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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04                                                
-                                                         G. Chudov, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                          S. Leontiev, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track                              CRYPTO-PRO
Expires: March 12, 2007                                September 8, 2006


     GOST 28147-89 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                  draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-03.txt

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document is intended to register new cipher suites for the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, according to the procedure
   specified in TLS Protocol standards.  These cipher suites are based
   on Russian national cryptographic standards - GOST R 34.10-94 and
   GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys, GOST 28147-89 encryption algorithm and
   GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm.





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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  CipherSuite Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.2.  PRF, Signature and Hash  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  Cipher and MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Data Structures and Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Keys Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3.  Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.4.  Server Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.5.  Certificate Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.6.  Client Key Exchange Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.7.  Certificate Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.8.  Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.1.  Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.2.  Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     A.1.  Gost-CryptoPro-TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 16
























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1.  Introduction

   This document proposes the addition of new cipher suites to the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to support GOST R 34.11-94
   digest, GOST 28147-89 encryption and VKO GOST R 34.10-94/2001 key
   exchange algorithms.  The cipher suites defined here were proposed by
   CRYPTO-PRO Company for the "Russian Cryptographic Software
   Compatibility Agreement" community.

   Algorithms GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST 28147-89 and
   GOST R 34.11-94 have been developed by Russian Federal Agency of
   Governmental Communication and Information (FAGCI) and "All-Russian
   Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization".  They are
   described in [GOSTR341094], [GOSTR341001], [GOSTR341194] and
   [GOST28147] ([GOST3431095], [GOST3431004], [GOST3431195]).
   Algorithms VKO GOST R 34.10-94/2001 and PRF_GOSTR3411 are described
   in [CPALGS].

   This document defines two configurations:
      anonymous client - authenticated server (only server provides a
      certificate);
      authenticated client - authenticated server (client and server
      exchange certificates).

   The presentation language used here is the same as in [TLS1.2].
   Since this specification extends [TLS1.2], these descriptions should
   be merged with those in the TLS specification and any others that
   extend TLS.  This means, that enum types may not specify all possible
   values and structures with multiple formats chosen with a select()
   clause may not indicate all possible cases.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
   NOT","SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
   this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


2.  CipherSuite Definitions

2.1.  Key Exchange

   The cipher suites defined here use the following key exchange
   algorithms:









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     +-------------------------------------+------------------------+
     | CipherSuite                         | Key Exchange Algorithm |
     +-------------------------------------+------------------------+
     | TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT | VKO GOST R 34.10-94    |
     | TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT | VKO GOST R 34.10-2001  |
     | TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 | VKO GOST R 34.10-94    |
     | TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 | VKO GOST R 34.10-2001  |
     +-------------------------------------+------------------------+

   Key derivation algorithms based on GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-
   2001 public keys (VKO GOST R 34.10-94, VKO GOST R 34.10-2001) are
   described in [CPALGS].

2.2.  PRF, Signature and Hash

   For a PRF, described in section 5 of [TLS1.2], the cipher suites
   described here use PRF_GOSTR3411 (refer to Section 3.1).  The same
   PRF MUST be used for all dependent protocols, such as [EAP-TLS].

   GOST R 34.10-94/2001 signature is used for CertificateVerify message.

   GOST R 34.11 digest algorithm ([GOSTR341194]) is used for
   CertificateVerify.signature.gostR3411_hash and Finished.verify_data
   (see sections 7.4.10 and 7.4.11 of [TLS1.2])

2.3.  Cipher and MAC

   The following cipher algorithm and MAC functions are used (for
   details refer to Section 3.1):

   +-------------------------------------+-----------+----------------+
   | CipherSuite                         | Cipher    | MAC            |
   +-------------------------------------+-----------+----------------+
   | TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT | GOST28147 | IMIT_GOST28147 |
   | TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT | GOST28147 | IMIT_GOST28147 |
   | TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 | -         | HMAC_GOSTR3411 |
   | TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 | -         | HMAC_GOSTR3411 |
   +-------------------------------------+-----------+----------------+

   For all four cipher suites, the use of MAC is slighttly different
   from the one, described in section 6.2.3.1 of [TLS1.2].  In [TLS1.2],
   MAC is calculated from the following data:

     MACed_data[seq_num] = seq_num +
                           TLSCompressed.type +
                           TLSCompressed.version +
                           TLSCompressed.length +
                           TLSCompressed.fragment;



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   These cipher suites use the same input for first record, but for each
   next record the input from all previous records is concatenated:

     MACed_data[0] + ... + MACed_data[n]


3.  Data Structures and Computations

3.1.  Algorithms

   GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147] uses 256-bit key size and 8-byte IV.
   Cipher suites, defined here, use GOST 28147-89 as a stream cipher in
   counter mode with S-box from id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
   (see [CPALGS]) and CryptoPro key meshing algorithm.

   IMIT_GOST28147 is GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147] in "IMITOVSTAVKA" mode (4
   bytes)

   HMAC_GOSTR3411(secret, data) is based on GOST R 34.11-94 digest and
   described in [CPALGS].

   PRF_GOSTR3411(secret, label, seed) is based on HMAC_GOSTR3411 and
   described in [CPALGS].

3.2.  Keys Calculation

   Key calculation is done according to section 6.3 of [TLS1.2], with
   PRF_GOSTR3411 function used instead of PRF.  The parameters are as
   follows:

   SecurityParameters.hash_size = 32
   SecurityParameters.key_material_length = 32
   SecurityParameters.IV_size = 8

   Length of necessary key material is 144 bytes.

3.3.  Server Certificate

   For these cipher suites this message is required and it MUST contain
   a certificate, with a public key algorithm matching
   ServerHello.cipher_suite.

3.4.  Server Key Exchange

   This message MUST NOT be used in these cipher suites, because all the
   parameters necessary are present in server certificate (see [CPPK]).





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3.5.  Certificate Request

   This message is used as described in section 7.4.5 of [TLS1.2], and
   extended as follows:

    enum {
        gostr341094(21), gostr34102001(22),(255)
    } ClientCertificateType;

   gostr341094 and gostr34102001 certificate types identify that the
   server accepts GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 public key
   certificates.

   [IANA please remove] Note: The above numeric definitions for
   ClientCertificateType have not yet been registered.

    enum{
      gostr3411(XX), (255)
    } HashType;

   gostr3411 hash type identifes that the server accepts GOST R 34.11-94
   hash function.  It is RECOMMENDED to populate
   CertificateRequest.certificate_hash only with gostr3411 value, when
   one of the cipher suites described in this document is chosen.

3.6.  Client Key Exchange Message

   This message is used as described in section 7.4.9 of [TLS1.2], it is
   required for these suites, and contains DER-encoded
   TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure [X.660].

    enum { vko_gost } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;

    struct {
        select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
            case vko_gost: TLSGostKeyTransportBlob;
        } exchange_keys;
    } ClientKeyExchange;

   ASN1-syntax for this structure is:











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    TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE {
        keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
        proxyKeyBlobs SEQUENCE OF TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob OPTIONAL
    }

    TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE {
        keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
        cert    OCTET STRING
    }

   GostR3410-KeyTransport is defined in [CPCMS].

   keyBlob.transportParameters MUST be present.

   keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey MUST be present if the
   server didn't request client certificate or client's public key
   algorithm and parameters do not match those of the recipient.  Else
   it SHOULD be omited.

   proxyKeyBlobs - (optional) contains key exchange for secondary
   recipients (for example, for the firewall, which audits connections).

   cert - contains secondary recipient's certificate.

   Actions of client:

   First, the client generates a random 32-byte premaster_secret.

   Then shared_ukm is calculated as first 8 bytes of digest of
   concatenated client random and server random:

   shared_ukm = GOSTR3411(client_random|server_random)[0..7]

   Then client chooses a sender key.  If
   keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey is present, the
   corresponding secret key MUST be used as a sender key.  If it is
   missing, the secret key, corresponding to the client certificate MUST
   be used.

   Using the sender key and recipient's public key, algorithm VKO
   GOST R 34.10-94 or VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 (described in [CPALGS]) is
   applied to produce KEK.  VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 is used with
   shared_ukm as UKM.

   Then CryptoPro Key Wrap algorithm is applied to encrypt
   premaster_secret and produce CEK_ENC and CEK_MAC.  Again, shared_ukm
   is used as UKM. keyBlob.transportParameters.encryptionParamSet is
   used for all encryption operations.



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   The resulting encrypted key (CEK_ENC) is placed in
   keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.encryptedKey field, it's mac (CEK_MAC) is
   placed in keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.macKey field, and shared_ukm
   (UKM) is placed in keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm field.

   Actions of server:

   Server MUST verify, that keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm is equal to
   GOSTR3411(client_random|server_random)[0..7], before decrypting the
   premaster_secret.

   Server applies VKO GOST R 34.10-94 or VKO GOST R 34.10-2001,
   (depending on the client public key type), and CryptoPro Key Unwrap
   algorithm in the simillar manner to decrypt the premaster_secret.

   Server MUST verify keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.macKey after
   decrypting the premaster_secret.

3.7.  Certificate Verify

   This message is used as described in section 7.4.10 of [TLS1.2].  If
   the client have sent both a client certificate and an ephemeral
   public key, it MUST send a certificate verify message, as a proof of
   possession of the private key for provided certificate.

   The TLS structures are extended as follows:

    enum { gostr341094, gostr34102001 }
        SignatureAlgorithm;

    select (SignatureAlgorithm) {
        case gostr341094:
            digitally-signed struct {
                opaque gostr341194_hash[32];
            };
        case gostr34102001:
            digitally-signed struct {
                opaque gostr341194_hash[32];
            };
    } Signature;

    CertificateVerify.signature.gostR3411_hash =
        GOSTR3411(handshake_messages)








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3.8.  Finished

   This message is used as described in section 7.4.11 of [TLS1.2].

   Finished.verify_data = PRF_GOSTR3411(master_secret, finished_label,
                              GOSTR3411(handshake_messages)) [0..11]


4.  Compatibility

   Some applications use the cipher suites specified herein with
   [TLS1.0], using features of [TLS1.2], including cipher-suite
   dependent PRF, Finished and Certificate Verify computations.


5.  Security Considerations

   It is RECOMMENDED that software applications verify signature values,
   subject public keys and algorithm parameters to conform to
   [GOSTR341001], [GOSTR341094] standards prior to their use.

   Use of the same key for signature and key derivation is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.

   It is RECOMMENDED for both client and server to verify the private
   key usage period, if this extension is present in the certificate.

   The cipher suites TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT and
   TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT proposed hereby, have been
   analyzed by special certification laboratory of Scientific and
   Technical Centre "ATLAS" in appropriate levels of
   target_of_evaluation (TOE).

   It is RECOMMENDED to subject the implementations of these cipher
   suites to examination by an authorized agency with approved methods
   of cryptographic analysis.


6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has assigned the following values for GOST 28147-89 mode ciphers
   definitions:

    enum {
        gostr341094(21), gostr34102001(22)
    } ClientCertificateType;





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    enum{
      gostr3411(XX)
    } HashType;


   CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT = {0x00,0x80}
   CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT = {0x00,0x81}
   CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 = {0x00,0x82}
   CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 = {0x00,0x83}

   [IANA please remove] Note: The above numeric definitions for
   CipherSuites and ClientCertificateType have not yet been registered.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative references

   [CPALGS]   Popov, V., Kurepkin, I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
              Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89, GOST
              R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
              Algorithms", RFC 4357, January 2006.

   [CPCMS]    Leontiev, S. and G. Chudov, "Using the GOST 28147-89, GOST
              R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001
              Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 4490, May 2006.

   [CPPK]     Leontiev, S. and D. Shefanovski, "Using the GOST R
              34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
              Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
              May 2006.

   [GOST28147]
              Government Committee of the USSR for Standards,
              "Cryptographic Protection for Data Processing System,
              Gosudarstvennyi Standard of USSR (In Russian)",
              GOST 28147-89, 1989.

   [GOST3431004]
              Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification
              of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
              Formation and verification processes of (electronic)
              digital signature based on Asymmetric Cryptographic
              Algorithm (In Russian)", GOST 34.310-2004, 2004.




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   [GOST3431095]
              Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification
              of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
              Produce and check procedures of Electronic Digital
              Signature based on Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithm (In
              Russian)", GOST 34.310-95, 1995.

   [GOST3431195]
              Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification
              of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
              Cashing function (In Russian)", GOST 34.311-95, 1995.

   [GOSTR341001]
              Government Committee of the Russia for Standards,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic Data
              Security.Signature and verification processes of
              [electronic] digital signature, Gosudarstvennyi Standard
              of Russian Federation (In Russian)", GOST R 34.10-2001,
              2001.

   [GOSTR341094]
              Government Committee of the Russia for Standards,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
              Produce and check procedures of Electronic Digital
              Signatures based on Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithm,
              Gosudarstvennyi Standard of Russian Federation (In
              Russian)", GOST R 34.10-94, 1994.

   [GOSTR341194]
              Government Committee of the Russia for Standards,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
              Hashing function, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of Russian
              Federation (In Russian)", GOST R 34.11-94, 1994.

   [TLS1.2]   Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol",
              draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-01 (work in progress),
              June 2006.

7.2.  Informative references

   [EAP-TLS]  Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication
              Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.




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   [TLS1.0]   Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
              RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [X.660]    ISO/IEC, "ITU-T Recommendation X.660 Information
              Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
              Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
              Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T X.660, 1997.


Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules

   Additional ASN.1 modules, referenced here, can be found in [CPALGS]
   and [CPCMS].

A.1.  Gost-CryptoPro-TLS

   Gost-CryptoPro-TLS
       { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2)
         cryptopro(2) other(1) modules(1) gost-CryptoPro-TLS(16) 1 }
   DEFINITIONS ::=
   BEGIN
   -- EXPORTS All --
   -- The types and values defined in this module are exported for
   -- use in the other ASN.1 modules contained within the Russian
   -- Cryptography "GOST" & "GOST R" Specifications, and for the use
   -- of other applications which will use them to access Russian
   -- Cryptography services. Other applications may use them for
   -- their own purposes, but this will not constrain extensions and
   -- modifications needed to maintain or improve the Russian
   -- Cryptography service.
       IMPORTS
           Certificate,
           AlgorithmIdentifier
           FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
           dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
           id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
           id-CryptoPro-algorithms, gostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
           FROM Cryptographic-Gost-Useful-Definitions
               { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2)
                 cryptopro(2) other(1) modules(1)
                 cryptographic-Gost-Useful-Definitions(0) 1 }
           GostR3410-KeyTransport
           FROM GostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
                gostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
       ;
       id-PRF-GostR3411-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
           { id-CryptoPro-algorithms prf-gostr3411-94(23) }
       TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob ::=



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           SEQUENCE {
               keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
               cert    OCTET STRING
           }
       TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::=
           SEQUENCE {
               keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
               proxyKeyBlobs SEQUENCE OF
                   TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob OPTIONAL
           }
       TLSGostSrvKeyExchange ::=
           SEQUENCE OF
               OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {Certificate})
       TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect ::=
           SEQUENCE {
               hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
               hmacAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
               prfAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
           }
       TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient ::=
           SEQUENCE OF
               TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect
       TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectServer ::=
           TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect

   END -- Gost-CryptoPro-TLS


Appendix B.  Acknowledgments

   This document was created in accordance with "Russian Cryptographic
   Software Compatibility Agreement", signed by FGUE STC "Atlas",
   CRYPTO-PRO, Factor-TS, MD PREI, Infotecs GmbH, SPRCIS (SPbRCZI),
   Cryptocom, R-Alpha.  The aim of this agreement is to achieve mutual
   compatibility of the products and solutions.

   The authors wish to thank:

      Microsoft Corporation Russia for provided information about
      company products and solutions, and also for technical consulting
      in PKI.
      RSA Security Russia and Demos Co Ltd for active colaboration and
      critical help in creation of this document.
      NIP Informzachita for compatibility testing of the proposed data
      formats while incorporating them into company products.
      Citrix Inc for help in compatibility testing Citrix products for
      Microsoft Windows.




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      Russ Hously (Vigil Security, LLC, housley@vigilsec.com) and
      Vasilij Sakharov (DEMOS Co Ltd, svp@dol.ru) for initiative,
      creating this document.

   Author's Addresses

   Alexandr Afanasiev
   Factor-TS
   office 711, 14, Presnenskij val,
   Moscow, 123557, Russian Federation
   EMail: afa1@factor-ts.ru

   Nikolaj Nikishin
   Infotecs GmbH
   p/b 35, 80-5, Leningradskij prospekt,
   Moscow, 125315, Russian Federation
   EMail: nikishin@infotecs.ru

   Boleslav Izotov
   FGUE STC "Atlas"
   38, Obraztsova,
   Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
   EMail: izotov@nii.voskhod.ru

   Elena Minaeva
   MD PREI
   build 3, 6A, Vtoroj Troitskij per.,
   Moscow, Russian Federation
   EMail: evminaeva@mail.ru

   Serguei Murugov
   R-Alpha
   4/1, Raspletina,
   Moscow, 123060, Russian Federation
   EMail: msm@top-cross.ru

   Igor Ustinov
   Cryptocom
   office 239, 51, Leninskij prospekt,
   Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation
   EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru

   Anatolij Erkin
   SPRCIS (SPbRCZI)
   1, Obrucheva,
   St.Petersburg, 195220, Russian Federation
   EMail: erkin@nevsky.net




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Authors' Addresses

   Grigorij S. Chudov (editor)
   CRYPTO-PRO, Ltd.
   38, Obraztsova
   Moscow  127018
   Russia

   Phone: +7 (495) 933 11 68
   Fax:   +7 (495) 933 11 68
   Email: chudov@CryptoPro.ru
   URI:   http://www.CryptoPro.ru


   Serguei E. Leontiev (editor)
   CRYPTO-PRO, Ltd.
   38, Obraztsova
   Moscow  127018
   Russia

   Phone: +7 (495) 933 11 68
   Fax:   +7 (495) 933 11 68
   Email: lse@CryptoPro.ru
   URI:   http://www.CryptoPro.ru



























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Full Copyright Statement

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