Network Working Group J. Richer, Ed.
Internet-Draft Bespoke Engineering
Intended status: Standards Track May 15, 2019
Expires: November 16, 2019
Transactional Authorization
draft-richer-transactional-authz-00
Abstract
This document defines a mechanism for delegating authorization to a
piece of software, and conveying that delegation to the software.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 RFC 2119 [RFC2119] RFC 8174 [RFC8174] when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2019.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Transaction request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. User . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Interact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4.1. Redirect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4.2. Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5.1. Detatched JWS method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5.2. MTLS method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5.3. DID method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Interaction response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Redirect interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Secondary device interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Wait response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Interaction at the AS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Error response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Transaction continue request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Token response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Handle references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Validating handles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Transaction handles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.3. Client handles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.4. Resource handles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.5. User handles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.6. Key handles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Binding Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Binding a key to a transaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2. Validating detached JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.3. Validating attached JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.4. Validating MTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.5. Validating DID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Using a Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
16. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Parties
The Authorization Server (AS) manages the transactions. It is
defined by its transaction endpoint, a single URL that accepts a POST
request with a JSON payload. The AS can also have other endpoints,
including interaction endpoints.
The Authorization Requester (AR) is a party calling the AS. It can
be acting as either RC or RS. (TODO: there needs to be a better term
for this.)
The Resource Client (RC) requests tokens from the AS and uses tokens
at the RS.
The Resource Server (RS) accepts tokens from the RC and validates
them (potentially at the AS).
The Resource Owner (RO) authorizes the request from the RC to the RS
2. Transaction request
To start a transaction, the RC makes a transaction request to the
transaction endpoint of the AS. The RC creates a JSON document with
up to five sections.
client Information about the RC making the request, including
display name, home page, logo, and other user-facing information.
This section is RECOMMENDED.
resources Information about the RS's the resulting token will be
applied to, including locations, extents of access, types of data
being accessed, and other API information. This section is
REQUIRED.
user Information about the RO as known to or provided to the RC, in
the form of assertions or references to external data. This
section is OPTIONAL.
interact Information about how the RC is able to interact with the
RO, including callback URI's and state. This section is REQUIRED
if the client is capable of driving interaction with the user.
keys Information about the keys known to the RC and able to be
presented in future parts of the transaction. This section is
REQUIRED. (Note: I can't think of a good reason for this to be
optional.)
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An AS MAY
2.1. Client
This section provides descriptive details of the client software
making the call.
name Display name of the client software
uri User-facing web page of the client software
logo_uri Display image to represent the client software
client: {
name: "Display Name",
uri: "https://example.com/client"
}
This can also be presented as a client handle reference.
2.2. Resource
This section identifies the RS and describes what the RC wants to do
with the API hosted at the RS. This section is an array of objects,
each object representing a single resource set. That AS MUST
interpret the request as being for all of the resources listed.
actions The types of actions the RC will take at the RS
locations URIs the RC will call at the RS
data types of data available to the RC at the RS's API
resources: [
{
actions: ["read", "write"],
locations: ["https://exapmle.com/resource"]
data: ["foo", "bar"]
}
]
This can also be presented as a set of resource handle references.
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2.3. User
This section provides a verifiable assertion about the RO interacting
with the client on behalf of the request.
assertion The value of the assertion as a string.
type The type of the assertion. Possible values include
"oidc_id_token"...
user: {
assertion: "eyj0....",
type: "oidc_id_token"
}
This can also be presented as a user handle reference.
2.4. Interact
This section provides details of how the RC can interact with the RO.
All interact requests MUST have the "type" field.
type REQUIRED. Type of interaction. Can be "redirect" or "device".
Each interaction type has its own parameters and behaviors, detailed
below.
This can also be presented as interaction handle reference.
2.4.1. Redirect
A redirect type interaction has the RC send the RO to a URL at the AS
and interact with the AS directly, using any number of interactions.
Following the interaction, the RO is sent back to the RC using the
"callback" URI.
type MUST be "redirect"
callback REQUIRED. URI to send the user to after interaction,
SHOULD (MUST?) be unique per transaction and hosted or accessible
by the RC. This URL MUST NOT contain any fragment component.
This URL MUST be protected by HTTPS, hosted on a server local to
the user's browser ("localhost"), or use an application-specific
URL scheme. MAY be limited by the AS based on the client's
information.
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state REQUIRED. Unique value to be returned to the application as a
query parameter on the callback URL, must be sufficiently random
to be unguessable by an attacker. MUST be generated by the client
for this transaction.
interact: {
type: redirect
callback: https://client.foo/
state: foo
}
2.4.2. Device
The device type interaction has the RC instruct the user to go to a
URL at the AS using a secondary device. The user then interacts with
the AS directly by entering a short code provided by the AS to the
RC. Following the interaction, the RO is prompted by the AS to check
their RC device, which can poll the AS until the authorization is
complete.
type MUST be "device"
interact: {
type: device
}
2.5. Keys
This section lists the keys that the client can present proof of
ownership. Each key type has its own proofing mechanism and
additional required parameters, listed in individual sections below.
type Validation method for the key, must be one of "jwsd", "mtls/
x509", or "did/zkp".
All presented keys MUST be validated by the AS as per the Key
Validation section.
This can also be presented as a key handle reference. The key
referenced by a handle MUST be validated by the AS.
key: {
handle: "3eru876tyhgr5678ikjhgt"
}
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2.5.1. Detatched JWS method
type MUST be "jwsd"
jwks Value of the public key as a JWK Set JSON object [Note: should
this be a single JWK instead? And do we want to bother with url-
based references?]. MUST contain an "alg" field which is used to
validate the signature. MUST contain the "kid" field to identify
the key in the signed object.
key: {
type: jwsd,
jwks: { keys: [ alg: RS256, kty: ... ] }
}
2.5.2. MTLS method
type MUST be "mtls"
cert REQUIRED. String serialized value of the certificate
thumbprint as per OAuth-MTLS.
key: {
type: mtls,
cert: "MII...."
}
2.5.3. DID method
type MUST be "did"
did The DID URL identifying the key (or keys) used to sign this
request.
key: {
type: did,
did: "did:v:foo...."
}
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3. Interaction response
When evaluating a transaction request, the AS can determine that it
needs to have the RO present to interact with the AS before issuing a
token. This interaction can include the RO logging in to the AS,
authorizing the transaction, providing proof claims, determining if
the transaction decision should be remembered for the future, and
other items.
The AS responds to the RC based on the type of interaction supported
by the RC in the transaction request.
This response can indicate a set of keys are bound to the transaction
as in Key Binding. This response includes a transaction handle as in
Transaction Handle.
3.1. Redirect interaction
If the RC supports a "redirect" style interaction, the AS creates a
unique interaction URL and returns it to the RC. This URL MUST be
associated with a single pending transaction.
interaction_url The interaction URL that the RC will direct the RO
to. This URL MUST be unique to this transaction request. The URL
SHOULD contain a random portion of sufficient entropy so as not to
be guessable by the user. The URL MUST NOT contain the
transaction handle or any client identifying information. This
URL MUST be protected by HTTPS. This URL MUST NOT contain any
fragment component.
handle The transaction handle to use in the continue request once
the RO has been returned to the RC via the callback URL. See the
section on transaction handles.
{
interaction_url: "https://server.example.com/interact/123asdfklj",
handle: {
value: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh",
method: "bearer"
}
}
When the RC receives this response, it sends the RO to the
interaction URL. When interacting with the RO, the AS MAY perform
any of the behaviors in the User Interaction section.
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Once the RO has completed the interaction with the AS, the AS returns
the user to the RC by redirecting the RO's browser to the RC's
callback URL presented at the start of the transaction, with the
state parameter appended to the callback URL as a query parameter in
addition to an interaction handle to be returned to the AS in a
transaction continuation request.
state REQUIRED. The (hashed?) value of the state parameter sent by
the client in the initial interaction request.
interact_handle REQUIRED. A shared secret associated with this
interaction. This value MUST be sufficiently random so as not to
be guessable by an attacker. This value MUST be associated by the
AS with the underlying transaction that is associated to with this
interaction.
Upon processing this request to the callback URL, the client MUST
match the state value to the value it sent in the original
transaction request. The RC then sends a transaction continuation
request with the transaction handle returned in the interaction
response and the (hash of?) the interaction handle returned as a
query parameter to the callback URL.
The client sends the hash of the interaction handle as the
"interact_handle" field of the transaction continuation request.
{
"handle": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU",
"interact_handle": "CuD9MrpSXVKvvI6dN1awtNLx-HhZy46hJFDBicG4KoZaCmBofvqPxtm7CDMTsUFuvcmLwi_zUN70cCvalI6ENw"
}
[Open Question: error conditions. If the user denies access or
there's some other authorization error, do we return to the callback?
What's the attack surface here? We could always return an error page
to the browser and cancel the underlying transaction, effectively
killing it at the AS.]
If the AS cannot identify the source transaction from the source URL,
it returns an HTTP 404 error page to the browser and optionally an
error message to the user.
3.2. Secondary device interaction
If the RC supports a "device" style interaction, the AS creates a
unique interaction code and returns it to the RC along with a URL to
give the user for interaction.
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user_code A short code that the user can type into an authorization
server. This string MUST be case-insensitive, MUST consist of
only easily typeable characters (such as letters or numbers). The
time in which this code will be accepted MUST be short lived.
interaction_url The interaction URL that the RC will direct the RO
to. This URL SHOULD be stable over time.
wait The amount of time to wait before polling again, in integer
seconds.
handle The transaction handle to use in the continue request. See
the section on transaction handles.
{
user_code: "ABCD1234"
interaction_url: "https://server.example.com/device",
wait: 30,
handle: {
value: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh",
method: "bearer"
}
}
When the RC receives this response, it MUST communicate the user code
to the RO. If possible the RC SHOULD communicate the interaction URL
to the user as well, although this can be a stable URL at the AS.
4. Wait response
If the AS needs to do something that the RC has no part in before it
can give a definitive response, the AS replies to the transaction
request with a wait response. This tells the RC that it can poll the
transaction after a set amount of time.
This response can indicate a set of keys are bound to the transaction
as in Key Binding. This response includes a transaction handle as in
Transaction Handle.
wait REQUIRED. The amount of time to wait before polling again, in
integer seconds.
handle REQUIRED. The transaction handle to use in the continue
request. This MUST be a newly-created handle and MUST replace any
existing handle for this transaction. See the section on
transaction handles.
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{
wait: 30,
handle: {
value: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh",
method: "bearer"
}
}
5. Interaction at the AS
When the RO is interacting with the AS at the interaction endpoint,
the AS MAY perform whatever actions it sees
6. Error response
If the AS determines that the token cannot be issued for any reason,
it responds to the client with an error message. This message does
not include a transaction handle, and the RC can no longer poll for
this transaction. The RC MAY create a new transaction and start
again.
error The error code.
{
error: user_denied
}
TODO: we should have a robust error mechanism.
7. Transaction continue request
Once a transaction has begun, the AS associates that transaction with
a transaction handle which is returned to the RC in one of the
transaction responses. This handle MUST be unique, MUST be
associated with a single transaction, and MUST be one time use.
The RC continues the transaction by making a request with the
transaction handle in the body of the request. The RC MAY add
additional fields depending on the type of interaction and
authorization process in play.
transaction The (hash of?) transaction handle to use in the continue
request.
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interaction_handle The (hash of?) interaction handle returned to the
RC's callback URL from the interaction endpoint.
{
transaction: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh"
}
8. Token response
access_token The access token that the RC uses to call the RS.
access_token_keys List of keys that the access token is bound to
using the methods in key validation. If not specified, the access
token is a bearer token.
handle The transaction handle to use in the continue request to get
a new access token once the one issued is no longer usable. See
the section on transaction handles.
key: {
access_token: "08ur4kahfga09u23rnkjasdf",
handle: {
value: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh",
method: "bearer"
}
}
9. Handle references
Many parts of this protocol are referenced through the use of handles
as stand-ins for actual values, including transactions themselves as
well as portions of transactions.
value The value of the handle as a string.
method The verification method, MUST be one of "bearer" or "sha3".
9.1. Validating handles
Bearer handles are validated by doing an exact byte comparison of the
string representation of the handle value.
SHA3 handles are validated by taking the SHA3 hash of the handle
value and encoding it in Base64URL with no padding.
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9.2. Transaction handles
Transaction handles are issued by the AS to the RC to allow the RC to
continue a transaction after every step. A transaction handle MUST
be discarded after it is used. If the AS determines that the RC can
continue the transaction, a new transaction handle will be issued in
its place.
9.3. Client handles
Client handles stand in for the client section of the initial
transaction request. The AS MAY issue a client handle to a client as
part of a static registration process, analogous to a client ID,
allowing the client to be associated with an AS-side configuration
that does not change at runtime. Such static processes SHOULD be
bound to a set of keys known only to the client software.
Client handles MAY be issued by the RS in response to a transaction
request. The AS MAY bind this handle to the interact, resource, and
key handles issued in the same response. When the RC receives this
handle, it MAY present the handle in future transaction requests
instead of sending its information again.
{
handle: {
value: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh",
method: "bearer"
},
client_handle: {
value: "absc2948afgdkjnasdf9082ur3kjasdfasdf89",
method: "bearer"
}
}
The RC sends its handle in lieu of the client block of the
transaction request:
{
client: {
handle: "absc2948afgdkjnasdf9082ur3kjasdfasdf89"
}
}
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9.4. Resource handles
Resource handles stand in for the detailed resource request in the
transaction request. Resource handles MAY be created by the
authorization server as static stand-ins for specific resource
requests, analogous to OAuth2 scopes.
Resource handles MAY be issued by the RS in response to a transaction
request. When the RC receives this handle, it MAY present the handle
in future transaction requests instead of sending its information
again.
{
handle: {
value: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh",
method: "bearer"
},
resource_handle: {
value: "foo",
method: "bearer"
}
}
The RC sends its handle in lieu of the resource block of the
transaction request:
{
resource: {
handle: "foo"
}
}
9.5. User handles
User handles MAY be issued by the AS in response to validating a
specific RO during a transaction. This handle can be used in future
transactions to represent the current user, analogous to the
persistent claims token.
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{
handle: {
value: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh",
method: "bearer"
},
user_handle: {
value: "absc2948afgdkjnasdf9082ur3kjasdfasdf89",
method: "bearer"
}
}
The RC sends its handle in lieu of the user block of the transaction
request:
{
user: {
handle: "absc2948afgdkjnasdf9082ur3kjasdfasdf89"
}
}
9.6. Key handles
Key handles stand in for the keys section of the initial transaction
request. The AS MAY issue a key handle to a client as part of a
static registration process, allowing the client to be associated
with an AS-side configuration that does not change at runtime.
Key handles MAY be issued by the RS in response to a transaction
request. The AS SHOULD bind this handle to the client, resource, and
user handles issued in the same response. When the RC receives this
handle, it MAY present the handle in future transaction requests
instead of sending its information again.
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{
handle: {
value: "tghji76ytghj9876tghjko987yh",
method: "bearer"
},
key_handle: {
value: "absc2948afgdkjnasdf9082ur3kjasdfasdf89",
method: "bearer"
}
}
The RC sends its handle in lieu of the client block of the
transaction request:
{
key: {
handle: "absc2948afgdkjnasdf9082ur3kjasdfasdf89"
}
}
When the AS receives a key handle, it MUST validate that the keys
referenced by the handle are bound to the current transaction
request.
10. Binding Keys
Any keys presented by the RC to the AS or RS MUST be validated as
part of the transaction in which they are presented. Any keys bound
to the transaction are indicated by the bound_keys section of the
transaction response. Any keys referenced in this section MUST be
used with all future transaction requests.
10.1. Binding a key to a transaction
Keys are bound to a transaction by including a bound_keys field in
the transaction response alongside the transaction handle. Any
further keys used for binding
10.2. Validating detached JWS
To sign a request to the transaction endpoint, the RC takes the
serialized body of the request and signs it using detached JWS. The
header of the JWS MUST contain the kid field of the key bound to this
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client during this transaction. The header MUST contain an alg field
appropriate for the key identified by kid and MUST NOT be none. The
The RC presents the signature in the JWS-Signature HTTP Header field.
[Note: this is a custom header field, do we need this?]
JWS-Signature: eyj0....
When the AS receives the JWS-Signature header, it MUST parse its
contents as a detached JWS object. The HTTP Body is used as the
payload for purposes of validating the JWS, with no transformations.
10.3. Validating attached JWS
[Note: if we do an attached JWS we end up having two different data
types to deal with at the AS, is this ok?]
To sign a request to the transaction endpoint with an attached JWS,
the RC takes the body of the request as the JWS payload and wraps the
request in a JWS object.
10.4. Validating MTLS
The RC presents its client certificate during TLS negotiation with
the server. The AS or RS takes the thumbprint of the client
certificate presented during mutual TLS negotiation and compares that
thumbprint to the thumbprint presented by the RC application.
10.5. Validating DID
The RC signs the request using [some HTTP signing mechanism] and its
private key, and attaches the signature to the HTTP request using [a
header method?]. [Note: is DID just a key-lookup mechanism here or
should we use a different kind of crypto method as well?]
11. Using a Token
Bearer access tokens issued through this method can be used with the
authorization header method found in RFC6750. Other access tokens
are validated by the RS in accordance with the methods in the Binding
Keys section.
12. Acknowledgements
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13. IANA Considerations
This specification creates one registry and registers several values
into existing registries.
14. Security Considerations
15. Privacy Considerations
16. Normative References
[OpenID] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
Core 1.0", November 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
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Internet-Draft transactional-authz May 2019
Appendix A. Document History
- 00
o Initial submission.
Author's Address
Justin Richer (editor)
Bespoke Engineering
Email: ietf@justin.richer.org
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