I2NSF Working Group S. Hares, Ed.
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track J. Jeong, Ed.
Expires: May 6, 2021 J. Kim
Sungkyunkwan University
R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Q. Lin
Huawei
November 2, 2020
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model
draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-13
Abstract
This document defines an information model and the corresponding YANG
data model for the capabilities of various Network Security Functions
(NSFs) in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)
framework to centrally manage the capabilities of the various NSFs.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Capability Information Model Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy Model Overview . . . . . 5
3.2. Matched Policy Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action . . . . 8
4. Overview of YANG Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. YANG Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities . . . . . . 12
6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendix A. Configuration Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General
Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a Time-
based Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web
Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a
VoIP/VoLTE Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of a HTTP
and HTTPS Flood Mitigator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1. Introduction
As the industry becomes more sophisticated and network devices (e.g.,
Internet of Things, Self-driving vehicles, and smartphone using Voice
over IP (VoIP) and Voice over LTE (VoLTE)) requires advanced security
protection in various scenario, service providers have a lot of
problems described in [RFC8192]. To resolve these problems, this
document specifies the information and data model of the capabilities
of Network Security Functions (NSFs) in a framework of the Interface
to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329].
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
NSFs produced by multiple security vendors provide various security
capabilities to customers. Multiple NSFs can be combined together to
provide security services over the given network traffic, regardless
of whether the NSFs are implemented as physical or virtual functions.
Security Capabilities describe the functions that Network Security
Functions (NSFs) are available to provide for security policy
enforcement purposes. Security Capabilities are independent of the
actual security control mechanisms that will implement them.
Every NSF SHOULD be described with the set of capabilities it offers.
Security Capabilities enable security functionality to be described
in a vendor-neutral manner. That is, it is not needed to refer to a
specific product or technology when designing the network; rather,
the functions characterized by their capabilities are considered.
Security Capabilities are a market enabler, providing a way to define
customized security protection by unambiguously describing the
security features offered by a given NSF.
This document provides an information model and the corresponding
YANG data model [RFC6020][RFC7950] that defines the capabilities of
NSFs to centrally manage the capabilities of those security devices.
The security devices can register their own capabilities into a
Network Operator Management (Mgmt) System (i.e., Security Controller)
with this YANG data model through the registration interface
[RFC8329]. With the database of the capabilities of those security
devices maintained centrally, those security devices can be more
easily managed [RFC8329].
This YANG data model uses an "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy
model that is used as the basis for the design of I2NSF Policy as
described in [RFC8329] and Section 3.1. The "ietf-i2nsf-capability"
YANG module defined in this document provides the following features:
o Definition for time capabilities of network security functions.
o Definition for event capabilities of generic network security
functions.
o Definition for condition capabilities of generic network security
functions.
o Definition for condition capabilities of advanced network security
functions.
o Definition for action capabilities of generic network security
functions.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
o Definition for resolution strategy capabilities of generic network
security functions.
o Definition for default action capabilities of generic network
security functions.
2. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329].
This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common
YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management
Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree
diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].
3. Capability Information Model Design
A Capability Information Model (CapIM) is a formalization of the
functionality that an NSF advertises. This enables the precise
specification of what an NSF can do in terms of security policy
enforcement, so that computer-based tasks can unambiguously refer to,
use, configure, and manage NSFs. Capabilities MUST be defined in a
vendor- and technology-independent manner (e.g., regardless of the
differences among vendors and individual products).
Humans are able to refer to categories of security controls and
understand each other. For instance, security experts agree on what
is meant by the terms "NAT", "filtering", and "VPN concentrator". As
a further example, network security experts unequivocally refer to
"packet filters" as stateless devices able to allow or deny packet
forwarding based on various conditions (e.g., source and destination
IP addresses, source and destination ports, and IP protocol type
fields) [Alshaer].
However, more information is required in case of other devices, like
stateful firewalls or application layer filters. These devices
filter packets or communications, but there are differences in the
packets and communications that they can categorize and the states
they maintain. Humans deal with these differences by asking more
questions to determine the specific category and functionality of the
device. Machines can follow a similar approach, which is commonly
referred to as question-answering [Hirschman] [Galitsky]. In this
context, the CapIM and the derived Data Models provide important and
rich information sources.
Analogous considerations can be applied for channel protection
protocols, where we all understand that they will protect packets by
means of symmetric algorithms whose keys could have been negotiated
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
with asymmetric cryptography, but they may work at different layers
and support different algorithms and protocols. To ensure
protection, these protocols apply integrity, optionally
confidentiality, anti-reply protections, and authenticate peers.
The CapIM is intended to clarify these ambiguities by providing a
formal description of NSF functionality. The set of functions that
are advertised MAY be restricted according to the privileges of the
user or application that is viewing those functions. I2NSF
Capabilities enable unambiguous specification of the security
capabilities available in a (virtualized) networking environment, and
their automatic processing by means of computer-based techniques.
This includes enabling the security controller to properly identify
and manage NSFs, and allow NSFs to properly declare their
functionality, so that they can be used in the correct way.
3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy Model Overview
This document defines an information model for representing NSF
capabilities. Some basic design principles for security capabilities
and the systems that manage them are:
o Independence: each security capability SHOULD be an independent
function, with minimum overlap or dependency on other
capabilities. This enables each security capability to be
utilized and assembled together freely. More importantly, changes
to one capability SHOULD NOT affect other capabilities. This
follows the Single Responsibility Principle [Martin] [OODSRP].
o Abstraction: each capability MUST be defined in a vendor-
independent manner.
o Advertisement: A dedicated, well-known interface MUST be used to
advertise and register the capabilities of each NSF. This same
interface MUST be used by other I2NSF Components to determine what
Capabilities are currently available to them.
o Execution: a dedicated, well-known interface MUST be used to
configure and monitor the use of a capability. This provides a
standardized ability to describe its functionality, and report its
processing results. This facilitates multi-vendor
interoperability.
o Automation: the system MUST have the ability to auto-discover,
auto-negotiate, and auto-update its security capabilities (i.e.,
without human intervention). These features are especially useful
for the management of a large number of NSFs. They are essential
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
for adding smart services (e.g., refinement, analysis, capability
reasoning, and optimization) to the security scheme employed.
These features are supported by many design patterns, including
the Observer Pattern [OODOP], the Mediator Pattern [OODMP], and a
set of Message Exchange Patterns [Hohpe].
o Scalability: the management system SHOULD have the capability to
scale up/down or scale in/out. Thus, it can meet various
performance requirements derived from changeable network traffic
or service requests. In addition, security capabilities that are
affected by scalability changes SHOULD support reporting
statistics to the security controller to assist its decision on
whether it needs to invoke scaling or not.
Based on the above principles, this document defines a capability
model that enables an NSF to register (and hence advertise) its set
of capabilities that other I2NSF Components can use. These
capabilities MAY have their access control restricted by policy; this
is out of scope for this document. The set of capabilities provided
by a given set of NSFs unambiguously define the security offered by
the set of NSFs used. The security controller can compare the
requirements of users and applications to the set of capabilities
that are currently available in order to choose which capabilities of
which NSFs are needed to meet those requirements. Note that this
choice is independent of vendor, and instead relies specifically on
the capabilities (i.e., the description) of the functions provided.
Furthermore, when an unknown threat (e.g., zero-day exploits and
unknown malware) is reported by an NSF, new capabilities may be
created, and/or existing capabilities may be updated (e.g., by
updating its signature and algorithm). This results in enhancing the
existing NSFs (and/or creating new NSFs) to address the new threats.
New capabilities may be sent to and stored in a centralized
repository, or stored separately in a vendor's local repository. In
either case, a standard interface facilitates the update process.
This document specifies a metadata model that MAY be used to further
describe and/or prescribe the characteristics and behavior of the
I2NSF capability model. For example, in this case, metadata could be
used to describe the updating of the capability, and prescribe the
particular version that an implementation should use. This initial
version of the model covers and has been validated to describe NSFs
that are designed with a set of capabilities (which covers most of
the existing NSFs). Checking the behavior of the model with systems
that change capabilities dynamically at runtime has been extensively
explored (e.g., impact on automatic registration).
The "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model in [RFC8329] is used
as the basis for the design of the capability model; definitions of
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
all I2NSF policy-related terms are also defined in
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]. The following three terms define the
structure and behavior of an I2NSF imperative policy rule:
o Event: An Event is defined as any important occurrence in time of
a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of
the system being managed. When used in the context of I2NSF
Policy Rules, it is used to determine whether the Condition clause
of the I2NSF Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. Examples of an
I2NSF Event include time and user actions (e.g., logon, logoff,
and actions that violate an ACL).
o Condition: A condition is defined as a set of attributes,
features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of
known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine
whether or not the set of Actions in that (imperative) I2NSF
Policy Rule can be executed or not. Examples of I2NSF Conditions
include matching attributes of a packet or flow, and comparing the
internal state of an NSF to a desired state.
o Action: An action is used to control and monitor aspects of flow-
based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are satisfied.
NSFs provide security functions by executing various Actions.
Examples of I2NSF Actions include providing intrusion detection
and/or protection, web and flow filtering, and deep packet
inspection for packets and flows.
An I2NSF Policy Rule is made up of three Boolean clauses: an Event
clause, a Condition clause, and an Action clause. This structure is
also called an ECA (Event-Condition-Action) Policy Rule. A Boolean
clause is a logical statement that evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE.
It may be made up of one or more terms; if more than one term is
present, then each term in the Boolean clause is combined using
logical connectives (i.e., AND, OR, and NOT).
An I2NSF ECA Policy Rule has the following semantics:
IF <event-clause> is TRUE
IF <condition-clause> is TRUE
THEN execute <action-clause> [constrained by metadata]
END-IF
END-IF
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Technically, the "Policy Rule" is really a container that aggregates
the above three clauses, as well as metadata. Aggregating metadata
enables business logic to be used to prescribe behavior. For
example, suppose a particular ECA Policy Rule contains three actions
(A1, A2, and A3, in that order). Action A2 has a priority of 10;
actions A1 and A3 have no priority specified. Then, metadata may be
used to restrict the set of actions that can be executed when the
event and condition clauses of this ECA Policy Rule are evaluated to
be TRUE; two examples are: (1) only the first action (A1) is
executed, and then the policy rule returns to its caller, or (2) all
actions are executed, starting with the highest priority.
The above ECA policy model is very general and easily extensible.
3.2. Matched Policy Rule
The concept of a "matched" policy rule is defined as one in which its
event and condition clauses both evaluate to true. To precisely
describe what an NSF can do in terms of security, the things need to
describe are the events it can catch, the conditions it can evaluate,
and the actions it can enforce.
Therefore, the properties that to characterize the capabilities of a
NSF are as below:
o Ac is the set of Actions currently available from the NSF;
o Ec is the set of Events that an NSF can catch. Note that for NSF
(e.g., a packet filter) that are not able to react to events, this
set will be empty;
o Cc is the set of Conditions currently available from the NSF;
o EVc defines the set of Condition Clause Evaluation Rules that can
be used at the NSF to decide when the Condition Clause is true
given the result of the evaluation of the individual Conditions.
3.3. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action
Formally, two I2NSF Policy Rules conflict with each other if:
o the Event Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE;
o the Condition Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE;
o the Action Clauses affect the same object in different ways.
For example, if we have two Policy Rules in the same Policy:
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
R1: During 8am-6pm, if traffic is external, then run through FW
R2: During 7am-8pm, conduct anti-malware investigation
There is no conflict between R1 and R2, since the actions are
different. However, consider these two rules:
R3: During 8am-6pm, John gets GoldService
R4: During 10am-4pm, FTP from all users gets BronzeService
R3 and R4 are now in conflict, between the hours of 10am and 4pm,
because the actions of R3 and R4 are different and apply to the same
user (i.e., John).
Conflicts theoretically compromise the correct functioning of devices
(as happened for routers several year ago). However, NSFs have been
designed to cope with these issues. Since conflicts are originated
by simultaneously matching rules, an additional process decides the
action to be applied, e.g., among the ones the matching rule would
have enforced. This process is described by means of a resolution
strategy
On the other hand, it may happen that, if an event is caught, none of
the policy rules matches. As a simple case, no rules may match a
packet arriving at border firewall. In this case, the packet is
usually dropped, that is, the firewall has a default behavior to
manage cases that are not covered by specific rules.
Therefore, we introduce another security capability that serves to
characterize valid policies for an NSF that solve conflicts with
resolution strategies and enforce default actions if no rules match:
o RSc is the set of Resolution Strategy that can be used to specify
how to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the
same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in
this particular NSF;
o Dc defines the notion of a Default action. This action can be
either an explicit action that has been chosen {a}, or a set of
actions {F}, where F is a dummy symbol (i.e., a placeholder value)
that can be used to indicate that the default action can be freely
selected by the policy editor. This is denoted as {F} U {a}.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
4. Overview of YANG Data Model
This section provides as overview of how the YANG data model can be
used in the I2NSF framework described in [RFC8329]. Figure 1 shows
the capabilities (e.g., firewall and web filter) of NSFs in the I2NSF
Framework. As shown in this figure, an NSF Developer's Management
System can register NSFs and the capabilities that the network
security devices can support. To register NSFs in this way, the
Developer's Management System utilizes this standardized capability
YANG data model through the I2NSF Registration Interface [RFC8329].
That is, this Registration Interface uses the YANG module described
in this document to describe the capabilities of a network security
function that is registered with the Security Controller. With the
capabilities of those network security devices maintained centrally,
those security devices can be more easily managed, which can resolve
many of the problems described in [RFC8192].
In Figure 1, a new NSF at a Developer's Management Systems has
capabilities of Firewall (FW) and Web Filter (WF), which are denoted
as (Cap = {FW, WF}), to support Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policy
rules where 'E', 'C', and 'A' mean "Event", "Condition", and
"Action", respectively. The condition involves IPv4 or IPv6
datagrams, and the action includes "Allow" and "Deny" for those
datagrams.
Note that the NSF-Facing Interface [RFC8329] is used to configure the
security policy rules of the generic network security functions, and
the configuration of advanced security functions over the NSF-Facing
Interface is used to configure the security policy rules of advanced
network security functions (e.g., anti-virus and Distributed-Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigator), respectively, according to the
capabilities of NSFs registered with the I2NSF Framework.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
+------------------------------------------------------+
| I2NSF User (e.g., Overlay Network Mgmt, Enterprise |
| Network Mgmt, another network domain's mgmt, etc.) |
+--------------------+---------------------------------+
I2NSF ^
Consumer-Facing Interface |
|
v I2NSF
+-----------------+------------+ Registration +-------------+
| Network Operator Mgmt System | Interface | Developer's |
| (i.e., Security Controller) |<-------------->| Mgmt System |
+-----------------+------------+ +-------------+
^ New NSF
| Cap = {FW, WF}
I2NSF | E = {}
NSF-Facing Interface | C = {IPv4, IPv6}
| A = {Allow, Deny}
v
+---------------+----+------------+-----------------+
| | | |
+---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+
| NSF-1 | ... | NSF-m | | NSF-1 | ... | NSF-n |
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+
NSF-1 NSF-m NSF-1 NSF-n
Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF}
E = {} E = {user} E = {dev} E = {time}
C = {IPv4} C = {IPv6} C = {IPv4, IPv6} C = {IPv4}
A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny} A = {Allow, Deny}
Developer's Mgmt System A Developer's Mgmt System B
Figure 1: Capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF Framework
A use case of an NSF with the capabilities of firewall and web filter
is described as follows.
o If a network manager wants to apply security policy rules to block
malicious users with firewall and web filter, it is a tremendous
burden for a network administrator to apply all of the needed
rules to NSFs one by one. This problem can be resolved by
managing the capabilities of NSFs in this document.
o If a network administrator wants to block malicious users for IPv4
or IPv6 traffic, he sends a security policy rule to block the
users to the Network Operator Management System using the I2NSF
Consumer-Facing Interface.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
o When the Network Operator Management System receives the security
policy rule, it automatically sends that security policy rules to
appropriate NSFs (i.e., NSF-m in Developer's Management System A
and NSF-1 in Developer's Management System B) which can support
the capabilities (i.e., IPv6). This lets an I2NSF User not
consider NSFs where the rule is applied.
o If NSFs encounter the suspicious IPv4 or IPv6 packets of malicious
users, they can filter the packets out according to the configured
security policy rule. Therefore, the security policy rule against
the malicious users' packets can be automatically applied to
appropriate NSFs without human intervention.
5. YANG Tree Diagram
This section shows a YANG tree diagram of capabilities of network
security functions, as defined in the Section 3.
5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities
This section explains a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities and its
features. Figure 2 shows a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities.
The NSF capabilities in the tree include time capabilities, event
capabilities, condition capabilities, action capabilities, resolution
strategy capabilities, and default action capabilities. Those
capabilities can be tailored or extended according to a vendor's
specific requirements. Refer to the NSF capabilities information
model for detailed discussion Section 3.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
module: ietf-i2nsf-capability
+--rw nsf* [nsf-name]
+--rw nsf-name string
+--rw time-capabilities* enumeration
+--rw event-capabilities
| +--rw system-event-capability* identityref
| +--rw system-alarm-capability* identityref
+--rw condition-capabilities
| +--rw generic-nsf-capabilities
| | +--rw ipv4-capability* identityref
| | +--rw icmp-capability* identityref
| | +--rw ipv6-capability* identityref
| | +--rw icmpv6-capability* identityref
| | +--rw tcp-capability* identityref
| | +--rw udp-capability* identityref
| | +--rw sctp-capability* identityref
| +--rw advanced-nsf-capabilities
| | +--rw anti-virus-capability* identityref
| | +--rw anti-ddos-capability* identityref
| | +--rw ips-capability* identityref
| | +--rw url-capability* identityref
| | +--rw voip-volte-capability* identityref
| +--rw context-capabilities* identityref
+--rw action-capabilities
| +--rw ingress-action-capability* identityref
| +--rw egress-action-capability* identityref
| +--rw log-action-capability* identityref
+--rw resolution-strategy-capabilities* identityref
+--rw default-action-capabilities* identityref
+--rw ipsec-method* identityref
Figure 2: YANG Tree Diagram of Capabilities of Network Security
Functions
Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities which describe
when to execute the I2NSF policy rule. The time capabilities are
defined in terms of absolute time and periodic time. The absolute
time means the exact time to start or end. The periodic time means
repeated time like day, week, or month..
Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe
the event that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause
of the I2NSF Policy Rule. The defined event capabilities are system
event and system alarm.
Condition capabilities are used to specify capabilities of a set of
attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to
determine whether or not the set of actions in that (imperative)
I2NSF policy rule can be executed. The condition capabilities are
classified in terms of generic network security functions and
advanced network security functions. The condition capabilities of
generic network security functions are defined as IPv4 capability,
IPv6 capability, TCP capability, UDP capability, SCTP capability and
ICMP capability. The condition capabilities of advanced network
security functions are defined as anti-virus capability, anti-DDoS
capability, Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) capability, HTTP
capability, and VoIP/VoLTE capability. See Section 3.1 for more
information about the condition in the ECA policy model.
Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that
describe the control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when
the event and condition clauses are satisfied. The action
capabilities are defined as ingress-action capability, egress-action
capability, and log-action capability. See Section 3.1 for more
information about the action in the ECA policy model. Also, see
Section 7.2 (NSF-Facing Flow Security Policy Structure) in [RFC8329]
for more information about the ingress and egress actions. In
addition, see Section 9.1 (Flow-Based NSF Capability
Characterization) in [RFC8329] for more information about logging at
NSFs.
Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities
that describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or
different policy rules that are matched and contained in this
particular NSF. The resolution strategy capabilities are defined as
First Matching Rule (FMR), Last Matching Rule (LMR), Prioritized
Matching Rule (PMR), Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE),
and Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN). See Section 3.3
for more information about the resolution strategy.
Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that
describe how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a
packet. The default action capabilities are defined as pass, drop,
alert, and mirror. See Section 3.3 for more information about the
default action.
IPsec method capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to
support an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [RFC7296] for the security
communication. The default action capabilities are defined as IKE or
IKE-less. See [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection] for more
information about the SDN-based IPsec flow protection in I2NSF.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability
This section introduces a YANG module for NSFs' capabilities, as
defined in the Section 3.
This YANG module imports from [RFC6991]. It makes references to [RFC
0768][IANA-Protocol-Numbers][RFC0791][RFC0792][RFC0793][RFC3261][RFC4
443][RFC4960][RFC8200][RFC8329][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-mo
del][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-capability@2020-11-02.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-capability {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability";
prefix
nsfcap;
organization
"IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions)
Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf>
WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
Editor: Jaehoon Paul Jeong
<mailto:pauljeong@skku.edu>
Editor: Jinyong Tim Kim
<mailto:timkim@skku.edu>
Editor: Susan Hares
<mailto:shares@ndzh.com>";
description
"This module is a YANG module for I2NSF Network Security
Functions (NSFs)'s Capabilities.
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Relating to IETF Documents
http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
revision "2020-11-02"{
description "Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
}
/*
* Identities
*/
identity event {
description
"Base identity for I2NSF events.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - Event";
// RFC Ed.: replace the above draft with an actual RFC in the
// YANG module and remove this note.
}
identity system-event-capability {
base event;
description
"Identity for system event";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System event";
}
identity system-alarm-capability {
base event;
description
"Identity for system alarm";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm";
}
identity access-violation {
base system-event-capability;
description
"Identity for access violation event";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System event for access
violation";
}
identity configuration-change {
base system-event-capability;
description
"Identity for configuration change event";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System event for configuration
change";
}
identity memory-alarm {
base system-alarm-capability;
description
"Identity for memory alarm. Alarm when memory usage
exceed the threshold.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for memory";
}
identity cpu-alarm {
base system-alarm-capability;
description
"Identity for CPU alarm. Alarm when CPU usage
exceed the threshold.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for CPU";
}
identity disk-alarm {
base system-alarm-capability;
description
"Identity for disk alarm. Alarm when disk usage
exceed the threshold.";
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for disk";
}
identity hardware-alarm {
base system-alarm-capability;
description
"Identity for hardware alarm. Alarm when a hardware failure
occur.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for hardware";
}
identity interface-alarm {
base system-alarm-capability;
description
"Identity for interface alarm";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF NSF
Monitoring YANG Data Model - System alarm for interface";
}
identity condition {
description
"Base identity for I2NSF conditions";
}
identity context-capability {
base condition;
description
"Base identity for context condition capabilities for an NSF.";
}
identity access-control-list {
base context-capability;
description
"Identity for Access Control List (ACL) condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists
(ACLs) - A user-ordered set of rules used to configure the
forwarding behavior in an NSF.";
}
identity application-layer-filter {
base context-capability;
description
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
"Identity for application-layer-filter condition capability";
}
identity target {
base context-capability;
description
"Identity for target condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists
(ACLs) - An access control for a target (e.g., the
corresponding IP address) in an NSF.";
}
identity user {
base context-capability;
description
"Identity for user condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists
(ACLs) - An access control for a user (e.g., the
corresponding IP address) in an NSF.";
}
identity group {
base context-capability;
description
"Identity for group condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists
(ACLs) - An access control for a group (e.g., the
corresponding IP addresses) in an NSF.";
}
identity geography {
base context-capability;
description
"Identity for geography condition capability";
reference
"draft-google-self-published-geofeeds-02: Self-published
IP Geolocation Data - An access control for a geographical
location i.e., geolocation (e.g., the corresponding IP
address).";
}
identity ipv4-capability {
base condition;
description
"Base identity for IPv4 condition capability";
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol";
}
identity exact-ipv4-header-length {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv4 header-length
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Header Length";
}
identity range-ipv4-header-length {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match IPv4 header-length
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Header Length";
}
identity ipv4-tos {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for IPv4 Type-Of-Service (TOS)
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Type of Service";
}
identity exact-ipv4-total-length {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv4 total length
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Total Length";
}
identity range-ipv4-total-length {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match IPv4 total length
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Total Length";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
identity ipv4-id {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for IPv4 identification condition capability.
IPv4 ID Field is used for fragmentation";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Identification
RFC 6864: Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field";
}
identity ipv4-fragment-flags {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for IPv4 fragment flags condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Fragmentation Flags";
}
identity exact-ipv4-fragment-offset {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv4 fragment offset
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Fragmentation Offset";
}
identity range-ipv4-fragment-offset {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match IPv4 fragment offset
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Fragmentation Offset";
}
identity exact-ipv4-ttl {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv4 Time-To-Live (TTL)
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Time To Live (TTL)";
}
identity range-ipv4-ttl {
base ipv4-capability;
description
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
"Identity for range-match IPv4 Time-To-Live (TTL)
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Time To Live (TTL)";
}
identity ipv4-protocol {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for IPv4 protocol condition capability";
reference
"IANA Website: Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers
- Protocol Number for IPv4
RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Protocol";
}
identity exact-ipv4-address {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv4 address
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Address";
}
identity range-ipv4-address {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match IPv4 address condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Address";
}
identity ipv4-ip-opts {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for IPv4 option condition capability";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Options";
}
identity ipv4-geo-ip {
base ipv4-capability;
description
"Identity for geography condition capability";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
identity ipv6-capability {
base condition;
description
"Base identity for IPv6 condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification";
}
identity ipv6-traffic-class {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for IPv6 traffic class
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Traffic Class";
}
identity exact-ipv6-flow-label {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv6 flow label
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Flow Label
RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification";
}
identity range-ipv6-flow-label {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match IPv6 flow label
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Flow Label
RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification";
}
identity exact-ipv6-payload-length {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv6 payload length
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Specification - Payload Length";
}
identity range-ipv6-payload-length {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match IPv6 payload length
condition capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Payload Length";
}
identity ipv6-next-header {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for IPv6 next header condition capability";
reference
"IANA Website: Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers
- Protocol Number for IPv6
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Next Header";
}
identity exact-ipv6-hop-limit {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv6 hop limit condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Hop Limit";
}
identity range-ipv6-hop-limit {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match IPv6 hop limit condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Hop Limit";
}
identity exact-ipv6-address {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match IPv6 address condition
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Address";
}
identity range-ipv6-address {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match IPv6 address condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Address";
}
identity ipv6-header-order {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for header order IPv6 address condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Extension Header Order";
}
identity ipv6-options {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for options IPv6 address condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Options";
}
identity ipv6-hop-by-hop {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for hop by hop IPv6 address condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Options";
}
identity ipv6-routing-header {
base ipv6-capability;
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
description
"Identity for routing header IPv6 address condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Routing Header";
}
identity ipv6-fragment-header {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for fragment header IPv6 address condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Fragment Header";
}
identity ipv6-destination-options {
base ipv6-capability;
description
"Identity for destination options IPv6 address condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - Destination Options";
}
identity tcp-capability {
base condition;
description
"Base identity for TCP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol";
}
identity exact-tcp-port-num {
base tcp-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match TCP port number condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number";
}
identity range-tcp-port-num {
base tcp-capability;
description
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
"Identity for range-match TCP port number condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Port Number";
}
identity exact-tcp-window-size {
base tcp-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match TCP window size condition capability";
reference
"RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Window Size";
}
identity range-tcp-window-size {
base tcp-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match TCP window size condition capability";
reference
"RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Window Size";
}
identity tcp-flags {
base tcp-capability;
description
"Identity for TCP flags condition capability";
reference
"RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - Flags";
}
identity udp-capability {
base condition;
description
"Base identity for UDP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol";
}
identity exact-udp-port-num {
base udp-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match UDP port number condition capability";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number";
}
identity range-udp-port-num {
base udp-capability;
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
description
"Identity for range-match UDP port number condition capability";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Port Number";
}
identity exact-udp-total-length {
base udp-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match UDP total-length condition capability";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Total Length";
}
identity range-udp-total-length {
base udp-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match UDP total-length condition capability";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Total Length";
}
identity sctp-capability {
description
"Identity for SCTP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol";
}
identity exact-sctp-port-num {
base sctp-capability;
description
"Identity for exact-match SCTP port number condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number";
}
identity range-sctp-port-num {
base sctp-capability;
description
"Identity for range-match SCTP port number condition
capability";
reference
"RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Port Number";
}
identity sctp-chunk-type {
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
base sctp-capability;
description
"Identity for SCTP chunk type condition capability";
reference
"RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - Chunk Type";
}
identity icmp-capability {
base condition;
description
"Base identity for ICMP condition capability";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol";
}
identity icmp-type {
base icmp-capability;
description
"Identity for ICMP type condition capability";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol";
}
identity icmp-code {
base icmp-capability;
description
"Identity for ICMP code condition capability";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol";
}
identity icmpv6-capability {
base condition;
description
"Base identity for ICMPv6 condition capability";
reference
"RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6";
}
identity icmpv6-type {
base icmpv6-capability;
description
"Identity for ICMPv6 type condition capability";
reference
"RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
- ICMPv6";
}
identity icmpv6-code {
base icmpv6-capability;
description
"Identity for ICMPv6 code condition capability";
reference
"RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6";
}
identity url-capability {
base condition;
description
"Base identity for URL condition capability";
}
identity pre-defined {
base url-capability;
description
"Identity for pre-defined URL Database condition capability.
The NSF capable of using a predefined public URL Database.";
}
identity user-defined {
base url-capability;
description
"Identity for user-defined URL Database condition capability.
The NSF capable of using a URL Database that can be added
manually by a user.";
}
identity log-action-capability {
description
"Base identity for log-action capability";
}
identity rule-log {
base log-action-capability;
description
"Identity for rule log log-action capability.
Log the received packet based on the rule";
}
identity session-log {
base log-action-capability;
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
description
"Identity for session log log-action capability.
Log the received packet based on the session.";
}
identity ingress-action-capability {
description
"Base identity for ingress-action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Ingress action";
}
identity egress-action-capability {
description
"Base identity for egress-action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Egress action";
}
identity default-action-capability {
description
"Base identity for default-action capability";
}
identity pass {
base ingress-action-capability;
base egress-action-capability;
base default-action-capability;
description
"Identity for pass action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Ingress, egress, and pass actions.";
}
identity drop {
base ingress-action-capability;
base egress-action-capability;
base default-action-capability;
description
"Identity for drop action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Ingress, egress, and drop actions.";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
identity alert {
base ingress-action-capability;
base egress-action-capability;
base default-action-capability;
description
"Identity for alert action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Ingress, egress, and alert actions.
draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF
NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - Alarm (i.e., alert).";
}
identity mirror {
base ingress-action-capability;
base egress-action-capability;
base default-action-capability;
description
"Identity for mirror action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Ingress, egress, and mirror actions.";
}
identity invoke-signaling {
base egress-action-capability;
description
"Identity for invoke signaling action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Invoke-signaling action";
}
identity forwarding {
base egress-action-capability;
description
"Identity for forwarding action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Forwarding action";
}
identity redirection {
base egress-action-capability;
description
"Identity for redirection action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Functions - Redirection action";
}
identity resolution-strategy-capability {
description
"Base identity for resolution strategy capability";
}
identity fmr {
base resolution-strategy-capability;
description
"Identity for First Matching Rule (FMR) resolution
strategy capability";
}
identity lmr {
base resolution-strategy-capability;
description
"Identity for Last Matching Rule (LMR) resolution
strategy capability";
}
identity pmr {
base resolution-strategy-capability;
description
"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR) resolution
strategy capability";
}
identity pmre {
base resolution-strategy-capability;
description
"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE)
resolution strategy capability";
}
identity pmrn {
base resolution-strategy-capability;
description
"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN)
resolution strategy capability";
}
identity advanced-nsf-capability {
description
"Base identity for advanced Network Security Function (NSF)
capability. This can be used for advanced NSFs such as
Anti-Virus, Anti-DDoS Attack, IPS, and VoIP/VoLTE Security
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Service.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF capability";
}
identity anti-virus-capability {
base advanced-nsf-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus capability.
This can be used for an extension point for Anti-Virus
as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus capability";
}
identity anti-ddos-capability {
base advanced-nsf-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Attack capability.
This can be used for an extension point for Anti-DDoS
Attack as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Attack capability";
}
identity ips-capability {
base advanced-nsf-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF IPS capabilities. This can be
used for an extension point for IPS as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF IPS capability";
}
identity voip-volte-capability {
base advanced-nsf-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Security Service
capability. This can be used for an extension point
for VoIP/VoLTE Security Service as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
identity detect {
base anti-virus-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus Detection capability.
This can be used for an extension point for Anti-Virus
Detection as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus Detection capability";
}
identity allow-list {
base anti-virus-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-Virus Allow List capability.
This can be used for an extension point for Anti-Virus
Allow List as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus Allow List capability";
}
identity syn-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS SYN Flood Action
capability. This can be used for an extension point for
Anti-DDoS SYN Flood Action as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS SYN Flood Action
capability";
}
identity udp-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS UDP Flood Action
capability. This can be used for an extension point for
Anti-DDoS UDP Flood Action as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS UDP Flood Action
capability";
}
identity http-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS HTTP Flood Action
capability. This can be used for an extension point for
Anti-DDoS HTTP Flood Action as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS HTTP Flood Action
capability";
}
identity https-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS HTTPS Flood Action
capability. This can be used for an extension point for
Anti-DDoS HTTPS Flood Action as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS HTTPS Flood Action
capability";
}
identity dns-request-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS DNS Request Flood
Action capability. This can be used for an extension
point for Anti-DDoS DNS Request Flood Action as an
advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS DNS Request Flood
Action capability";
}
identity dns-reply-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS DNS Reply Flood
Action capability. This can be used for an extension
point for Anti-DDoS DNS Reply Flood Action as an
advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS DNS Reply Flood
Action capability";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
identity icmp-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS ICMP Flood Action
capability. This can be used for an extension point
for Anti-DDoS ICMP Flood Action as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS ICMP Flood Action
capability";
}
identity icmpv6-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS ICMPv6 Flood Action
capability. This can be used for an extension point
for Anti-DDoS ICMPv6 Flood Action as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS ICMPv6 Flood Action
capability";
}
identity sip-flood-action {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS SIP Flood Action
capability. This can be used for an extension point
for Anti-DDoS SIP Flood Action as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS SIP Flood Action
capability";
}
identity detect-mode {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Detection Mode
capability. This can be used for an extension point
for Anti-DDoS Detection Mode as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Detection Mode
capability";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
identity baseline-learning {
base anti-ddos-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Baseline Learning
capability. This can be used for an extension point
for Anti-DDoS Baseline Learning as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Baseline Learning
capability";
}
identity signature-set {
base ips-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF IPS Signature Set capability.
This can be used for an extension point for IPS Signature
Set as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF IPS Signature Set capability";
}
identity ips-exception-signature {
base ips-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF IPS Exception Signature
capability. This can be used for an extension point for
IPS Exception Signature as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF IPS Exception Signature Set
capability";
}
identity voip-volte-call-id {
base voip-volte-capability;
description
"Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE Call-ID capability.
This can be used for an extension point for VoIP/VoLTE
Voice-ID as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";
}
identity user-agent {
base voip-volte-capability;
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
description
"Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE User Agent capability.
This can be used for an extension point for VoIP/VoLTE
User Agent as an advanced NSF.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";
}
identity ipsec-capability {
description
"Base identity for an IPsec capability";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08:
Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow
Protection - IPsec methods such as IKE and IKE-less";
}
identity ike {
base ipsec-capability;
description
"Identity for an IPsec Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
capability";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08:
Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow
Protection - IPsec method with IKE.
RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) - IKE as a component of IPsec used for
performing mutual authentication and establishing and
maintaining Security Associations (SAs).";
}
identity ikeless {
base ipsec-capability;
description
"Identity for an IPsec without Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
capability";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08:
Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow
Protection - IPsec method without IKE";
}
/*
* Grouping
*/
grouping nsf-capabilities {
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
description
"Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure.";
leaf-list time-capabilities {
type enumeration {
enum absolute-time {
description
"absolute time capabilities.
If a network security function has the absolute time
capability, the network security function supports
rule execution according to absolute time.";
}
enum periodic-time {
description
"periodic time capabilities.
If a network security function has the periodic time
capability, the network security function supports
rule execution according to periodic time.";
}
}
description
"Time capabilities";
}
container event-capabilities {
description
"Capabilities of events.
If a network security function has the event capabilities,
the network security function supports rule execution
according to system event and system alarm.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure.
draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04: I2NSF
NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model - System Alarm and
System Events.";
leaf-list system-event-capability {
type identityref {
base system-event-capability;
}
description
"System event capabilities";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
leaf-list system-alarm-capability {
type identityref {
base system-alarm-capability;
}
description
"System alarm capabilities";
}
}
container condition-capabilities {
description
"Conditions capabilities.";
container generic-nsf-capabilities {
description
"Conditions capabilities.
If a network security function has the condition
capabilities, the network security function
supports rule execution according to conditions of
IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, SCTP, ICMP, ICMPv6, or payload.";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol - IPv4.
RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP.
RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - TCP.
RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP.
RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - SCTP.
RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - IPv6.
RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6.
RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure.";
leaf-list ipv4-capability {
type identityref {
base ipv4-capability;
}
description
"IPv4 packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 791: Internet Protocol";
}
leaf-list icmp-capability {
type identityref {
base icmp-capability;
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
description
"ICMP packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP";
}
leaf-list ipv6-capability {
type identityref {
base ipv6-capability;
}
description
"IPv6 packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification - IPv6";
}
leaf-list icmpv6-capability {
type identityref {
base icmpv6-capability;
}
description
"ICMPv6 packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
- ICMPv6";
}
leaf-list tcp-capability {
type identityref {
base tcp-capability;
}
description
"TCP packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol - TCP";
}
leaf-list udp-capability {
type identityref {
base udp-capability;
}
description
"UDP packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
leaf-list sctp-capability {
type identityref {
base sctp-capability;
}
description
"SCTP packet capabilities";
reference
"RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol - SCTP";
}
}
container advanced-nsf-capabilities {
description
"Advanced Network Security Function (NSF) capabilities,
such as Anti-Virus, Anti-DDoS, IPS, and VoIP/VoLTE.
This container contains the leaf-lists of advanced
NSF capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF capabilities";
leaf-list anti-virus-capability {
type identityref {
base anti-virus-capability;
}
description
"Anti-Virus capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-Virus capabilities";
}
leaf-list anti-ddos-capability {
type identityref {
base anti-ddos-capability;
}
description
"Anti-DDoS Attack capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Attack capabilities";
}
leaf-list ips-capability {
type identityref {
base ips-capability;
}
description
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
"IPS capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF IPS capabilities";
}
leaf-list url-capability {
type identityref {
base url-capability;
}
description
"URL capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF URL capabilities";
}
leaf-list voip-volte-capability {
type identityref {
base voip-volte-capability;
}
description
"VoIP/VoLTE capabilities";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Advanced NSF VoIP/VoLTE capabilities";
}
}
leaf-list context-capabilities {
type identityref {
base context-capability;
}
description
"Security context capabilities";
}
}
container action-capabilities {
description
"Action capabilities.
If a network security function has the action capabilities,
the network security function supports the attendant
actions for policy rules.";
leaf-list ingress-action-capability {
type identityref {
base ingress-action-capability;
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
}
description
"Ingress-action capabilities";
}
leaf-list egress-action-capability {
type identityref {
base egress-action-capability;
}
description
"Egress-action capabilities";
}
leaf-list log-action-capability {
type identityref {
base log-action-capability;
}
description
"Log-action capabilities";
}
}
leaf-list resolution-strategy-capabilities {
type identityref {
base resolution-strategy-capability;
}
description
"Resolution strategy capabilities.
The resolution strategies can be used to specify how
to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions
of the same or different policy rules that are matched
for the same packet and by particular NSF";
}
leaf-list default-action-capabilities {
type identityref {
base default-action-capability;
}
description
"Default action capabilities.
A default action is used to execute I2NSF policy rules
when no rule matches a packet. The default action is
defined as pass, drop, alert, or mirror.";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Ingress and egress actions.";
}
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
leaf-list ipsec-method {
type identityref {
base ipsec-capability;
}
description
"IPsec method capabilities";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08:
Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow
Protection - IPsec methods such as IKE and IKE-less";
}
}
/*
* Data nodes
*/
list nsf {
key "nsf-name";
description
"The list of Network Security Functions (NSFs)";
leaf nsf-name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name of Network Security Function (NSF)";
}
uses nsf-capabilities;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 3: YANG Data Module of I2NSF Capability
7. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
"IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
ID: yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
Filename: [ TBD-at-Registration ]
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]:
Name: ietf-i2nsf-capability
Maintained by IANA? N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability
Prefix: nsfcap
Module:
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
8. Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema
designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as
NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is
the secure transport layer, and the required transport secure
transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer
is HTTPS, and the required transport secure transport is TLS
[RFC8446].
The NETCONF access control model [RFC8341] provides a means of
restricting access to specific NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a
preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol
operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable, creatable, and deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes
could have a negative effect on network and security operations.
o list nsf: An attacker could alter the security capabilities
associated with an NSF whereby disabling or enabling the evasion
of security mitigations.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.google-self-published-geofeeds]
Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
Kumari, "A Format for Self-published IP Geolocation
Feeds", draft-google-self-published-geofeeds-09 (work in
progress), February 2020.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model]
Jeong, J., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L., and H.
Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model", draft-
ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-04 (work in
progress), September 2020.
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection]
Lopez, R., Lopez-Millan, G., and F. Pereniguez-Garcia,
"Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow
Protection", draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-12
(work in progress), October 2020.
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R.,
and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8192, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8192>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)",
RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519>.
[RFC8525] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>.
[RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation
Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.
9.2. Informative References
[Alshaer] Shaer, Al., Hamed, E., and H. Hamed, "Modeling and
management of firewall policies", 2004.
[Galitsky]
Galitsky, B. and R. Pampapathi, "Can many agents answer
questions better than one", First
Monday http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v10i1.1204, 2005.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
[Hirschman]
Hirschman, L. and R. Gaizauskas, "Natural Language
Question Answering: The View from Here", Natural Language
Engineering 7:4, pgs 275-300, Cambridge University Press ,
Nov 2001.
[Hohpe] Hohpe, G. and B. Woolf, "Enterprise Integration Patterns",
ISBN 0-32-120068-3 , 2003.
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]
Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H.
Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)
Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-08 (work in
progress), July 2019.
[I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]
Strassner, J., Halpern, J., and S. Meer, "Generic Policy
Information Model for Simplified Use of Policy
Abstractions (SUPA)", draft-ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-
model-03 (work in progress), May 2017.
[IANA-Protocol-Numbers]
"Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", Available:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-
numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml, September 2020.
[Martin] Martin, R., "Agile Software Development, Principles,
Patterns, and Practices", Prentice-Hall , ISBN:
0-13-597444-5 , 2002.
[OODMP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html".
[OODOP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html".
[OODSRP] "http://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html".
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Appendix A. Configuration Examples
This section shows configuration examples of "ietf-i2nsf-capability"
module for capabilities registration of general firewall.
A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General Firewall
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a general firewall in either an IPv4 network or an
IPv6 network.
<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>general_firewall</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<generic-nsf-capabilities>
<ipv4-capability>ipv4-protocol</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>exact-ipv4-address</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>range-ipv4-address</ipv4-capability>
<tcp-capability>exact-fourth-layer-port-num</tcp-capability>
<tcp-capability>range-fourth-layer-port-num</tcp-capability>
</generic-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 4: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a
General Firewall in an IPv4 Network
Figure 4 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network. Its
capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall.
2. The NSF can inspect a protocol, an exact IPv4 address, and a
range of IPv4 addresses for IPv4 packets.
3. The NSF can inspect an exact port number and a range of port
numbers for the fourth layer packets.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or alert.
<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>general_firewall</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<generic-nsf-capabilities>
<ipv6-capability>ipv6-next-header</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>exact-ipv6-address</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>range-ipv6-address</ipv6-capability>
<tcp-capability>exact-fourth-layer-port-num</tcp-capability>
<tcp-capability>range-fourth-layer-port-num</tcp-capability>
</generic-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 5: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a
General Firewall in an IPv6 Network
In addition, Figure 5 shows the configuration XML for the
capabilities registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv6
network. Its capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall.
2. The NSF can inspect a protocol (Next-Header), an exact IPv6
address, and a range of IPv6 addresses for IPv6 packets.
3. The NSF can inspect an exact port number and a range of port
numbers for the fourth layer packets.
4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or alert.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a Time-based
Firewall
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a time-based firewall in either an IPv4 network or an
IPv6 network.
<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>time_based_firewall</nsf-name>
<time-capabilities>absolute-time</time-capabilities>
<time-capabilities>periodic-time</time-capabilities>
<condition-capabilities>
<generic-nsf-capabilities>
<ipv4-capability>ipv4-next-header</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>exact-ipv4-address</ipv4-capability>
<ipv4-capability>range-ipv4-address</ipv4-capability>
</generic-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 6: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a
Time-based Firewall in an IPv4 Network
Figure 6 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network.
Its capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall.
2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to
absolute time and periodic time.
3. The NSF can inspect a protocol (Next-Header), an exact IPv4
address, and a range of IPv4 addresses for IPv4 packets.
4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or alert.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>time_based_firewall</nsf-name>
<time-capabilities>absolute-time</time-capabilities>
<time-capabilities>periodic-time</time-capabilities>
<condition-capabilities>
<generic-nsf-capabilities>
<ipv6-capability>ipv6-next-header</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>exact-ipv6-address</ipv6-capability>
<ipv6-capability>range-ipv6-address</ipv6-capability>
</generic-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 7: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a
Time-based Firewall in an IPv6 Network
In addition, Figure 7 shows the configuration XML for the
capabilities registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an
IPv6 network. Its capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall.
2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to
absolute time and periodic time.
3. The NSF can inspect a protocol (Next-Header), an exact IPv6
address, and a range of IPv6 addresses for IPv6 packets.
4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or alert.
A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web Filter
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a web filter.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>web_filter</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<advanced-nsf-capabilities>
<url-capability>user-defined</url-capability>
</advanced-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 8: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a
Web Filter
Figure 8 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a web filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are as
follows.
1. The name of the NSF is web_filter.
2. The NSF can inspect URL matched from a user-defined URL Database.
User can add a new URL into the database.
3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or alert.
A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a VoIP/VoLTE
Filter
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a VoIP/VoLTE filter.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 56]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>voip_volte_filter</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<advanced-nsf-capabilities>
<voip-volte-capability>voice-id</voip-volte-capability>
</advanced-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 9: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a
VoIP/VoLTE Filter
Figure 9 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a VoIP/VoLTE filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are
as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is voip_volte_filter.
2. The NSF can inspect a voice id for VoIP/VoLTE packets.
3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or alert.
A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of a HTTP and HTTPS
Flood Mitigator
This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities
registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator.
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 57]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
<nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability">
<nsf-name>http_and_https_flood_mitigation</nsf-name>
<condition-capabilities>
<advanced-nsf-capabilities>
<anti-ddos-capability>http-flood-action</anti-ddos-capability>
<anti-ddos-capability>https-flood-action</anti-ddos-capability>
</advanced-nsf-capabilities>
</condition-capabilities>
<action-capabilities>
<ingress-action-capability>pass</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>drop</ingress-action-capability>
<ingress-action-capability>alert</ingress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>pass</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>drop</egress-action-capability>
<egress-action-capability>alert</egress-action-capability>
</action-capabilities>
</nsf>
Figure 10: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of a
HTTP and HTTPS Flood Mitigator
Figure 10 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities
registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator as an NSF. Its
capabilities are as follows.
1. The name of the NSF is http_and_https_flood_mitigation.
2. The NSF can control the amount of packets for HTTP and HTTPS
packets, which are routed to the NSF's IPv4 address or the NSF's
IPv6 address.
3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass,
drop, or alert.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications
Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based
Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized
Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by
the IITP grant funded by the MSIT (2020-0-00395, Standard Development
of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology).
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 58]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Appendix C. Contributors
This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group.
Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Acee
Lindem, Roman Danyliw, and Tom Petch. The authors sincerely
appreciate their contributions.
The following are co-authors of this document:
Patrick Lingga
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
Republic of Korea
EMail: patricklink@skku.edu
Liang Xia
Huawei
101 Software Avenue
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012
China
EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com
Cataldo Basile
Politecnico di Torino
Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 34
Torino, 10129
Italy
EMail: cataldo.basile@polito.it
John Strassner
Huawei
2330 Central Expressway
Santa Clara, CA 95050
USA
EMail: John.sc.Strassner@huawei.com
Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 59]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Zurbaran, 12
Madrid, 28010
Spain
Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
Hyoungshick Kim
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
Republic of Korea
EMail: hyoung@skku.edu
Daeyoung Hyun
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
Republic of Korea
EMail: dyhyun@skku.edu
Dongjin Hong
Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
Republic of Korea
EMail: dong.jin@skku.edu
Jung-Soo Park
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon, 34129
Republic of Korea
EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr
Tae-Jin Ahn
Korea Telecom
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 60]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon, 305-811
Republic of Korea
EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com
Se-Hui Lee
Korea Telecom
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon, 305-811
Republic of Korea
EMail: sehuilee@kt.com
Authors' Addresses
Susan Hares (editor)
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
USA
Phone: +1-734-604-0332
EMail: shares@ndzh.com
Jaehoon Paul Jeong (editor)
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 61]
Internet-Draft I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model November 2020
Jinyong Tim Kim
Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 10 8273 0930
EMail: timkim@skku.edu
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI
USA
Phone: +1-248-968-9809
EMail: rgm@htt-consult.com
Qiushi Lin
Huawei
Huawei Industrial Base
Shenzhen, Guangdong 518129
China
EMail: linqiushi@huawei.com
Hares, et al. Expires May 6, 2021 [Page 62]
