dprive H. Zhang
Internet-Draft P. Aras
Updates: 1995 (if approved) Salesforce
Intended status: Standards Track W. Toorop
Expires: May 21, 2020 NLnet Labs
S. Dickinson
Sinodun IT
A. Mankin
Salesforce
November 18, 2019
DNS Zone Transfer-over-TLS
draft-ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls-00
Abstract
DNS zone transfers are transmitted in clear text, which gives
attackers the opportunity to collect the content of a zone by
eavesdropping on network connections. The DNS Transaction Signature
(TSIG) mechanism is specified to restrict direct zone transfer to
authorized clients only, but it does not add confidentiality. This
document specifies use of DNS-over-TLS to prevent zone contents
collection via passive monitoring of zone transfers.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 21, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Use Cases for XFR-over-TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Connection and Data Flows in Existing XFR Mechanisms . . . . 5
4.1. AXFR Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. IXFR Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Data Leakage of NOTIFY and SOA Message Exchanges . . . . 7
4.3.1. NOTIFY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.2. SOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Connection and Data Flows in XoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. AXoT mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. IXoT mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3.1. Fallback to AXFR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Zone Transfer with DoT - Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. TSIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. SIG(0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3.1. Opportunistic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3.2. Strict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3.3. Mutual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4. IP Based ACL on the Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.5. ZONEMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.6. Comparison of Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Policies for Both AXFR and IXFR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Multi-primary Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
14. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
15.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
DNS has a number of privacy vulnerabilities, as discussed in detail
in [I-D.ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis]. Stub client to recursive resolver
query privacy has received the most attention to date. There are now
standards track documents for three encryption capabilities for stub
to recursive queries and more work going on to guide deployment of
specifically DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [RFC7858] and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)
[RFC8484].
[I-D.ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis] established that stub client DNS query
transactions are not public and needed protection, but on zone
transfer [RFC1995] [RFC5936] it says only:
"Privacy risks for the holder of a zone (the risk that someone gets
the data) are discussed in [RFC5936] and [RFC5155]."
In what way is exposing the full contents of a zone a privacy risk?
The contents of the zone could include information such as names of
persons used in names of hosts. Best practice is not to use personal
information for domain names, but many such domain names exist.
There may also be regulatory, policy or other reasons why the zone
contents in full must be treated as private.
Neither of the RFCs mentioned in [I-D.ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis]
contemplates the risk that someone gets the data through
eavesdropping on network connections, only via enumeration or
unauthorized transfer as described in the following paragraphs.
[RFC5155] specifies NSEC3 to prevent zone enumeration, which is when
queries for the authenticated denial of existences records of DNSSEC
allow a client to walk through the entire zone. Note that the need
for this protection also motivates NSEC5 [I-D.vcelak-nsec5]; zone
walking is now possible with NSEC3 due to crypto-breaking advances,
and NSEC5 is a response to this problem.
[RFC5155] does not address data obtained outside zone enumeration
(nor does [I-D.vcelak-nsec5]). Preventing eavesdropping of zone
transfers (this draft) is orthogonal to preventing zone enumeration,
though they aim to protect the same information.
[RFC5936] specifies using TSIG [RFC2845] for authorization of the
clients of a zone transfer and for data integrity, but does not
express any need for confidentiality, and TSIG does not offer
encryption. Some operators use SSH tunneling or IPSec to encrypt the
transfer data.
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Because the AXFR zone transfer is typically carried out-over-TCP from
authoritative DNS protocol implementations, encrypting AXFR using
DNS-over-TLS [RFC7858] seems like a simple step forward. This
document specifies how to use DoT to prevent zone collection from
zone transfers, including discussion of approaches for IXFR, which
uses UDP or TCP.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Privacy terminology is as described in Section 3 of [RFC6973].
Note that in this document we choose to use the terms 'primary' and
'secondary' for two servers engaged in zone transfers.
DNS terminology is as described in [RFC8499].
DoT: DNS-over-TLS as specified in [RFC7858]
DoH: DNS-over-HTTPS as specified in [RFC8484]
XoT: Generic XFR-over-TLS mechanisms as specified in this document
AXoT: AXFR-over-TLS
IXoT: IXFR over-TLS
3. Use Cases for XFR-over-TLS
o Confidentiality. Clearly using an encrypted transport for zone
transfers will defeat zone content leakage that can occur via
passive surveillance.
o Authentication. Use of single or mutual TLS authentication (in
combination with ACLs) can complement and potentially be an
alternative to TSIG.
o Performance. Existing AXFR and IXFR mechanisms have the burden of
backwards compatibility with older implementations based on the
original specifications in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]. For example,
some older AXFR servers don't support using a TCP connection for
multiple AXFR sessions or XFRs of different zones because they
have not been updated to follow the guidance in [RFC5836]. Any
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implementation of XFR-over-TLS would obviously be required to
implement optimized and interoperable transfers as described in
[RFC5936] e.g. transfer of multiple zones-over-one connection.
o Performance. Current usage of TCP for IXFR is sub-optimal in some
cases i.e. connections are frequently closed after a single IXFR.
4. Connection and Data Flows in Existing XFR Mechanisms
The original specification for zone transfers in [RFC1034] and
[RFC1035] was based on a polling mechanism: a secondary performed a
periodic SOA query (based on the refresh timer) to determine if an
AXFR was required.
[RFC1995] and [RFC1996] introduced the concepts of IXFR and NOTIFY
respectively, to provide for prompt propagation of zone updates.
This has largely replaced AXFR where possible, particularly for
dynamically updated zones.
[RFC5936] subsequently redefined the specification of AXFR to improve
performance and interoperability.
In this document we use the phrase "XFR mechanism" to describe the
entire set of message exchanges between a secondary and a primary
that concludes in a successful AXFR or IXFR request/response. This
set may or may not include
o NOTIFY messages
o SOA queries
o Fallback from IXFR to AXFR
o Fallback from IXFR-over-UDP to IXFR-over-TCP
The term is used to encompasses the range of permutations that are
possible and is useful to distinguish the 'XFR mechanism' from a
single XFR request/response exchange.
4.1. AXFR Mechanism
The figure below provides an outline of an AXFR mechanism including
NOTIFYs.
Figure 1. AXFR Mechanism [1]
1. An AXFR is often (but not always) preceded by a NOTIFY (over UDP)
from the primary to the secondary. A secondary may also initiate
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an AXFR based on a refresh timer or scheduled/triggered zone
maintenance.
2. The secondary will normally (but not always) make a SOA query to
the primary to obtain the serial number of the zone held by the
primary.
3. If the primary serial is higher than the secondaries serial
(using Serial Number Arithmetic [RFC1982]), the secondary makes
an AXFR request (over TCP) to the primary after which the AXFR
data flows in one or more AXFR responses on the TCP connection.
[RFC5936] specifies that AXFR must use TCP as the transport protocol
but details that there is no restriction in the protocol that a
single TCP session must be used only for a single AXFR exchange, or
even solely for XFRs. For example, it outlines that the SOA query
can also happen on this connection. However, this can cause
interoperability problems with older implementations that support
only the trivial case of one AXFR per connection.
Further details of the limitations in existing AXFR implementations
are outlined in [RFC5936].
It is noted that unless the NOTIFY is sent over a trusted
communication channel and/or signed by TSIG is can be spoofed causing
unnecessary zone transfer attempts.
Similarly unless the SOA query is sent over a trusted communication
channel and/or signed by TSIG the response can, in principle, be
spoofed causing a secondary to incorrectly believe its version of the
zone is update to date. Repeated successful attacks on the SOA could
result in a secondary serving stale zone data.
4.2. IXFR Mechanism
The figure below provides an outline of the IXFR mechanism including
NOTIFYs.
Figure 1. IXFR Mechanism [2]
1. An IXFR is normally (but not always) preceded by a NOTIFY (over
UDP) from the primary to the secondary. A secondary may also
initiate an IXFR based on a refresh timer or scheduled/triggered
zone maintenance.
2. The secondary will normally (but not always) make a SOA query to
the primary to obtain the serial number of the zone held by the
primary.
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3. If the primary serial is higher than the secondaries serial
(using Serial Number Arithmetic [RFC1982]), the secondary makes
an IXFR request to the primary after the primary sends an IXFR
response.
[RFC1995] specifies that Incremental Transfer may use UDP if the
entire IXFR response can be contained in a single DNS packet,
otherwise, TCP is used. In fact is says in non-normative language:
"Thus, a client should first make an IXFR query using UDP."
So there may be a forth step above where the client falls back to
IXFR-over-TCP. There may also be a forth step where the secondary
must fall back to AXFR because e.g. the primary does not support
IXFR.
However it is noted that at least two widely used open source
authoritative nameserver implementations (BIND [3] and NSD [4]) do
IXFR using TCP by default in their latest releases. For BIND TCP
connections are sometimes used for SOA queries but in general they
are not used persistently and close after an IXFR is completed.
It is noted that the specification for IXFR was published well before
TCP was considered a first class transport for DNS. This document
therefore updates [RFC1995] to state that DNS implementations that
support IXFR-over-TCP MUST use [RFC7766] to optimise the use of TCP
connections and SHOULD use [RFC7858] to manage persistent
connections.
4.3. Data Leakage of NOTIFY and SOA Message Exchanges
This section attempts to presents a rationale for also encrypting the
other messages in the XFR mechanism.
Since the SOA of the published zone can be trivially discovered by
simply querying the publicly available authoritative servers leakage
RR of this is not discussed in the following sections.
4.3.1. NOTIFY
Unencrypted NOTIFY messages identify configured secondaries on the
primary.
[RFC1996] also states:
"If ANCOUNT>0, then the answer section represents an unsecure hint at
the new RRset for this .
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But since the only supported QTYPE for NOTIFY is SOA, this does not
pose a potential leak.
4.3.2. SOA
For hidden primaries or secondaries the SOA response leaks the degree
of lag of any downstream secondary.
5. Connection and Data Flows in XoT
5.1. Performance Considerations
The details in [RFC7766], [RFC7858] and [RFC8310] about e.g. using
persistent connections and TLS Session Resumption [RFC5077] are fully
applicable to XFR-over-TLS as well.
It is RECOMMENDED that clients and servers that support XoT also
implement EDNS0 Keepalive [RFC7828].
5.2. AXoT mechanism
The figure below provides an outline of the AXoT mechanism including
NOTIFYs.
Figure 3: AXoT mechanism [5]
All implementations that support XoT MUST fully implement [RFC5953]
behavior on TLS connections.
Sections 4.1, 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of [RFC5936] describe guidance for AXFR
clients and servers with regard to re-use of sessions for multiple
AXFRs, AXFRs of different zones and using TCP session for other
queries including SOA.
For clarity we restate here that an AXoT client MAY use an already
opened TLS connection to send a AXFR request. Using an existing open
connection is RECOMMENDED over opening a new connection. (Non-AXoT
session traffic can also use an open connection.)
For clarity we additionally state here that an AXoT client MAY use an
already opened TLS connection to send a SOA request. Using an
existing open connection is RECOMMENDED over opening a new
connection.
The connection for AXFR-over-TLS SHOULD be established using port
853, as specified in [RFC7858], unless there is mutual agreement
between the secondary and primary to use a port other than port 853
for XFR-over-TLS.
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QUESTION: Should there be a requirement that the SOA is always done
on a TLS connection if the XFR is? For the case when no transfer is
required this could be unnecessary overhead.
5.3. IXoT mechanism
The figure below provides an outline of the IXoT mechanism including
NOTIFYs.
Figure 4: IXoT mechanism [6]
The connection for IXFR-over-TLS SHOULD be established using port
853, as specified in [RFC7858], unless there is mutual agreement
between the secondary and primary to use a port other than port 853
for XFR-over-TLS.
[RFC1995] says nothing with respect to optimizing IXFRs over TCP or
re-using already open TCP connections to perform IXFRs or other
queries. We provide guidance here that aligns with the guidance in
[RFC5936] for AXFR and with that for performant TCP/TLS usage in
[RFC7766] and [RFC7858].
An IXoT client MAY use an already opened TLS connection to send a
IXFR request. Using an existing open connection is RECOMMENDED over
opening a new connection. (Non-IXoT session traffic can also use an
open connection.)
An IXoT client MAY use an already open TLS connection to send an SOA
query. Using an existing open connection is RECOMMENDED over opening
a new connection.
An IXoT server MUST be able to handle multiple IXoT requests on a
single TLS connection, as well as to handle other query/response
transactions over it.
An IXoT client MAY keep an existing TLS session open in the
expectation it is likely to need to perform an IXFR in the near
future. The client may use the frequency of recent IXFRs to
calculate an average update rate and then use EDNS0 Keepalive to
request an appropriate timeout from the server (if the server
supports EDNS0 Keepalive). If the server does not support EDNS0
Keepalive the client MAY keep the connection open for a few seconds
([RFC7766] recommends that servers use timeouts of at least a few
seconds).
An IXoT client MAY pipeline IXFR requests for different zones on a
single TLS connection. AN IXoT server MAY respond to those requests
out of order.
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5.3.1. Fallback to AXFR
Fallback to AXFR can happen, for example, if the server is not able
to provide an IXFR for the requested SOA. Implementations differ in
how long they store zone deltas and how many may be stored at any one
time.
After a failed IXFR a IXoT client SHOULD request the AXFR on the
already open TLS connection.
6. Zone Transfer with DoT - Authentication
6.1. TSIG
TSIG [RFC2845] provides a mechanism for two parties to exchange
secret keys which can then be used to create a message digest to
protect individual DNS messages. This allows each party to
authenticate that a request or response (and the data in it) came
from the other party, even if it was transmitted-over-an unsecured
channel or via a proxy. It provides party-to-party data
authentication, but not hop-to-hop channel authentication or
confidentiality.
6.2. SIG(0)
TBD
6.3. TLS
6.3.1. Opportunistic
Opportunistic TLS [RFC8310] provides a defence against passive
surveillance, providing on-the-wire confidentiality.
6.3.2. Strict
Strict TLS [RFC8310] requires that a client is configured with an
authentication domain name (and/or SPKI pinset) that should be used
to authenticate the TLS handshake with the server. This additionally
provides a defense for the client against active surveillance,
providing client-to-server authentication and end-to-end channel
confidentiality.
6.3.3. Mutual
This is an extension to Strict TLS [RFC8310] which requires that a
client is configured with an authentication domain name (and/or SPKI
pinset) and a client certificate. The client offers the certificate
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for authentication by the server and the client can authentic the
server the same way as in Strict TLS. This provides a defense for
both parties against active surveillance, providing bi-directional
authentication and end-to-end channel confidentiality.
6.4. IP Based ACL on the Primary
Most DNS server implementations offer an option to configure an IP
based Access Control List (ACL), which is often used in combination
with TSIG based ACLs to restrict access to zone transfers on primary
servers.
This is also possible with XoT but it must be noted that as with TCP
the implementation of such and ACL cannot be enforced on the primary
until a XFR request is received on an established connection.
If control were to be any more fine-grained than this then a separate
port would be required for XoT such that implementations would be
able to refuse connections on that port to all clients except those
configured as secondaries.
6.5. ZONEMD
Message Digest for DNS Zones (ZONEMD)
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-dns-zone-digest] digest is a mechanism that can be
used to verify the content of a standalone zone. It is designed to
be independent of the transmission channel or mechanism, allowing a
general consumer of a zone to do origin authentication of the entire
zone contents. Note that the current version of
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-dns-zone-digest] states:
"As specified at this time, ZONEMD is not designed for use in large,
dynamic zones due to the time and resources required for digest
calculation. The ZONEMD record described in this document includes
fields reserved for future work to support large, dynamic zones."
It is complementary the above mechanisms and can be used in
conjunction with XFR-over-TLS but is not considered further.
6.6. Comparison of Authentication Methods
The Table below compares the properties of each of the above methods
in terms of what protection they provide to the secondary and primary
servers during XoT in terms of:
o 'Data Auth': Authentication that the DNS message data is signed by
the party with whom credentials were shared (the signing party may
or may not be party operating the far end of a TCP/TLS connection
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in a 'proxy' scenario). For the primary the TSIG on the XFR
request confirms that the requesting party is authorized to
request zone data, for the secondary it authenticates the zone
data that is received.
o 'Channel Conf': Confidentiality of the communication channel
between the client and server (i.e. the two end points of a TCP/
TLS connection).
o Channel Auth: Authentication of the identity of party to whom a
TCP/TLS connection is made (this might not be a direct connection
between the primary and secondary in a proxy scenario).
It is noted that zone transfer scenarios can vary from a simple
single primary/secondary relationship where both servers are under
the control of a single operator to a complex hierarchical structure
which includes proxies and multiple operators. Each deployment
scenario will require specific analysis to determine which
authentication methods are best suited to the deployment model in
question.
Table 1: Properties of Authentication methods for XoT [7]
Based on this analysis it can be seen that:
o A combination of Opportunistic TLS and TSIG provides both data
authentication and channel confidentiality for both parties.
However this does not stop a MitM attack on the channel which
could be used to gather zone data.
o Using just mutual TLS can be considered a standalone solution if
the secondary has reason to place equivalent trust in channel
authentication as data authentication e.g. the same operator runs
both the primary and secondary.
o Using TSIG, Strict TLS and an ACL on the primary provides all 3
properties for both parties with probably the lowest operational
overhead.
7. Policies for Both AXFR and IXFR
We call the entire group of servers involved in XFR (all the
primaries and all the secondaries) the 'transfer group'.
Within any transfer group both AXFRs and IXFRs for a zone SHOULD all
use the same policy e.g. if AXFRs use AXoT all IXFRs SHOULD use IXoT.
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In order to assure the confidentiality of the zone information, the
entire transfer group MUST have a consistent policy of requiring
confidentiality. If any do not, this is a weak link for attackers to
exploit.
A XoT policy should specify
o If TSIG is required
o What kind of TLS is required (Opportunistic, Strict or mTLS)
o If IP based ACLs should also be used.
Since this may require configuration of a number of servers who may
be under the control of different operators the desired consistency
could be hard to enforce and audit in practice.
Certain aspects of the Policies can be relatively easily tested
independently e.g. by requesting zone transfers without TSIG, from
unauthorized IP addresses or over cleartext DNS. Other aspects such
as if a secondary will accept data without a TSIG digest or if
secondaries are using Strict as opposed to Opportunistic TLS are more
challenging.
NOTE: The authors request feedback on this challenge and welcome
suggestions of how to practically manage this.
8. Multi-primary Configurations
Also known as multi-master configurations this model can provide
flexibility and redundancy particularly for IXFR. A secondary will
receive one or more NOTIFY messages and can send an SOA to all of the
configured primaries. It can then choose to send an IXFR request to
the primary with the highest SOA (or other criteria e.g. RTT).
When using persistent connections the secondary may have a TLS
connection already open to one or more primaries. Should a secondary
preferentially request an IXFR from a primary to which it already has
an open TLS connection or the one with the highest SOA (assuming it
doesn't have a connection open to it already)?
Two extremes can be envisaged here. In the first case the secondary
continues to use one persistent connection to a single primary until
it has reason not to. Reasons not to might include the primary
repeatedly closing the connection, long RTTs on transfers or the SOA
of the primary being an unacceptable lag behind the SOA of an
alternative primary.
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At the other extreme a primary could keep multiple persistent
connections open to all available primaries and only request IXFRs
from the primary with the highest serial number. Since normally the
number of secondaries and primaries in direct contact in a transfer
group is reasonably low this might be feasible if latency is the most
significant concern.
9. Implementation Considerations
TBD
10. Implementation Status
The 1.9.2 version of Unbound [8] includes an option to perform AXFR-
over-TLS (instead of TCP). This requires the client (secondary) to
authenticate the server (primary) using a configured authentication
domain name.
It is noted that use of a TLS proxy in front of the primary server is
a simple deployment solution that can enable server side XoT.
11. IANA Considerations
TBD
12. Security Considerations
This document specifies a security measure against a DNS risk: the
risk that an attacker collects entire DNS zones through eavesdropping
on clear text DNS zone transfers. It presents a new Security
Consideration for DNS. Some questions to discuss are:
o Should DoT in this new case be required to use only TLS 1.3 and
higher to avoid residual exposure?
o How should padding be used in IXFR?
o Should there be an option to 'pad' an AXFR response (i.e. a set of
AXFR responses on a given connection) to hide the zone size?
13. Acknowledgements
The authors thank Benno Overeinder, Shumon Huque and Tim Wicinski for
review and discussions.
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14. Changelog
draft-ietf-dprive-xfr-over-tls-00
o Rename after adoption and reference update.
o Add placeholder for SIG(0) discussion
o Update section on ZONEMD
draft-hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls-02
o Substantial re-work of the document.
draft-hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls-01
o Editorial changes, updates to references.
draft-hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls-00
o Initial commit
15. References
15.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis]
Bortzmeyer, S. and S. Dickinson, "DNS Privacy
Considerations", draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-02 (work in
progress), October 2019.
[I-D.vcelak-nsec5]
Vcelak, J., Goldberg, S., Papadopoulos, D., Huque, S., and
D. Lawrence, "NSEC5, DNSSEC Authenticated Denial of
Existence", draft-vcelak-nsec5-08 (work in progress),
December 2018.
[RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc1995>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.
[RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
(AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8310] Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8310>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
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15.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-dns-zone-digest]
Wessels, D., Barber, P., Weinberg, M., Kumari, W., and W.
Hardaker, "Message Digest for DNS Zones", draft-ietf-
dnsop-dns-zone-digest-02 (work in progress), October 2019.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1982, August 1996, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc1982>.
[RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1996,
August 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>.
[RFC5953] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
RFC 5953, DOI 10.17487/RFC5953, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5953>.
[RFC7766] Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S., Bellis, R., Mankin, A., and
D. Wessels, "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
Requirements", RFC 7766, DOI 10.17487/RFC7766, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7766>.
15.3. URIs
[1] https://github.com/hanzhang0116/hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls/
blob/02_updates/02-draft-svg/AXFR_mechanism.svg
[2] https://github.com/hanzhang0116/hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls/
blob/02_updates/02-draft-svg/IXFR%20mechanism.svg
[3] https://www.isc.org/bind/
[4] https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/about/
[5] https://github.com/hanzhang0116/hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls/
blob/02_updates/02-draft-svg/AXoT_mechanism_1.svg
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[6] https://github.com/hanzhang0116/hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls/
blob/02_updates/02-draft-svg/IXoT_mechanism_1.svg
[7] https://github.com/hanzhang0116/hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls/
blob/02_updates/02-draft-svg/
Properties_of_Authentication_methods_for_XoT.svg
[8] https://github.com/NLnetLabs/unbound/blob/release-1.9.2/doc/
Changelog
Authors' Addresses
Han Zhang
Salesforce
San Francisco, CA
United States
Email: hzhang@salesforce.com
Pallavi Aras
Salesforce
Herndon, VA
United States
Email: paras@salesforce.com
Willem Toorop
NLnet Labs
Science Park 400
Amsterdam 1098 XH
The Netherlands
Email: willem@nlnetlabs.nl
Sara Dickinson
Sinodun IT
Magdalen Centre
Oxford Science Park
Oxford OX4 4GA
United Kingdom
Email: sara@sinodun.com
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Allison Mankin
Salesforce
Herndon, VA
United States
Email: allison.mankin@gmail.com
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