DOTS T. Reddy
Internet-Draft D. Wing
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco
Expires: April 30, 2017 M. Boucadair
Orange
K. Nishizuka
NTT Communications
L. Xia
Huawei
October 27, 2016
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
draft-reddy-dots-data-channel-01
Abstract
The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data not
easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel
under attack conditions. This is a companion document to the DOTS
signal channel specification.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. DOTS Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. DOTS Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Create Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Delete Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3. Retrieving Installed Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Install Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2. Remove Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.3. Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . 13
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.
In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising
enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and
amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application
server, a client, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.
DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) defines two channels: signal and
data channels [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] (Figure 1). The DOTS
signal channel used to convey that a network is under a DDOS attack
to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are
undertaken on the suspect traffic is further elaborated in
[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel]. The DOTS data channel is used for
infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents in the aim to
significantly augment attack response coordination.
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+---------------+ +---------------+
| | <------- Signal Channel ------> | |
| DOTS Client | | DOTS Server |
| | <======= Data Channel ======> | |
+---------------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: DOTS Channels
Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] identifies that the DOTS
data channel is used to perform the tasks listed below:
o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or
remove traffic filters dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic
and permitting white-listed traffic. Sample use cases for
populating black- or white-list filtering rules are detailed
hereafter:
A. If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS
attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its
servicing router (DOTS gateway) of all suspect IP addresses
that need to be blocked or black-listed for further
investigation. The DOTS client could also specify a list of
protocols and ports in the black-list rule. That DOTS gateway
in-turn propagates the black-listed IP addresses to the DOTS
server which will undertake appropriate action so that traffic
from these IP addresses to the target network (specified by
the DOTS client) is blocked.
B. An enterprise network has partner sites from which only
legitimate traffic arrives and the enterprise network wants to
ensure that the traffic from these sites is not penalized
during DDOS attacks. The DOTS client uses DOTS data channel
to convey the white-listed IP addresses or prefixes of the
partner sites to its DOTS server. The DOTS server uses this
information to white-list flows from such IP addresses or
prefixes reaching the enterprise network.
o Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for
which mitigation may be requested:
A. The DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server a collection of
prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when requesting
mitigation, to which the server would respond with a success
status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and
message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request
failed (see requirement OP-006 in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
and Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]).
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2. Notational Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].
3. DOTS Data Channel
The DOTS data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges
between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, which must operate
nominally even when confronted with despite signal degradation due to
packet loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to
deal with attack conditions.
As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a
reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect
data delivery success or failure. Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP) [RFC7252] over TLS [RFC5246] over TCP is used for DOTS data
channel (Figure 2). COAP was designed according to the REST
architecture, and thus exhibits functionality similar to that of
HTTP, it is quite straightforward to map from CoAP to HTTP and from
HTTP to CoAP.
+--------------+
| DOTS |
+--------------+
| CoAP |
+--------------+
| TLS |
+--------------+
| TCP |
+--------------+
| IP |
+--------------+
Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS data channel over CoAP over TLS
JSON [RFC7159] payloads is used to convey DOTS signal channel session
configuration, filtering rules as well as data channel specific
payload messages that convey request parameters and response
information such as errors. All data channel URIs defined in this
document, and in subsequent documents, MUST NOT have a URI containing
"/DOTS-signal".
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A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used to
exchange multiple requests and multiple responses. To reduce DOTS
client and DOTS server workload, DOTS client SHOULD re-use the TLS
session.
3.1. DOTS Provisioning
A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set
up DOTS related configuration and policy information exchange between
the two DOTS agents.
3.1.1. Create Identifiers
A POST request is used to create identifiers, such as names or
aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested. Such
identifiers may then be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel
exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack
(Figure 3).
Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Uri-Path: "identifier"
Content-Format: "application/json"
{
"policy-id": "integer",
"id": { "alias-name" : [
"traffic-protocol": "string",
"destination-protocol-port": "string",
"destination-ip": "string",
],
"alias-name" : [
"FQDN": "string",
],
"alias-name" : [
"URI": "string",
],
}
"alias-name" : [
"E.164": "string",
]
}
}
Figure 3: POST to create identifiers
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The header fields are described below:
policy-id: Identifier of the policy represented using an integer.
This identifier MUST be unique for each policy bound to the DOTS
client, i.e., the policy-id needs to be unique relative to the
active policies with the DOTS server. This identifier MUST be
generated by the client. This document does not make any
assumption about how this identifier is generated. This is a
mandatory attribute.
alias-name: Name of the alias. This is a mandatory attribute.
traffic-protocol: Valid protocol values include tcp, udp, sctp, and
dccp. Protocol values are separated by commas (e.g., "tcp, udp").
This is an optional attribute.
destination-protocol-port: The destination port number. Ports are
separated by commas and port number range (using "-"). For TCP,
UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: the destination range of ports (e.g.,
80-8080). This information is useful to avoid disturbing a group
of customers when address sharing is in use [RFC6269]. This is an
optional attribute.
destination-ip: The destination IP address or prefix. IP addresses
and prefixes are separated by commas. Prefixes are represented
using CIDR [RFC4632] notation. This is an optional attribute.
FQDN: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a system,
rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a
hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN. This is an optional
attribute.
URI: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This is an optional
attribute.
E.164: E.164 number. This is an optional attribute.
In the POST request at least one of the attributes traffic-protocol
or destination-protocol-port or destination-ip or FQDN or URI or
E.164 MUST be present.
Figure 4 shows a POST request to create alias called "https1" for
HTTPS servers with IP addresses 2002:db8:6401::1 and 2002:db8:6401::2
listening on port 443.
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Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Uri-Path: "identifier"
Content-Format: "application/json"
{
"policy-id": 123321333242,
"id": { "Server1" : [
"traffic-protocol": "tcp",
"destination-protocol-port": "443",
"destination-ip": "2002:db8:6401::1,
2002:db8:6401::2",
]
}
}
Figure 4: POST to create identifiers
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success, CoAP 4.xx
codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5.xx codes are returned
if the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of accepting the
alias. Response code 2.01 (Created) will be returned in the response
if the DOTS server has accepted the alias. If the request is missing
one or more mandatory attributes, then 4.00 (Bad Request) will be
returned in the response or if the request contains invalid or
unknown parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) will be returned in the
response. The CoAP response will include the JSON body received in
the request.
3.1.2. Delete Identifier
A DELETE request is used to delete an identifier maintained by a DOTS
server (Figure 5).
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Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Uri-Path: "identifier"
Content-Format: "application/json"
{
"policy-id": "number"
}
Figure 5: DELETE identifier
If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the
DELETE request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04
(Not Found) error response code. The DOTS server successfully
acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the identifier using
2.02 (Deleted) response code.
3.1.3. Retrieving Installed Identifiers
A GET request is used to retrieve the set of installed identifiers
from a DOTS server.
Figure 6 shows how to retrieve all the identifiers that were
instantiated by the DOTS client while Figure 7 shows how to retrieve
a specific identifier.
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Uri-Path: "identifier"
Figure 6: GET to retrieve all the installed identifiers
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Uri-Path: "identifier"
Uri-Path: "policy-id value"
Figure 7: GET to retrieve the specific identifier
Figure 8 shows response for all identifiers on the DOTS server.
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{
"policy-data":[
{
"policy-id": 1234534333242
"id": { "Server1" : [
"traffic-protocol": "tcp",
"destination-protocol-port": "443",
"destination-ip": "2002:db8:6401::1,
2002:db8:6401::2",
]
}
},
{
"policy-id": 1233213344443
"id": { "Server2" : [
"traffic-protocol": "tcp",
"destination-protocol-port": "80",
"destination-ip": "2002:db8:6401::10,
2002:db8:6401::20",
]
}
}
]
}
Figure 8: Response body
If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the
GET request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04
(Not Found) error response code.
3.2. Filtering Rules
One of the possible arrangements for a DOTS client to signal
filtering rules to a DOTS server via the DOTS gateway is discussed
below:
The DOTS data channel conveys the filtering rules to the DOTS
gateway. The DOTS gateway validates if the DOTS client is authorized
to signal the filtering rules and if the client is authorized
propagates the rules to the DOTS server. Likewise, the DOTS server
validates if the DOTS gateway is authorized to signal the filtering
rules. To create or purge filters, the DOTS client sends CoAP
requests to the DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway validates the rules
and proxies the requests containing the filtering rules to a DOTS
server. When the DOTS gateway receives the associated CoAP response
from the DOTS server, it propagates the response back to the DOTS
client.
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The following APIs define means for a DOTS client to configure
filtering rules on a DOTS server.
3.2.1. Install Filtering Rules
A POST request is used to push filtering rules to a DOTS server
(Figure 9).
Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Uri-Path: "filter"
Content-Format: "application/json"
{
"policy-id": "integer",
"traffic-protocol": "string",
"source-protocol-port": "string",
"destination-protocol-port": "string",
"destination-ip": "string",
"source-ip": "string",
"lifetime": "number",
"dscp": "string",
"traffic-rate" : "number"
}
Figure 9: POST to install filtering rules
The header fields are described below:
policy-id: An identifier of the policy represented as an integer.
This identifier MUST be unique for each policy bound to the DOTS
client, i.e., the policy-id needs to be unique relative to the
active policies with the DOTS server. This identifier MUST be
generated by the client. This document does not make any
assumption about how this identifier is generated. This is a
mandatory attribute.
traffic-protocol: Valid protocol values include tcp, udp, sctp, and
dccp. Protocol values are separated by commas (e.g., "tcp, udp").
This is an optional attribute.
source-protocol-port: The source port number. Ports are separated
by commas and port number range (using "-"). For TCP, UDP, SCTP,
or DCCP: the source range of ports (e.g., 1024-65535). This is an
optional attribute.
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destination-protocol-port: The destination port number. Ports are
separated by commas and port number range (using "-"). For TCP,
UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: the destination range of ports (e.g.,
443-443). This information is useful to avoid disturbing a group
of customers when address sharing is in use [RFC6269]. This is an
optional attribute.
destination-ip: The destination IP address or prefix. IP addresses
and prefixes are separated by commas. Prefixes are represented
using CIDR notation. This is an optional attribute.
source-ip: The source IP addresses or prefix. IP addresses and
prefixes are separated by commas. Prefixes are represented using
CIDR notation. This is an optional attribute.
lifetime: Lifetime of the rule in seconds. Upon the expiry of this
lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed, this particular
rule is removed. The rule can be refreshed by sending the same
message again. The default lifetime of the rule is 60 minutes --
this value was chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not
typically a burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the rule
where the client has unexpectedly quit in a timely manner. A
lifetime of zero indicates indefinite lifetime for the rule. The
server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the response.
This is an optional attribute.
dscp: Differentiated services code point (DSCP) value in the IP
header of a packet. This is an optional attribute.
traffic-rate: This is the allowed traffic rate in bytes per second
indicated in IEEE floating point [IEEE.754.1985] format. The
value 0 indicates all traffic for the particular flow to be
discarded. This is a mandatory attribute.
In the POST request at least one of the attributes traffic-protocol
or source-protocol-port or destination-protocol-port or destination-
ip or source-ip MUST be present. The relative order of two rules is
determined by comparing their respective policy identifiers. The
rule with higher numeric policy identifier value has higher
precedence (and thus will match before) than the rule with lower
numeric policy identifier value.
Figure 10 shows a POST request to block traffic from an attacker
using 2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64 IPv6 prefix to a network resource
reachable at IP address 2002:db8:6401::1 to operate a server on TCP
port 443.
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Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Content-Format: "application/json"
{
"policy-id": 123321333242,
"traffic-protocol": "tcp",
"source-protocol-port": "0-65535",
"destination-protocol-port": "443",
"destination-ip": "2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64",
"source-ip": "2002:db8:6401::1",
"lifetime": 1800,
"traffic-rate": 0
}
Figure 10: POST to Install filterng rules
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success, CoAP 4.xx
codes are some sort of invalid request and 5.xx codes are returned if
the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of configuring the
filtering rules. Response code 2.01 (Created) will be returned in
the response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules. If
the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes then 4.00
(Bad Request) will be returned in the response or if the request
contains invalid or unknown parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) will
be returned in the response. The CoAP response will include the JSON
body received in the request.
3.2.2. Remove Filtering Rules
A DELETE request is used to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server
(Figure 11).
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Content-Format: "application/json"
{
"policy-id": "number"
}
Figure 11: DELETE to remove the filtering rules
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If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the
DELETE request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04
(Not Found) error response code. The DOTS server successfully
acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the filtering rules
using 2.02 (Deleted) response code, and removes the filtering rules
as soon as possible.
3.2.3. Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules
The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the
counters for installed filtering rules. A GET request is used to
retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server.
Figure 12 shows how to retrieve all the filtering rules programmed by
the DOTS client while Figure 13 shows how to retrieve specific
filtering rules programmed by the DOTS client.
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Uri-Path: "list"
Figure 12: GET to retrieve the filtering rules (1)
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
Uri-Path: "policy-id value"
Figure 13: GET to retrieve the filtering rules (2)
Figure 14 shows response for all active policies on the DOTS server.
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{
"policy-data":[
{
"policy-id":123321333242,
"traffic-protocol": "tcp",
"source-protocol-port": "0-65535",
"destination-protocol-port": "443",
"destination-ip": "2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64",
"source-ip": "2002:db8:6401::1",
"lifetime": 1800,
"traffic-rate": 0,
"match-count": 689324,
},
{
"policy-id":123321333242,
"traffic-protocol": "udp",
"source-protocol-port": "0-65535",
"destination-protocol-port": "53",
"destination-ip": "2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64",
"source-ip": "2002:db8:6401::2",
"lifetime": 1800,
"traffic-rate": 0,
"match-count": 6666,
}
]
}
Figure 14: Response body
If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the
GET request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04
(Not Found) error response code.
4. IANA Considerations
TODO
[TBD: DOTS WG will probably have to do something similar to
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-10, create JSON DOTS
claim registry and register the JSON attributes defined in this
specification].
5. Security Considerations
Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and
message integrity. TLS based on client certificate MUST be used for
mutual authentication. The interaction between the DOTS agents
requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering
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confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST
be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.
An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application
segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used.
Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result
in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS
on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO
[RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an
attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore
will never reach the TLS layer.
Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation
of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of
the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that
network).
Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish
exchange instructions and notification over a secure and
authenticated channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid
that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as
deleting filtering rules. Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated
from within the trusted domain if an entity has been corrupted.
Adequate means to monitor trusted nodes should also be enabled.
6. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Andrew Mortensen,
Roman Danyliw, and Gilbert Clark for the discussion and comments.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]
Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T.,
christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and
N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
architecture-00 (work in progress), July 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-02 (work in
progress), July 2016.
[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel]
Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Wing, D., and P. Patil,
"Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Signal Channel", draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel-01
(work in progress), September 2016.
[IEEE.754.1985]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic", August
1985.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC6269] Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6269>.
Reddy, et al. Expires April 30, 2017 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft DOTS Data Channel October 2016
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
Authors' Addresses
Tirumaleswar Reddy
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560103
India
Email: tireddy@cisco.com
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134
USA
Email: dwing@cisco.com
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Kaname Nishizuka
NTT Communications
GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
Tokyo 108-8118
Japan
Email: kaname@nttv6.jp
Reddy, et al. Expires April 30, 2017 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft DOTS Data Channel October 2016
Liang Xia
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012
China
Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Reddy, et al. Expires April 30, 2017 [Page 18]