Network Working Group S. Smyshlyaev, Ed.
Internet-Draft E. Alekseev
Intended status: Informational I. Oshkin
Expires: January 21, 2016 V. Popov
CRYPTO-PRO
V. Podobaev
FACTOR-TS
I. Ustinov
Cryptocom
July 20, 2015
Guidelines on the cryptographic algorithms, accompanying the usage of
standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012
draft-smyshlyaev-gost-usage-01
Abstract
The usage of cryptographic algorithms defined by GOST R 34.10-2012
[GOST3410-2012] and GOST R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012] standards for
protection of the information is carried out, as a rule, within the
cryptographic protocols based on the accompanying algorithms.
This memo contains a description of the accompanying algorithms
defining the pseudorandom functions, the key agreement protocols
based on the Diffie-Hellman method, the parametrs of elliptic curves,
the key derivation functions and the algorithms used for export of
keying material.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2016.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Conventions used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Basic terms and definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Algorithm descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. HMAC functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. VKO algorithms for key agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. The parameters of elliptic curves . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5. Key derivation function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 . . . . . 13
4.6. Key derivation function KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 . . . 14
4.7. Key wrap and unwrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Values of parameter sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.1. Canonical form parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.2. Twisted Edwards form parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix B. Test examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
The usage of cryptographic algorithms defined by the GOST R
34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] and GOST R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012]
standards for protection of the information is carried out, as a
rule, within the cryptographic protocols based on the accompanying
algorithms.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
The specifications of algorithms and parameters proposed in this memo
are provided on the basis of experience in the development of
cryptographic protocols, as described in the [RFC4357], [RFC4490] and
[RFC4491].
This memo contains a description of the accompanying algorithms
defining the pseudorandom functions, the key derivation functions,
the key agreement protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman method and
the algorithms used for export of key material.
This memo does not specify the cryptographic algorithms GOST R
34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] and GOST R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012].
These algorithms are defined by the national standards GOST R
34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] and GOST R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012] and
described in [RFC7091] and [RFC6986] (an English version of Russian
national standards).
The need to ensure compatibility of the cryptographic protocol
implementations based on the Russian cryptographic standards GOST R
34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] and GOST R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012] is
served as the main reason for the development of this document.
2. Scope
This memo is recommended for usage in encryption and protection the
authenticity of the data based on the usage of the digital signature
algorithms GOST R 34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] and hash function GOST R
34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012] in public and corporate networks to
protect information that does not contain a classified information.
3. Conventions used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3.1. Notation
This document uses the following notation for the sets and operations
on the elements of these sets in accordance with GOST R 34.11-2012
[GOST3411-2012]:
(xor) exclusive-or of two binary vectors of the same length;
V_n the finite-dimensional vector space over GF(2) of dimension n
with the (xor) operation, for n = 0 the V_0 space consists of
a single empty element of size 0;
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
U the element of V_n; in the binary representation U =
(u_(n-1), u_(n-2), ..., u_1, u_0), where u_i in {0, 1};
A|B concatenation of vectors A, B, i.e., if A in V_n1, B in V_n2,
A = (a_(n1-1), a_(n1-2), ..., a_0), and B = (b_(n2-1),
b_(n2-2), ..., b_0), then A|B = (a_(n1-1), a_(n1-2), ...,
a_0, b_(n2-1), b_(n2-2), ..., b_0) is an element of
V_(n1+n2);
V_(8, r) the set of byte strings of size r; if W is an element of
V(8, r), then W = (w^0, w^1, ..., w^(r-1)), where w^0, w^1,
..., w^(r-1) are elements of V_8; if A in V_(8, r1), B in
V_(8, r2), A = (a^0, a^1, ..., a^(r1-1)), and B = (b^0, b^1,
..., b^(r2-1)), then A|B = (a^0, a^1, ..., a^(r1-1), b^0,
b^1, ..., b^(r2-1)) is an element of V_(8, r1+r2);
Bit representation the bit representation of the element W = (w^0,
w^1, ..., w^(r-1)) of V_(8, r), where w^0 = (w_7, w_6, ...,
w_0), w^1 = (w_15, w_14, ..., w_8), ..., w^(r-1) = (w_(8r-1),
w_(8r-2), ..., w_(8r-8)) are elements of V_8, is an element
(w_(8r-1), w_(8r-2), ..., w_1, w_0) of V_(8*r);
Byte representation if n is a multiple of 8, r = n/8, then the byte
representation of the element W = (w_(n-1), w_(n-2), ...,
w_0) of V_n is a byte string (w^0, w^1, ..., w^(r-1)) of
V_(8, r), where w^0 = (w_7, w_6, ..., w_0), w^1 = (w_15,
w_14, ..., w_8), ..., w^(r-1) = (w_(8r-1), w_(8r-2), ...,
w_(8r-8)) are elements of V_8;
K (key) arbitrary element of V_n; if K in V_n, then its size (in
bits) is equal to n, where n can be an arbitrary natural
number.
Note: It is proposed to interpret and edit the formulas in accordance
with the above definitions.
3.2. Basic terms and definitions
This memo uses the following terms, abbreviations and symbols:
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
+----------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| Symbols | Meaning |
+----------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| H_256 | GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function, 256-bit |
| | |
| H_512 | GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function, 512-bit |
| | |
| HMAC | a function for calculating a message authentication |
| | code, based on hash function in accordance with |
| | [RFC2104] |
| | |
| HMAC_256 | an HMAC function based on the hash function H_256, |
| | intended for computing a message authentication code |
| | |
| HMAC_512 | an HMAC function based on the hash function H_512, |
| | intended for computing a message authentication code |
| | |
| PRF | a pseudorandom function, i.e., a transformation that |
| | allows to generate pseudorandom sequence of bytes |
| | |
| KDF | a key derivation function, i.e., a transformation, |
| | that allows to derive keys and keying material for the |
| | root key and random data using a pseudorandom function |
+----------+--------------------------------------------------------+
To produce a byte sequence of the size r with functions that give a
longer output the input should be taken from the output sequence of
the first r bytes. This remark applies to the following functions:
o the functions described in Section 4.2;
o KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256.
When n is multiple of 8, an element of V_n can be represented in the
bit and byte form. The result of operation <<|>>, applied to the
elements in the bit representation is described in the bit
representation. The result of the operation <<|>>, applied to the
same elements in byte representation is described in the byte
representation. Thus, the symbol <<|>> is used to refer to two
different operations, depending on the form of their arguments. The
operation is uniquely determined by the representation of arguments.
Hereinafter all data (the elements of V_n) are considered given in
the byte representation unless otherwise specified. Operation <<|>>
on the arguments of functions, unless explicitly stated, is performed
on their byte representation.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
If the function is defined outside this document (eg, H_256) and its
definition is using arguments in bit representation, it is assumed
that the bit representation of the argument is formed immediately
before the calculation of the function (in particular, immediately
after the application of the operation <<|>> to the byte
representation of the arguments).
If the output of another function that is defined outside of this
document is used as the argument of the function defined below and
has output value in bit representation, it is assumed that the output
value will be translated into the byte representation before
substitution in arguments.
4. Algorithm descriptions
For the algorithms described in this paper the possible values of the
functions are limited by the permissibility of applying them as the
input parameter of the transformations and are assigned by the
protocols.
4.1. HMAC functions
This section defines the HMAC transformations based on GOST R
34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012] algorithms.
4.1.1. HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_256
This algorithm uses H_256 as a hash function for HMAC, described in
[RFC2104]. The method of forming the values of ipad and opad is also
given in [RFC2104]. The size of the HMAC_256 output in bytes is
equal to 32, the block size of the iterative procedure for the H_256
compression function in bytes is equal to 64 (in the notation of
[RFC2104], L = 32 and B = 64, respectively).
4.1.2. HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512
This algorithm uses H_512 as a hash function for HMAC, described in
[RFC2104]. The method of forming the values of ipad and opad is also
given in [RFC2104]. The size of the HMAC_512 output in bytes is
equal to 64, the block size of the iterative procedure for the H_512
compression function in bytes is equal to 64 (in the notation of
[RFC2104], L = 64 and B = 64, respectively).
4.2. PRF
This section defines six HMAC-based PRF transformations recommended
for usagee. Two of them are designed for the TLS protocol and four
are designed for IPsec.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
4.2.1. PRFs for the TLS protocol
4.2.1.1. PRF_TLS_GOSTR3411_2012_256
This is the transformation to implement the pseudorandom function of
the TLS protocol; the transformation uses HMAC_256 based on GOST R
34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012], 256-bit output, and corresponds to the
method of specifying the arguments and the output value of P_hash
data expansion function, given in Section 5 of [RFC2246] and kept in
[RFC5246].
PRF_TLS_GOSTR3411_2012_256 (secret, label, seed) =
= P_GOSTR3411_2012_256 (secret, label | seed),
4.2.1.2. PRF_TLS_GOSTR3411_2012_512
This is the transformation to implement the pseudorandom function of
the TLS protocol; the transformation uses HMAC_512 based on GOST R
34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012], 512-bit output, and corresponds to the
method of specifying the arguments and the output value of P_hash
data expansion function, given in Section 5 of [RFC2246] and kept in
[RFC5246].
PRF_TLS_GOSTR3411_2012_512 (secret, label, seed) =
= P_GOSTR3411_2012_512 (secret, label | seed),
4.2.2. PRFs for the IPsec protocols based on GOST R 34.11-2012, 256-bit
4.2.2.1. PRF_IPSEC_KEYMAT_GOSTR3411_2012_256
This pseudorandom function used for the keying material generation is
defined as follows (the arguments are the byte strings K and S):
PRF_IPSEC_KEYMAT_GOSTR3411_2012_256 (K, S) = T1| T2| T3| T4|...,
where
T1 = HMAC_256 (K, S),
T2 = HMAC_256 (K, T1 | S),
T3 = HMAC_256 (K, T2 | S),
T4 = HMAC_256 (K, T3 | S),
...
PRF_IPSEC_KEYMAT_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function is similar to KEYMAT
function in [RFC2409] regarding the assignment scheme for the
arguments in the iterations.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
4.2.2.2. PRF_IPSEC_PRFPLUS_GOSTR3411_2012_256
The pseudorandom function PRF_IPSEC_PRFPLUS_GOSTR3411_2012_256 is
similar to the prf+ function in [RFC7296], where HMAC_256 function is
used as a prf function.
4.2.3. PRFs for the IPsec protocols based on GOST R 34.11-2012, 512-bit
4.2.3.1. PRF_IPSEC_KEYMAT_GOSTR3411_2012_512
This pseudorandom function for the keying material generation is
defined as follows (the arguments are the byte strings K and S):
PRF_IPSEC_KEYMAT_GOSTR3411_2012_512 (K, S) = T1| T2| T3| T4|...,
where
T1 = HMAC_512 (K, S),
T2 = HMAC_512 (K, T1 | S),
T3 = HMAC_512 (K, T2 | S),
T4 = HMAC_512 (K, T3 | S),
...
PRF_IPSEC_KEYMAT_GOSTR3411_2012_512 is similar to KEYMAT function in
[RFC2409] regarding the assignment scheme for the arguments in
iterations.
4.2.3.2. PRF_IPSEC_PRFPLUS_GOSTR3411_2012_512
The pseudorandom function PRF_IPSEC_PRFPLUS_GOSTR3411_2012_512 is
similar to the prf+ function in [RFC7296], where HMAC_512 function is
used as a prf function.
4.3. VKO algorithms for key agreement
This section identifies the key agreement algorithms using GOST R
34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012].
4.3.1. VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256
The VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256 transformation is used for an agreement of
the VKO 256-bit keys and based on GOST R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012],
256-bit. This algorithm can be applied for a key agreement using the
GOST R 34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] 256-bit and 512-bit keys.
The algorithm is designed to produce an encryption key or a keying
material of size 256 bits to be used in various cryptographic
protocols. Key or keying material KEK_VKO (x, y, UKM) is produced by
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
the side of communication from his private key x, the public key y*P
of the opposite side and UKM value, considered as a number.
The algorithm can be used for deriving both static and ephemeral key
with the public key size n >= 512 bits including the case where one
side uses a static key and the other - ephemeral.
UKM parameter is optional (the default UKM = 1) and can take any
value from 1 to 2^(n/2)-1. It is allowed to use a nonzero UKM of
arbitrary size not exceeding n/2 bits. UKM size of 64 bit or more is
recommended for cases where the keys at least one of the parties are
static.
K is calculated using formula
K (x, y, UKM) = (m/q*UKM*x mod q)*(y*P),
where m and q are the parameters of the elliptic curve defined in the
GOST R 34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] notation.
KEK_VKO is calculated using formula
KEK_VKO (x, y, UKM) = H_256 (K(x, y, UKM)).
This algorithm is defined by analogy with Section 5.2 of [RFC4357],
but applies the hash function H_256 instead of the hash function GOST
R 34.11-94 [GOST3411-94] (referred as gostR3411) and K(x, y, UKM) is
calculated with public key size n >= 512 bits and UKM size up to n/2
bits.
4.3.2. VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_512
The VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256 transformation is used for an agreement of
the VKO 512-bit keys and based on GOST R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012],
512-bit. This algorithm can be applied for a key agreement using the
GOST R 34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] 512-bit keys.
The algorithm is designed to produce an encryption key or keying
material of size 512 bits to be used in cryptographic protocols. Key
or keying material KEK_VKO (x, y, UKM) is produced by the exchange
participant from his private key x, the public key y*P of the
opposite side and the UKM value, considered as a number.
The algorithm can be used for both static and ephemeral key with the
public key size n >= 1024 bits including the case where one side uses
a static key and the other uses an ephemeral one.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
UKM parameter is optional (the default UKM = 1) and can take any
value from 1 to 2^(n/2)-1. It is allowed to use a nonzero UKM of
arbitrary size not exceeding n/2 bits. UKM size of 128 bit or more
is recommended for cases where the keys at least one of the parties
are static.
K (x, y, UKM) = (m/q*UKM*x mod q)*(y*P),
where m and q - the parameters of the elliptic curve according GOST R
34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] notation.
KEK_VKO (x, y, UKM) = H_512 (K (x, y, UKM)).
This algorithm is defined by analogy with Section 5.2 of [RFC4357],
but instead of the hash function GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3411-94]
(referred as gostR3411) applies the hash function H_256, and K(x, y,
UKM) is calculated at the public key size n >= 1024 bits and UKM size
up to n/2 bits.
4.4. The parameters of elliptic curves
This section defines the elliptic curves parameters and identifiers
that are recommended for the usage with signature and verification
algorithms of digital signature in accordance with GOST R 34.10-2012
[GOST3410-2012] standard and with the key agreement algorithms
VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256 and VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_512.
This document does not negate the use of other parameters of elliptic
curves.
4.4.1. Canonical form
This section defines the elliptic curves parameters of the GOST R
34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] standard for the case of elliptic curves
with a prime 512-bit modulus in canonical (Weierstrass) form, that is
given by the following equation defined in GOST R 34.10-2012
[GOST3410-2012]:
y^2 = x^3 + ax + b.
In case of an elliptic curves with 256-bit the parameters defined in
[RFC4357] are proposed to use.
4.4.1.1. Parameters and identifiers
The parameters for each of the elliptic curve are represented by the
foloing values which are defined in GOST R 34.10-2012
[GOST3410-2012]:
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
p the elliptic curve modulus;
a, b the coefficients of the equation of the elliptic curve in the
canonical form;
q the order of the elliptic curve;
(x, y) the coordinates of a point P (generator of the prime order
group) of the elliptic curve in the canonical form.
Both sets of the parameters are presented as ASN structures of the
form:
SEQUENCE {
a INTEGER,
b INTEGER,
p INTEGER,
q INTEGER,
x INTEGER,
y INTEGER
}
Parameter sets have the following identifiers:
1. id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA, <<1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.1.>>,
2. id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB, <<1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.2.>>.
Corresponding values of parameter sets can be found in
Appendix Appendix A.1.
4.4.2. Twisted Edwards form
This section defines the elliptic curves parameters and identifiers
of the GOST R 34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012] standard for the case of
elliptic curves that have a representation in Twisted Edwards form
with a prime 256-bit and 512-bit modulus.
A Twisted Edwards curve E over a finite prime field F_p, p > 3, is an
elliptic curve defined by the equation:
e*u^2 + v^2 = 1 + d*u^2*v^2,
where e, d are in F_p, ed(e-d) != 0.
A Twisted Edwards curve has an equivalent representation in the
Weierstrass form defined by parameters a, b. The parameters a, b, e,
d are related as follows:
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
a = s^2 - 3*t^2,
b = 2*t^3 - t*s^2,
where
s = (e - d) / 4,
t = (e + d) / 6,
Coordinate transformation is defined as follows:
(u,v) --> (x,y) = (s(1 + v) / (1 - v) + t, s(1 + v) / ((1 - v)
u)),
(x,y) --> (u,v) = ((x - t) / y, (x - t - s) / (x - t + s)).
4.4.2.1. Parameters and identifiers
The parameters for each of the elliptic curve are represented by the
foloing values which are defined in GOST R 34.10-2012
[GOST3410-2012]:
p the elliptic curve modulus;
a, b the coefficients of the equation of the elliptic curve in the
canonical form;
e, d the coefficients of the equation of the elliptic curve in the
Twisted Edwards form;
m the order of the elliptic curve group;
q the order of the subgroups of prime order elliptic curve
group;
(x, y) the coordinates of a point P (generator of the prime order
group) of the elliptic curve in the canonical form;
(u, v) the coordinates of a point P (generator of the prime order
group) of the elliptic curve in the Twisted Edwards form.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
Both sets of the parameters are presented as ASN structures of the
form:
SEQUENCE {
p INTEGER,
a INTEGER,
b INTEGER,
e INTEGER,
d INTEGER,
m INTEGER,
q INTEGER,
x INTEGER,
y INTEGER,
u INTEGER,
v INTEGER
}
Parameter sets have the following identifiers:
1. id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA, <<1.2.643.7.1.2.1.1.1>>,
2. id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC, <<1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.3>>.
Corresponding values of parameter sets can be found in
Appendix Appendix A.2.
4.5. Key derivation function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256
The key derivation function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 based on HMAC_256
function is designed to generate a 256-bit keying material and is
given by:
KDF (K_in, label, seed) = HMAC_256 (K_in, 0x01 | label | 0x00 |
seed | 0x01 | 0x00),
where
o K_in -- derivation key,
o label, seed -- the parameters, fixed and assigned by a protocol.
The key derivation function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 is a special case
of KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012 function, described in the next section.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
4.6. Key derivation function KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256
The key derivation function KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 based on
HMAC_256 and is given by:
KDF_TREE (K_in, label, seed, R) = K(1)| K(2)| K(3)| K(4)|...,
K(i) = HMAC_256 (K_in, [i]_2 | label | 0x00 | seed| [L]_2), i >=
1,
where
R a fixed external parameter, with possible values of 1, 2, 3
or 4;
K_in derivation key;
L the required size (in bits) of the generated keying material
(an integer, not exceeding 256*(2^(8*R)-1));
[L]_2 byte representation of L, in network byte order;
i iteration counter;
[i]_2 byte representation of the iteration counter (in the network
byte order), the number of bytes in the representation [i]_2
is equal to R (no more than 4 bytes);
label, seed the parameters, fixed and assigned by a protocol.
The key derivation function KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 is intended
for generating a keying material in size of L, not exceeding
256*(2^(8*R)-1) bits, and utilizes general principles of the input
and output for the key derivation function outlined in Section 5.1 of
NIST SP 800-108 [NISTSP800-108]. HMAC_256 algorithm with 256-bit
output described in Section 4.1 is selected as a pseudorandom
function.
When R = 1 and L = 256 the function KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 is
equivalent to KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 from the previous section.
Each key derived from the keying material formed using the derivation
key K_in (0-level key) may be a 1-level diversification key and may
be used to generate a new keying material. The keying material
derived from the 1-level derivation key, can be split down into the
2nd level derivation keys. The application of this procedure leads
to the construction of the key tree with the root key and the
formation of the key material to the hierarchy of the levels, as
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
described in Section 6 of NIST SP 800-108 [NISTSP800-108]. The
partitioning procedure for keying material at each level is defined
in the specific protocols.
4.7. Key wrap and unwrap
Wrapped representation of the secret key K (GOST R 34.10-2012
[GOST3410-2012] key or GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147-89] key) is formed as
follows by using a given export key K_e (GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147-89]
key) and a random UKM vector from 8 to 16 bytes in size:
1. Generate a random UKM vector.
2. With the key derivation function, using export key K_e as a
derivation key, and a UKM vector as the value of seed, generate a
key, denoted by KEK_e (UKM), where
KEK_e (UKM) = KDF (K_e, label, UKM),
where KDF function (see previous section) is used as a key
derivation function for the fixed value
label = (0x26 | 0xBD | 0xB8 | 0x78).
3. MAC value GOST 28147-89 (4-byte) for the data K and the key KEK_e
(UKM) is calculated, initialization vector (IV) in this case is
equal to the first 8 bytes of UKM. The resulting value is
denoted as CEK_MAC.
4. The key K is encrypted by the GOST 28147-89 algorithm in the
Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode with the key KEK_e (UKM). The
encoding result is denoted as CEK_ENC.
5. The wrapped representation of the key is considered (UKM |
CEK_ENC | CEK_MAC).
and the seed value that is equal to UKM.
During the key import the value of key K is restored as follows from
the wrapped representation of the key (GOST R 34.10-2012
[GOST3410-2012] key or GOST 28147-89 key [GOST28147-89] key) and the
export key K_e:
1. From the wrapped representation of the key selects the sets UKM,
CEK_ENC, and CEK_MAC.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
2. With the key derivation function, using the export key K_e as a
derivation key, and a random UKM value as the value of seed,
generates a key, denoted by KEK_e(UKM), where
KEK_e (UKM) = KDF (K_e, label, UKM).
3. The CEK_ENC set is decrypted by the GOST 28147-89 algorithm in
the Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode with the key KEK_e(UKM). The
unwrapped key K is assumed to be equal to the result of
decryption.
4. MAC value GOST 28147-89 (4-byte) for the data K and the key
KEK_e(UKM) is calculated, initialization vector (IV) in this case
is equal to the first 8 bytes of UKM. If the result does not
equal to CEK_MAC, an error is returned.
The algorithms for wrapping and unwrapping of the GOST R 34.10-2012
[GOST3410-2012] keys are modifications of the CryptoPro Key Wrap and
CryptoPro Key Unwrap algorithms, described in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of
[RFC4357].
5. Acknowledgments
Smyslov Valery and Dmitry Belyavsky have provided useful comments and
suggestions on early drafts.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[GOST28147-89]
Gosudarstvennyi Standard of USSR, Government Committee of
the USSR for Standards, "Systems of information
processing. Cryptographic data security. Algorithms of
cryptographic transformation", GOST 28147-89, 1989.
[GOST3410-2012]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
digital signature", GOST R 34.10-2012, 2012.
[GOST3411-2012]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function", GOST R 34.11-2012, 2012.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
[GOST3411-94]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function", GOST R 34.11-94, 1994.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4357] Popov, V., Kurepkin, I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89, GOST
R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms", RFC 4357, DOI 10.17487/RFC4357, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4357>.
6.2. Informative References
[NISTSP800-108]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions", NIST SP 800-108, October 2009.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, DOI 10.17487/RFC2409, November 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2409>.
[RFC4490] Leontiev, S., Ed. and G. Chudov, Ed., "Using the GOST
28147-89, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R
34.10-2001 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS)", RFC 4490, DOI 10.17487/RFC4490, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4490>.
[RFC4491] Leontiev, S., Ed. and D. Shefanovski, Ed., "Using the GOST
R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4491, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4491>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
[RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
[RFC7091] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.10-2012:
Digital Signature Algorithm", RFC 7091,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7091, December 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7091>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
Appendix A. Values of parameter sets
A.1. Canonical form parameters
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
Parameter set: id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA
SEQUENCE
{
OBJECT IDENTIFIER
id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA
SEQUENCE
{
INTEGER
00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FD
C4
INTEGER
00 E8 C2 50 5D ED FC 86 DD C1 BD 0B 2B 66 67 F1
DA 34 B8 25 74 76 1C B0 E8 79 BD 08 1C FD 0B 62
65 EE 3C B0 90 F3 0D 27 61 4C B4 57 40 10 DA 90
DD 86 2E F9 D4 EB EE 47 61 50 31 90 78 5A 71 C7
60
INTEGER
00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FD
C7
INTEGER
00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF 27 E6 95 32 F4 8D 89 11 6F F2 2B 8D 4E 05 60
60 9B 4B 38 AB FA D2 B8 5D CA CD B1 41 1F 10 B2
75
INTEGER 3
INTEGER
00 75 03 CF E8 7A 83 6A E3 A6 1B 88 16 E2 54 50
E6 CE 5E 1C 93 AC F1 AB C1 77 80 64 FD CB EF A9
21 DF 16 26 BE 4F D0 36 E9 3D 75 E6 A5 0E 3A 41
E9 80 28 FE 5F C2 35 F5 B8 89 A5 89 CB 52 15 F2
A4
}
}
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
Parameter set: id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB
SEQUENCE
{
OBJECT IDENTIFIER
id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB
SEQUENCE
{
INTEGER
00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6C
INTEGER
00 68 7D 1B 45 9D C8 41 45 7E 3E 06 CF 6F 5E 25
17 B9 7C 7D 61 4A F1 38 BC BF 85 DC 80 6C 4B 28
9F 3E 96 5D 2D B1 41 6D 21 7F 8B 27 6F AD 1A B6
9C 50 F7 8B EE 1F A3 10 6E FB 8C CB C7 C5 14 01
16
INTEGER
00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
6F
INTEGER
00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
01 49 A1 EC 14 25 65 A5 45 AC FD B7 7B D9 D4 0C
FA 8B 99 67 12 10 1B EA 0E C6 34 6C 54 37 4F 25
BD
INTEGER 2
INTEGER
00 1A 8F 7E DA 38 9B 09 4C 2C 07 1E 36 47 A8 94
0F 3C 12 3B 69 75 78 C2 13 BE 6D D9 E6 C8 EC 73
35 DC B2 28 FD 1E DF 4A 39 15 2C BC AA F8 C0 39
88 28 04 10 55 F9 4C EE EC 7E 21 34 07 80 FE 41
BD
}
}
A.2. Twisted Edwards form parameters
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
Parameter set: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA
SEQUENCE
{
OBJECT IDENTIFIER
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA
SEQUENCE
{
INTEGER
00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FD
97
INTEGER
00 C2 17 3F 15 13 98 16 73 AF 48 92 C2 30 35 A2
7C E2 5E 20 13 BF 95 AA 33 B2 2C 65 6F 27 7E 73
35
INTEGER
29 5F 9B AE 74 28 ED 9C CC 20 E7 C3 59 A9 D4 1A
22 FC CD 91 08 E1 7B F7 BA 93 37 A6 F8 AE 95 13
INTEGER
01
INTEGER
06 05 F6 B7 C1 83 FA 81 57 8B C3 9C FA D5 18 13
2B 9D F6 28 97 00 9A F7 E5 22 C3 2D 6D C7 BF FB
INTEGER
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 3F 63 37 7F 21 ED 98 D7 04 56 BD 55 B0 D8 31
9C
INTEGER
40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0F D8 CD DF C8 7B 66 35 C1 15 AF 55 6C 36 0C 67
INTEGER
00 91 E3 84 43 A5 E8 2C 0D 88 09 23 42 57 12 B2
BB 65 8B 91 96 93 2E 02 C7 8B 25 82 FE 74 2D AA
28
INTEGER
32 87 94 23 AB 1A 03 75 89 57 86 C4 BB 46 E9 56
5F DE 0B 53 44 76 67 40 AF 26 8A DB 32 32 2E 5C
INTEGER
0D
INTEGER
60 CA 1E 32 AA 47 5B 34 84 88 C3 8F AB 07 64 9C
E7 EF 8D BE 87 F2 2E 81 F9 2B 25 92 DB A3 00 E7
}
}
Parameter set: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
SEQUENCE
{
OBJECT IDENTIFIER
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC
SEQUENCE
{
INTEGER
00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FD
C7
INTEGER
00 DC 92 03 E5 14 A7 21 87 54 85 A5 29 D2 C7 22
FB 18 7B C8 98 0E B8 66 64 4D E4 1C 68 E1 43 06
45 46 E8 61 C0 E2 C9 ED D9 2A DE 71 F4 6F CF 50
FF 2A D9 7F 95 1F DA 9F 2A 2E B6 54 6F 39 68 9B
D3
INTEGER
00 B4 C4 EE 28 CE BC 6C 2C 8A C1 29 52 CF 37 F1
6A C7 EF B6 A9 F6 9F 4B 57 FF DA 2E 4F 0D E5 AD
E0 38 CB C2 FF F7 19 D2 C1 8D E0 28 4B 8B FE F3
B5 2B 8C C7 A5 F5 BF 0A 3C 8D 23 19 A5 31 25 57
E1
INTEGER
01
INTEGER
00 9E 4F 5D 8C 01 7D 8D 9F 13 A5 CF 3C DF 5B FE
4D AB 40 2D 54 19 8E 31 EB DE 28 A0 62 10 50 43
9C A6 B3 9E 0A 51 5C 06 B3 04 E2 CE 43 E7 9E 36
9E 91 A0 CF C2 BC 2A 22 B4 CA 30 2D BB 33 EE 75
50
INTEGER
00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF 26 33 6E 91 94 1A AC 01 30 CE A7 FD 45 1D 40
B3 23 B6 A7 9E 9D A6 84 9A 51 88 F3 BD 1F C0 8F
B4
INTEGER
3F FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
C9 8C DB A4 65 06 AB 00 4C 33 A9 FF 51 47 50 2C
C8 ED A9 E7 A7 69 A1 26 94 62 3C EF 47 F0 23 ED
INTEGER
00 E2 E3 1E DF C2 3D E7 BD EB E2 41 CE 59 3E F5
DE 22 95 B7 A9 CB AE F0 21 D3 85 F7 07 4C EA 04
3A A2 72 72 A7 AE 60 2B F2 A7 B9 03 3D B9 ED 36
10 C6 FB 85 48 7E AE 97 AA C5 BC 79 28 C1 95 01
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
48
INTEGER
00 F5 CE 40 D9 5B 5E B8 99 AB BC CF F5 91 1C B8
57 79 39 80 4D 65 27 37 8B 8C 10 8C 3D 20 90 FF
9B E1 8E 2D 33 E3 02 1E D2 EF 32 D8 58 22 42 3B
63 04 F7 26 AA 85 4B AE 07 D0 39 6E 9A 9A DD C4
0F
INTEGER
12
INTEGER
46 9A F7 9D 1F B1 F5 E1 6B 99 59 2B 77 A0 1E 2A
0F DF B0 D0 17 94 36 8D 9A 56 11 7F 7B 38 66 95
22 DD 4B 65 0C F7 89 EE BF 06 8C 5D 13 97 32 F0
90 56 22 C0 4B 2B AA E7 60 03 03 EE 73 00 1A 3D
}
}
Appendix B. Test examples
1) HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_256
Key K:
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
T:
01 26 bd b8 78 00 af 21 43 41 45 65 63 78 01 00
HMAC_256(K, T) value:
a1 aa 5f 7d e4 02 d7 b3 d3 23 f2 99 1c 8d 45 34
01 31 37 01 0a 83 75 4f d0 af 6d 7c d4 92 2e d9
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
2) HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512
Key K:
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
T:
01 26 bd b8 78 00 af 21 43 41 45 65 63 78 01 00
HMAC_256(K, T) value:
a5 9b ab 22 ec ae 19 c6 5f bd e6 e5 f4 e9 f5 d8
54 9d 31 f0 37 f9 df 9b 90 55 00 e1 71 92 3a 77
3d 5f 15 30 f2 ed 7e 96 4c b2 ee dc 29 e9 ad 2f
3a fe 93 b2 81 4f 79 f5 00 0f fc 03 66 c2 51 e6
3) PRF_TLS_GOSTR3411_2012_256
Key K:
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
Seed:
18 47 1d 62 2d c6 55 c4 d2 d2 26 96 91 ca 4a 56
0b 50 ab a6 63 55 3a f2 41 f1 ad a8 82 c9 f2 9a
Label:
11 22 33 44 55
Output T1:
ff 09 66 4a 44 74 58 65 94 4f 83 9e bb 48 96 5f
15 44 ff 1c c8 e8 f1 6f 24 7e e5 f8 a9 eb e9 7f
Output T2:
c4 e3 c7 90 0e 46 ca d3 db 6a 01 64 30 63 04 0e
c6 7f c0 fd 5c d9 f9 04 65 23 52 37 bd ff 2c 02
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
4) PRF_TLS_GOSTR3411_2012_512
Key K:
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
Seed:
18 47 1d 62 2d c6 55 c4 d2 d2 26 96 91 ca 4a 56
0b 50 ab a6 63 55 3a f2 41 f1 ad a8 82 c9 f2 9a
Label:
11 22 33 44 55
Output T1:
f3 51 87 a3 dc 96 55 11 3a 0e 84 d0 6f d7 52 6c
5f c1 fb de c1 a0 e4 67 3d d6 d7 9d 0b 92 0e 65
ad 1b c4 7b b0 83 b3 85 1c b7 cd 8e 7e 6a 91 1a
62 6c f0 2b 29 e9 e4 a5 8e d7 66 a4 49 a7 29 6d
Output T2:
e6 1a 7a 26 c4 d1 ca ee cf d8 0c ca 65 c7 1f 0f
88 c1 f8 22 c0 e8 c0 ad 94 9d 03 fe e1 39 57 9f
72 ba 0c 3d 32 c5 f9 54 f1 cc cd 54 08 1f c7 44
02 78 cb a1 fe 7b 7a 17 a9 86 fd ff 5b d1 5d 1f
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
5) PRF_IPSEC_KEYMAT_GOSTR3411_2012_256
Key K:
c9 a9 a7 73 20 e2 cc 55 9e d7 2d ce 6f 47 e2 19
2c ce a9 5f a6 48 67 05 82 c0 54 c0 ef 36 c2 21
Data of S:
01 26 bd b8 78 00 1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27 01 00
Output T1:
21 01 d8 0c 47 db 54 bc 3c 82 9b 8c 30 7c 47 55
50 88 83 a6 d6 9e 60 1b f7 aa fb 0a bc a4 ed 95
Output T2:
33 b8 4e d0 8f 93 56 f8 1d f8 d2 79 f0 79 c9 02
87 cb 45 2c 81 d4 1e 80 38 43 08 86 c1 92 12 aa
6) PRF_IPSEC_PRFPLUS_GOSTR3411_2012_256
Key K:
c9 a9 a7 73 20 e2 cc 55 9e d7 2d ce 6f 47 e2 19
2c ce a9 5f a6 48 67 05 82 c0 54 c0 ef 36 c2 21
Data of S:
01 26 bd b8 78 00 1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27 01 00
Output T1:
2d e5 ee 84 e1 3d 7b e5 36 16 67 39 13 37 0a b0
54 c0 74 b7 9b 69 a8 a8 46 82 a9 f0 4f ec d5 87
Output T2:
29 f6 0d da 45 7b f2 19 aa 2e f9 5d 7a 59 be 95
4d e0 08 f4 a5 0d 50 4d bd b6 90 be 68 06 01 53
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
7) PRF_IPSEC_KEYMAT_GOSTR3411_2012_512
Key K:
c9 a9 a7 73 20 e2 cc 55 9e d7 2d ce 6f 47 e2 19
2c ce a9 5f a6 48 67 05 82 c0 54 c0 ef 36 c2 21
Data of S:
01 26 bd b8 78 00 1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27 01 00
Output T1:
b9 55 5b 29 91 75 4b 37 9d a6 8e 60 98 f5 b6 0e
df 91 8a 56 20 4b ff f3 a8 37 6d 1f 57 ed b2 34
a5 12 32 81 23 cd 6c 03 0b 54 14 2e 1e c7 78 2b
03 00 be a5 7c c2 a1 4c a3 b4 f0 85 a4 5c d6 ca
Output T2:
37 b1 e0 86 52 43 a4 fb 29 14 8d 27 4d 30 63 fc
bf b0 f2 f4 68 d5 27 e4 3b ca 41 fa 6b b5 3e c8
df 21 bf c4 62 3a 2e 76 8b 64 54 03 3e 09 52 32
d1 8c 86 a6 8f 00 98 d3 31 81 75 f6 59 05 ae db
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
8) PRF_IPSEC_ PRFPLUS_GOSTR3411_2012_512
Key K:
c9 a9 a7 73 20 e2 cc 55 9e d7 2d ce 6f 47 e2 19
2c ce a9 5f a6 48 67 05 82 c0 54 c0 ef 36 c2 21
Data of S:
01 26 bd b8 78 00 1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27 01 00
Output T1:
5d a6 71 43 a5 f1 2a 6d 6e 47 42 59 6f 39 24 3f
cc 61 57 45 91 5b 32 59 10 06 ff 78 a2 08 63 d5
f8 8e 4a fc 17 fb be 70 b9 50 95 73 db 00 5e 96
26 36 98 46 cb 86 19 99 71 6c 16 5d d0 6a 15 85
Output T2:
48 34 49 5a 43 74 6c b5 3f 0a ba 3b c4 6e bc f8
77 3c a6 4a d3 43 c1 22 ee 2a 57 75 57 03 81 57
ee 9c 38 8d 96 ef 71 d5 8b e5 c1 ef a1 af a9 5e
be 83 e3 9d 00 e1 9a 5d 03 dc d6 0a 01 bc a8 e3
9) VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256 with 256-bit output on the GOST R
34.10-2012 keys (512-bit output) with id-tc26-gost-
3410-12-512-paramSetA
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
UKM value:
1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27
Private key x of A:
c9 90 ec d9 72 fc e8 4e c4 db 02 27 78 f5 0f ca
c7 26 f4 67 08 38 4b 8d 45 83 04 96 2d 71 47 f8
c2 db 41 ce f2 2c 90 b1 02 f2 96 84 04 f9 b9 be
6d 47 c7 96 92 d8 18 26 b3 2b 8d ac a4 3c b6 67
Public key x*P of A (curve point (X, Y)):
aa b0 ed a4 ab ff 21 20 8d 18 79 9f b9 a8 55 66
54 ba 78 30 70 eb a1 0c b9 ab b2 53 ec 56 dc f5
d3 cc ba 61 92 e4 64 e6 e5 bc b6 de a1 37 79 2f
24 31 f6 c8 97 eb 1b 3c 0c c1 43 27 b1 ad c0 a7
91 46 13 a3 07 4e 36 3a ed b2 04 d3 8d 35 63 97
1b d8 75 8e 87 8c 9d b1 14 03 72 1b 48 00 2d 38
46 1f 92 47 2d 40 ea 92 f9 95 8c 0f fa 4c 93 75
64 01 b9 7f 89 fd be 0b 5e 46 e4 a4 63 1c db 5a
Private key y of part B:
48 c8 59 f7 b6 f1 15 85 88 7c c0 5e c6 ef 13 90
cf ea 73 9b 1a 18 c0 d4 66 22 93 ef 63 b7 9e 3b
80 14 07 0b 44 91 85 90 b4 b9 96 ac fe a4 ed fb
bb cc cc 8c 06 ed d8 bf 5b da 92 a5 13 92 d0 db
Public key y*P of B (curve point (X, Y)):
19 2f e1 83 b9 71 3a 07 72 53 c7 2c 87 35 de 2e
a4 2a 3d bc 66 ea 31 78 38 b6 5f a3 25 23 cd 5e
fc a9 74 ed a7 c8 63 f4 95 4d 11 47 f1 f2 b2 5c
39 5f ce 1c 12 91 75 e8 76 d1 32 e9 4e d5 a6 51
04 88 3b 41 4c 9b 59 2e c4 dc 84 82 6f 07 d0 b6
d9 00 6d da 17 6c e4 8c 39 1e 3f 97 d1 02 e0 3b
b5 98 bf 13 2a 22 8a 45 f7 20 1a ba 08 fc 52 4a
2d 77 e4 3a 36 2a b0 22 ad 40 28 f7 5b de 3b 79
KEK_VKO value:
c9 a9 a7 73 20 e2 cc 55 9e d7 2d ce 6f 47 e2 19
2c ce a9 5f a6 48 67 05 82 c0 54 c0 ef 36 c2 21
10) VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_512 with 512-bit output on the GOST R
34.10-2012 keys (512-bit output) with id-tc26-gost-
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
3410-12-512-paramSetA
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
UKM value:
1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27
Private key x of A:
c9 90 ec d9 72 fc e8 4e c4 db 02 27 78 f5 0f ca
c7 26 f4 67 08 38 4b 8d 45 83 04 96 2d 71 47 f8
c2 db 41 ce f2 2c 90 b1 02 f2 96 84 04 f9 b9 be
6d 47 c7 96 92 d8 18 26 b3 2b 8d ac a4 3c b6 67
Public key x*P of A (curve point (X, Y)):
aa b0 ed a4 ab ff 21 20 8d 18 79 9f b9 a8 55 66
54 ba 78 30 70 eb a1 0c b9 ab b2 53 ec 56 dc f5
d3 cc ba 61 92 e4 64 e6 e5 bc b6 de a1 37 79 2f
24 31 f6 c8 97 eb 1b 3c 0c c1 43 27 b1 ad c0 a7
91 46 13 a3 07 4e 36 3a ed b2 04 d3 8d 35 63 97
1b d8 75 8e 87 8c 9d b1 14 03 72 1b 48 00 2d 38
46 1f 92 47 2d 40 ea 92 f9 95 8c 0f fa 4c 93 75
64 01 b9 7f 89 fd be 0b 5e 46 e4 a4 63 1c db 5a
Private key y of B:
48 c8 59 f7 b6 f1 15 85 88 7c c0 5e c6 ef 13 90
cf ea 73 9b 1a 18 c0 d4 66 22 93 ef 63 b7 9e 3b
80 14 07 0b 44 91 85 90 b4 b9 96 ac fe a4 ed fb
bb cc cc 8c 06 ed d8 bf 5b da 92 a5 13 92 d0 db
Public key y*P of B (curve point (X, Y)):
19 2f e1 83 b9 71 3a 07 72 53 c7 2c 87 35 de 2e
a4 2a 3d bc 66 ea 31 78 38 b6 5f a3 25 23 cd 5e
fc a9 74 ed a7 c8 63 f4 95 4d 11 47 f1 f2 b2 5c
39 5f ce 1c 12 91 75 e8 76 d1 32 e9 4e d5 a6 51
04 88 3b 41 4c 9b 59 2e c4 dc 84 82 6f 07 d0 b6
d9 00 6d da 17 6c e4 8c 39 1e 3f 97 d1 02 e0 3b
b5 98 bf 13 2a 22 8a 45 f7 20 1a ba 08 fc 52 4a
2d 77 e4 3a 36 2a b0 22 ad 40 28 f7 5b de 3b 79
KEK_VKO value:
79 f0 02 a9 69 40 ce 7b de 32 59 a5 2e 01 52 97
ad aa d8 45 97 a0 d2 05 b5 0e 3e 17 19 f9 7b fa
7e e1 d2 66 1f a9 97 9a 5a a2 35 b5 58 a7 e6 d9
f8 8f 98 2d d6 3f c3 5a 8e c0 dd 5e 24 2d 3b df
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
11) Key derivation function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256:
K_in key:
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
Label:
26 bd b8 78
Seed:
af 21 43 41 45 65 63 78
KDF(K_in, label, seed) value:
a1 aa 5f 7d e4 02 d7 b3 d3 23 f2 99 1c 8d 45 34
01 31 37 01 0a 83 75 4f d0 af 6d 7c d4 92 2e d9
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
12) Key derivation function KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256
Output size of L:
512
K_in key:
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
Label:
26 bd b8 78
Seed:
af 21 43 41 45 65 63 78
Value of K1:
22 b6 83 78 45 c6 be f6 5e a7 16 72 b2 65 83 10
86 d3 c7 6a eb e6 da e9 1c ad 51 d8 3f 79 d1 6b
Value of K2:
07 4c 93 30 59 9d 7f 8d 71 2f ca 54 39 2f 4d dd
e9 37 51 20 6b 35 84 c8 f4 3f 9e 6d c5 15 31 f9
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
13) Key wrap and unwrap with the szOID_Gost28147_89_TC26_Z_ParamSet
parameters
Key K:
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
UKM value:
af 21 43 41 45 65 63 78
Label:
26 bd b8 78f
KEK_e(UKM) = KDF(K_e, label, UKM):
a1 aa 5f 7d e4 02 d7 b3 d3 23 f2 99 1c 8d 45 34
01 31 37 01 0a 83 75 4f d0 af 6d 7c d4 92 2e d9
CEK_MAC:
38 d5 8a a3
CEK_ENC:
b9 fb 92 42 95 0f 84 3f 0f bd 5b 9a 5e cf 9f 17
f7 9e 6d 21 58 16 56 de 6d c5 85 dd 62 7a 44 0a
Authors' Addresses
Stanislav Smyshlyaev (editor)
CRYPTO-PRO
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow 127018
Russian Federation
Phone: +7 (495) 995-48-20
Email: svs@cryptopro.ru
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Abbreviated Title July 2015
Evgeny Alekseev
CRYPTO-PRO
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow 127018
Russian Federation
Email: alekseev@cryptopro.ru
Igor Oshkin
CRYPTO-PRO
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow 127018
Russian Federation
Email: oshkin@cryptopro.ru
Vladimir Popov
CRYPTO-PRO
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow 127018
Russian Federation
Email: vpopov@cryptopro.ru
Vladimir Podobaev
FACTOR-TS
11A, 1st Magistralny proezd
Moscow 123290
Russian Federation
Phone: +7 (495) 644-31-30
Email: v_podobaev@factor-ts.ru
Igor Ustinov
Cryptocom
14, Kedrova str., build 2
Moscow 117218
Russian Federation
Phone: +7 (499) 124-62-26
Email: igus@cryptocom.ru
Smyshlyaev, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 35]