CMP Algorithms
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-02

Versions: 00 01 02                                                      
LAMPS Working Group                                         H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft                                                   Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track                        November 2, 2020
Expires: May 6, 2021


                             CMP Algorithms
                   draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-01

Abstract

   This document describes the conventions for using several
   cryptographic algorithms with the Certificate Management Protocol
   (CMP).  CMP is used to enroll and further manage the lifecycle of
   X.509 certificates.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021.

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  SHA2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  DSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Key Management Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Key Agreement Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.1.1.  Diffie-Hellman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.1.2.  ECDH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Key Transport Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.2.1.  RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.3.1.  AES Key Wrap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Key Derivation Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.4.1.  Password-based Key Derivation Function 2  . . . . . .   8
   5.  Content Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Message Authentication Code Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  Password-based MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  Diffie-Hellman-based MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.3.  SHA2-based HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Algorithm Use Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     A.1.  Algorithm Profile for PKI Management Message Profiles . .  15
     A.2.  Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile . . . . . .  16
   Appendix B.  History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   [RFC Editor: please delete]: !!! The change history was moved to
   Appendix B !!!

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]



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   [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
   here.

2.  Message Digest Algorithms

   This section specifies the conventions employed by CMP
   implementations that support SHA-1 or SHA2 algorithm family.

   Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the hashAlg field of
   OOBCertHash, the owf field of Challenge, PBMParameter, and
   DHBMParameter, and the digestAlgorithms field of SignedData and the
   digestAlgorithm field of SignerInfo.

   Digest values are located in the hashVal field of OOBCertHash, the
   witness field of Challenge, and the certHash field of CertStatus.  In
   addition, digest values are input to signature algorithms.

2.1.  SHA2

   The SHA2 message digest algorithm family is defined in FIPS Pub 180-4
   [FIPS180-4].

   The message digest algorithms SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
   produce a 224-bit are identified by the following object identifiers
   (OIDs):

      id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
         us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
         hashalgs(2) 4 }
      id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
         us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
         hashalgs(2) 1 }
      id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
         us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
         hashalgs(2) 2 }
      id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
         us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4)
         hashalgs(2) 3 }

   Further conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5754
   Section 2 [RFC5754].

3.  Signature Algorithms

   This section specifies the conventions employed by CMP
   implementations that support DSA, RSA, or ECDSA.





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   The signature algorithm is referred to as MSG_SIG_ALG in RFC 4210
   Appendix D and E [RFC4210] and in the Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   Signature algorithm identifiers are located in the protectionAlg
   field of PKIHeader, the algorithmIdentifier field of POPOSigningKey,
   signatureAlgorithm field of p10cr, SignKeyPairTypes, and the
   SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData.

   Signature values are located in the protection field of PKIMessage,
   signature field of POPOSigningKey, signature field of p10cr, and
   SignerInfo signature field of SignedData.

3.1.  DSA

   The DSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS186-4]
   and MAY be used with SHA-224 and SHA-256 as specified in RFC 5754
   [RFC5754].

   The algorithm identifiers for DSA with SHA2 signature values are:

      id-dsa-with-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1 }
      id-dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2 }

   Further conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5754
   Section 3.1 [RFC5754].

3.2.  RSA

   The RSA (RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5) signature algorithm is
   defined in RFC 8017 [RFC8017].  RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 MAY be used with
   SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 as specified in RFC 5754
   [RFC5754].

   The algorithm identifiers for RSASAA-PSS signatures as specified in
   RFC 4055 [RFC4055] is:

      id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 10 }

   Further conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 4056
   [RFC4056].





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   The algorithm identifiers for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures as
   specified in RFC 4055 [RFC4055] are:

      sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
         member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 14 }
      sha256WithRSAEncryption  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { iso(1)
         member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11 }
      sha384WithRSAEncryption  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { iso(1)
         member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12 }
      sha512WithRSAEncryption  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { iso(1)
         member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 13 }

   Further conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5754
   Section 3.2 [RFC5754].

3.3.  ECDSA

   The ECDSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186-4
   [FIPS186-4] and MAY be used with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or
   SHA-512 as specified in RFC 5754 [RFC5754].

   The algorithm identifiers for ECDSA with SHA2 signature values are:

      ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
      ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
      ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
      ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }

   Further conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5754
   Section 3.3 [RFC5754].

4.  Key Management Algorithms

   CMP accommodates the following general key management techniques: key
   agreement, key transport, and passwords.

   CRMF [RFC4211] and CMP Updates [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates]
   facilitate the use of CMS [RFC5652] EnvelopedData by deprecating the
   use of EncryptedValue.








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4.1.  Key Agreement Algorithms

   The key agreement algorithm is referred to as PROT_ENC_ALG in
   RFC 4210 Appendix D and E [RFC4210] and in the Lightweight CMP
   Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   Key agreement algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
   [RFC5652] EnvelopedData together with the key agreement key
   management technique.  When a key agreement algorithm is used, a key-
   encryption algorithm (Section 4.3) is needed next to the content-
   encryption algorithm (Section 5).

   Key agreement algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData
   RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm fields.

   Key encryption algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData
   RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.

   Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in the EnvelopedData
   RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo RecipientEncryptedKeys
   encryptedKey field.

4.1.1.  Diffie-Hellman

   Diffie-Hellman key agreement is defined in RFC 2631 [RFC2631] and MAY
   be used in the ephemeral-static or a static-static variant as
   specified in RFC 3370 [RFC3370].

   The Diffie-Hellman algorithm identifiers are:

      id-alg-ESDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 5 }
      id-alg-SSDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 10 }

   Further conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 3370
   Section 4.1 [RFC3370].

4.1.2.  ECDH

   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement is defined in
   RFC 5753 [RFC5753] and MAY be used on the ephemeral-static variant in
   RFC 5753 [RFC5753], the 1-Pass ECMQV variant as specified in RFC 5753
   [RFC5753] or the static-static variant as specified in RFC RFC 6278
   [RFC6278].

   Algorithm Identifiers and further conventions to be considered are
   specified in RFC RFC 5753 [RFC5753] and RFC 6278 [RFC6278].



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4.2.  Key Transport Algorithms

   The key transport algorithm is also referred to as PROT_ENC_ALG in
   RFC 4210 Appendix D and E [RFC4210] and in the Lightweight CMP
   Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   Key transport algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
   [RFC5652] EnvelopedData together with the key transport key
   management technique.

   Key transport algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData
   RecipientInfos KeyTransRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.

   Key transport encrypted content-encryption keys are located in the
   EnvelopedData RecipientInfos KeyTransRecipientInfo encryptedKey
   field.

4.2.1.  RSA

   The RSA key transport algorithm is the RSA encryption scheme defined
   in RFC 8017 [RFC8017].

   The algorithm identifier for RSA (PKCS #1 v1.5) is:

      rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 }

   The algorithm identifier for RSAES-OAEP is:

      id-RSAES-OAEP  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 7 }

   Further conventions to be considered for PKCS #1 v1.5 are specified
   in RFC 3370 Section 4.2.1 [RFC3370] and for RSAES-OAEP in RFC 3560
   [RFC3560].

4.3.  Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms

   The symmetric key-encryption algorithm is also referred to as
   PROT_SYM_ALG in RFC 4210 Appendix D and E [RFC4210] and in the
   Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   As symmetric key-encryption key management technique is not used by
   CMP, the symmetric key-encryption algorithm is only needed when using
   the key agreement or password-based key management technique with CMS
   [RFC5652] EnvelopedData.





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   Key-encryption algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData
   RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm and
   EnvelopedData RecipientInfos PassworRecipientInfo
   keyEncryptionAlgorithm fields.

   Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in the EnvelopedData
   RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo RecipientEncryptedKeys
   encryptedKey and EnvelopedData RecipientInfos PassworRecipientInfo
   encryptedKey fields.

4.3.1.  AES Key Wrap

   The AES encryption algorithm is defined in FIBS Pub 197 [FIPS197] and
   the key wrapping is defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394].

   AES key encryption has the algorithm identifier:

      id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 5 }
      id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 25 }
      id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 45 }

   Further conventions to be considered for AES key wrap are specified
   in RFC 3394 Section 2.2 [RFC3394] and RFC 3565 Section 2.3.2
   [RFC3565].

4.4.  Key Derivation Algorithms

   Key derivation algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
   [RFC5652] EnvelopedData together with password-based key management
   technique.

   Key derivation algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData
   RecipientInfos PassworRecipientInfo keyDerivationAlgorithm field.

4.4.1.  Password-based Key Derivation Function 2

   The password-based key derivation function 2 (PBKDF2) is defined in
   RFC 8018 [RFC8018].







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   Password-based key derivation function 2 has the algorithm
   identifier:

      id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
         rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) 12 }

   Further conventions to be considered for PBKDF2 are specified in
   RFC 3370 Section 4.4.1 [RFC3370] and RFC 8018 Section 5.2 [RFC8018].

5.  Content Encryption Algorithms

   The content encryption algorithm is also referred to as PROT_SYM_ALG
   in RFC 4210 Appendix D and E [RFC4210] and in the Lightweight CMP
   Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   Content encryption algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS
   [RFC5652] EnvelopedData to transport a signed private key package in
   case of central key generation or key archiving, a certificate to
   facilitate implicit prove-of-possession, or a revocation passphrase
   in encrypted form.

   Content encryption algorithm identifiers are located in the
   EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithmrithm
   field.

   Encrypted content is located in the EnvelopedData
   EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent field.

5.1.  AES

   The AES encryption algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS197].
   Details of usage of AES-CCM and AES-GCM in CMS [RFC5652]
   EnvelopedData is specified in RFC 5084 [RFC5084].


















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   AES content encryption has the algorithm identifier:

      id-aes128-CCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 7 }
      id-aes192-CCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 27 }
      id-aes256-CCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 47 }
      id-aes128-GCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 6 }
      id-aes192-GCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 26 }
      id-aes256-GCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
         country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
         nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 46 }

   Further conventions to be considered for AES content encryption are
   specified in RFC 5084 [RFC5084].

6.  Message Authentication Code Algorithms

   The message authentication code algorithm is also referred to as
   MSG_MAC_ALG in RFC 4210 Appendix D and E [RFC4210] and in the
   Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   Message authentication code algorithm identifiers are located in the
   mac field of PBMParameter and DHBMParameter, the PBKDF2-params prf
   field.

   Message authentication code values are located in the EnvelopedData
   EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent field.

6.1.  Password-based MAC

   The password-based MAC is defined in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].

   The algorithm identifier for password-based MAC as specified in
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210] is:

      id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }





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   Further conventions to be considered for password-based MAC are
   specified in RFC 4210 Section 5.1.3.1 [RFC4210].

6.2.  Diffie-Hellman-based MAC

   The Diffie-Hellman-based MAC is defined in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].

   The algorithm identifiers for Diffie-Hellman-based MAC is:

      id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }

   Further conventions to be considered for Diffie-Hellman-based MAC are
   specified in RFC 4210 Section 5.1.3.2 [RFC4210].

6.3.  SHA2-based HMAC

   The HMAC is defined in RFC 2104 [RFC2104] and FIPS Pub 198-1
   [FIPS198-1].  The SHA2 algorithms are defined in
   Section 2.1Section 2.1 and FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS180-4].

   The algorithm identifiers for SHA2-based HMAC as specified in
   RFC 4231 [RFC4231] are:

      id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
      id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
      id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
      id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
         us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }

   Further conventions to be considered for SHA2-based HMAC are
   specified in RFC 4231 Section 3.1 [RFC4231].

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not request changes to the IANA registry.

8.  Security Considerations

   RFC 4210 Appendix D.2 [RFC4210] contains a set of algorithms,
   mandatory to be supported by conforming implementations.  Theses
   algorithms were appropriate at the time CMP war releases, but as
   cryptographic algorithms weaken over time, some of them should not be
   uses anymore.  In general, new attacks are emerging due to research




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   cryptoanalysis or increase in computing power. new algorithms were
   introduced that are more resistant to today's attacks.

   This document lists many cryptographic algorithms usable with CMP to
   offer implementers a more up to date choice.  Finally, the algorithms
   to be supported also heavily depend on the utilizes certificates in
   the target environment.

   In the appendix of this document there is also an update to the
   Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and a set of algorithms to be
   supported when implementing the Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   To keep the list of algorithms to be used with CMP up to date to
   enlist secure algorithms resisting known attack scenarios, future
   algorithms should be added and weakened algorithms should be
   deprecated.

9.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Russ Housley for his input and feedback to this document.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS180-4]
              NIST, "FIPS Pub 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHA)", August
              2015 , <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.

   [FIPS186-4]
              NIST, "FIPS Pub 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",
              July 2013, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.

   [FIPS197]  NIST, "FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)",
              November 2001, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.197.pdf>.

   [FIPS198-1]
              NIST, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)",
              July 2008, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates]
              Brockhaus, H., "CMP Updates", draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
              updates-05 (work in progress), September 2020.



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   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2631]  Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
              RFC 2631, DOI 10.17487/RFC2631, June 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2631>.

   [RFC3370]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
              Algorithms", RFC 3370, DOI 10.17487/RFC3370, August 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3370>.

   [RFC3394]  Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
              (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
              September 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.

   [RFC3560]  Housley, R., "Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
              Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 3560, DOI 10.17487/RFC3560, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3560>.

   [RFC3565]  Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
              Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax
              (CMS)", RFC 3565, DOI 10.17487/RFC3565, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3565>.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.

   [RFC4056]  Schaad, J., "Use of the RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm in
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4056,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4056, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4056>.








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   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC4231]  Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
              224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
              RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4231>.

   [RFC5084]  Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
              Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 5084, DOI 10.17487/RFC5084, November 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5084>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5753]  Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
              Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
              Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>.

   [RFC5754]  Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
              Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754, January
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.

   [RFC6278]  Herzog, J. and R. Khazan, "Use of Static-Static Elliptic
              Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement in Cryptographic
              Message Syntax", RFC 6278, DOI 10.17487/RFC6278, June
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6278>.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.

   [RFC8018]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #5:
              Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1",
              RFC 8018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8018, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8018>.



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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
              Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP
              Profile", draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-03
              (work in progress), October 2020.

Appendix A.  Algorithm Use Profiles

   This appendix provides profiles of algorithms and respective
   conventions for different application use cases.

A.1.  Algorithm Profile for PKI Management Message Profiles

   The following table contains definitions of algorithm used within PKI
   Management Message Profiles as defined in CMP Appendix D.2 [RFC4210].
   The columns in the table are:

   Name: an identifier used for message profiles

   Use: description of where and for what the algorithm is used

   Mandatory: an AlgorithmIdentifier which MUST be supported by
   conforming implementations

   Name         Use                                     Mandatory
   ------------ --------------------------------------- ----------------
   MSG_SIG_ALG  protection of PKI messages using        RSA
                signature
   MSG_MAC_ALG  protection of PKI messages using MACing PasswordBasedMac
   SYM_PENC_ALG symmetric encryption of an end entity's AES-wrap
                private key where symmetric key is
                distributed out-of-band
   PROT_ENC_ALG asymmetric algorithm used for           D-H
                encryption of (symmetric keys for
                encryption of) private keys transported
                in PKIMessages
   PROT_SYM_ALG symmetric encryption algorithm used for AES
                encryption of private key bits (a key
                of this type is encrypted using
                PROT_ENC_ALG)

   Mandatory Algorithm Identifiers and Specifications:




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   RSA: sha256WithRSAEncryption with 2048 bit, see Section 3.2

   PasswordBasedMac: id-PasswordBasedMac, see Section 6.1 (with id-
   sha256 as the owf parameter, see Section 2.1 and id-hmacWithSHA256 as
   the mac parameter, see Section 6.3)

   D-H: id-alg-ESDH, see Section 4.1.1

   AES-wrap: id-aes256-wrap, see Section 4.3.1

   AES: id-aes256-GCM, see Section 5.1

A.2.  Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile

   The following table contains definitions of algorithm which MUST be
   supported by conforming implementations This profile is referenced in
   the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
   The columns in the table are:

   Name: an identifier used for message profiles

   Use: description of where and for what the algorithm is used

   Mandatory: an AlgorithmIdentifier which MUST be supported by
   conforming implementations


























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   Name         Use                                     Mandatory
   ------------ --------------------------------------- ----------------
   MSG_SIG_ALG  protection of PKI messages using        ECDSA
                signature
   MSG_MAC_ALG  protection of PKI messages using MACing PasswordBasedMac
   KM_KA_ALG    asymmetric key agreement algorithm used ECDH
                for agreement of a symmetric keys for
                encryption of EnvelopedData, e.g., a
                private key transported in PKIMessages
   KM_KT_ALG    asymmetric key encryption algorithm     RSA
                used for transport of a symmetric keys
                for encryption of EnvelopedData, e.g.,
                a private key transported in
                PKIMessages
   KM_PB_ALG    symmetric derivation algorithm used to  PBKDF2
                derive a symmetric key for encryption
                of EnvelopedData, e.g., a private key
                transported in PKIMessages, from a
                password
   PROT_ENC_ALG Symmetric key encryption algorithm to   AES-wrap
                encrypt a content encryption key
   PROT_SYM_ALG symmetric content encryption algorithm  AES
                used for encryption of, e.g., private
                key bits (a key of this type is
                encrypted using PROT_ENC_ALG)

   Mandatory Algorithm Identifiers and Specifications:

   < TBD: The list of mandatory algorithms has to be defined later. >

Appendix B.  History of changes

   Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
   document.

   From version 00 -> 01:

   o  Changed sections Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms and Content
      Encryption Algorithms based on the discussion on the mailing list
      (see thread "[CMP Algorithms] Use Key-Wrap with or without padding
      in Section 4.3 and Section 5")

   o  Added Appendix A with updated algorithms profile for RDC4210
      Appendix D.2 and first proposal for the Lightweight CMP Profile

   o  Minor changes in wording





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Author's Address

   Hendrik Brockhaus
   Siemens AG

   Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com













































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