Network Working Group S. Previdi, Ed.
Internet-Draft C. Filsfils
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: January 21, 2016 B. Field
Comcast
I. Leung
Rogers Communications
E. Aries
Facebook
E. Vyncke
Cisco Systems, Inc.
D. Lebrun
Universite Catholique de Louvain
July 20, 2015
IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)
draft-previdi-6man-segment-routing-header-07
Abstract
Segment Routing (SR) allows a node to steer a packet through a
controlled set of instructions, called segments, by prepending a SR
header to the packet. A segment can represent any instruction,
topological or service-based. SR allows to enforce a flow through
any path (topological, or application/service based) while
maintaining per-flow state only at the ingress node to the SR domain.
Segment Routing can be applied to the IPv6 data plane with the
addition of a new type of Routing Extension Header. This draft
describes the Segment Routing Extension Header Type and how it is
used by SR capable nodes.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2016.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Structure of this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Segment Routing Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Data Planes supporting Segment Routing . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Abstract Routing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Segment Routing Global Block (SRGB) . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Traffic Engineering with SR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Segment Routing Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. IPv6 Instantiation of Segment Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Segment Identifiers (SIDs) and SRGB . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.1. Node-SID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.2. Adjacency-SID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Segment Routing Extension Header (SRH) . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.1. SRH and RFC2460 behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. SRH Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Segment Routing Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Segment Routing Node Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2.1. Ingress SR Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2.2. Transit Non-SR Capable Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.2.3. SR Intra Segment Transit Node . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2.4. SR Segment Endpoint Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3. FRR Flag Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. SR and Tunneling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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8. Example Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.1. Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.1.1. Source routing threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9.1.2. Applicability of RFC 5095 to SRH . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1.3. Service stealing threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.1.4. Topology disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.1.5. ICMP Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.2. Security fields in SRH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.2.1. Selecting a hash algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.2.2. Performance impact of HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.2.3. Pre-shared key management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3. Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3.1. Nodes within the SR domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3.2. Nodes outside of the SR domain . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.3.3. SR path exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.3.4. Impact of BCP-38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Structure of this document
Section 3 gives an introduction on SR for IPv6 networks.
Section 4 describes the Segment Routing abstract model.
Section 5 defines the Segment Routing Header (SRH) allowing
instantiation of SR over IPv6 dataplane.
Section 6 details the procedures of the Segment Routing Header.
2. Segment Routing Documents
Segment Routing terminology is defined in
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].
Segment Routing use cases are described in
[I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-use-cases].
Segment Routing IPv6 use cases are described in
[I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases].
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Segment Routing protocol extensions are defined in
[I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions], and
[I-D.psenak-ospf-segment-routing-ospfv3-extension].
The security mechanisms of the Segment Routing Header (SRH) are
described in [I-D.vyncke-6man-segment-routing-security].
3. Introduction
Segment Routing (SR), defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing],
allows a node to steer a packet through a controlled set of
instructions, called segments, by prepending a SR header to the
packet. A segment can represent any instruction, topological or
service-based. SR allows to enforce a flow through any path
(topological or service/application based) while maintaining per-flow
state only at the ingress node to the SR domain. Segments can be
derived from different components: IGP, BGP, Services, Contexts,
Locators, etc. The list of segment forming the path is called the
Segment List and is encoded in the packet header.
SR allows the use of strict and loose source based routing paradigms
without requiring any additional signaling protocols in the
infrastructure hence delivering an excellent scalability property.
The source based routing model described in
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] is inherited from the ones proposed
by [RFC1940] and [RFC2460]. The source based routing model offers
the support for explicit routing capability.
3.1. Data Planes supporting Segment Routing
Segment Routing (SR), can be instantiated over MPLS
([I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing-mpls]) and IPv6. This document
defines its instantiation over the IPv6 data-plane based on the use-
cases defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases].
Segment Routing for IPv6 (SR-IPv6) is required in networks where MPLS
data-plane is not used or, when combined with SR-MPLS, in networks
where MPLS is used in the core and IPv6 is used at the edge (home
networks, datacenters).
This document defines a new type of Routing Header (originally
defined in [RFC2460]) called the Segment Routing Header (SRH) in
order to convey the Segment List in the packet header as defined in
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]. Mechanisms through which segment
are known and advertised are outside the scope of this document.
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3.2. Illustration
In the context of Figure 1 where all the links have the same IGP
cost, let us assume that a packet P enters the SR domain at an
ingress edge router I and that the operator requests the following
requirements for packet P:
The local service S offered by node B must be applied to packet P.
The links AB and CE cannot be used to transport the packet P.
Any node N along the journey of the packet should be able to
determine where the packet P entered the SR domain and where it
will exit. The intermediate node should be able to determine the
paths from the ingress edge router to itself, and from itself to
the egress edge router.
Per-flow State for packet P should only be created at the ingress
edge router.
The operator can forbid, for security reasons, anyone outside the
operator domain to exploit its intra-domain SR capabilities.
I---A---B---C---E
\ | / \ /
\ | / F
\|/
D
Figure 1: An illustration of SR properties
All these properties may be realized by instructing the ingress SR
edge router I to push the following abstract SR header on the packet
P.
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| | |
| Abstract SR Header | |
| | |
| {SD, SB, SS, SF, SE}, Ptr, SI, SE | Transported |
| ^ | | Packet |
| | | | P |
| +---------------------+ | |
| | |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: Packet P at node I
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The abstract SR header contains a source route encoded as a list of
segments {SD, SB, SS, SF, SE}, a pointer (Ptr) and the identification
of the ingress and egress SR edge routers (segments SI and SE).
A segment identifies a topological instruction or a service
instruction. A segment can either be global or local. The
instruction associated with a global segment is recognized and
executed by any SR-capable node in the domain. The instruction
associated with a local segment is only supported by the specific
node that originates it.
Let us assume some IGP (i.e.: ISIS and OSPF) extensions to define a
"Node Segment" as a global instruction within the IGP domain to
forward a packet along the shortest path to the specified node. Let
us further assume that within the SR domain illustrated in Figure 1,
segments SI, SD, SB, SE and SF respectively identify IGP node
segments to I, D, B, E and F.
Let us assume that node B identifies its local service S with local
segment SS.
With all of this in mind, let us describe the journey of the packet
P.
The packet P reaches the ingress SR edge router. I pushes the SR
header illustrated in Figure 2 and sets the pointer to the first
segment of the list (SD).
SD is an instruction recognized by all the nodes in the SR domain
which causes the packet to be forwarded along the shortest path to D.
Once at D, the pointer is incremented and the next segment is
executed (SB).
SB is an instruction recognized by all the nodes in the SR domain
which causes the packet to be forwarded along the shortest path to B.
Once at B, the pointer is incremented and the next segment is
executed (SS).
SS is an instruction only recognized by node B which causes the
packet to receive service S.
Once the service applied, the next segment is executed (SF) which
causes the packet to be forwarded along the shortest path to F.
Once at F, the pointer is incremented and the next segment is
executed (SE).
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SE is an instruction recognized by all the nodes in the SR domain
which causes the packet to be forwarded along the shortest path to E.
E then removes the SR header and the packet continues its journey
outside the SR domain.
All of the requirements are met.
First, the packet P has not used links AB and CE: the shortest-path
from I to D is I-A-D, the shortest-path from D to B is D-B, the
shortest-path from B to F is B-C-F and the shortest-path from F to E
is F-E, hence the packet path through the SR domain is I-A-D-B-C-F-E
and the links AB and CE have been avoided.
Second, the service S supported by B has been applied on packet P.
Third, any node along the packet path is able to identify the service
and topological journey of the packet within the SR domain. For
example, node C receives the packet illustrated in Figure 3 and hence
is able to infer where the packet entered the SR domain (SI), how it
got up to itself {SD, SB, SS, SE}, where it will exit the SR domain
(SE) and how it will do so {SF, SE}.
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| | |
| SR Header | |
| | |
| {SD, SB, SS, SF, SE}, Ptr, SI, SE | Transported |
| ^ | | Packet |
| | | | P |
| +--------+ | |
| | |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: Packet P at node C
Fourth, only node I maintains per-flow state for packet P. The
entire program of topological and service instructions to be executed
by the SR domain on packet P is encoded by the ingress edge router I
in the SR header in the form of a list of segments where each segment
identifies a specific instruction. No further per-flow state is
required along the packet path. The per-flow state is in the SR
header and travels with the packet. Intermediate nodes only hold
states related to the IGP global node segments and the local IGP
adjacency segments. These segments are not per-flow specific and
hence scale very well. Typically, an intermediate node would
maintain in the order of 100's to 1000's global node segments and in
the order of 10's to 100 of local adjacency segments. Typically the
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SR IGP forwarding table is expected to be much less than 10000
entries.
Fifth, the SR header is inserted at the entrance to the domain and
removed at the exit of the operator domain. For security reasons,
the operator can forbid anyone outside its domain to use its intra-
domain SR capability.
4. Abstract Routing Model
At the entrance of the SR domain, the ingress SR edge router pushes
the SR header on top of the packet. At the exit of the SR domain,
the egress SR edge router removes the SR header.
The abstract SR header contains an ordered list of segments, a
pointer identifying the next segment to process and the
identifications of the ingress and egress SR edge routers on the path
of this packet. The pointer identifies the segment that MUST be used
by the receiving router to process the packet. This segment is
called the active segment.
A property of SR is that the entire source route of the packet,
including the identity of the ingress and egress edge routers is
always available with the packet. This allows for interesting
accounting and service applications.
We define three SR-header operations:
"PUSH": an SR header is pushed on an IP packet, or additional
segments are added at the head of the segment list. The pointer
is moved to the first entry of the added segments.
"NEXT": the active segment is completed, the pointer is moved to
the next segment in the list.
"CONTINUE": the active segment is not completed, the pointer is
left unchanged.
In the future, other SR-header management operations may be defined.
As the packet travels through the SR domain, the pointer is
incremented through the ordered list of segments and the source route
encoded by the SR ingress edge node is executed.
A node processes an incoming packet according to the instruction
associated with the active segment.
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Any instruction might be associated with a segment: for example, an
intra-domain topological strict or loose forwarding instruction, a
service instruction, etc.
At minimum, a segment instruction must define two elements: the
identity of the next-hop to forward the packet to (this could be the
same node or a context within the node) and which SR-header
management operation to execute.
Each segment is known in the network through a Segment Identifier
(SID). The terms "segment" and "SID" are interchangeable.
4.1. Segment Routing Global Block (SRGB)
In the SR abstract model, a segment is identified by a Segment
Routing Identifier (SID). The SR abstract model doesn't mandate a
specific format for the SID (IPv6 address or other formats).
In Segment Routing IPv6 the SID is an IPv6 address. Therefore, the
SRGB is materialized by the global IPv6 address space which
represents the set of IPv6 routable addresses in the SR domain. The
following rules apply:
o Each node of the SR domain MUST be configured with the Segment
Routing Global Block (SRGB).
o All global segments must be allocated from the SRGB. Any SR
capable node MUST be able to process any global segment advertised
by any other node within the SR domain.
o Any segment outside the SRGB has a local significance and is
called a "local segment". An SR-capable node MUST be able to
process the local segments it originates. An SR-capable node MUST
NOT support the instruction associated with a local segment
originated by a remote node.
4.2. Traffic Engineering with SR
An SR Traffic Engineering policy is composed of two elements: a flow
classification and a segment-list to prepend on the packets of the
flow.
In SR, this per-flow state only exists at the ingress edge node where
the policy is defined and the SR header is pushed.
It is outside the scope of the document to define the process that
leads to the instantiation at a node N of an SR Traffic Engineering
policy.
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[I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-use-cases] illustrates various
alternatives:
N is deriving this policy automatically (e.g. FRR).
N is provisioned explicitly by the operator.
N is provisioned by a controller or server (e.g.: SDN Controller).
N is provisioned by the operator with a high-level policy which is
mapped into a path thanks to a local CSPF-based computation (e.g.
affinity/SRLG exclusion).
N could also be provisioned by other means.
[I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-use-cases] explains why the
majority of use-cases require very short segment-lists, hence
minimizing the performance impact, if any, of inserting and
transporting the segment list.
A SDN controller, which desires to instantiate at node N an SR
Traffic Engineering policy, collects the SR capability of node N such
as to ensure that the policy meets its capability.
4.3. Segment Routing Database
The Segment routing Database (SRDB) is a set of entries where each
entry is identified by a SID. The instruction associated with each
entry at least defines the identity of the next-hop to which the
packet should be forwarded and what operation should be performed on
the SR header (PUSH, CONTINUE, NEXT).
+---------+-----------+---------------------------------+
| Segment | Next-Hop | SR Header operation |
+---------+-----------+---------------------------------+
| Sk | M | CONTINUE |
| Sj | N | NEXT |
| Sl | NAT Srvc | NEXT |
| Sm | FW srvc | NEXT |
| Sn | Q | NEXT |
| etc. | etc. | etc. |
+---------+-----------+---------------------------------+
Figure 4: SR Database
Each SR-capable node maintains its local SRDB. SRDB entries can
either derive from local policy or from protocol segment
advertisement.
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5. IPv6 Instantiation of Segment Routing
5.1. Segment Identifiers (SIDs) and SRGB
Segment Routing, as described in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing],
defines Node-SID and Adjacency-SID. When SR is used over IPv6 data-
plane the following applies.
The SRGB is the global IPv6 address space which represents the set of
IPv6 routable addresses in the SR domain.
5.1.1. Node-SID
The Node-SID identifies a node. With SR-IPv6 the Node-SID is an IPv6
prefix that the operator configured on the node and that is used as
the node identifier. Typically, in case of a router, this is the
IPv6 address of the node loopback interface. Therefore, SR-IPv6 does
not require any additional SID advertisement for the Node Segment.
The Node-SID is in fact the IPv6 address of the node.
Node SIDs are IPv6 addresses part of the SRGB (i.e.: addresses of
global scope).
5.1.2. Adjacency-SID
Adjacency-SIDs can be either globally scoped IPv6 addresses or any
128-bit identifier representing the adjacency. Obviously, in the
latter case, the scope of the Adjacency-SID is local to the router
and any packet with the a such Adjacency-SID would need first to
reach the node through the node's Node-SID prior for the node to
process the Adjacency-SID. In other wrods, two segments (SIDs) would
then be required: the first is the node's Node-SID that brings the
packet to the node and the second is the Adjacency-SID that will make
the node to forward the packet through the interface the Adjacency-
SID is allocated to.
In the SR architecture defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]
the Adjacency-SID (or Adj-SID) is the segment identifier associated
with the instruction of forwarding the packet through the interface
the Adj-SID is assigned to. Adj-SIDs can be either globally scoped
IPv6 addresses or any 128-bit identifier representing the adjacency.
Obviously, in the latter case, the scope of the Adj-SID is local to
the router and any packet with the a such Adj-SID would need first to
reach the node through the node's Node-SID prior for the node to
process the Adj-SID. In other wrods, two segments (SIDs) would then
be required: the first is the node's Node-SID that brings the packet
to the node and the second is the Adj-SID that will make the node to
forward the packet through the interface the Adj-SID is allocated to.
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A node may advertise one (or more) Adj-SIDs allocated to the same
interface as well as a node can advertise the same Adj-SID for
multiple interfaces. Use cases of Adj-SID advertisements are
described in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]The semantic of the
Adj-SID is:
Send out the packet to the interface this Adj-SID is allocated to.
When SR is applied to IPv6, Node-SIDs are a global IPv6 addresses and
therefore, an Adj-SID has a global significance (i.e.: the IPv6
address representing the SID is a global address). In other words, a
node that advertises the Adj-SID in the form of a global IPv6 address
representing the link/adjacency the packet has to be forwarded to,
will apply to the Adj-SID a global significance.
Advertisement of Adj-SID may be done using multiple mechanisms among
which the ones described in ISIS and OSPF protocol extensions:
[I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions] and
[I-D.psenak-ospf-segment-routing-ospfv3-extension]. The distinction
between local and global significance of the Adj-SID is given in the
encoding of the Adj-SID advertisement.
5.2. Segment Routing Extension Header (SRH)
A new type of the Routing Header (originally defined in [RFC2460]) is
defined: the Segment Routing Header (SRH) which has a new Routing
Type, (suggested value 4) to be assigned by IANA.
As an example, if an explicit path is to be constructed across a core
network running ISIS or OSPF, the segment list will contain SIDs
representing the nodes across the path (loose or strict) which,
usually, are the IPv6 loopback interface address of each node. If
the path is across service or application entities, the segment list
contains the IPv6 addresses of these services or application
instances.
The Segment Routing Header (SRH) is defined as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Routing Type | Segments Left |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| First Segment | Flags | HMAC Key ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Segment List[0] (128 bits ipv6 address) |
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| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
...
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Segment List[n] (128 bits ipv6 address) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Policy List[0] (optional) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Policy List[1] (optional) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Policy List[2] (optional) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Policy List[3] (optional) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
| |
| HMAC (256 bits) |
| (optional) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
where:
o Next Header: 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header
immediately following the SRH.
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o Hdr Ext Len: 8-bit unsigned integer, is the length of the SRH
header in 8-octet units, not including the first 8 octets.
o Routing Type: TBD, to be assigned by IANA (suggested value: 4).
o Segments Left. Defined in [RFC2460], it contains the index, in
the Segment List, of the next segment to inspect. Segments Left
is decremented at each segment and it is used as an index in the
segment list.
o First Segment: offset in the SRH, not including the first 8 octets
and expressed in 16-octet units, pointing to the last element of
the segment list, which is in fact the first segment of the
segment routing path.
o Flags: 16 bits of flags. Following flags are defined:
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|C|P|R|R| Policy Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
C-flag: Clean-up flag. Set when the SRH has to be removed from
the packet when packet reaches the last segment.
P-flag: Protected flag. Set when the packet has been rerouted
through FRR mechanism by a SR endpoint node. See Section 6.3
for more details.
R-flags. Reserved and for future use.
Policy Flags. Define the type of the IPv6 addresses encoded
into the Policy List (see below). The following have been
defined:
Bits 4-6: determine the type of the first element after the
segment list.
Bits 7-9: determine the type of the second element.
Bits 10-12: determine the type of the third element.
Bits 13-15: determine the type of the fourth element.
The following values are used for the type:
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0x0: Not present. If value is set to 0x0, it means the
element represented by these bits is not present.
0x1: SR Ingress.
0x2: SR Egress.
0x3: Original Source Address.
o HMAC Key ID and HMAC field, and their use are defined in
[I-D.vyncke-6man-segment-routing-security].
o Segment List[n]: 128 bit IPv6 addresses representing the nth
segment in the Segment List. The Segment List is encoded starting
from the last segment of the path. I.e., the first element of the
segment list (Segment List [0]) contains the last segment of the
path while the last segment of the Segment List (Segment List[n])
contains the first segment of the path. The index contained in
"Segments Left" identifies the current active segment.
o Policy List. Optional addresses representing specific nodes in
the SR path such as:
SR Ingress: a 128 bit generic identifier representing the
ingress in the SR domain (i.e.: it needs not to be a valid IPv6
address).
SR Egress: a 128 bit generic identifier representing the egress
in the SR domain (i.e.: it needs not to be a valid IPv6
address).
Original Source Address: IPv6 address originally present in the
SA field of the packet.
The segments in the Policy List are encoded after the segment list
and they are optional. If none are in the SRH, all bits of the
Policy List Flags MUST be set to 0x0.
5.2.1. SRH and RFC2460 behavior
The SRH being a new type of the Routing Header, it also has the same
properties:
SHOULD only appear once in the packet.
Only the router whose address is in the DA field of the packet
header MUST inspect the SRH.
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Therefore, Segment Routing in IPv6 networks implies that the segment
identifier (i.e.: the IPv6 address of the segment) is moved into the
DA of the packet.
The DA of the packet changes at each segment termination/completion
and therefore the original DA of the packet MUST be encoded as the
last segment of the path.
As illustrated in Section 3.2, nodes that are within the path of a
segment will forward packets based on the DA of the packet without
inspecting the SRH. This ensures full interoperability between SR-
capable and non-SR-capable nodes.
6. SRH Procedures
In this section we describe the different procedures on the SRH.
6.1. Segment Routing Operations
When Segment Routing is instantiated over the IPv6 data plane the
following applies:
o The segment list is encoded in the SRH.
o The active segment is in the destination address of the packet.
o The Segment Routing CONTINUE operation (as described in
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]) is implemented as a regular/
plain IPv6 operation consisting of DA based forwarding.
o The NEXT operation is implemented through the update of the DA
with the value represented by the Next Segment field in the SRH.
o The PUSH operation is implemented through the insertion of the SRH
or the insertion of additional segments in the SRH segment list.
6.2. Segment Routing Node Functions
SR packets are forwarded to segments endpoints (i.e.: nodes whose
address is in the DA field of the packet). The segment endpoint,
when receiving a SR packet destined to itself, does:
o Inspect the SRH.
o Determine the next active segment.
o Update the Segments Left field (or, if requested, remove the SRH
from the packet).
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o Update the DA.
o Send the packet to the next segment.
The procedures applied to the SRH are related to the node function.
Following nodes functions are defined:
Ingress SR Node.
Transit Non-SR Node.
Transit SR Intra Segment Node.
SR Endpoint Node.
6.2.1. Ingress SR Node
Ingress Node can be a router at the edge of the SR domain or a SR-
capable host. The ingress SR node may obtain the segment list by
either:
Local path computation.
Local configuration.
Interaction with an SDN controller delivering the path as a
complete SRH.
Any other mechanism (mechanisms through which the path is acquired
are outside the scope of this document).
The following are the steps of the creation of the SRH:
Next Header and Hdr Ext Len fields are set according to [RFC2460].
Routing Type field is set as TBD (SRH).
The Segment List is built with the FIRST segment of the path
encoded in the LAST element of the Segment List. Subsequent
segments are encoded on top of the first segment. Finally, the
LAST segment of the path is encoded in the FIRST element of the
Segment List. In other words, the Segment List is encoded in the
reverse order of the path.
The original DA of the packet is encoded as the last segment of
the path (encoded in the first element of the Segment List).
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The DA of the packet is set with the value of the first segment
(found in the last element of the segment list).
The Segments Left field is set to n-1 where n is the number of
elements in the Segment List.
The First Segment field is set to n-1 where n is the number of
elements in the Segment List.
The packet is sent out towards the first segment (i.e.:
represented in the packet DA).
6.2.1.1. Security at Ingress
The procedures related to the Segment Routing security are detailed
in [I-D.vyncke-6man-segment-routing-security].
In the case where the SR domain boundaries are not under control of
the network operator (e.g.: when the SR domain edge is in a home
network), it is important to authenticate and validate the content of
any SRH being received by the network operator. In such case, the
security procedure described in
[I-D.vyncke-6man-segment-routing-security] is to be used.
The ingress node (e.g.: the host in the home network) requests the
SRH from a control system (e.g.: an SDN controller) which delivers
the SRH with its HMAC signature on it.
Then, the home network host can send out SR packets (with an SRH on
it) that will be validated at the ingress of the network operator
infrastructure.
The ingress node of the network operator infrastructure, is
configured in order to validate the incoming SRH HMACs in order to
allow only packets having correct SRH according to their SA/DA
addresses.
6.2.2. Transit Non-SR Capable Node
SR is interoperable with plain IPv6 forwarding. Any non SR-capable
node will forward SR packets solely based on the DA. There's no SRH
inspection. This ensures full interoperability between SR and non-SR
nodes.
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6.2.3. SR Intra Segment Transit Node
Only the node whose address is in DA inspects and processes the SRH
(according to [RFC2460]). An intra segment transit node is not in
the DA and its forwarding is based on DA and its SR-IPv6 FIB.
6.2.4. SR Segment Endpoint Node
The SR segment endpoint node is the node whose address is in the DA.
The segment endpoint node inspects the SRH and does:
1. IF DA = myself (segment endpoint)
2. IF Segments Left > 0 THEN
decrement Segments Left
update DA with Segment List[Segments Left]
3. IF Segments Left == 0 THEN
IF Clean-up bit is set THEN remove the SRH
4. ELSE give the packet to next PID (application)
End of processing.
5. Forward the packet out
6.3. FRR Flag Settings
A node supporting SR and doing Fast Reroute (as described in
[I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-use-cases], when rerouting
packets through FRR mechanisms, SHOULD inspect the rerouted packet
header and look for the SRH. If the SRH is present, the rerouting
node SHOULD set the Protected bit on all rerouted packets.
7. SR and Tunneling
Encapsulation can be realized in two different ways with SR-IPv6:
Outer encapsulation.
SRH with SA/DA original addresses.
Outer encapsulation tunneling is the traditional method where an
additional IPv6 header is prepended to the packet. The original IPv6
header being encapsulated, everything is preserved and the packet is
switched/routed according to the outer header (that could contain a
SRH).
SRH allows encoding both original SA and DA, hence an operator may
decide to change the SA/DA at ingress and restore them at egress.
This can be achieved without outer encapsulation, by changing SA/DA
and encoding the original SA in the Policy List and in the original
DA in the Segment List.
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8. Example Use Case
A more detailed description of use cases are available in
[I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases]. In this section, a simple SR-IPv6
example is illustrated.
In the topology described in Figure 6 it is assumed an end-to-end SR
deployment. Therefore SR is supported by all nodes from A to J.
Home Network | Backbone | Datacenter
| |
| +---+ +---+ +---+ | +---+ |
+---|---| C |---| D |---| E |---|---| I |---|
| | +---+ +---+ +---+ | +---+ |
| | | | | | | | +---+
+---+ +---+ | | | | | | |--| X |
| A |---| B | | +---+ +---+ +---+ | +---+ | +---+
+---+ +---+ | | F |---| G |---| H |---|---| J |---|
| +---+ +---+ +---+ | +---+ |
| |
| +-----------+
| SDN |
| Orch/Ctlr |
+-----------+
Figure 6: Sample SR topology
The following workflow applies to packets sent by host A and destined
to server X.
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. Host A sends a request for a path to server X to the SDN
controller or orchestration system.
. The SDN controller/orchestrator builds a SRH with:
. Segment List: C, F, J, X
. HMAC
that satisfies the requirements expressed in the request
by host A and based on policies applicable to host A.
. Host A receives the SRH and insert it into the packet.
The packet has now:
. SA: A
. DA: C
. SRH with
. SL: X, J, F, C
. Segments Left: 3 (i.e.: Segment List size - 1)
. PL: C (ingress), J (egress)
Note that X is the last segment and C is the
first segment (i.e.: the SL is encoded in the reverse
path order).
. HMAC
. When packet arrives in C (first segment), C does:
. Validate the HMAC of the SRH.
. Decrement Segments Left by one: 2
. Update the DA with the next segment found in
Segment List[2]. DA is set to F.
. Forward the packet to F.
. When packet arrives in F (second segment), F does:
. Decrement Segments Left by one: 1
. Update the DA with the next segment found in
Segment List[1]. DA is set to J.
. Forward the packet to J.
. Packet travels across G and H nodes which do plain
IPv6 forwarding based on DA. No inspection of SRH needs
to be done in these nodes. However, any SR capable node
is allowed to set the Protected bit in case of FRR
protection.
. When packet arrives in J (third segment), J does:
. Decrement Segments Left by one: 0
. Update the DA with the next segment found in
Segment List[0]. DA is set to X.
. If the cleanup bit is set, then node J will strip out
the SRH from the packet.
. Forward the packet to X.
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The packet arrives in the server that may or may not support SR. The
return traffic, from server to host, may be sent using the same
procedures.
9. Security Considerations
This section analyzes the security threat model, the security issues
and proposed solutions related to the new Segment Routing Header.
The Segment Routing Header (SRH) is simply another type of the
routing header as described in RFC 2460 [RFC2460] and is:
o inserted by a SR edge router when entering the segment routing
domain or by the originating host itself. The source host can
even be outside the SR domain;
o inspected and acted upon when reaching the destination address of
the IP header per RFC 2460 [RFC2460].
Per RFC2460 [RFC2460], routers on the path that simply forward an
IPv6 packet (i.e. the IPv6 destination address is none of theirs)
will never inspect and process the content of SRH. Routers whose one
interface IPv6 address equals the destination address field of the
IPv6 packet MUST to parse the SRH and, if supported and if the local
configuration allows it, MUST act accordingly to the SRH content.
According to RFC2460 [RFC2460], the default behavior of a non SR-
capable router upon receipt of an IPv6 packet with SRH destined to an
address of its, is to:
o ignore the SRH completely if the Segment Left field is 0 and
proceed to process the next header in the IPv6 packet;
o discard the IPv6 packet if Segment Left field is greater than 0,
it MAY send a Parameter Problem ICMP message back to the Source
Address.
9.1. Threat model
9.1.1. Source routing threats
Using a SRH is similar to source routing, therefore it has some well-
known security issues as described in RFC4942 [RFC4942] section 2.1.1
and RFC5095 [RFC5095]:
o amplification attacks: where a packet could be forged in such a
way to cause looping among a set of SR-enabled routers causing
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unnecessary traffic, hence a Denial of Service (DoS) against
bandwidth;
o reflection attack: where a hacker could force an intermediate node
to appear as the immediate attacker, hence hiding the real
attacker from naive forensic;
o bypass attack: where an intermediate node could be used as a
stepping stone (for example in a De-Militarized Zone) to attack
another host (for example in the datacenter or any back-end
server).
9.1.2. Applicability of RFC 5095 to SRH
First of all, the reader must remember this specific part of section
1 of RFC5095 [RFC5095], "A side effect is that this also eliminates
benign RH0 use-cases; however, such applications may be facilitated
by future Routing Header specifications.". In short, it is not
forbidden to create new secure type of Routing Header; for example,
RFC 6554 (RPL) [RFC6554] also creates a new Routing Header type for a
specific application confined in a single network.
In the segment routing architecture described in
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] there are basically two kinds of
nodes (routers and hosts):
o nodes within the SR domain, which is within one single
administrative domain, i.e., where all nodes are trusted anyway
else the damage caused by those nodes could be worse than
amplification attacks: traffic interception, man-in-the-middle
attacks, more server DoS by dropping packets, and so on.
o nodes outside of the SR domain, which is outside of the
administrative segment routing domain hence they cannot be trusted
because there is no physical security for those nodes, i.e., they
can be replaced by hostile nodes or can be coerced in wrong
behaviors.
The main use case for SR consists of the single administrative domain
where only trusted nodes with SR enabled and configured participate
in SR: this is the same model as in RFC6554 [RFC6554]. All non-
trusted nodes do not participate as either SR processing is not
enabled by default or because they only process SRH from nodes within
their domain.
Moreover, all SR nodes ignore SRH created by outsiders based on
topology information (received on a peering or internal interface) or
on presence and validity of the HMAC field. Therefore, if
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intermediate nodes ONLY act on valid and authorized SRH (such as
within a single administrative domain), then there is no security
threat similar to RH-0. Hence, the RFC 5095 [RFC5095] attacks are
not applicable.
9.1.3. Service stealing threat
Segment routing is used for added value services, there is also a
need to prevent non-participating nodes to use those services; this
is called 'service stealing prevention'.
9.1.4. Topology disclosure
The SRH may also contains IPv6 addresses of some intermediate SR-
nodes in the path towards the destination, this obviously reveals
those addresses to the potentially hostile attackers if those
attackers are able to intercept packets containing SRH. On the other
hand, if the attacker can do a traceroute whose probes will be
forwarded along the SR path, then there is little learned by
intercepting the SRH itself. Also the clean-bit of SRH can help by
removing the SRH before forwarding the packet to potentially a non-
trusted part of the network.
9.1.5. ICMP Generation
Per section 4.4 of RFC2460 [RFC2460], when destination nodes (i.e.
where the destination address is one of theirs) receive a Routing
Header with unsupported Routing Type, the required behavior is:
o If Segments Left is zero, the node must ignore the Routing header
and proceed to process the next header in the packet.
o If Segments Left is non-zero, the node must discard the packet and
send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the packet's
Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Routing Type.
This required behavior could be used by an attacker to force the
generation of ICMP message by any node. The attacker could send
packets with SRH (with Segment Left set to 0) destined to a node not
supporting SRH. Per RFC2460 [RFC2460], the destination node could
generate an ICMP message, causing a local CPU utilization and if the
source of the offending packet with SRH was spoofed could lead to a
reflection attack without any amplification.
It must be noted that this is a required behavior for any unsupported
Routing Type and not limited to SRH packets. So, it is not specific
to SRH and the usual rate limiting for ICMP generation is required
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anyway for any IPv6 implementation and has been implemented and
deployed for many years.
9.2. Security fields in SRH
This section summarizes the use of specific fields in the SRH. They
are based on a key-hashed message authentication code (HMAC).
The security-related fields in SRH are:
o HMAC Key-id, 8 bits wide;
o HMAC, 256 bits wide (optional, exists only if HMAC Key-id is not
0).
The HMAC field is the output of the HMAC computation (per RFC 2104
[RFC2104]) using a pre-shared key identified by HMAC Key-id and of
the text which consists of the concatenation of:
o the source IPv6 address;
o First Segment field;
o an octet whose bit-0 is the clean-up bit flag and others are 0;
o HMAC Key-id;
o all addresses in the Segment List.
The purpose of the HMAC field is to verify the validity, the
integrity and the authorization of the SRH itself. If an outsider of
the SR domain does not have access to a current pre-shared secret,
then it cannot compute the right HMAC field and the first SR router
on the path processing the SRH and configured to check the validity
of the HMAC will simply reject the packet.
The HMAC field is located at the end of the SRH simply because only
the router on the ingress of the SR domain needs to process it, then
all other SR nodes can ignore it (based on local policy) because they
trust the upstream router. This is to speed up forwarding operations
because SR routers which do not validate the SRH do not need to parse
the SRH until the end.
The HMAC Key-id field allows for the simultaneous existence of
several hash algorithms (SHA-256, SHA3-256 ... or future ones) as
well as pre-shared keys. This allows for pre-shared key roll-over
when two pre-shared keys are supported for a while when all SR nodes
converged to a fresher pre-shared key. The HMAC Key-id field is
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opaque, i.e., it has neither syntax not semantic except as an index
to the right combination of pre-shared key and hash algorithm and
except that a value of 0 means that there is no HMAC field. It could
also allow for interoperation among different SR domains if allowed
by local policy and assuming a collision-free Key Id allocation.
When a specific SRH is linked to a time-related service (such as
turbo-QoS for a 1-hour period) where the DA, Segment ID (SID) are
identical, then it is important to refresh the shared-secret
frequently as the HMAC validity period expires only when the HMAC
Key-id and its associated shared-secret expires.
9.2.1. Selecting a hash algorithm
The HMAC field in the SRH is 256 bit wide. Therefore, the HMAC MUST
be based on a hash function whose output is at least 256 bits. If
the output of the hash function is 256, then this output is simply
inserted in the HMAC field. If the output of the hash function is
larger than 256 bits, then the output value is truncated to 256 by
taking the least-significant 256 bits and inserting them in the HMAC
field.
SRH implementations can support multiple hash functions but MUST
implement SHA-2 [FIPS180-4] in its SHA-256 variant.
NOTE: SHA-1 is currently used by some early implementations used for
quick interoperations testing, the 160-bit hash value must then be
right-hand padded with 96 bits set to 0. The authors understand that
this is not secure but is ok for limited tests.
9.2.2. Performance impact of HMAC
While adding a HMAC to each and every SR packet increases the
security, it has a performance impact. Nevertheless, it must be
noted that:
o the HMAC field is used only when SRH is inserted by a device (such
as a home set-up box) which is outside of the segment routing
domain. If the SRH is added by a router in the trusted segment
routing domain, then, there is no need for a HMAC field, hence no
performance impact.
o when present, the HMAC field MUST only be checked and validated by
the first router of the segment routing domain, this router is
named 'validating SR router'. Downstream routers may not inspect
the HMAC field.
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o this validating router can also have a cache of <IPv6 header +
SRH, HMAC field value> to improve the performance. It is not the
same use case as in IPsec where HMAC value was unique per packet,
in SRH, the HMAC value is unique per flow.
o Last point, hash functions such as SHA-2 have been optmized for
security and performance and there are multiple implementations
with good performance.
With the above points in mind, the performance impact of using HMAC
is minimized.
9.2.3. Pre-shared key management
The field HMAC Key-id allows for:
o key roll-over: when there is a need to change the key (the hash
pre-shared secret), then multiple pre-shared keys can be used
simultaneously. The validating routing can have a table of <HMAC
Key-id, pre-shared secret> for the currently active and future
keys.
o different algorithm: by extending the previous table to <HMAC Key-
id, hash function, pre-shared secret>, the validating router can
also support simultaneously several hash algorithms (see section
Section 9.2.1)
The pre-shared secret distribution can be done:
o in the configuration of the validating routers, either by static
configuration or any SDN oriented approach;
o dynamically using a trusted key distribution such as [RFC6407]
The intent of this document is NOT to define yet-another-key-
distribution-protocol.
9.3. Deployment Models
9.3.1. Nodes within the SR domain
A SR domain is defined as a set of interconnected routers where all
routers at the perimeter are configured to insert and act on SRH.
Some routers inside the SR domain can also act on SRH or simply
forward IPv6 packets.
The routers inside a SR domain can be trusted to generate SRH and to
process SRH received on interfaces that are part of the SR domain.
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These nodes MUST drop all SRH packets received on an interface that
is not part of the SR domain and containing a SRH whose HMAC field
cannot be validated by local policies. This includes obviously
packet with a SRH generated by a non-cooperative SR domain.
If the validation fails, then these packets MUST be dropped, ICMP
error messages (parameter problem) SHOULD be generated (but rate
limited) and SHOULD be logged.
9.3.2. Nodes outside of the SR domain
Nodes outside of the SR domain cannot be trusted for physical
security; hence, they need to request by some trusted means (outside
of the scope of this document) a complete SRH for each new connection
(i.e. new destination address). The received SRH MUST include a HMAC
Key-id and HMAC field which is computed correctly (see Section 9.2).
When an outside node sends a packet with an SRH and towards a SR
domain ingress node, the packet MUST contain the HMAC Key-id and HMAC
field and the the destination address MUST be an address of a SR
domain ingress node .
The ingress SR router, i.e., the router with an interface address
equals to the destination address, MUST verify the HMAC field with
respect to the HMAC Key-id.
If the validation is successful, then the packet is simply forwarded
as usual for a SR packet. As long as the packet travels within the
SR domain, no further HMAC check needs to be done. Subsequent
routers in the SR domain MAY verify the HMAC field when they process
the SRH (i.e. when they are the destination).
If the validation fails, then this packet MUST be dropped, an ICMP
error message (parameter problem) SHOULD be generated (but rate
limited) and SHOULD be logged.
9.3.3. SR path exposure
As the intermediate SR nodes addresses appears in the SRH, if this
SRH is visible to an outsider then he/she could reuse this knowledge
to launch an attack on the intermediate SR nodes or get some insider
knowledge on the topology. This is especially applicable when the
path between the source node and the first SR domain ingress router
is on the public Internet.
The first remark is to state that 'security by obscurity' is never
enough; in other words, the security policy of the SR domain MUST
assume that the internal topology and addressing is known by the
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attacker. A simple traceroute will also give the same information
(with even more information as all intermediate nodes between SID
will also be exposed). IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
[RFC4303] cannot be use to protect the SRH as per RFC4303 the ESP
header must appear after any routing header (including SRH).
To prevent a user to leverage the gained knowledge by intercepting
SRH, it it recommended to apply an infrastructure Access Control List
(iACL) at the edge of the SR domain. This iACL will drop all packets
from outside the SR-domain whose destination is any address of any
router inside the domain. This security policy should be tuned for
local operations.
9.3.4. Impact of BCP-38
BCP-38 [RFC2827], also known as "Network Ingress Filtering", checks
whether the source address of packets received on an interface is
valid for this interface. The use of loose source routing such as
SRH forces packets to follow a path which differs from the expected
routing. Therefore, if BCP-38 was implemented in all routers inside
the SR domain, then SR packets could be received by an interface
which is not expected one and the packets could be dropped.
As a SR domain is usually a subset of one administrative domain, and
as BCP-38 is only deployed at the ingress routers of this
administrative domain and as packets arriving at those ingress
routers have been normally forwarded using the normal routing
information, then there is no reason why this ingress router should
drop the SRH packet based on BCP-38. Routers inside the domain
commonly do not apply BCP-38; so, this is not a problem.
10. IANA Considerations
TBD
11. Manageability Considerations
TBD
12. Contributors
The authors would like to thank Dave Barach, John Leddy, John
Brzozowski, Pierre Francois, Nagendra Kumar, Mark Townsley, Christian
Martin, Roberta Maglione, Eric Vyncke, James Connolly, David Lebrun,
Aloys Augustin and Fred Baker for their contribution to this
document.
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13. Acknowledgements
TBD
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[FIPS180-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS
180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", March 2012,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/
fips-180-4.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions]
Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Bashandy, A., Gredler, H.,
Litkowski, S., Decraene, B., and J. Tantsura, "IS-IS
Extensions for Segment Routing", draft-ietf-isis-segment-
routing-extensions-05 (work in progress), June 2015.
[I-D.psenak-ospf-segment-routing-ospfv3-extension]
Psenak, P., Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Gredler, H.,
Shakir, R., Henderickx, W., and J. Tantsura, "OSPFv3
Extensions for Segment Routing", draft-psenak-ospf-
segment-routing-ospfv3-extension-02 (work in progress),
July 2014.
[I-D.vyncke-6man-segment-routing-security]
Vyncke, E., Previdi, S., and D. Lebrun, "IPv6 Segment
Routing Security Considerations", draft-vyncke-6man-
segment-routing-security-02 (work in progress), February
2015.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC5095] Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation
of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5095, December 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5095>.
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[RFC6407] Weis, B., Rowles, S., and T. Hardjono, "The Group Domain
of Interpretation", RFC 6407, DOI 10.17487/RFC6407,
October 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6407>.
14.2. Informative References
[I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-use-cases]
Filsfils, C., Francois, P., Previdi, S., Decraene, B.,
Litkowski, S., Horneffer, M., Milojevic, I., Shakir, R.,
Ytti, S., Henderickx, W., Tantsura, J., Kini, S., and E.
Crabbe, "Segment Routing Use Cases", draft-filsfils-
spring-segment-routing-use-cases-01 (work in progress),
October 2014.
[I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases]
Brzozowski, J., Leddy, J., Leung, I., Previdi, S.,
Townsley, W., Martin, C., Filsfils, C., and R. Maglione,
"IPv6 SPRING Use Cases", draft-ietf-spring-ipv6-use-
cases-04 (work in progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]
Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Decraene, B., Litkowski, S.,
and R. Shakir, "Segment Routing Architecture", draft-ietf-
spring-segment-routing-03 (work in progress), May 2015.
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing-mpls]
Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Bashandy, A., Decraene, B.,
Litkowski, S., Horneffer, M., Shakir, R., Tantsura, J.,
and E. Crabbe, "Segment Routing with MPLS data plane",
draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-mpls-01 (work in
progress), May 2015.
[RFC1940] Estrin, D., Li, T., Rekhter, Y., Varadhan, K., and D.
Zappala, "Source Demand Routing: Packet Format and
Forwarding Specification (Version 1)", RFC 1940,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1940, May 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1940>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
1997.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
May 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.
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[RFC4942] Davies, E., Krishnan, S., and P. Savola, "IPv6 Transition/
Co-existence Security Considerations", RFC 4942,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4942, September 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4942>.
[RFC6554] Hui, J., Vasseur, JP., Culler, D., and V. Manral, "An IPv6
Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol
for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)", RFC 6554, March
2012.
Authors' Addresses
Stefano Previdi (editor)
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Via Del Serafico, 200
Rome 00142
Italy
Email: sprevidi@cisco.com
Clarence Filsfils
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Brussels
BE
Email: cfilsfil@cisco.com
Brian Field
Comcast
4100 East Dry Creek Road
Centennial, CO 80122
US
Email: Brian_Field@cable.comcast.com
Ida Leung
Rogers Communications
8200 Dixie Road
Brampton, ON L6T 0C1
CA
Email: Ida.Leung@rci.rogers.com
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Ebben Aries
Facebook
US
Email: exa@fb.com
Eric Vyncke
Cisco Systems, Inc.
De Kleetlaann 6A
Diegem 1831
Belgium
Email: evyncke@cisco.com
David Lebrun
Universite Catholique de Louvain
Place Ste Barbe, 2
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium
Email: david.lebrun@uclouvain.be
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