but this isn't the case:
   most are surprisingly similar in their functional behavior, even
   though the actual details vary considerably.

   In late 1998, as Carl Malamud and I were sitting down to review the
   Blocks architecture[2], we realized that we needed to have a
   protocol for exchanging Blocks. The conventional wisdom is that when
   you need an application protocol, there are four ways to proceed:

   1.  find an existing exchange protocol that (more or less) does what
       you want;

   2.  define an exchange model on top of the world-wide web
       infrastructure that (more or less) does what you want;

   3.  define an exchange model on top of the electronic mail
       infrastructure that (more or less) does what you want; or,

   4.  define a new protocol from scratch that does exactly what you
       want.

   An engineer can make reasoned arguments about the merits of each of
   the these approaches. Here's the process we followed...

   The most appealing option is to find an existing protocol and use
   that. (In other words, we'd rather "buy" than "make".) So, we did a
   survey of many existing application protocols and found that none of
   them were a good match for the semantics of the protocol we needed.

   For example, most application protocols are oriented toward
   client/server behavior, and emphasize the client pulling data from
   the server; in contrast with Blocks, a client usually pulls data
   from the server, but it also may request the server to


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   asynchronously push (new) data to it. Clearly, we could mutate a
   protocol such as FTP[3] or SMTP into what we wanted, but by the time
   we did all that, the base protocol and our protocol would have more
   differences than similarities. In other words, the cost of modifying
   an off-the-shelf implementation becomes comparable with starting
   from scratch.

   Another approach is to use HTTP[4] as the exchange protocol and
   define the rules for data exchange over that. For example, IPP[5]
   (the Internet Printing Protocol) uses this approach. The basic idea
   is that HTTP defines the rules for exchanging data and then you
   define the data's syntax and semantics. Because you inherit the
   entire HTTP infrastructure (e.g., HTTP's authentication mechanisms,
   caching proxies, and so on), there's less for you to have to invent
   (and code!). Or, conversely, you might view the HTTP infrastructure
   as too helpful. As an added bonus, if you decide that your protocol
   runs over port 80, you may be able to sneak your traffic past older
   firewalls, at the cost of port 80 saturation.

   HTTP has many strengths: it's ubiquitous, it's familiar, and there
   are a lot of tools available for developing HTTP-based systems.
   Another good thing about HTTP is that it uses MIME[6] for encoding
   data.

   Unfortunately for us, even with HTTP 1.1[7], there still wasn't a
   good fit. As a consequence of the highly-desirable goal of
   maintaining compatibility with the original HTTP, HTTP's framing
   mechanism isn't flexible enough to support server-side asynchronous
   behavior and its authentication model isn't similar to other
   Internet applications.

   Mapping IPP onto HTTP 1.1 illustrates the latter issue. For example,
   the IPP server is supposed to signal its client when a job
   completes. Since the HTTP client must originate all requests and
   since the decision to close a persistent connection in HTTP is
   unilateral, the best that the IPP specification can do is specify
   this functionality in a non-deterministic fashion.

   Further, the IPP mapping onto HTTP shows that even subtle shifts in
   behavior have unintended consequences. For example, requests in IPP
   are typically much larger than those seen by many HTTP server
   implementations -- resulting in oddities in many HTTP servers (e.g.,
   requests are sometimes silently truncated). The lesson is that
   HTTP's framing mechanism is very rigid with respect to its view of
   the request/response model.

   Lastly, given our belief that the port field of the TCP header isn't
   a constant 80, we were immune to the seductive allure of wanting to
   sneak our traffic past unwary site administrators.


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   The third choice, layering the protocol on top of e-mail, was
   attractive. Unfortunately, the nature of our application includes a
   lot of interactivity with relatively small response times. So, this
   left us the final alternative: defining a protocol from scratch.

   To begin, we figured that our requirements, while a little more
   stringent than most, could fit inside a framework suitable for a
   large number of future application protocols. The trick is to avoid
   the kitchen-sink approach. (Dave Clark[39] has a saying: "One of the
   roles of architecture is to tell you what you can't do.")









































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2. You can Solve Any Problem...

   ...if you're willing to make the problem small enough.

   Our most important step is to limit the problem to application
   protocols that exhibit certain features:

   o  they are connection-oriented;

   o  they use requests and responses to exchange messages; and,

   o  they allow for asynchronous message exchange.

   Let's look at each, in turn.

   First, we're only going to consider connection-oriented application
   protocols (e.g., those that work on top of TCP[8]). Another branch
   in the taxonomy, connectionless, consists of those that don't want
   the delay or overhead of establishing and maintaining a reliable
   stream. For example, most DNS[9] traffic is characterized by a
   single request and response, both of which  fit within a single IP
   datagram. In this case, it makes sense to implement a basic
   reliability service above the transport layer in the application
   protocol itself.

   Second, we're only going to consider message-oriented application
   protocols. A "message" -- in our lexicon -- is simply structured
   data exchanged between loosely-coupled systems. Another branch in
   the taxonomy, tightly-coupled systems, uses remote procedure calls
   as the exchange paradigm. Unlike the
   connection-oriented/connectionless dichotomy, the issue of loosely-
   or tightly-coupled systems is similar to a continuous spectrum.
   Fortunately, the edges are fairly sharp.

   For example, NFS[10] is a tightly-coupled system using RPCs. When
   running in a properly-configured LAN, a remote disk accessible via
   NFS is virtually indistinguishable from a local disk. To achieve
   this, tightly-coupled systems are highly concerned with issues of
   latency. Hence, most (but not all) tightly-coupled systems use
   connection-less RPC mechanisms; further, most tend to be implemented
   as operating system functions rather than user-level programs. (In
   some environments, the tightly-coupled systems are implemented as
   single-purpose servers, on hardware specifically optimized for that
   one function.)

   Finally, we're going to consider the needs of application protocols
   that exchange messages asynchronously. The classic client/server
   model is that the client sends a request and the server sends a
   response. If you think of requests as "questions" and responses as


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   "answers", then the server answers only those questions that it's
   asked and it never asks any questions of its own. We'll need to
   support a more general model, peer-to-peer. In this model, for a
   given transaction one peer might be the "client" and the other the
   "server", but for the next transaction, the two peers might switch
   roles.

   It turns out that the client/server model is a proper subset of the
   peer-to-peer model: it's acceptable for a particular application
   protocol to dictate that the peer that establishes the connection
   always acts as the client (initiates requests), and that the peer
   that listens for incoming connections always acts as the server
   (issuing responses to requests).

   There are quite a few existing application domains that don't fit
   our requirements, e.g., nameservice (via the DNS), fileservice (via
   NFS), multicast-enabled applications such as distributed video
   conferencing, and so on. However, there are a lot of application
   domains that do fit these requirements, e.g., electronic mail, file
   transfer, remote shell, and the world-wide web. So, the bet we are
   placing in going forward is that there will continue to be reasons
   for defining protocols that fit within our framework.





























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3. Protocol Mechanisms

   The next step is to look at the tasks that an application protocol
   must perform and how it goes about performing them. Although an
   exhaustive exposition might identify a dozen (or so) areas, the ones
   we're interested in are:

   o  framing, which tells how the beginning and ending of each message
      is delimited;

   o  encoding, which tells how a message is represented when exchanged;

   o  error reporting, which tells how errors are described;

   o  multiplexing, which tells how independent parallel exchanges are
      handled;

   o  user authentication, which tells how the peers at each end of the
      connection are identified and verified; and,

   o  transport security, which tells how the exchanges are protected
      against third-party interception or modification.

   A notable absence in this list is naming -- we'll explain why later
   on.

3.1 Framing

   There are three commonly used approaches to delimiting messages:
   octet-stuffing, octet-counting, and connection-blasting.

   An example of a protocol that uses octet-stuffing is SMTP. Commands
   in SMTP are line-oriented (each command ends in a CR-LF pair). When
   an SMTP peer sends a message, it first transmits the "DATA" command,
   then it transmits the message, then it transmits a "." (dot)
   followed by a CR-LF. If the message contains any lines that begin
   with a dot, the sending SMTP peer sends two dots; similarly, when
   the other SMTP peer receives a line that begins with a dot, it
   discards the dot, and, if the line is empty, then it knows it's
   received the entire message. Octet-stuffing has the property that
   you don't need the entire message in front of you before you start
   sending it. Unfortunately, it's slow because both the sender and
   receiver must scan each line of the message to see if they need to
   transform it.

   An example of a protocol that uses octet-counting is HTTP. Commands
   in HTTP consist of a request line followed by headers and a body.
   The headers contain an octet count indicating how large the body is.
   The properties of octet-counting are the inverse of octet-stuffing:


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   before you can start sending a message you need to know the length
   of the whole message, but you don't need to look at the content of
   the message once you start sending or receiving.

   An example of a protocol that uses connection-blasting is FTP.
   Commands in FTP are line-oriented, and when it's time to exchange a
   message, a new TCP connection is established to transmit the
   message. Both octet-counting and connection-blasting have the
   property that the messages can be arbitrary binary data; however,
   the drawback of the connection-blasting approach is that the peers
   need to communicate IP addresses and TCP port numbers, which may be
   "transparently" altered by NATS[11] and network bugs. In addition,
   if the messages being exchanged are small (say less than 32k), then
   the overhead of establishing a connection for each message
   contributes significant latency during data exchange.

3.2 Encoding

   There are many schemes used for encoding data (and many more
   encoding schemes have been proposed than are actually in use).
   Fortunately, only a few are burning brightly on the radar.

   The messages exchanged using SMTP are encoded using the
   822-style[12]. The 822-style divides a message into textual headers
   and an unstructured body. Each header consists of a name and a value
   and is terminated with a CR-LF pair. An additional CR-LF separates
   the headers from the body.

   It is this structure that HTTP uses to indicate the length of the
   body for framing purposes. More formally, HTTP uses MIME, an
   application of the 822-style to encode both the data itself (the
   body) and information about the data (the headers). That is,
   although HTTP is commonly viewed as a retrieval mechanism for
   HTML[13], it is really a retrieval mechanism for objects encoded
   using MIME, most of which are either HTML pages or referenced
   objects such as GIFs.

3.3 Error Reporting

   An application protocol needs a mechanism for conveying error
   information between peers. The first formal method for doing this
   was defined by SMTP's "theory of reply codes". The basic idea is
   that an error is identified by a three-digit string, with each
   position having a different significance:

   the first digit: indicating success or failure, either permanent or
      transient;

   the second digit: indicating the part of the system reporting the


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      situation (e.g., the syntax analyzer); and,

   the third digit: identifying the actual situation.

   Operational experience with SMTP suggests that the range of error
   conditions is larger than can be comfortably encoded using a
   three-digit string (i.e., you can report on only 10 different things
   going wrong for any given part of the system). So, [14] provides a
   convenient mechanism for extending the number of values that can
   occur in the second and third positions.

   Virtually all of the application protocols we've discussed thus far
   use the three-digit reply codes, although there is less coordination
   between the designers of different application protocols than most
   would care to admit. (A notable exception to the theory of reply
   codes is IMAP[15] which uses error "tokens" instead of three-digit
   codes.)

   In addition to conveying a reply code, most application protocols
   also send a textual diagnostic suitable for human, not machine,
   consumption. (More accurately, the textual diagnostic is suitable
   for people who can read a widely used variant of the English
   language.) Since reply codes reflect both positive and negative
   outcomes, there have been some innovative uses made for the text
   accompanying positive responses, e.g., prayer wheels[40].
   Regardless, some of the more modern application protocols include a
   language localization parameter for the diagnostic text.

   Finally, since the introduction of reply codes in 1981, two
   unresolved criticisms have been raised:

   o  a reply code is used both to signal the outcome of an operation
      and a change in the application protocol's state; and,

   o  a reply code doesn't specify whether the associated textual
      diagnostic is destined for the end-user, administrator, or
      programmer.

3.4 Multiplexing

   Few application protocols today allow independent parallel exchanges
   over the same connection. In fact, the more widely implemented
   approach is to allow pipelining, e.g., command pipelining[16] in
   SMTP or persistent connections in HTTP 1.1. Pipelining allows a
   client to make multiple requests of a server, but requires the
   requests to be processed serially. (Note that a protocol needs to
   explicitly provide support for pipelining, since, without explicit
   guidance, many implementors produce systems that don't handle
   pipelining properly; typically, an error in a request causes


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   subsequent requests in the pipeline to be discarded).

   Pipelining is a powerful method for reducing network latency. For
   example, without persistent connections, HTTP's framing mechanism is
   really closer to connection-blasting than octet-counting, and it
   enjoys the same latency and efficiency problems.

   In addition to reducing network latency (the pipelining effect),
   parallelism also reduces server latency by allowing multiple
   requests to be processed by multi-threaded implementations. Note
   that if you allow any form of asynchronous exchange, then support
   for parallelism is also required, because exchanges aren't
   necessarily occurring under the synchronous direction of a single
   peer.

   Unfortunately, when you allow parallelism, you also need a flow
   control mechanism to avoid starvation and deadlock. Otherwise, a
   single set of exchanges can monopolize the bandwidth provided by the
   transport layer. Further, if a peer is resource-starved, then it may
   not have enough buffers to receive a message and deadlock results.

   Flow control is typically implemented at the transport layer. For
   example, TCP uses sequence numbers and a sliding window: each
   receiver manages a sliding window that indicates the number of data
   octets that may be transmitted before receiving further permission.
   However, it's now time for the third shoe of multiplexing to drop:
   segmentation. If you do flow control then you also need a
   segmentation mechanism to fragment messages into smaller pieces
   before sending and then re-assemble them as they're received.

   All three of the multiplexing issues: parallelism, flow control, and
   segmentation have an impact on how the protocol does framing. Before
   we defined framing as "how to tell the beginning and end of each
   message" -- in addition, we need to be able to identify independent
   messages, send messages only when flow control allows us to, and
   segment them if they're larger than the available window (or too
   large for comfort).

   Segmentation impacts framing in another way -- it relaxes the
   octet-counting requirement that you need to know the length of the
   whole message before sending it. With segmentation, you can start
   sending segments before the whole message is available. In HTTP 1.1
   you can "chunk" (segment) data to get this advantage.

3.5 User Authentication

   Perhaps for historical (or hysterical) reasons, most application
   protocols don't do authentication. That is, they don't authenticate
   the identity of the peers on the connection or the authenticity of


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   the messages being exchanged. Or, if authentication is done, it is
   domain-specific for each protocol. For example, FTP and HTTP use
   entirely different models and mechanisms for authenticating the
   initiator of a connection. (Independent of mainstream HTTP, there is
   a little-used variant[17] that authenticates the messages it
   exchanges.)

   A few years ago, SASL[18] (the Simple Authentication and Security
   Layer) was developed to provide a framework for authenticating
   protocol peers. SASL let's you describe how an authentication
   mechanism works, e.g., an OTP[19] (One-Time Password) exchange. It's
   then up to each protocol designer to specify how SASL exchanges are
   conveyed by the protocol. For example, [20] explains how SASL works
   with SMTP.

   A notable exception to the SASL bandwagon is HTTP, which defines its
   own authentication mechanisms[21]. There is little reason why SASL
   couldn't be introduced to HTTP, although to avoid race-conditions
   with the use of OTP, the persistent connection mechanism of HTTP 1.1
   must be used.

   SASL has an interesting feature in that in addition to explicit
   protocol exchanges to authenticate identity, it can also use
   implicit information provided from the layer below. For example, if
   the connection is running over IPsec[22], then the credentials of
   each peer are known and verified when the TCP connection is
   established.

3.6 Transport Security

   HTTP is the first widely used protocol to make use of transport
   security to encrypt the data sent on the connection. The current
   version of this mechanism, TLS[23], is also available for SMTP and
   other application protocols such as ACAP[24] (the Application
   Configuration Access Protocol).

   The key difference between the original mechanism and TLS, is one of
   provisioning. In the initial approach, a world-wide web server would
   listen on two ports, one for plaintext traffic and the other for
   secured traffic; in contrast, a server implementing an application
   protocol that is TLS-enabled listens on a single port for plaintext
   traffic; once a connection is established, the use of TLS is
   negotiated by the peers.








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3.7 Let's Recap

   Let's briefly compare the properties of the three main
   connection-oriented application protocols in use today:

                     Mechanism  SMTP        FTP        HTTP
           -------------------  ----------  ---------  -------------
                       Framing  Stuffing    Blasting   Counting

                      Encoding  822-style   Binary     MIME

               Error Reporting  3-digit     3-digit    3-digit

                  Multiplexing  pipelining  none       persistent
                                                       and chunky

           User Authentication  SASL        user/pass  user/pass

            Transport Security  TLS         none       TLS (nee SSL)

   Note that the username/password mechanisms used by FTP and HTTP are
   entirely different with one exception: both can be termed a
   "username/password" mechanism.

   These three choices are broadly representative: as more protocols
   are considered, the patterns are reinforced. For example, POP[25]
   uses octet-stuffing, but IMAP uses octet-counting, and so on.
























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4. Protocol Properties

   When we design an application protocol, there are a few properties
   that we should keep an eye on.

4.1 Scalability

   A well-designed protocol is scalable.

   Because few application protocols support multiplexing, a common
   trick is for a program to open multiple simultaneous connections to
   a single destination. The theory is that this reduces latency and
   increases throughput. The reality is that both the transport layer
   and the server view each connection as an independent instance of
   the application protocol, and this causes problems.

   In terms of the transport layer, TCP uses adaptive algorithms to
   efficiently transmit data as networks conditions change. But what
   TCP learns is limited to each connection. So, if you have multiple
   TCP connections, you have to go through the same learning process
   multiple times -- even if you're going to the same host. Not only
   does this introduce unnecessary traffic spikes into the network,
   because TCP uses a slow-start algorithm when establishing a
   connection, the program still sees additional latency. To deal with
   the fact that a lack of multiplexing in application protocols causes
   implementors to make sloppy use of the transport layer, network
   protocols are now provisioned with increasing sophistication, e.g.,
   RED[26]. Further, suggestions are also being considered for
   modification of TCP implementations to reduce concurrent learning,
   e.g., [27].

   In terms of the server, each incoming connection must be dispatched
   and (probably) authenticated against the same resources.
   Consequently, server overhead increases based on the number of
   connections established, rather than the number of remote users. The
   same issues of fairness arise: it's much harder for servers to
   allocate resources on a per-user basis, when a user can cause an
   arbitrary number of connections to pound on the server.

   Another important aspect of scalability to consider is the relative
   numbers of clients and servers. (This is true even in the
   peer-to-peer model, where a peer can act both in the client and
   server role.) Typically, there are many more client peers than
   server peers. In this case, functional requirements should be
   shifted from the servers onto the clients. The reason is that a
   server is likely to be interacting with multiple clients and this
   functional shift makes it easier to scale.




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4.2 Efficiency

   A well-designed protocol is efficient.

   For example, although a compelling argument can be made than
   octet-stuffing leads to more elegant implementations than
   octet-counting, experience shows that octet-counting consumes far
   fewer cycles.

   Regrettably, we sometimes have to compromise efficiency in order to
   satisfy other properties. For example, 822 (and MIME) use textual
   headers. We could certainly define a more efficient representation
   for the headers if we were willing to limit the header names and
   values that could be used. In this case, extensibility is viewed as
   more important than efficiency. Of course, if we were designing a
   network protocol instead of an application protocol, then we'd make
   the trade-offs using a razor with a different edge.

4.3 Simplicity

   A well-designed protocol is simple.

   Here's a good rule of thumb: a poorly-designed application protocol
   is one in which it is equally as "challenging" to do something basic
   as it is to do something complex. Easy things should be easy to do
   and hard things should be harder to do. The reason is simple: the
   pain should be proportional to the gain.

   Another rule of thumb is that if an application protocol has two
   ways of doing the exact same thing, then there's a problem somewhere
   in the architecture underlying the design of the application
   protocol.

   Hopefully, simple doesn't mean simple-minded: something that's
   well-designed accommodates everything in the problem domain, even
   the troublesome things at the edges. What makes the design simple is
   that it does this in a consistent fashion. Typically, this leads to
   an elegant design.

4.4 Extensibility

   A well-designed protocol is extensible.

   As clever as application protocol designers are, there are likely to
   be unforeseen problems that the application protocol will be asked
   to solve. So, it's important to provide the hooks that can be used
   to add functionality or customize behavior. This means that the
   protocol is evolutionary, and there must be a way for
   implementations reflecting different steps in the evolutionary path


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   to negotiate which extensions will be used.

   But, it's important to avoid falling into the extensibility trap:
   the hooks provided should not be targeted at half-baked future
   requirements. Above all, the hooks should be simple.

   Of course good design goes a long way towards minimizing the need
   for extensibility. For example, although SMTP initially didn't have
   an extension framework, it was only after ten years of experience
   that its excellent design was altered. In contrast, a
   poorly-designed protocol such as Telnet[28] can't function without
   being built around the notion of extensions.







































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5. The BXXP Framework

   Finally, we get to the money shot: here's what we did.

   We defined an application protocol framework called BXXP (the Blocks
   eXtensible eXchange Protocol). The reason it's a "framework" instead
   of an application protocol is that we provide all the mechanisms
   discussed earlier without actually specifying the kind of messages
   that get exchanged. So, when someone else needs an application
   protocol that requires connection-oriented, asynchronous
   request/response interactions, they can start with BXXP. It's then
   their responsibility to define the last 10% of the application
   protocol, the part that does, as we say, "the useful work".

   So, what does BXXP look like?

                     Mechanism  BXXP
           -------------------  ----------------------------------------
                       Framing  Counting, with a trailer

                      Encoding  MIME, defaulting to text/xml

               Error Reporting  3-digit and localized textual diagnostic

                  Multiplexing  independent request/response streams

           User Authentication  SASL

            Transport Security  SASL or TLS

5.1 Framing and Encoding

   Framing in BXXP looks a lot like SMTP or HTTP: there's a command
   line that identifies the beginning of the frame, then there's a MIME
   object (headers and body). Unlike SMTP, BXXP uses octet-counting,
   but unlike HTTP, the command line is where you find the size of the
   payload. Finally, there's a trailer after the MIME object to aid in
   detecting framing errors.

   Actually, the command line for BXXP has a lot of information, it
   tells you:

   o  whether this frame contains a request or response;

   o  whether there's more to the message than just what's in this
      frame (a continuation flag);

   o  how to distinguish the message contained in this frame from other
      messages (a serial number);


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   o  where the payload occurs in the sliding window (a sequence
      number) along with how many octets are in the payload of this
      frame; and,

   o  which part of the system should get the message (for requests) or
      whether this is a positive or negative response.

   (The command line is textual and ends in a CR-LF pair, and the
   arguments are separated by a space.)

   Since you need to know all this stuff to process a frame, we put it
   all in one easy to parse location. You could probably devise a more
   efficient encoding, but the command line is a very small part of the
   frame, so you wouldn't get much bounce from optimizing it. Further,
   because framing is at the heart of BXXP, the frame format has
   several consistency checks that catch the majority of programming
   errors. (The combination of a sequence number, an octet count, and a
   trailer allows for very robust error detection.)

   Another trick is in the headers: because the command line contains
   all the framing information, the headers may contain minimal MIME
   information (such as Content-Type). Usually, however, the headers
   are empty. That's because the BXXP default payload is XML[29].
   (Actually, a "Content-Type: text/xml" with binary transfer encoding).

   We chose XML as the default because it provides a simple mechanism
   for nested, textual representations. (Alas, the 822-style encoding
   doesn't easily support nesting.) By design, XML's nature isn't
   optimized for compact representations. That's okay because we're
   focusing on loosely-coupled systems and besides there are efficient
   XML parsers available. Further, there's a fair amount of anecdotal
   experience -- and we'll stress the word "anecdotal" -- that if you
   have any kind of compression (either at the link-layer or during
   encryption), then XML encodings squeeze down nicely.

   Even so, use of XML is probably the most controversial part of BXXP.
   After all, there are more efficient representations around. We
   agree, but the real issue isn't efficiency, it's ease of use: there
   are a lot of people who grok the XML thing and there are a lot of
   XML tools out there. The pain of recreating this social
   infrastructure far outweighs any benefits of devising a new
   representation. So, if the "make" option is too expensive, is there
   something else we can "buy" besides XML? Well, there's ASN.1/BER
   (just kidding).

   In the early days of the SNMP[30], which does use ASN.1, the same
   issues arose. In the end, the working group agreed that the use of
   ASN.1 for SNMP was axiomatic, but not because anyone thought that
   ASN.1 was the most efficient, or the easiest to explain, or even


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   well liked. ASN.1 was given axiomatic status because the working
   group decided it was not going to spend the next three years
   explaining an alternative encoding scheme to the developer community.

   So -- and we apologize for appealing to dogma -- use of XML as the
   favored encoding scheme in BXXP is axiomatic.

5.2 Error Reporting

   We use 3-digit error codes, with a localized textual diagnostic.
   (Each peer specifies a preferred ordering of languages.)

   In addition, the response message to a request is flagged as either
   positive or negative. This makes it easy to signal success or
   failure and allow the receiving peer some freedom in the amount of
   parsing it wants to do on failure.

5.3 Multiplexing

   Despite the lessons of SMTP and HTTP, there isn't a lot of field
   experience to rely on when designing the multiplexing features of
   BXXP. (Actually, there were several efforts in 1998 related to
   application layer framing, e.g., [31], but none appear to have
   achieved orbit.)

   So, here's what we did: frames are exchanged in the context of a
   "channel". Each channel has an associated "profile" that defines the
   syntax and semantics of the messages exchanged over a channel.

   Channels provide both an extensibility mechanism for BXXP and the
   basis for multiplexing. Remember the last parameter in the command
   line of a BXXP frame? The "part of the system" that gets the message
   is identified by a channel number.

   A profile is defined according to a "Profile Registration" template.
   The template defines how the profile is identified (using a
   URI[32]), what kind of messages get exchanged during channel
   creation, what kind of messages get sent in requests and responses,
   along with the syntax and semantics of those messages. When you
   create a channel, you identify a profile and maybe piggyback your
   first request. If the channel is successfully created, you get back
   a positive response; otherwise, you get back a negative response
   explaining why.

   Perhaps the easiest way to see how channels provide an extensibility
   mechanism is to consider what happens when a connection is
   established. The BXXP peer that accepted the connection sends a
   greeting on channel zero identifying the profiles that it supports.
   (Channel 0 is used for channel management -- it's automatically


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   created when a connection is opened.) If you want transport
   security, the very first thing you do is to create a channel that
   negotiates transport security, and, once the channel is created, you
   tell it to do its thing. Next, if you want to authenticate, you
   create a channel that performs user authentication, and, once the
   channel is created, you tell it to get busy. At this point, you
   create one or more channels for data exchange. This process is
   called "tuning"; once you've tuned the connection, you start using
   the data exchange channels to do "the useful work".

   The first channel that's successfully started has a trick associated
   with it: when you ask to start the channel, you're allowed to
   specify a "service name" that goes with it. This allows a server
   with multiple configurations to select one based on the client's
   suggestion. (A useful analogy is HTTP 1.1's "Host:" header.) If the
   server accepts the "service name", then this configuration is used
   for the rest of the connection.

   To allow parallelism, BXXP allows you to use multiple channels
   simultaneously. Each channel processes requests serially, but there
   are no constraints on the processing order for different channels.
   So, in a multi-threaded implementation, each channel maps to its own
   thread.

   This is the most general case, of course. For one reason or another,
   an implementor may not be able to support this. So, BXXP allows for
   both positive and negative responses when a request is made. So, if
   you want the classic client/server model, the client program should
   simply reject any requests made by the server. This effectively
   throttles any asynchronous messages from the server.

   Of course, we now need to provide mechanisms for segmentation and
   flow control. For the former, we just put a "continuation" or "more
   to come" flag in the command line for the frame. For the latter, we
   introduced the notion of a "transport mapping".

   What this means is that BXXP doesn't directly define how it sits of
   top of TCP. Instead, it lists a bunch of requirements for how a
   transport service needs to support a BXXP session. Then, in a
   separate document, we defined how you can use TCP to meet these
   requirements.

   This second document pretty much says "use TCP directly", except
   that it introduces a flow control mechanism for multiplexing
   channels over a single TCP connection. The mechanism we use is the
   same one used by TCP (sequence numbers and a sliding window). It's
   proven, and can be trivially implemented by a minimal implementation
   of BXXP.



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   The introduction of flow control is a burden from an implementation
   perspective -- although TCP's mechanism is conceptually simple, an
   implementor must take great care. For example, issues such as
   priorities, queue management, and the like should be addressed.
   Regardless, we feel that the benefits of allowing parallelism for
   intra-application streams is worth it. (Besides, our belief is that
   few application implementors will actually code the BXXP framework
   directly -- rather, we expect them to use third-party packages that
   implement BXXP.)

5.4 User Authentication

   We use SASL. If you successfully authenticate using a channel, then
   there is a single user identity for each peer on that connection
   (i.e., authentication is per-connection, not per-channel). This
   design decision mandates that each connection correspond to a single
   user regardless of how many channels are open on that connection.
   One reason why this is important is that it allows service
   provisioning, such as quality of service (e.g., as in [33]) to be
   done on a per-user granularity.

5.5 Transport Security

   We use SASL and TLS. If you successfully complete a transport
   security negotiation using a channel, then all traffic on that
   connection is secured (i.e., confidentiality is per-connection, not
   per-channel, just like authentication).

   We defined a BXXP profile that's used to start the TLS engine.






















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5.6 Things We Left Out

   We purposefully excluded two things that are common to most
   application protocols: naming and authorization.

   Naming was excluded from the framework because, outside of URIs,
   there isn't a commonly accepted framework for naming things. To our
   view, this remains a domain-specific problem for each application
   protocol. Maybe URIs are appropriate in the context of a
   particularly problem domain, maybe not. So, when an application
   protocol designer defines their own profile to do "the useful work",
   they'll have to deal with naming issues themselves. BXXP provides a
   mechanism for identifying profiles and binding them to channels.
   It's up to you to define the profile and use the channel.

   Similarly, authorization was explicitly excluded from the framework.
   Every approach to authorization we've seen uses names to identify
   principals (i.e., targets and subjects), so if a framework doesn't
   include naming, it can't very well include authorization.

   Of course, application protocols do have to deal with naming and
   authorization -- those are two of the issues addressed by the
   applications protocol designer when defining a profile for use with
   BXXP.



























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6. Current Status

   So, how do you go about using BXXP?

   First, get the framework specification[35] and read it. Next, define
   your own profile. Finally, get one of the open source SDKs (in Perl
   or Java) and start coding.

   The BXXP specification defines several profiles itself: a channel
   management profile, a family of profiles for SASL, and a transport
   layer security profile. These provide good examples. Of course,
   we've been using BXXP internally for a year and a half now, so if
   you want to look at a rather detailed profile definition, check out
   the Blocks Simple Exchange[34] profile. It addresses the issue of
   naming for its application domain, and, in doing so, opens the door
   for authorization.



































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7. To Be Determined...

   Since the initial publication of BXXP, we've gotten some pretty good
   feedback. As a result, a number of changes and clarifications were
   incorporated. There are, however, a few open issues that we'll need
   to decide soon:

   closing channels: At present, channel management doesn't allow you
      to close a channel -- we never envisioned the need given that
      BXXP allows 127 channels to be open by each peer. However, the
      question comes up a lot. We can either add this functionality to
      channel management, increase the number of channels, or do
      nothing.

   reply code limitations: At present, BXXP has a generic "error"
      element used to convey a reply code and textual diagnostic. This
      element doesn't address either of the two issues currently raised
      with reply codes: overloading of the first digit and diagnostic
      targeting.

   textual debugging: At present, it's hard to debug BXXP sessions by
      hand because the framing protocol includes an octet count. One
      suggestion is to add an optional feature to BXXP that uses the
      trailer as the final delimiter, at the cost of reducing both the
      efficiency and robustness of the framing protocol.

   transport mappings: At present, only one transport mapping for BXXP
      has been defined (the mapping of a BXXP session onto a single TCP
      connection). Other mappings are possible, most notably onto
      UDP[37] or onto SCTP[38].

      In mapping the BXXP framework onto UDP, additional mechanisms
      must be added, e.g., achieving reliability through
      retransmission.

      In mapping the BXXP framework onto SCTP, BXXP can achieve
      multiplexing without having to provide a mechanism for flow
      control. The reason is that SCTP explicitly separates reliabilty
      from flow control (in TCP they are bundled together). In essence,
      each BXXP channel would have a separate window managed by SCTP,
      and yet retain congestion avoidance characteristics across the
      entire BXXP connection. Accordingly, a future mapping of BXXP
      onto SCTP is simpler than the TCP mapping defined in [36].

   the name: A lot of folks on slashdot think that we should call this
      BEEP. We have to admit, there are a lot of comic possibilities...

   If you have an opinion on any of these issues, let us know!



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References

   [1]   Postel, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 821, STD 10,
         Aug 1982.

   [2]   Rose, M.T. and C. Malamud, "Blocks: Architectural Precepts",
         draft-mrose-blocks-architecture-01 (work in progress), March
         2000.

   [3]   Postel, J. and J.K. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", RFC
         959, STD 9, Oct 1985.

   [4]   Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and H. Frystyk, "Hypertext
         Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC 1945, May 1996.

   [5]   Herriot, R., "Internet Printing Protocol/1.0: Encoding and
         Transport", RFC 2565, April 1999.

   [6]   Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
         Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
         Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.

   [7]   Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter,
         L., Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
         -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [8]   Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", RFC 793, STD 7,
         Sep 1981.

   [9]   Mockapetris, P.V., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
         RFC 1034, STD 13, Nov 1987.

   [10]  Microsystems, Sun, "NFS: Network File System Protocol
         specification", RFC 1094, Mar 1989.

   [11]  Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address Translator
         (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC 2663, August 1999.

   [12]  Crocker, D., "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text
         messages", RFC 822, STD 11, Aug 1982.

   [13]  Berners-Lee, T. and D. Connolly, "Hypertext Markup Language -
         2.0", RFC 1866, November 1995.

   [14]  Freed, N., "SMTP Service Extension for Returning Enhanced
         Error Codes", RFC 2034, October 1996.

   [15]  Myers, J., "IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms", RFC 1731,
         December 1994.


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   [16]  Freed, N., "SMTP Service Extension for Command Pipelining",
         RFC 2197, September 1997.

   [17]  Rescorla, E. and A. Schiffman, "The Secure HyperText Transfer
         Protocol", RFC 2660, August 1999.

   [18]  Myers, J.G., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
         (SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997.

   [19]  Newman, C., "The One-Time-Password SASL Mechanism", RFC 2444,
         October 1998.

   [20]  Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication", RFC
         2554, March 1999.

   [21]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
         Leach, P., Luotonen, A. and L. Stewart, "HTTP Authentication:
         Basic and Digest Access Authentication", RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [22]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
         Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [23]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
         2246, January 1999.

   [24]  Newman, C. and J. G. Myers, "ACAP -- Application Configuration
         Access Protocol", RFC 2244, November 1997.

   [25]  Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", RFC
         1939, STD 53, May 1996.

   [26]  Braden, B., Clark, D.D., Crowcroft, J., Davie, B., Deering,
         S., Estrin, D., Floyd, S., Jacobson, V., Minshall, G.,
         Partridge, C., Peterson, L., Ramakrishnan, K.K., Shenker, S.,
         Wroclawski, J. and L. Zhang, "Recommendations on Queue
         Management and Congestion Avoidance in the Internet", RFC
         2309, April 1998.

   [27]  Touch, J., "TCP Control Block Interdependence", RFC 2140,
         April 1997.

   [28]  Postel, J. and J.K. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol Specification",
         RFC 854, May 1983.

   [29]  World Wide Web Consortium, "Extensible Markup Language (XML)
         1.0", W3C XML, February 1998,
         <http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/REC-xml-19980210>.

   [30]  Case, J.D., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M.L. and C. Davin, "Simple


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         Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 1157, STD 15, May
         1990.

   [31]  World Wide Web Consortium, "SMUX Protocol Specification",
         Working Draft, July 1998,
         <http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/WD-mux-19980710>.

   [32]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R.T. and L. Masinter, "Uniform
         Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396, August
         1998.

   [33]  Waitzman, D., "IP over Avian Carriers with Quality of
         Service", RFC 2549, April 1999.

   [34]  Rose, M.T., "The Blocks Simple Exchange Profile",
         draft-mrose-blocks-exchange-01 (work in progress), April 2000.

   [35]  Rose, M.T., "The Blocks eXtensible eXchange Protocol
         Framework", draft-mrose-bxxp-framework-00 (work in progress),
         June 2000.

   [36]  Rose, M.T., "Mapping the BXXP Framework onto TCP",
         draft-mrose-bxxp-tcpmapping-00 (work in progress), June 2000.

   [37]  Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", RFC 768, STD 6, Aug 1980.

   [38]  Stewart, R.R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C.,
         Schwarzbauer, H.J., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang,
         L. and V. Paxson, "Stream Control Transmission Control
         Protocol", draft-ietf-sigtran-sctp-10 (work in progress),
         April 2000.

   [39]  mailto:ddc@lcs.mit.edu

   [40]  http://mappa.mundi.net/cartography/Wheel/


Author's Address

   Marshall T. Rose
   Invisible Worlds, Inc.
   1179 North McDowell Boulevard
   Petaluma, CA  94954-6559
   US

   Phone: +1 707 789 3700
   EMail: mrose@invisible.net
   URI:   http://invisible.net/



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Full Copyright Statement

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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.















































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